Stay the course, smartly
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) has broken the monotony of reports recommending early withdrawal from Afghanistan. Its Responsible Transition: Securing U.S. Interests in Afghanistan Beyond 2011, takes as given the Administration’s time line: start of the turnover to Afghan security forces in July 2011, completion by the end of 2014. It also imagines a continuing substantial counter-terrorism and support presence (25-35,000 troops) beyond that date.
This is the most forward-leaning of the recent reports on Afghanistan, and it is likely correct in regarding the July 2011 and 2014 dates as locked in by the recent NATO Summit. Its definition of vital U.S. interests is not markedly different from those others have put forward: preventing Al Qaeda from regrouping and attacking the U.S. as well as stabilizing Pakistan. It attempts
to craft an effective middle ground between large unsustainable expeditionary force commitments that would sap the long-term power of the United States and “offshore” minimalist strategies that would fail to disrupt, dismantle and defeat transnational terror groups.
The emphasis is mainly on the military side, but it also focuses on politics, commending the ongoing refocus away from support for the government in Kabul and towards more support for local governance and implicitly viewing President Karzai as a problem rather than a solution. The text gets notably vague when the issue of preventing corruption and dealing with warlords at the local level comes up, and how the local focus will be sustained when drawdown starts is not at all clear. As the Iraq precedent shows, once the U.S. military starts withdrawing the civilians go too.
The report’s treatment of Pakistan is robust. It recommends significant toughening of the diplomatic message and a reduced but long term commitment in Afghanistan aimed at convincing the Pakistanis that they will have to do more about the Taliban and Al Qaeda, or the U.S. will do it for them. The Pakistanis, no longer believing that the Americans are leaving soon, will then have less need to hedge their bets by allowing the Taliban to continue operating and more incentive to crack down so that the Americans don’t come calling.
This is a “stay the course” report, but one that pays serious attention to resource limits. But will we maintain even 25-35,000 troops indefinitely in Afghanistan? Will the Afghans want them there?
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See event writeups: Pristina prepares for negotiations with Belgrade
See event writeups, please.
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How should Iraq deal with its neighbors?
With ample evidence that its neighbors are playing a strong role in Iraq, it is puzzling why the Obama Administration has been reluctant to deal with them in a more concerted way. Following on a Bush Administration that had only reluctantly and belatedly engaged with Iraq’s neighbors, I’d have expected Obama to move aggressively in this direction, as it did in others recommended by the Iraq Study Group (caveat emptor: I was its executive director).
Why hasn’t this happened? First, because the Administration has dropped Iraq way down on its list of diplomatic priorities, especially with Tehran (where the nuclear issue is given absolute priority). Second, because some of the neighbors have begun doing the right things, largely on their own (but likely with some push from Washington): Turkey has dramatically improved its rapport with both Baghdad and Erbil (the de facto capital of Iraqi Kurdistan), Saudi Arabia gave ample backing to Iyad Allawi in the Iraqi elections, and Kuwait has begun to patch up relations with Baghdad, as has Egypt.
The Americans claim that they are giving priority to Iraq in their bilateral relations with each of the neighbors, but what they have not done is to exploit the kind of regional forum that proved useful under the Bush Administration (and has often proved useful in other stabilization situations). What is missing is a concerted regional effort to ensure Iraq’s stability and to block efforts by neighbors, especially Syria, to pursue their own interests in ways that may destabilize Iraq.
It is not too late for this kind of neighbors’ diplomacy, but Baghdad, not Washington, would now have to initiate it. Once the new government is fully formed and approved in the Council of Representatives (parliament), the Prime Minister would do well to invite his neighbors, the U.S. and NATO to a regional conference to discuss the way forward.
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Both protest too much, methinks
…a plea for a foreign solution to regional problems is a cop-out, not a serious request for action.
That may be, but the Iranians are clearly concerned, with Ahmedinejad claiming that the diploleaks are an American plot that will not affect Tehran’s “legal” relationships with other countries:
Iran is far from loving the leaks, as the headline of Chas’ piece suggests, and is doing its best to discredit them. Ahmedinejad and Chas protest too much for me to believe that they are not concerned that the leaks have lowered the barrier to military action.
But for the moment, military action is not at the top of the agenda. Covert action (the computer worm Stuxnet and assassinations of Iranian scientists being the most visible components) appears to be slowing Iranian technological progress.
While expectations are low, the P5+1 (Permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany) meeting with Iran Monday and Tuesday in Geneva is the best diplomatic bet for a deal that would allow Iran to enrich uranium but limit the amount and extent of the product. Have we ever done better than this with countries that have stepped back from bomb making? We shouldn’t expect more from Iran.
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No waste of Lady Ashton’s time
Hossein Askari yesterday offers over at the National Interest a scathing denunciation of next week’s P5+1 talks with Iran, calling them a waste of Lady Ashton’s time. His preferred option: tightened unilateral sanctions and support for the Iranian people:
All the U.S. administration needs is political will to support the people of Iran in their struggle for freedom, human rights, a say in governance and a better future for all Iranians.
While I am delighted to support their struggle, I really do wish the piece had not been published with this stunningly martial photograph of the late Shah,
which doesn’t quite mesh with the freedom and human rights message.
Besides, the popular struggle against the regime seems to be quiescent for the moment: best we use this time to make whatever progress we can on the nuclear issue.
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The Sudan negotiators need to hurry
Things are heating up in Abyei, an oil-endowed region that lies along the boundary between North and South Sudan. According to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, Abyei should decide in a referendum whether to join the North or the South, where a January 9 referendum will decide whether the South will declare independence next July.
But North and South have failed to agree on who should be permitted to vote in the Abyei referendum, with the North backing Arabic-speaking nomads who enter Abyei, which is largely settled by Ngok Dinka farmers loyal to the South, for a substantial portion of the year.
There is talk of a negotiated settlement of Abyei’s fate, to be reached in talks led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki. The negotiators had better hurry.
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