My debut on bloggingheads
Recorded Friday with Ussama Makdisi of Rice University, discussing next steps in Egypt, but it can no longer be embedded. Watch it here.
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Maliki ueber alles?
While we’ve all been preoccupied with Tunisia then Egypt, an Iraqi Supreme Court decision has called into question the independence of the central bank, the electoral commission, the human rights commission and the integrity commission. Reidar Visser has commented on the electoral commission aspect, but arguably the central bank is even more important. The big issue is accumulation of power in the hands of the Prime Minister.
Here are the most obviously relevant articles of the Iraqi constitution:
Article 102:
The High Commission for Human Rights, the Independent Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Public Integrity are considered independent commissions subject to monitoring by the Council of Representatives, and their functions shall be regulated by law.
Article 103:
First: The Central Bank of Iraq, the Board of Supreme Audit, the Communication and Media Commission, and the Endowment Commissions are financially and administratively independent institutions, and the work of each of these institutions shall be regulated by law.
Second: The Central Bank of Iraq is responsible before the Council of Representatives. The Board of Supreme Audit and the Communication and Media Commission shall be attached to the Council of Representatives.
What the court apparently decided is that agencies with an “executive” function have to be subordinated to the executive branch, not the Council of Representatives, in order to respect the separation of powers. This is obviously pretty deep legal water in which I don’t know how to swim, so I am reluctant to dive in.
But it also raises important questions about the survivability of democracy in Iraq, where accumulation of power has a long and unhappy history. Independent agencies are a frequent feature of the landscape in democratic societies, and independent central banks are regarded as absolutely vital to macroeconomic stability, which Iraq has enjoyed for the most part since the fall of Saddam Hussein. If executive branch supervision refers exclusively to financial probity and other administrative questions, that is one thing (though perhaps not entirely without problems). If executive branch decision is going to mean that these institutions are no longer in any serious sense independent, that is another.
We shouldn’t leap to conclusions, but I certainly hope the U.S. embassy in Baghdad is inquiring and letting the Prime Minister know that those who fought and paid for Iraq’s relative freedom would not be interested in seeing it undermined by an overly aggressive effort to centralize power.
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Egyptian army scraps constitution, keeps cabinet
The Armed Forces communique’ no. 5, issued today, does the following (according to Egyptian Chronicles):
1. Freezes the current constitution.
2. Dissolves both chambers of parliament.
3. Announces the army will rule the country for a 6 month transitional period until August.
4. Forms a committee to amend some constitution articles.
5. Continues Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet until a new one is named (unclear when).
6. Asserts that Mohamed Hussein Tantawy, the minister of defense, will represent the country.
7. Egypt respects its international treaties.
The main potential difficulty here is the continuation of Ahmed Shafik’s cabinet, which is the last one appointed by then President Mubarak. It is hard to imagine that the protesters will be pleased with that, though most will welcome the freezing of the Mubarak-era constitution and dissolution of its parliament, fraudulently elected in December. It is easy to imagine however that the Army wants to keep at least some of the ministers in place–otherwise it has to find new people to run the ministries, which would raise all sorts of difficult political and technical issues.
I had some experience with a military regime in Brazil 1982-85, where I was a U.S. diplomat. The Brazilian armed forces had enjoyed exercising power and a privileged position for some time, but by the time I arrived they had realized that running the country was just too difficult. They preferred to get back to playing soldier. So they decided to turn the country back to the civilians, who have done a pretty good job since. My sense is that the Egyptian military already knows that running the country is too hard–they need help and are prepared to get it from Mubarak’s cabinet (which of course includes quite a few of their colleagues).
The question is whether the protesters will accept this or insist, as they have said they would, on dismissal of the cabinet. This immediate question is related to a broader one: how much accountability will there be for crimes and corruption under the Mubarak regime? Leaving the cabinet in place now virtually guarantees that accountability will be postponed, if not skipped altogether. How many files will be destroyed by the Mubarak-appointed ministers? Several of them have already been barred from leaving the country. Can the Army really leave in power ministers who can’t be trusted to leave Egypt? Not to mention Vice President Omar Suleiman, who appears to remain quietly in office.
One other point: the six-month transition period. That would be consistent with new elections in by September, when they were due for the presidency anyway. I won’t be surprised to see this period extended. It might even be wise to extend it, if the time is used to allow people to organize political parties that can seriously compete with Mubarak’s NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood, which will have a head start. Six months are also not too long to get the electoral mechanism into shape–it is used to running fraudulent elections, not competitive ones.
Revolutions move in phases. The first phase is over. But there is more to come. I’d bet on a new cabinet, which really is needed to ensure that the subsequent phases move in the right direction. But when the Army will recognize the necessity I can’t predict.
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The army begins to fill in the blanks
The Egyptian armed forces have issued their 4th communique’, which tries to clarify at least a few things for the transitional period between now and eventual civilian, democratic government (“an elected civilian state to rule the country for building a free democratic state” is the way the New York Times translates it).
Here is a paraphrased summary from Egyptian Chronicles:
- The army is obliged to what was said in the previous communiqués.
- The government and the people to return back to their responsibilities toward the country.
