Tag: Afghanistan
A sad commentary, even if my man won
It’s hard to write more than 140-character tweets about last night’s “foreign policy” debate. Governor Romney lined up behind President Obama on almost all current policy issues. He even liked foreign assistance, gender equality, democracy promotion and diplomatic efforts to end Iran’s progress toward nuclear [weapons?] capability. Not to mention their agreement on drones, sanctions, withdrawal from Afghanistan and support for Israel. And they agreed that America’s strength abroad depends on the health of its economy and educational system at home. We’ve got a bipartisan foreign policy, whether we like it or not.
The real problem is that the Ryan budget, which Romney supports, is not aligned with what the Governor advocated. This is particularly clear on foreign aid, which the Ryan budget guts. I realize this is a wonkish concern, but it is also a real one. Priorities not reflected in budget proposals are not real priorities. We can be sure that a Romney presidency would not do what Romney says, because he would not fund it. He would prefer a massive military buildup, on top of the massive military buildup of the past ten years.
The disagreements last night were almost entirely about past events. Romney wanted to leave many more troops in Iraq than Obama and blames the president for the failure to reach a status of forces agreement. The fact that the Iraqis were not willing to bend on legal jurisdiction over the Americans remaining went unmentioned. By the way: the issue is not “immunity,” as most of the press would have it. American troops remain liable in U.S. courts for criminal acts committed abroad, even if the “receiving country” agrees to waive its jurisdiction. The administration resisted tightening Iran sanctions, until of course it no longer resisted because it thought the timing right.
If you want to check the facts, the Washington Post offers a good rundown. I don’t think there was much advantage or disadvantage in the errors, though it is a bit troubling that Romney does not know that Syria does not border Iran, which has ample routes “to the sea.” I wish Obama had not exaggerated the increase in exports to China. The numbers are pretty good without embellishment.
I agree with Peter Beinart: George W. Bush won this debate. Both Obama and Romney defined American foreign policy purely in military terms. This is a serious misreading of the challenges we face as well as the instruments needed to meet them. While pointing repeatedly to problems like Mali’s Islamist insurgency, Iran’s nuclear program, Pakistan’s failing state and Egypt’s economic deterioration, neither talked about the civilian instruments required to resolve them. Diplomacy, foreign aid, international law enforcement, multilateral financial and other institutions simply don’t register on the presidential level, even with my preferred candidate. That itself is a sad commentary on what we call foreign policy, bipartisan or not.
PS: Here is a Voice of America piece I participated in before the debate:
PPS: And here is the piece KSA2 (an English-language Saudi station) did the night of the election:
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Follow the money
The real difference between the candidates on foreign policy issues is not what they say they would do but what they want to fund, which ultimately affects what whoever is elected can do. The Ryan budget proposal, which Romney has said he backs, cuts international affairs spending by almost 10% in 2013 and close to a quarter by 2016 while funding a giant military buildup (on top of the buildup that has occurred since 9/11). Obama does not propose cuts to military spending, but he is trying to keep it below previously projected levels. His “international affairs” budget proposal for 2013 would keep that category more or less at current levels, taking inflation into account.
The consequences of this difference between the candidates for American foreign policy are dramatic. We are already overusing our highly competent, effective and expensive military forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, they often substituted for far cheaper, but unavailable, civilians: the military provided not only humanitarian aid, which it is required to do in “non-permissive” environments, but also development and state-building assistance. I won’t be surprised if the U.S. military (along with the paramilitary parts of CIA) now has more foreign assistance money available than USAID. The Ryan budget proposal, if adopted, would dramatically increase reliance on the U.S. military for non-military aid, statebuilding, international law enforcement and other fundamentally civilian tasks.
This is not smart. At well over $1 million per deployed soldier (counting support and infrastructure costs), the U.S. military is a fabulously expensive way of getting things done. Relying on it for civilian tasks is the international equivalent of relying on emergency rooms for routine medical care. You may get it done, but only at a far higher price than providing the same care in doctors’ offices or community clinics.
The supposedly business-savvy Governor Romney is suggesting both health care in emergency rooms and use of our armed forces when civilians might suffice. Moreover, experience indicates that the existence of a strong military instrument without equally strong civilian instruments will get us into wars that we might otherwise avoid: need I mention Iraq? If anyone doubts whether our military has been thinking ahead to Iran, this map should be instructive:
I do not mean to suggest, as many of those publishing this map do, that we would be better off without these military installations. Clearly they lend credibility to the threat of force that will be essential if ever there is a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear problem. And if diplomacy fails, the military option needs to be on the table.
