An Iranian enrichment gambit
If New START has fallen into the abyss of partisan politics within the U.S., the issue of Iran’s effort to achieve nuclear weapons capability has fallen into the abyss of U.S.-Iranian relations, which seem capable of oscillating only between bad and worse, with an occasional move towards catastrophic. The Stimson Center and USIP have attempted to fish it out with a study group report advocating “strategic engagement.”
The approach is sagacious: while discounting the likelihood of any regime change stemming from the Green Movement in the near future, the expert group focuses on what can be done to strengthen those conservatives with reason to regret international sanctions and to want them ended, at the expense of hardliners who want nuclear weapons at any cost and have no interest in normalizing relations with the U.S. and the rest of the world. It rightly sees the tightening of sanctions as part of strategic engagement.
The group wants the U.S. (and the rest of the world) to acknowledge Iranian rights to enrichment, in the hope that doing so will enable an agreement that limits the degree and/or quantity of enrichment, hoping even for a phase-out. Here is the key sentence from the report: “Washington should signal its clear—if also clearly conditional—acceptance of Iran’s enrichment rights, providing that Tehran negotiates verifiable limits on the degree of enrichment and on the volume of enriched fuel stored in Iran.”
This is not a new idea, as a quick search reveals Matthew Bunn of Harvard put it out a year ago. Making a virtue of necessity is a tried and true approach in diplomacy. Iran is already enriching, why imagine you can stop it altogether?
It is easy to imagine how this idea will go over in some quarters, where even a substantial cut in Russian nuclear weapons is having a hard time getting a hearing. There are three rational criticisms likely: 1) Iran has lost its “right” to enrichment by violating its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 2) what reason is there to believe Iran will agree to anything on enrichment once its right is acknowledged, however conditionally? 3) what would prevent Iran from reneging on the agreement and enriching beyond the specified limits, either overtly or covertly?
Iran appears to have agreed to restart nuclear talks December 5. Will the enrichment gambit be tested then?
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“Forlorn Karzai breaking with the west”
Ahmed Rashid in the FT tries to convey how the world looks in the eyes of President Karzai: he sees in the West mixed messages, inability to get Pakistan to do the right things, a cacophony of ambassadors, vacillation about staying and going, unfair criticism, and manufactured rumors of mental imbalance. Preparing for NATO departure, the President is reasserting Afghan nationalism and trying to cut deals with the Taliban supported by Pakistan and Iran.
Larry Korb reporting from Kabul confirms that the President is largely in tune with others there, who are frustrated and unappreciative of the Administration’s surge and other efforts.
Meanwhile, in Lisbon NATO is preparing to reaffirm July 2011 as the beginning of its drawdown, with 2014 as the target date for completing the turnover of primary security responsibility to Kabul (a training/mentoring mission would remain). This reflects political feasibility in Europe and the U.S. as much as it does Afghan reality, but it is still an enormous additional investment. The question remains: is Karzai worth the candle? But it is the kind of question that won’t be asked once this NATO Summit has set its course.
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New START needs a new start
Ratification of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia has fallen into the partisan abyss we still call America. The left claims failure to ratify will encourage Iran to get nuclear weapons. The right fears grave impairment of the nation’s nuclear defenses.
Both claims are what the car guys call “BOOOOOOGUS.” Iran is likely to go for nuclear weapons capability no matter what happens to New START, which will only marginally decrease America’s nuclear forces. And failure to ratify will lead only to a pause in Washington’s reset with Moscow, which has good reason to react calmly.
That said, the Administration needs to get the treaty off to a new start if it expects ratification in either this lame duck Congress or the next. Turning down the rhetoric and turning up some careful analysis of the facts would be a good place to start. It is hard to believe that we can’t figure out a way to make a dispassionate and reasoned decision to reduce a number of weapons that hawks in both Washington and Moscow agree is excessive.
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Is Karzai worth it?
Five months ago James Traub in Foreign Policy asked the question: is Karzai worth the War in Afghanistan? General Stanley McCrystal had just been cashiered and David Petraeus had just taken over.
This is still the vital question. There is no point in conducting a counterinsurgency war unless the host government has legitimacy with the population. Karzai understands this perfectly well, which is why he complains bitterly about night time raids by U.S. forces, even if they are as effective as Petraeus claims.
The main American complaint about Karzai at the moment is corruption, which is rampant. The problem is that what the Americans view as corruption Karzai views as his system of governance, which relies heavily on a coterie of strongmen and large quantities of cash. Afghans are much less impressed than Americans with elections as the basis for legitimacy. They regard deliver of services, even those delivered through less than transparent means, as more important.
The Americans are working hard on anti-corruption efforts, but the opposite of corruption is not anti-corruption. It is good, transparent, accountable governance.
That should start at home, as Karzai rudely points out: American contracting for security and other services appears not only to be corrupt but also to be putting money in the pockets of insurgents.
But even if he has a point, the question remains: is Karzai worth it? This should be a focus of the December policy review, if it is going to be of any real use.
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Sudan is the next big thing
and this conference at NDU December 16 will be a good opportunity to get up to date.
For those who need a reminder, the Southern Sudan independence referendum is scheduled for January 9, followed by a 6 month transition period. It is going to be an enormous challenge to prevent this from becoming a mess.
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ISO
a graduate student to write up Carnegie’s event on Kyrgyzstan 12:15-2 pm November 23. Any takers? I can’t find the event on their website, but I can forward the email invitation if you are interested. Just ask daniel@peacefare.net
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