Flood of Afpak reports begins
Clear a shelf: the flood of reports on Afghanistan and Pakistan has only just begun. Earlier in the fall (it would be nice if they put dates on these reports!), the self-appointed Afghanistan Study Group (wish I had trademarked “study group” when I was executive director of the Iraq Study Group) has already recommended winding down and eventually out the military effort, while somehow increasing economic assistance and regional cooperation: A New Way Forward | Report of the Afghanistan Study Group.
Now the Council on Foreign Relations (Sandy Berger and Rich Armitage chairing) weigh in with a lukewarm endorsement of the current military and civilian “surge” approach, but only if it starts to show results by the time of the President’s December policy review. Absent that, they too advocate a drawdown and narrowing of the military effort to the fight against al Qaeda: U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan – Council on Foreign Relations.
At least two more due out soon. Center for American Progress should have a report out within a couple of weeks that focuses at least in part on the defects of the Karzai government and raises questions about whether it is worth supporting (as all the reports do, in one way or another). Century Foundation has got Tom Pickering and Lakhdar Brahimi working on another report that focuses at least in part on the prospects for “reconciling” some of the Taliban. Brahimi, remember, was the UN Special Representative who wanted to bring the Taliban into the political process, a move the Americans blocked.
The Administration has already let it be understood that the December presidential review is not expected to produce any dramatic policy moves, and Gates/Clinton have been anxious to let the Taliban and al Qaeda know that they expect the U.S. to still be militarily active in Afghanistan and Pakistan until 2014, when Karzai claims the Afghans will take over. But at the very least the reports already out suggest that there are profound doubts about the legitimacy, capability, honesty and efficacy of the Karzai government.
The CFR report defines a desirable end-state in Afghanistan this way: “An acceptable end state in Afghanistan would be one in which the Afghan people are secure and strong enough to prevent the rise of new terrorist safe havens inside Afghanistan and avert a return to civil war without relying upon U.S. or international military forces.” Can that be achieved with Karzai?
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Slo-mo train wreck
I’ve been hesitating to comment on the “Middle East peace process,” but I guess there comes a point at which you can’t ignore it any longer. When even President Obama has turned gloomy, you’ve got to wonder whether the time has come. So here goes:
Leverage in negotiations comes from having “BATNA”: a best alternative to a negotiated solution. The Israelis have one: they just keep on building settlements in the West Bank. The Ramallah Palestinians don’t really have one: Mahmoud Abbas doesn’t want to go back to the Intifada, and there is really nothing he can do to block the settlements. Hamas is trying out a new BATNA, as its last one (rockets into Israeli population centers) did not work so well. It is lying (relatively) low, figuring time is on its side.
The Israelis have got a BATNA, but what Netanyahu lacks is the ability to deliver Israel to a negotiated solution. His government is fractious, and he sees no need to take the political risks a negotiated solution would necessarily entail. Of course Mahmoud Abbas has a similar problem, only his government is just plain broken, since he doesn’t control what Hamas does or does not do. So neither side can deliver its own people to a negotiated peace.
Continuing to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank is making it hard to picture a viable two-state solution. Netanyahu says he wants the Arabs to accept Israel as a Jewish state, but his pursuit of his BATNA is putting the country into a demographic trap: the more settlements he builds, the harder it gets to picture a viable Palestinian state, which is an indispensable component of a two-state solution, and the more likely it gets that Israel/Palestine will end up as a single state, which eventually won’t have a Jewish majority.
So Israel and Palestine are careening towards an outcome neither wants, with leadership on the Israeli side that doesn’t want to take the risks required to prevent it and leadership on the Palestinian side that lacks any means to prevent it. Slo-mo train wreck.
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Still getting ready to sing
Anti-Kurd hardliner Osama al Nujaifi has been elected Speaker of the parliament in Baghdad, but then he and the rest of Iraqqiya walked out, apparently in protest against the treatment of some of its former Baathist members. Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani has been voted back into the Presidency, which however has lost the veto and is now almost entirely ceremonial. Its one substantial function is to designate a prime minister; Talabani almost immediately named Maliki, who gets a month to put together a government.
Allawi and Maliki reportedly sat together in parliament as a sign of solidarity, which won’t mean much in light of the subsequent walk-out.
Still no naming of ministers, or other devilish details like precisely what Allawi has been promised on the national security front.
No need yet to take your seats for the finale. The scruffily bearded guy won’t sing until the ministerial nominations are ready, which could still be weeks away.
Iraqi parliament convenes in 1st steps to new govt – Yahoo! News.
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The Balkans can still be lost
The International Herald Tribute surprised me yesterday by publishing a piece I did a couple of weeks ago with Soren Jessen-Petersen (formerly head of the UN Mission in Kosovo, now a co-lecturer at Georgetown) on how the Balkans could still go haywire. For those interested in an overview of what remains to be done there to make peace irreversible, check it out:
The Balkans Can Still Be Lost – NYTimes.com.
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The scruffily bearded guy gets ready to sing
Maliki and Allawi have at long last apparently cut a deal putting Allawi’s people in as speaker of the parliament and as head of a committee overseeing national security (but is this the old, ineffective one, or a new one?). This is the deal Reidar Visser proposed several days ago (Iraq leaders reach deWhy Iraqiyya Should Accept the Speakership « Iraq and Gulf Analysis). Kudos to Reidar!
Hard to believe this saga is at an end until we see a list of ministers approved in parliament. Is Moqtada al Sadr in or not? In where? What is the overall Iraqiyya role? What is Allawi’s specific role? Lots of devilish details before it is possible to judge what this all means.
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Europe has to go on a diet
President Obama scored points this week by supporting India’s bid for a permanent (non-veto) seat on the 15-member UN Security Council. He is likely to do the same for Brazil when he next meets its President, newly elected Dilma Rousseff. Neither Brazil nor India, however, can expect to occupy their cushions any time soon. Among the many obstacles, two bear mention:
1. Regional opposition is strong. Pakistan (and other Asian countries) are unlikely to applaud loudly as archrival India gets a permanent seat among the world’s mighty. Nor are Argentina and Mexico likely to applaud for lusophone Brazil to represent Latin America permanently on the Council.
2. Europe is over-represented and needs to give up seats so that the Council can be kept at a reasonable size. As many as five, more often four, seats on the Council are occupied by European Union members, including two permanent seats for France and the UK. To make room for Brazil and India, plus increased regional representation from Africa, the Middle East and Asia, will require Europe to go on a diet, as it has (barely) begun to do at the IMF: IMF Survey: G-20 Ministers Agree ‘Historic’ Reforms in IMF Governance.
This won’t be easy: Germany has long campaigned for a permanent seat of its own. But with EU countries coordinating their foreign and security policies, is there really any need for so many different European voices to be saying much the same thing? Or would European weight in peace and security issues be greater if the Union had fewer seats (and a louder voice)?
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