But it is hard for me to imagine that we spend more 1 one-thousandth of the cost of these bases on the diplomatic effort with Iran. We may in fact spend significantly less. That means that a 1 one-thousandth chance of a diplomatic solution is worth pursuing. I would put the real odds of diplomatic success at more like 50/50 or maybe 25/75. Someone on the right might say the odds are 1/10. But what Ryan and Romney are proposing is that we cut the diplomatic effort and increase the military push. Does that make financial sense?
I hasten to note that Romney has also made some sensible proposals to use American foreign assistance money more effectively by focusing on rule of law and establishing conditions for successful private initiative. The trouble is there won’t be any money in the government kitty to do those things if he is elected and the Ryan budget adopted.
Iran is the odd problem these days. It may require a military solution, but that is unusual. China as a currency manipulator does not. Even Russia as a geopolitical threat, if you think it one, requires diplomacy more than military mobilization. George W. Bush, no retiring violet, did not try to respond militarily to Russia when it went to war with Georgia, a country he wanted to get into NATO. The list of problems not amenable to military solution is long: Pakistan’s drift toward extremism, Afghanistan’s corrupt government, the stalled Middle East peace process. It is striking that the international community is busy mobilizing an exclusively military response to Islamist extremism in Mali, where a more balanced approach that emphasizes local community economic development would be far more likely to succeed.
I know it won’t happen, but this is what the two candidates should be asked at the debate: given the strains on the U.S. military, what would you do to strengthen America’s civilian instruments of foreign policy and how are those priorities reflected in your budget proposals?
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This week’s peace picks
It’s a busy week with a focus on peacebuilding and subjects that parallel key issues in the presidential debates, like foreign policy in the next administration and violence at embassies.
1. Talking to the Taliban, Monday October 15, 3:00 PM – 4:30 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speakers: Anatol Lieven, Peter Bergen
Please join the New America Foundation’s National Security Studies Program for a conversation with award-winning author Anatol Lieven. He will discuss his talks in July with figures close to the Taliban and the views they expressed on the contours of a possible peace settlement.
Officials recently dismissed the possibility of securing a political deal to end the conflict in Afghanistan, a longtime keystone of the American military strategy in Afghanistan, saying their goal now is to leave Afghanistan with the best tools possible for maintaining security and political stability. After 11 years of war, has the conflict budged at all in either the coalition’s or the insurgents’ direction? Lieven and Bergen will discuss this question, as well as the likelihood of different future scenarios for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Register for this event here.
2. The European Union and International Organizations in a Time of Crisis, Monday October 15, 5:30 PM – 7:00 PM, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Lindner Family Commons
Speaker: Francois Rivasseau, Romuald Sciora, Harvey Feigenbaum
Mr. Rivasseau will discuss the relationship between the EU and other international organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the World Bank, and the IMF, during this time of crisis. He will also assess the place of the EU in the new global order.
Register for this event here.
3. Religion, Culture, and Interpretations of Democracy: Implications for Peacebuilding, Tuesday October 16, 9:30 AM – 11:30 AM, United States Institute of Peace
Venue: United States Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20037
Speakers: Marc Gopin, Mohammad Abu-Nimer, James Patton, Juliette Schmidt
The final meeting of the three-part series on democracy and conflict will reflect on the influence of religion and culture on interpretations of democracy around the world and the implications for peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Political parties, civil society actors, church leaders, as well as western governments and donors are all participating in the process of building and maintaining democracies in post-conflict settings. This distinguished panel will discuss specific factors that play a role in the perception and development of democratic institutions in different parts of the world, and their relationship with sustainable peace.
Register for this event here.
4. Realism, Idealism & the Politics of Obama’s Foreign Policy, Tuesday October 16, 12:00 PM – 1:30 PM, Georgetown University
Venue: Georgetown University, Mortara Building, 3600 N Street NW, Washington, DC 20057
Speakers: James Mann, Tom Hamburger
Author and former Los Angeles Times correspondent Jim Mann will discuss his latest book, The Obamians, with Tom Hamburger, a member of the National Staff of the Washington Post. They’ll talk about politics and foreign policy, and the current presidential campaign. James Mann is a Washington-based author who has written a series of award-winning books about American foreign policy and about China. Mr. Mann is a former newspaper reporter, foreign correspondent and columnist who wrote for more than twenty years for the Los Angeles Times. He is now an author-in-residence at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Tom Hamburger joined The Washington Post’s national desk in 2012 after working for more than eight years in the Los Angeles Times’ Washington bureau as a reporter specializing in the intersection of money and politics in the nation’s capital. He has covered the White House, Congress and the courts and has written extensively about lobbying, campaign finance and corruption at all levels of government. A finalist for the Pulitzer Prize in 1996, he worked previously for The Wall Street Journal, the Minneapolis Star Tribune and the Arkansas Gazette.