- The current government and governors will continue performing its duties till we have a new elected government.
- The council is looking forward to guarantee the peaceful transitional of power in a democratic system that allows civil state.
- Egypt respects its international treaties
- The army calls the people of Egypt to cooperate with the police.
It appears that the current intention is to leave the Mubarak-appointed government in place in the interim, though at least one of its ministers seems to have been barred from leaving the country and is under house arrest. I have my doubts whether this will stand, since the protesters are likely to view it as a red line. Egypt’s leading democracy advocates have wanted something considerably more: a new, technocratic government and an end to the state of emergency, which the army has promised in a previous communique’ once the conditions are right.
There is no mention of a specific election date, which is just as well since it will take time to prepare anything like free and fair elections that offer a real opportunity for competition among political forces. Obviously the NDP–Mubarak’s National Democratic Party–is a problem (the Tunisians recently banned their own dictator’s former ruling party). But so too is the Muslim Brotherhood, which has an enormous advantage from being organized and well-established, even if illegal.
Items 2. and 6. ask for a return to normalcy, including cooperation with a police force that grossly misbehaved during the demonstrations (and there seem still to be hundreds of people missing). This is to be expected, and first indications are that many demonstrators are prepared to leave Tahrir at least until next Friday. The cleanup of Cairo by legions of volunteers is a very good sign that Egyptians have understood that the new regime will require responsibility as well as allow freedom.
Item 5 on treaties is an attempt in five English words to dispose of international concerns, especially about the peace treaty with Israel.
This isn’t much to go on, and in particular I find it difficult to believe that the government won’t be replaced, as has been rumored today. While Omar Suleiman seems to have evaporated for the moment, I also have to wonder whether he hopes for a continuing role in this transition, or will he be happy enough if he is not held accountable for the criminal behavior of the police and security services?
That is the big point omitted so far from the armed forces’ communiques: accountability. You can be pretty sure that the Egyptian army will protect its extensive perquisites, at least for the near term. But you have to wonder what will happen with the secret police, judges, jailers, torturers and others who were pillars of the Mubarak regime. It is of course too early to expect much to happen, but intentions are important too. Mubarak was one man, whose assets in Switzerland have already been frozen. What of all the cronies?
If you haven’t had enough videos of demonstrations lately, here’s one from today in Algiers, which some expect to get Tunisian flu next:
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What a day!
What a day!
Somehow my friend Emile Hokayem came to the conclusion several days ago that events in Egypt would favor Tehran, by removing a strong U.S. ally and “rekindling” Arab pride. Today it looks as if he could not have been more wrong. I know lots of people would have preferred that the United States do more for the demonstrators earlier in the process, as I would have, but it seems to me the President has had his thumb on the scale in their favor for some time now. Look and hear what he had to say today:
It’s not just that he comes out on the right side–that is easy enough after the fact. But he comes out on the right side for the right reasons. This is an enthusiastic endorsement, unhedged by the kind of reserve that Emile and others would expect.
And rightly so. As Shibley Telhami argues today in Politico, a democratic Egypt will shrink the space in which extremism thrives, not increase it. It will also speak up more loudly for the Palestinians, something that really is necessary if an agreement is to be reached–someone needs to save the Israelis from their single-minded drive towards a one-state solution.
What worries me is not Egypt’s regional impact or its effect on Israel, but rather completion of its democratic trajectory. As the President said today, this is a beginning, not an end. We’ve seen what happens when revolutions are hijacked–as in Iran–or stopped three-quarters of the way to the finish line–which is how I would describe Serbia. The turnover of power to the military, which is what happened today, cannot be allowed to get frozen in place.
There is at least a year ahead of difficult transition, and more likely several years. It will sometimes be hard to tell which is the right path. Egyptians have chosen wisely so far, and we are wise to let them continue to choose. But for the moment: what a day!
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Now it means something
This is the “second” communique’ from the Egyptian Armed Forces, issued earlier today. It takes on new meaning in light of Mubarak’s resignation. It looks as if this is going down the non-constitutional path, but the role of Omar Suleiman is not yet clear.
The Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces issued its second statement today Friday. It says the following:
Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
Due to the consecutive developments in current incidents and which define the destiny of the country, and in context of continuous follow up for internal and external incidents, and the decision to delegate responsibilities to the vice president of the country, and in belief in our national responsibility to preserve the stability and safety of the nation.
The Supreme Council of the Egyptian Armed Forces decided to secure the implementation of the following procedures:
First: End the state of emergency as soon as the current circumstances are over.
Decide on the appeals against elections and consequent measures.
Conduct needed legislative amendments and conduct free and fair presidential elections in light of the approved constitutional amendments.
Second: The Armed forces are committed to sponsor the legitimate demands of the people and achieving them by following on the implementation of these procedures in the defined time frames with all accuracy and seriousness and until the peaceful transfer of authority is completed towards a free democratic community that the people aspire to.
Third: The Armed Forces emphasize on no security pursuit of the honest people who refused the corruption and demanded reforms, and warns against touching the security and safety of the nation and the people. And emphasizes the need for regular work in state facilities and regaining of life to normal to preserve the interests and possessions of our great people.
God protect the nation and the people.
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