Tag: Afghanistan
Negotiating Afghanistan
Rarely have political and professional evaluations differed more than in Afghanistan today. While Presidents Obama and Karzai are upbeat about accelerating the turnover of security responsibility to the Afghan security forces this spring, the Pentagon’s own progress report suggests lots of reasons for caution. The difference lies in part in different definitions of what the Americans’ mission will be. But even taking that into account, there is a big spread between the 30,000 or so some think needed after the end of 2014 and the minimum 3000 that the American commander is said to have recommended. The President is said to be considering zero. What’s going on here?
In a word: negotiations. Karzai wants the Americans out faster and fewer to remain. Obama wants the same, plus immunity for whatever troops remain. The two presidents seem to have reached a modus vivendi: Obama gets immunity, Karzai gets faster drawdown. This will disappoint the thinktankers who want professional opinion to prevail. But war is politics by other means. It is not wrong for commanders in chief to make the ultimate decisions, so long as they are prepared to take responsibility for the consequences.
Obama has concluded that we are getting diminishing returns in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda there is pretty well devastated. He seems inclined to leave just enough troops to clobber them if they come back, or more likely to discourage them from returning. He has decided not to worry about how well or badly Afghanistan is governed. If that mattered to him, accelerating the withdrawal now, when little progress has been made on governance, would not make sense. Besides, worrying about Al Qaeda in Afghanistan isn’t a top priority when the greater threat seems now to be in Yemen, or possibly Mali. The President has many times expressed his preference for nation-building at home. He intends to live by what he says.
Karzai has concluded that he too is getting diminished returns from the American presence in Afghanistan. He worries less about Al Qaeda and more about the Taliban. He wants them inside the political process and appears willing to turn over at least some governance in the south to their dubious talents. He may even hope that the Taliban will support him, as a fellow Pushtun, despite their decade-long antagonism. But to get them into the political process he has to show that he can get the Americans down to minimal troop levels focused not on them but on Al Qaeda. That will also make him more popular with many Afghans (as well as with the Pakistanis) and benefit him in other ways: it will reduce the salience and visibility of the corruption the foreigners complain too much about and enable him to manipulate the electoral process in 2014, when he is supposed to step aside. He may do that, but he’ll want to be sure that whoever takes his place will not be too unfriendly to his and his family’s interests.
The problem here is that both Karzai and Obama may have under-valued the big risks: collapse of the Afghan security forces and a return of the country either to civil war or to Taliban domination of a large part of its territory (or, eventually, both). The latter is difficult to picture. Most Afghans hate the Taliban more than they hate the Americans. Kabulis are not going to welcome them with open arms. Neither will Tajiks and Uzbeks in the north. But a return of the country to civil war is not so hard to picture, especially now that its mineral spoils, including oil, are more apparent than they once were.
I admit to a good deal of discomfort leaving Afghanistan to whatever governance the Afghans can manage to sustain once the Americans draw down. Even in Iraq, where we arguably did a bit better job and the state was in any event a bit stronger to begin with, withdrawal has undermined the institutions we hoped would enable something like democracy to thrive. We’ve done a lousy job building the Afghan state. There are a lot of brave Afghans and Americans who have sacrificed a great deal in the effort to improve the situation, but the “effect,” as the military would call it, has been minimal. Afghanistan “good enough,” which is what the Administration calls its current state-building efforts, may be Afghanistan ripe for renewed civil war.
But the Presidents have decided that they will both gain if the effort is curtailed sooner rather than later. Only time and consequences will tell whether the outcome of their negotiation was wise or foolish.