Register for this event here.
5. Is Al-Qaeda Defeated? An Experts’ Debate, Tuesday October 16, 12:15 PM – 1:45 PM, New America Foundation
Venue: New America Foundation, 1899 L Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Suite 400
Speaker: Peter Bergen, Thomas Lynch III, Thomas Joscelyn, Bill Roggio, Reuel Gerecht
In Collaboration with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
While some counterterrorism analysts and officials say that U.S. military efforts over the past 11 years have resulted in the defeat of al-Qaeda, others argue that the terrorist organization is more durable than that. The successes won by the CIA drone program in Pakistan’s tribal regions and the symbolic killing of Osama bin Laden might be tempered by the growing strength of al-Qaeda’s affiliates in countries such as Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. On the other hand, many point out that al-Qaeda has failed to carry out a large-scale terrorist attack in the United States since 9/11.
With the Taliban toppled in Afghanistan, hundreds of militants killed in U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, and the death of bin Laden last year, has the United States come to the end of the “War on Terror”? The New America Foundation’s National Security Studies Program and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies invite you to a lively debate on whether or not we have seen the defeat of al-Qaeda. Peter Bergen, the director of New America’s National Security Studies Program, and Col. Thomas Lynch III, a Distinguished Fellow at National Defense University, will argue for the motion that al-Qaeda is defeated. Foundation for Defense of Democracies Senior Fellows Thomas Joscelyn and Bill Roggio will argue against the motion.
Register for this event here.
6. Transforming Terrorism and Radicalism with Muslim Nonviolent Alternatives, Tuesday October 16, 2:00 PM – 4:00 PM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Speakers: Qamar-ul Huda, Chaiwat Satha-Anand, Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana
The violent and nonviolent protests around the Muslim world regarding the anti-Islamic film, “Innocence of Muslims,” have reinvigorated the debate over the prevalence of nonviolent practices in Islamic communities. With religious extremists and zealous secularists posing serious threats to societies, it is critically important to examine the ethos of pluralism, peacebuilding activities, and the culture of sustainable peace in conflict zones in Muslim-majority countries.
Please join us for a conversation with Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, a prominent nonviolent activist and scholar from Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand, on the subject of transforming radical extremism with principles of nonviolence action. Has the rise of extremist voices weakened principles of nonviolence and moderation in Muslim communities? Are moderate Muslims capable of defeating extremism with nonviolent practices of tolerance, social justice, and education? Dr. Satha-Anand will explore these and other questions.
USIP’s efforts in the Middle East and larger Muslim world have aided in developing the capacity of civil society actors in peacebuilding and conflict management. Whether it be a peace education curriculum for madrasas in Pakistan, or an inter-faith mediation center in Nigeria, or a gender peacebuilding training toolkit in Iraq, USIP’s on-the-ground field work and research aims to resolve conflicts through nonviolent means.
Register for this event here.
7. Waging War on Corruption – Inside the Movement Fighting the Abuse of Power, Tuesday October 16, 6:00 PM – 8:00 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Founders Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Room 125
“The Arab Spring was the trigger that prompted me to finally start writing a book that Ihad long been thinking about – a book that aims to change the conversation about one of the gravest problems facing most countries: corruption in government. I have been involved in civil society organizations dedicated to fighting corruption for more than 20 years and seen remarkable progress in this period. The achievements have been formidable. It is time to convert discussion about the prospects of curbing graft and bribery from one of skepticism, indeed cynicism often, to one of cautious optimism and hope. The upbeat conclusion of this book rests, above all, on the remarkable – often exceptionally courageous – work of many heroes in many countries, from the civil society activists on the front lines, to the public prosecutors, investigative journalists, outstanding political leaders and former leaders of the United Nations and World Bank, “think tank” academics, and philanthropists. I believe individuals do change history. The heroes in this book are changing history. But, all of the work of these remarkable people would be in vain without massive public engagement. In the Arab Spring we saw tens of thousands of people overcome fear of vicious security forces to go into the streets and the town squares in the name of their personal dignity and self-respect and to protest illegitimate governments. The valor seen in Tunisia and Egypt, replicated in many countries now, represents a tipping point in the fight against the abuse of office by politicians and government officials for their personal enrichment. And, the anti-corruption movement, which overlaps so closely with efforts to promote human rights, protect journalists and build democracy, has been enormously powered in most recent times by the Internet in a hyper-connected age of transparency where the villains haveever fewer places to hide. I believe that if more people are made aware of the progress being seen in many countries today in the war on corruption then that in itself will further power vital efforts for reform and improve the human condition. This book does not minimize the challenges. The anti-corruption movement has reached base camp, but still has an Everest of corruption to climb. But for the skeptics, let me say bluntly there is a powerful momentum now in campaigns for transparency, accountability and justice and, as I note in the final line of the book, it is important for people now to stand on the right sideof history.” ~Frank Vogl, September 2012.
8. The Middle East: Policy Choices for the New Administration, Wednesday October 17, 9:30 AM – 12:00 PM, Rayburn House Office Building
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Avenue SW, Washington, DC 20515
Speakers: Paul Pillar, Scott McConnell, Jocelyne Cesari, Nathaniel Kern, Thomas R. Mattair
The Middle East Policy Council invites you and your colleagues to our 70th Capitol Hill Conference. Live streaming of this event will begin at approximately 9:30am EST on Wednesday, October 17th and conclude around noon. A questions and answers session will be held at the end of the proceedings. Refreshments will be served.
RSVP for this event to info@mepc.org.
9. Understanding Iranian Public Opinion, Wednesday October 17, 9:00 AM – 11:00 AM, Stimson
Venue: Stimson, 1111 19th Street NW, Washington, DC 20036, Twelfth Floor
Speakers: Ebrahim Mohseni, Steven Kull, Geneive Abdo, Sebastian Grafe
In the midst of bombastic rhetoric exchanged among Iran, Israel, and Western states over the nuclear issue, Iranian public opinion is often lost in the discussion. Where do the Iranian people stand? Iranian public opinion is seldom heard on topics such as the nuclear program, international sanctions, and a potential military strike.
Please join Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America and Stimson for a discussion of Iranian public opinion. Drawing on polls from numerous sources, including recent surveys conducted inside Iran, as well as polls conducted by calling into Iran, the speakers will analyze Iranian attitudes on the country’s nuclear program, nuclear weapons, international sanctions, and a potential military strike. The discussion will also focus on how sanctions and military threats have shaped Iranian opinion toward their own government and the West.
Register for this event here.
10. Bringing Peace Through Facilitated Dialogue: A Book Launch, Wednesday October 17, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Speaker: Daniel Serwer, Rusty Barber, Colette Rausch, David Smock
Today’s international conflicts typically involve multiple actors, interests, and drivers that have sparked long, violent histories. Ending these conflicts relies more and more on facilitated dialogue, a process in which a neutral third party helps a broad spectrum of conflicting parties overcome the many barriers to effective communication.
Facilitating Dialogue: USIP’s Work in Conflict Zones, edited by David Smock and Daniel Serwer, presents seven case studies of the U.S. Institute of Peace’s facilitated dialogue efforts in Iraq, Kosovo, Israel/Palestine, Colombia, Nigeria, and Nepal. Covering a variety of conflict situations and peacemaking efforts, the cases tell stories of peacebuilding successes, efforts in progress, limitations on what can be achieved, and lessons learned.
This workshop will present samples of the chapters in the book and a summary of lessons learned. Facilitating Dialogue: USIP’s Work in Conflict Zones will be available for purchase at this event.
Register for this event here.
11. Pedagogies for Peace in Post-Conflict and Fragile States, Thursday October 18, 9:30 AM – 11:00 AM, USIP
Venue: USIP, 2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington, DC
Speaker: Margaret Sinclair, Jeff Helsing, Xanthe Ackerman, Qamar-ul Huda, Lili Cole
What kind of curricula promote the best education for long-term peace in post-conflict, fragile and low resource contexts? Many kinds of primary and secondary school curricula aim to promote social cohesion, greater tolerance and recovery from violence. But until recently we have had little research on the different benefits of various curricula in different types of conflict, or on how they can be used together most effectively, and on whether these curricular approaches need to be sequenced temporally after conflict, and if so, how.
In May 2012, Education Above All, a Doha-based education group, commissioned papers from practitioners and thematic experts that map and analyze the most widely used of these different curricula, collectively designated as “education for global citizenship,” and the policies that have accompanied their implementation. A major finding of this research project was that “transformative education for local, national and global citizenship and peace CAN be implemented even under difficult conditions if there is a policy commitment to do so.” To explore this important issue, the project director, technical adviser and expert on conflict and education, Margaret Sinclair, will discuss these research findings with experts from the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Brookings Institution.
Through its Academy for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, research by Senior Fellows, and projects supported by grants, USIP has considerable experience in the creation of citizenship, human rights, history and peace curricula, including peace curricula specifically designed for use in Muslim religious schools, or madrasas, most recently in Sudan, Iraq and Pakistan. Two USIP staff members, Lili Cole and Qamar-ul Huda, contributed essays to Education for Global Citizenship.