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Light where we can, heavy when we must
Today’s New York Times declares victory for those in the Obama Administration who favor a light footprint abroad. The members of the new national security team–Hagel, Kerry and Brennan–each leans in that direction. Though Hagel voted as a senator for the Iraq war, he later became a doubter. His Vietnam experience and Kerry’s make both new cabinet members hesitant about the use of American military force abroad. Brennan, while always talking a good line in favor of a more comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in Yemen, is the brains behind the canonical light footprint drone war there against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
The light footprint approach is also getting a boost in Afghanistan, where the White House is leaning towards leaving fewer troops after 2014 than some would like. Zero is even a possibility. The leaks to this effect are all too clearly intended to get President Karzai, who is visiting Washington this week, to stop his mouthing off against the American presence and to convince the Taliban that they can get half a loaf if they come to the negotiating table. But feints in diplomacy have a way of becoming reality. America’s parlous fiscal situation will make many members of Congress look benignly on cutting back the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I need hardly mention that the Administration has already taken a light footprint approach to Syria–maybe more like a no footprint approach. It provides humanitarian assistance through nongovernmental organizations and as well as political support to the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, and other Syrian opposition organizations. It is also setting up Patriot batteries in Turkey and turning a blind eye to arms flowing from Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The results so far have fallen well short of the goal of ending the Asad regime and risk letting Syria fall into the hands of Sunni extremists. But the burden on the United States is mainly diplomacy and foreign assistance, not the far more expensive military.
I find it hard to fault the Administration for trying to limit commitments and save money at a time of serious fiscal strain. But it is a mistake to think we will always want to avoid the heavier footprint: troops and civilians on the ground to establish a safe and secure environment and plant the seeds for governance in states that may fail in ways that endanger vital American interests. The problem I see so far is not so much the President’s preference for the light footprint, but rather the assumption that it will ever be thus. Each and every president since the end of the Cold War has tried to avoid state-building efforts abroad. Each and every one has concluded that they were needed in one place or the other. This includes President Obama, who has quietly and correctly (if not alway successfully) indulged in civilian statebuilding to prevent violence in South Sudan since independence (the troops are cheap since they come from the UN). Obama also tried statebuilding in Afghanistan, where it was not a brilliant success.
We need to maintain the capacity to do heavier footprints, civilian as well as military, even as we try to avoid situations in which they are likely to be needed. This is the equivalent of asking the U.S. government to walk and chew gum at the same time. It has a hard time doing that. It is much more inclined to dismantle the extensive apparatus and experience built up during more than 10 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan than to husband and sustain it. The Civilian Response Corps President George W. Bush established, after declaring as a candidate his disdain for “a nation-building corps,” is already gutted. We’ll be reinventing that wheel if ever there is intervention in Syria, Mali, Iran or half a dozen other places where it might be needed in the next decade. This is not wise or economical.
Our mantra should be: light where we can, heavy where we must.
PS: David Rothkopf hopes what he calls the “disengagers” will redouble diplomatic efforts. Would that it be so.
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This week’s peace picks
A light week as Washington gets back into the swing of things after the holidays.
1. Crux of Asia Conference, Thursday January 10, 9:30 AM – 4:15 PM, Carnegie Endowment
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Jessica Matthews, Kurt Campbell, David Shambaugh, Frederic Grare, Ashley Tellis, Xia Liping, Srikanth Kondapalli, Daniel Blumenthal, Shen Dingli, Bharath Gopalaswamy, Kevin Pollpeter, Zha Daojiong, Sunjoy Joshi, Sean Mirski
The rise of China and India as major world powers promises to test the established global order in the coming decades. If history is any indication, Beijing, New Delhi, and Washington may all have different visions for this new international system. China and India’s many developmental similarities belie their deep strategic rivalry, which shapes their competing priorities on major global issues. As both states grow, their views on the international system will become increasingly relevant for their relationship, for the United States, and for the world as a whole.
Register for this event here.
2. Discussion with Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction on Challenges Facing the US, Thursday January 10, 2:30 PM – 4:00 PM, Stimson Center
Venue: Stimson Center, 1111 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, 12th Floor
Speakers: John Sopko, Ellen Laipson
In light of plans to transfer security responsibility for Afghanistan to its government by the end of 2014, the United States has a two year window of opportunity to overcome challenges presently facing its reconstruction efforts. Many of those challenges have been identified by audits and investigations conducted by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. Most recently its contributions include chronicling “persistent delays in instituting basic anti-money laundering procedures” at the Kabul Airport, detailing the Afghanistan National Security Forces’ difficulties in assuming responsibility for their operations and maintenance costs, and auditing the US’ Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund in response to schedule slips and inadequate sustainability plans.