Young people between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four represent nearly one-fifth of the population of the Middle East and North Africa. This group has played a central role in shaking up the old order, and while so far they have not been able to shape the policies of the new regimes, it remains key to the outcome of transitions in the region. A Generation on the Move, a study cosponsored by The Issam Fares institute at the American University in Beirut and UNICEF, offers important insights on the aspirations and problems of Arab youth. The study includes polling data that reveals further information about this demographic.
Register for this event here.
13. US-Pakistan Relationship Post-2014, Thursday October 18, 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM, Center for National Policy
Venue: Center for National Policy, One Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20001, Suite 333
Speakers: Stephen Tankel and Timothy Hoyt
U.S.-Pakistani relations have been defined by a curious mixture of antagonism and cooperation. Even before the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was involved in the illegal proliferation of nuclear technology and support for militant Islamist organizations. Since 9/11, the bilateral relationship has rested on occasional cooperation against al-Qaeda, while being severely strained by state support for the Taliban, Haqqani Network and other militants at war against the Afghan state and the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).
With the ISAF mission drawing down to a close by the end of 2014, what is the future of this troubled relationship between “frenemies?” Will relations improve as the strain of the Afghan campaign diminishes? Or will the U.S. more openly express its bitterness once its military is no longer reliant on supply routes that pass through Pakistan? Will Pakistani support for terrorist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba persist? There are factors that may only further radicalize the Pakistani security services following an ISAF drawdown such as the potential for renewed civil war and Indian “meddling” in Afghanistan. How will these affect relations with the United States?
Register for this event here.
14. Reality Diplomacy: How Ambassadors Deal with Crime and Corruption Abroad, Thursday October 18, 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM, George Mason University
Venue: George Mason University, Founders Hall, 3351 Fairfax Drive, Arlington, VA 22201, Room 113
Speakers: Richard Kauzlarich and Kenneth Yalowitz
For American business operating abroad, crime and corruption are realities of doing business internationally that must be avoided. The risk is that companies end up on the wrong side of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Further in many cases they need the help of US Embassies to avoid having to deal with corrupt host government officials. For non-official Americans living abroad, the facilitative payment to the traffic cop who arbitrarily stops their car to check papers, or to the border guard to speed up clearance of their household effects through customs is simply a small price to pay in societies that seem to operate on different standards of public service than Americans are used to. For students and academics, crime and corruption are political and sociological phenomena to be sliced and diced in the classroom and in scholarly articles as impediments to good governance to be eliminated through establishing independent judiciaries and democratically-elected legislatures passing the right sort of laws. Ambassadors Kenneth Yalowitz and Richard Kauzlarich, retired Senior Foreign Service Officers, have dealt with crime and corruption in countries where US foreign policy and national security objectives are at risk through the interaction criminal and corrupt official behavior. What can Ambassadors do when confronted with this nexus of crime and corruption while trying to accomplish a broad set of US political, economic and security priorities? Ambassadors Kauzlarich and Yalowitz will discuss their professional experiences in this regard and provide lessons-learned that will underscore the importance of better understanding how the intersection of terrorism, transnational crime and corruption represents a major non-traditional security challenge for the United States in the 21st Century.
15. Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms, Friday October 19, 10:00 AM – 11:30 AM, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Martin S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon, Steven Pifer, Strobe Talbott
As the 50th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis approaches, nuclear arms control has received scant attention in the current U.S. presidential campaign. Yet the future of arms control has major implications for U.S. national security, and no matter who is elected on November 6, the next president will have an opportunity to use arms control to enhance domestic and global security. In their new Brookings Focus Book, The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms (Brookings Press, 2012), Brookings Senior Fellows Steven Pifer and Michael O’Hanlon make a strong case for further steps in nuclear arms control, explain in clear and straightforward prose the background to complex arms control issues, and offer practical and realistic proposals for action by the administration in 2013 and beyond.
On October 19, the Arms Control Initiative and 21st Century Defense Initiative at Brookings will host a discussion to explore the possibilities for next steps on arms control and place them in a broader foreign policy context. They will relate the issues to the Pentagon’s budget situation and the longer-term vision of trying to move to a world without nuclear weapons. Pifer and O’Hanlon will be joined by Brookings President Strobe Talbott. Vice President Martin Indyk, director of Foreign Policy at Brookings, will moderate the discussion.
After the program, panelists will take audience questions. Copies of The Opportunity: Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Arms will be available for sale at the event.
Register for this event here.