Afghanistan’s struggles with insecurity and corruption are likely to continue well past the 2014 transition. Meanwhile the US has entered an era of fiscal austerity that will limit resources available to the Pentagon, State Department, and other government agencies involved in reconstruction. Sustainability has become one of the foremost issues for reconstruction investments as a consequence.
Mr. John Sopko’s address at the Stimson Center is his first on-the-record, public speech since taking office in July 2012, and he will use it to comment on the factors that underpin these challenges. Ellen Laipson, Stimson’s President and CEO, will moderate a panel discussion to follow, adding some additional perspectives about reconstruction efforts. We hope this event will provide a useful public forum to consider the US role in Afghanistan’s reconstruction, through 2014 and beyond.
Register for this event here.
3. Overkill: The Case for Reevaluating the U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Thursday January 10, 6:30 PM – 10:00 PM, Cato Institute
Venue: Cato Institute, 1000 Massachusetts Avenue Northwest, Washington, DC 20001
Speaker: Christopher Preble
The United States has far more nuclear weapons and delivery systems than deterrence requires. The triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and bomber aircraft reflects bureaucratic Cold War planning, not strategic vision. Can the United States achieve an effective nuclear program which makes us safer, while adapting to the need for a smaller defense budget? Join us as Christopher Preble, the Vice President of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, discusses U.S. nuclear strategy, and the need to bring it into the 21st century.
Register for this event here.
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Hussein Saleh, you are not alone
My journalist (McClatchy) friend and fellow Haverford graduate Roy Gutman tweeted this moving short video about a Yemeni International Committee of the Red Cross worker, Hussein Saleh:
I Know Where I’m Going from Intercross on Vimeo.
It reminded me of what I know: most of the people who work for humanitarian and other organizations, nongovernmental and governmental, in conflict zones are host country nationals. They take enormous risks and get killed at an accelerating rate: they are most of the more than 300 humanitarian workers killed last year worldwide.
My first encounter with what the State Department now calls “Foreign Service nationals,” that is citizens of the country in which a U.S. government facility is located, was with Danilo Bracchetti, who worked in U.S. embassy in Rome from the late 1940s until retirement sometime after I left in 1993. When he started, Rome had no garbage collection, because no one threw anything out. He was the only Italian I ever met who admitted to having been in a fascist youth organization (virtually everyone was of course). By the time I came along in the late 1970s, Italy was still in the throes of the Red Brigades, so working for the Americans was not without risk. He never betrayed the slightest hesitation. So far as Danilo was concerned, working for the Americans was an honor and a privilege, one I’m sure he was proud of to his premature dying day.
I’ve met other “host country” nationals in more dangerous situations. Iraq was particularly challenging. The U.S. Institute of Peace employees there did not always tell their families for whom they were working. In 2006/7 especially, they lived in risky conditions. One of our security contractors–an Iraqi Kurd–was killed then in a militia hit. A number of our employees and collaborators later applied for and got visas to come to the U.S., on grounds that they were in danger if they remained. Others fled to Kurdistan, which is still relatively safe from the sectarian violence that plagues other parts of Iraq.
A number of the key players in Afghanistan’s bureaucratic upper crust these days spent the Taliban years working for international relief organizations, some of which were active even then. It is amazing how well acclimated they are to Western habits, even though they conserve their Afghan roots. It was no small thing to deliver international aid during the years in which the Taliban ruled.
In Syria today virtually all the people distributing substantial amounts of international humanitarian assistance during the civil war are Syrians. The risks they face every day are unimaginable. Or, depending on how you look at it, all too imaginable.
Despite the very real risks they run on behalf of Western governments and organizations, these host country nationals are largely invisible in today’s world. But talk to any journalist, aid worker or diplomat. They will recount tales of their heroism and devotion. The host country (and third country) nationals run risks every day. As the year comes to a close, I hasten to express what so many of us have felt: deep appreciation and respect for the commitment they demonstrate and the sacrifices they make. Hussein Saleh, you are not alone.