16. European and US Perspectives on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Friday October 19, 12:00 PM, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies
Venue: American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 700, R.G. Livingston Conference Room of AICGS
Speakers: Dominik Tolksdorf
Please join AICGS on Friday, October 19, 2012, for a seminar with Mr. Dominik Tolksdorf, DAAD/AICGS Fellow, on “European and U.S. Perspectives on Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The discussion will take place at 12pm in the R.G. Livingston Conference Room of AICGS, 1755 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 700. A light luncheon will be served.
Transatlantic cooperation in Bosnia can generally be considered as strong. However, diverging views have become apparent in the past years. The future role of the international community in the country and of the Office of the High Representative is especially debated. However, the U.S. and the EU do share a common interest in supporting constitutional reform in Bosnia. The seminar will focus on the roles of the European Union and the U.S. in Bosnia in the past years and transatlantic efforts to reform the Dayton system.
Dr. Dominik Tolksdorf holds a PhD from the University of Munich. In his dissertation he examined the European Union’s support to reform processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 2006, he has worked as research fellow at the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP) at the University of Munich, as senior associate researcher at the Institute for European Studies, and as adjunct assistant professor at Vesalius College at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels. In his research, he focuses on the EU’s external relations, including the pre-accession process with the western Balkan states and Turkey, EU neighborhood policies, and the structure of the External Action Service.
Please register by Wednesday, October 15.
Please register for this event here.
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Why riot?
You don’t have to be a foreign affairs expert to see that there are political reasons for the Innocence of Muslims-inspired protests around the Muslim world in what has been termed “the video incident.” America’s recent wars in predominantly Muslim countries have heightened tensions. U.S. support for Israel also contributes.
But this can’t be just about politics. The video offended Muslim sentiments. If these protests were really about politics, why were they not more widespread and why did they not take on a more explicitly political guise?
Americans find it difficult to understand the religious justification for these protests. Either they are reduced to cultural relativism (“things are different in the Muslim world”) 0r they wonder if Muslims are so weak in their faith that any offense to their prophet pushes them to mass violence. Neither produces interesting answers.
What Westerners fail to appreciate is the cultural milieu in which Islam originated and propagated. Islam emerged from a pre-existing oral tradition of poetry. The influence is apparent in the Holy Qur’an, which often reads like poetry:
Say, “I seek refuge in the Lord of mankind,
The Sovereign of mankind,
The God of mankind,
From the evil of the retreating whisperer –
Who whispers [evil] into the breasts of mankind –
From among the jinn [spirits] and mankind.” (Surat an-Nas 114)
Recitation of the Qur’an is art, and those with the Qur’an memorized are respected. In early Islam, that was the only way to experience the Qur’an. It is believed Muhammad was illiterate, so when he received the Qur’an from the Angel Gabriel he memorized it and taught it to his followers. The sunnah, or the large body that encompasses the words and actions of the Prophet and some of his close followers, was also initially memorized and passed along orally.
Memorization and oral transmission were the privileged modes of gaining and disseminating knowledge. How was it to be determined whose oral transmission was legitimate? What would be done if two people remembered something differently? In the case of the sunnah an incredibly complex system developed for evaluating the legitimacy of different ahadith (pieces of the sunnah, particular stories about things the Prophet said or did). Was it possible that a certain transmitter could have had contact with another in order to pass along a hadith? Did both transmitters live in the same era and were they known to have traveled in the same region?
The issue of legitimacy also brought into question each transmitter’s character. Ignoring other variables, one might trust what one transmitter said the Prophet did over another if the first had a reputation for honesty while the second was known to lie. The legitimacy of the information a transmitter passed along was intimately connected to the transmitter’s reputation: how honest he was, how often he prayed, whether his teachings were consistent. Character is vital to legitimacy in the Islamic tradition.
The connection between the legitimacy of the content and the character of the content’s originator or transmitter implies that criticism of the latter calls the former into question. If a transmitter is not of high moral standing, there are implications for whether the ahadith he transmitted are considered legitimate. Insulting the Prophet, the original transmitter, calls into question his message, or all of Islam.
In the Shi’i tradition a religious leader’s character is very important, especially in a Muslim’s choice of Ayatollah. Because of the occultation of the last imam, Ayatollahs are selected to demonstrate how a Muslim should live her life until the last imam returns. The importance of an Ayatollah modeling good character is captured in the title given to a well-respected Ayatollah, marja-e-taqlid, which translates as “source of emulation.”
This is strange from the Judeo-Christian perspective, which privileges text. Jews are exigent about error-free copying of the Torah. Western culture worries about plagiarism. Improperly expropriating text undermines an author’s credibility and may call into question everything she has written. We have little need to worry about an author’s character to decide whether a text is valid or not.
It is therefore not surprising that the Judeo-Christian tradition includes insulting, teasing, or at least recognizing the faults of religious leaders without it negatively reflecting on their mission. In the Jewish tradition, many of the prophets are far from moral perfection, but their character flaws do not affect the sanctity of their purpose. Most Christians had a good laugh at the late-night TV jokes about Jesus’ possible wife. The ancient Greeks often mocked the gods.
There is of course no justification for the killings associated with the recent demonstrations. But the importance of transmitters in preserving the Islamic tradition provides some insight into the anger a number of Muslims are feeling around the world, an anger that so many in the West cannot begin to understand.
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Is there a political solution in Afghanistan?
Allison Stuewe writes:
The members of yesterday’s panel hosted by the Middle East Institute believed that a political solution is desirable but concluded nevertheless that the question of whether or not one is possible is harder to answer than it seems. The panel was more inclined to raise additional questions than provide definitive answers.
Marvin Weinbaum of the Middle East Institute, the event’s moderator, introduced some of the questions: Is a political solution possible? Are there incentives that would facilitate an agreement among all interests involved in the Afghan conflict? What will the U.S. or other participants in the peace process have to sacrifice to reach a negotiated solution? Has the opportunity for productive U.S. involvement in conflict resolution passed? Or should we still be pushing for a political solution? Are we failing to see the possibilities? Will U.S. government efforts to find a political solution be viewed in the region as a gesture of desperation for an easy exit?
Ambassador Omar Samad, previously Afghanistan’s ambassador to France and Canada and currently a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, structured his presentation around two questions that must be addressed in the peace process. First, he asked, what is the Afghan conflict? Is it an insurgency, civil war, or proxy-driven conflict? Is it about resources, ethnicity, geopolitical rivalries, anti-terrorism, or historical narratives? From the Afghan perspective, which looks at the conflict with history in mind, it is all of these.
In the 1960s, the country was stable, with a constitutional and democratic order. The communist coup and subsequent Soviet invasion ended three generations of peace and destroyed the government, infrastructure and human capital while killing over a million Afghans. The U.S.-backed resistance was successful in defeating the Soviets, but when the Soviets left and the United States lost interest, a void remained. Radical Islam thrived. As it became clear an agreement would not be reached between the powers that emerged after the Soviet defeat, the interests of external players became more pronounced. Pakistan and Iran had their own political agendas and used Islamic extremism to achieve their own ends.
9/11 was a game changer. The tragedy showed the world that there are consequences to ignoring conflict in Afghanistan. Previous mistakes should not be repeated in the current attempt at conflict resolution. The Bonn Agreement creating what Arif Rafiq, scholar at the Middle East Institute, views as a consociational government pointed in the right direction. There are divisions between Afghans based on ethnicity, language, and religion, but these divisions are shallow and reflect only part of Afghanistan’s history. Ambassador Samad believes there is an Afghan national identity, history and sense of belonging to the same state. It is unlikely that Afghanistan will collapse. What it needs is an inclusive political system.
Ambassador Samad’s second question was about the meaning of a “political solution.” Does this mean an intra-Afghan, regional, or international solution? From the Afghan perspective, all three are critical to ensuring future stability. A peace plan must be Afghan-inspired and include input from regional interests, but these imperatives will be hard to accomplish without international support. There will be a transition in 2014 when President Karzai concludes his term and much of the United States and NATO presence is withdrawn. We have between now and the end of 2014 to address security issues, ensure citizens will be able to vote, plan for legitimate elections, and invite the Taliban to participate in politics as equal citizens of the Afghan state.
Shamila Chaudhary of the New American Foundation (but previously at the National Security Council) contributed a former policymaker’s perspective.
American politics have hindered the search for a political solution. At the beginning of the war, the U.S. treated the Taliban and al-Qaeda as essentially the same terrorist organization and refused to negotiate on principle. We know now that there were divisions in the Taliban even over the 9/11 attack and that the U.S. government ignored some of what might have been indications that Taliban members were willing to talk. The military’s “fight, talk, build” strategy has made negotiation difficult. Congress is angry that it has not been consulted more. Despite Administration efforts, many members are unwilling to acquiesce to two Taliban requests: the transfer of Guantanamo detainees associated with the Taliban and the recognition of a Taliban office outside of Afghanistan. The rise in “green-on-blue” attacks, the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion in September and last year’s attack on the Embassy Kabul have made negotiation with the Taliban harder for the Americans, who won’t be able to engage seriously until after the U.S. election.