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Prevent what?
Most of us who work on international affairs think it would be much better to use diplomacy to prevent bad things from happening rather than waiting until the aftermath and then cleaning up after the elephants, which all too often involves expensive military action. But what precisely would that mean? What do we need to prevent?
The Council on Foreign Relations survey of prevention priorities for 2013 was published last week, just in time to be forgotten in the Christmas rush and New Year’s lull. It deserves notice, as it is one of the few nonpartisan attempts to define American national security priorities. This year’s edition was in part crowd-sourced and categorizes contingencies on two dimensions: impact on U.S. interests (high, medium, low) and likelihood (likely, plausible, unlikely).
Syria comes out on top in both dimensions. That’s a no-brainer for likelihood, as the civil war has already reached catastrophic dimensions and is affecting the broader region. Judging from Paul Stares’ video introduction to the survey, U.S. interests are ranked high in part because of the risk of use or loss of chemical weapons stocks. I’d have ranked them high because of the importance of depriving Iran of its one truly reliable ally and bridge to Hizbollah, but that’s a quibble.
CFR ranks another six contingencies as high impact on U.S. interests and only plausible rather than likely. This isn’t so useful, but Paul’s video comes to the rescue: an Israeli military strike on Iran that would “embroil” the U.S. and conflict with China in the East or South China seas are his picks to talk about. I find it peculiar that CFR does not treat what I would regard as certainly a plausible if not a likely contingency: a U.S. attack on Iran. There are few more important decisions President Obama will need to make than whether to use force to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Certainly it is a far more challenging decision than whether to go to war against China in the territorial disputes it is generating with U.S. allies in Pacific. I don’t know any foreign policy experts who would advise him to go in that direction.
It is striking that few of the other “plausible” and high-impact contingencies are amenable to purely military responses:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attack
It is not easy to determine the origin of cyberattacks, and not clear that a military response would be appropriate or effective. The same is also sometimes true of mass casualty attacks; our military response to 9/11 in Afghanistan has enmired the United States in its longest war to date, one where force is proving inadequate as a solution. It is hard to imagine any military response to internal instability in Pakistan, though CFR offers as an additional low probability contingency a possible U.S. military confrontation with Islamabad “triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations.”
In the “moderate” impact on U.S. interests, CFR ranks as highly likely “a major erosion of security in Afghanistan resulting from coalition drawdown.” I’d certainly have put that in high impact category, as we’ve still got 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and a significant portion of them will still be there at the end of 2013. In the “moderate” impact but merely plausible category CFR ranks:
- a severe Indo-Pakistan crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by a major terror attack
- a severe North Korean crisis caused by another military provocation, internal political instability, or threatening nuclear weapons/ICBM-related activities
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- continuing political instability and emergence of a terrorist safe haven in Libya
Again there are limits to what we can do about most of these contingencies by conventional military means. Only a North Korea crisis caused by military provocation or threats would rank be susceptible to a primarily military response. The others call for diplomatic and civilian responses in at least a measure equal to the possible military ones.
CFR lets two “moderate” impact contingencies languish in the low probability category that I don’t think belong there:
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- renewed unrest in the Kurdish dominated regions of Turkey and the Middle East
There is a very real possibility in Riyadh of a succession crisis, as the monarchy on the death of the king will likely move to a next generation of contenders. Kurdish irredentist aspirations are already a big issue in Iraq and Syria. It is hard to imagine this will not affect Iran and Turkey before the year is out. Neither is amenable to a purely military response.
Most of the contingencies with “low” impact on U.S. interests are in Africa:
- a deepening of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo that involves military intervention from its neighbors
- growing popular unrest and political instability in Sudan
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- renewed ethnic violence in Kenya surrounding March 2013 presidential election
- widespread unrest in Zimbabwe surrounding the electoral process and/or the death of Robert Mugabe
- failure of a multilateral intervention to push out Islamist groups from Mali’s north
This may tell us more about CFR and the United States than about the world. Africa has little purchase on American sentiments, despite our half-Kenyan president. All of these contingencies merit diplomatic attention, but none is likely to excite U.S. military responses of more than a purely emergency character, except for Mali. If you’ve got a few Islamist terrorists, you can get some attention even if you are in Africa.
What’s missing from this list? CFR mentions
…a third Palestinian intifada, a widespread popular unrest in China, escalation of a U.S.-Iran naval clash in the Persian Gulf, a Sino-Indian border crisis, onset of elections-related instability and violence in Ethiopia, unrest in Cuba following the death of Fidel Castro and/or incapacitation of Raul Castro, and widespread political unrest in Venezuela triggered by the death or incapacitation of Hugo Chavez.
I’d add intensification of the global economic slowdown (high probability, high impact), failure to do more about global warming (also high probability, delayed impact), demographic or financial implosion in Europe or Japan (and possibly even the U.S.), Russian crackdown on dissent, and resurgent Islamist extremism in Somalia. But the first three of these are not one-year “contingencies,” which shows one limit of the CFR exercise.
I would also note that the world is arguably in better shape at the end of 2012 than ever before in history. As The Spectator puts it:
Never has there been less hunger, less disease or more prosperity. The West remains in the economic doldrums, but most developing countries are charging ahead, and people are being lifted out of poverty at the fastest rate ever recorded. The death toll inflicted by war and natural disasters is also mercifully low. We are living in a golden age.
May it last.
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Redlines
The publication last week of a five-step peace process roadmap to 2015 allegedly prepared by Afghanistan’s High Peace Council reopens the issue of whether a negotiated settlement with the Taliban–or parts thereof–is possible. American efforts led first by Richard Holbrooke and more recently by Marc Grossman have failed. With an American drawdown of troops proceeding and Afghan forces all too clearly not yet capable of taking over, it would not be surprising to see the Afghans make another stab at a deal.
But anyone who thinks this plan was prepared in Dari or Pashto is kidding themselves. This document reads to me like an American plan, written in good diplospeak, warmed over. It foresees an increase in Pakistan’s role in the negotiations, but it also includes all the American red lines (admittedly at the very end):
Any outcome of the peace process must respect the Afghan Constitution and must not jeopardize the rights and freedoms that the citizens of Afghanistan, both men and women, enjoy under the Constitution. As part of the negotiated outcome, the Taliban and other armed opposition groups must cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and verifiably renounce violence.
The timeline for the plan began in early 2012. Some of the action items concerning release of prisoners and assurance of safe passage for negotiators seem to have been fulfilled. But a critical step, announcement that the Taliban are cutting their ties to al Qaeda, to my knowledge has not been taken (the deadline was March 2012). The Taliban have denied media reports to that effect. I know of no credible evidence that the Taliban have softened their position on education and participation of women, though they may have gotten savvier about (not) attacking girls’ schools. Nor have they renounced violence.
The devil, as always, is in the details. The roadmap proposes that in the second half of 2013 the negotiating parties
…agree on the modalities for the inclusion of Taliban and other armed opposition leaders in the power structure of the state, to include non-elected positions at different levels with due consideration of legal and governance principles.
I wrote about this for the Washington Post more than two years ago, when I first heard rumors of State Department officials looking for a settlement that would give over a large portion of southern Afghanistan to Taliban governance in exchange for cutting their ties with al Qaeda and laying down their arms. It is still a distasteful proposition.
But less so than two years ago because American and Afghan efforts have failed to install anything like functioning governance in much of Afghanistan outside urban centers. The Northern Alliance opponents of the Taliban may not like it, but the Americans will find it easier to twist their arms than those of the Taliban. The alternative to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban might just be their military success in the countryside, where they are doing relatively well.
It is reasonable under current conditions to pursue a plan like the one McClatchy uncovered. But those redlines are important. If the Taliban don’t break with al Qaeda and accept women as human beings, we’ll regret a settlement that brings them into Afghanistan’s governing structures. So will Pakistan.
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