The second obstacle Chaudhary identified was Pakistan. Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Hina Rabbani Khar spoke in Washington last month, clarifying Pakistani goals: an Afghan-led political solution that is satisfactory to Islamabad, no further destabilization in the border areas and the return of Afghan refugees still residing in Pakistan. Pakistan is in a bind because it does not have sufficient Afghan partners to guarantee these interests. Pakistan wants to curb pro-Indian sentiment and block moves towards an independent Pashtunistan in the border areas. Islamabad relies heavily on the Haqqani network, a group associated with the Afghan Taliban that could turn on Pakistan at any time. A productive agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan would include acceptance of the Durand line, limits on India’s security presence in Afghanistan and assurances that the border areas will not become an anti-Pakistan, pro-Indian hotspot.
Arif Rafiq thought a political solution possible but was pessimistic about the likelihood of one happening. He listed many reasons for his doubts: the Bonn framework is slowly unraveling. President Karzai, once respected as a leader from a prominent family, is now a divisive figure. Though he has said he will step down as planned, it appears he is working to consolidate his power and choose a successor who will allow him to continue to influence politics. He faces real challenges: Mullah Muhammad Omar’s Afghan Taliban does not want Karzai to be a part of peace talks and the opposition National Front not only opposes President Karzai but also envisions a constitutional overhaul to establish a federalized parliamentary democracy.
The surge is over and it did not accomplish what it set out to do. The Afghan army is not ready to take over primary security responsibility for the whole country. If anything, the surge emboldened militia groups and resulted in a huge influx of weapons. The insurgency is alive even if fragmented (there are divisions between Mullah Omar’s Taliban and Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami). The Taliban did not participate in the Bonn talks of December 2011. “Exploratory” talks among the Taliban, President Karzai and the U.S. have been on hold since March. There is no indication that Mullah Omar’s Taliban intends to participate in elections. The NATO-led coalition of the willing is fraying.
Rafiq did note some reasons for optimism. The U.S. helped build a functioning, if not fully effective, Afghan parliament . Pakistan needs the U.S. presence in Afghanistan to limits cross-border risks. It might be possible to exploit splits in the Taliban, some of whom are looking for the international legitimacy they lacked when they ruled most of Afghanistan. Most Afghans reject the emirate that the Taliban advocate.
The panel agreed time is running out. Political transition in Washington, Islamabad and Kabul is eating into the time available. Despite the Taliban’s motivations and goals, all participants noted that any political solution has to be open to all citizens. A political solution requires an Afghan state that balances the center and periphery and meets the bottom line goals of the neighbors and the major international powers. It is not going to be easy to solve this equation.
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George W. Bush’s playbook
I can do no better in summing up Mitt Romney’s foreign policy speech today than he does himself in the penultimate sentence:
The 21st century can and must be an American century. It began with terror, war, and economic calamity. It is our duty to steer it onto the path of freedom, peace, and prosperity.
Here’s the problem: the terror, war and economic calamity Romney refers to occurred not on Barack Obama’s watch, but on George W. Bush’s. And Governor Romney’s foreign policy prescriptions, like many of his domestic policy prescriptions, are drawn from George W. Bush’s playbook.
The few innovations in Romney’s speech at Virginia Military Institute today are hardly worth mentioning. He wants to see the Syrian revolutionaries get more arms, in particular anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, but he fails to say how he will prevent these from being used against us, except to say that those who receive them will have to share our values. That should fix everything in the arms bazaars of the Middle East.
He says he will support a two-state solution for peace between Palestine and Israel. Nice to see him return to the mainstream from the extremist wings of Israeli and American politics, which is where he was during the “47%” fund-raising dinner in Florida when he suggested we would kick the can down the road and maybe skip the two-state solution altogether. Trouble is, the people he pitched that line to are supporting his campaign with fat checks. He says there will be no daylight between America and Israel, which is code for saying that the Jewish settlements will continue to expand, since that is what Netanyahu’s Israel wants. I fail to understand an American presidential candidate who outsources U.S. policy on the Palestinians to Israel.
In Libya he’ll track down the killers of our personnel, which is exactly what Obama promises to do. I’d just be curious how those 15 Navy ships he plans to build each year will help in the effort.
He pledges to condition aid to Egypt but makes the conditions both vague and easy to meet: build democratic institutions and maintain the peace treaty with Israel. There are lots of problems with President Morsy’s Egypt, but you won’t be able to hang him for either of those offenses, yet.
In Afghanistan, he calls the withdrawal the president has pledged a retreat but makes it clear he is not proposing anything very different.
Then there is this on foreign assistance:
I will make further reforms to our foreign assistance to create incentives for good governance, free enterprise, and greater trade, in the Middle East and beyond. I will organize all assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official with responsibility and accountability to prioritize efforts and produce results. I will rally our friends and allies to match our generosity with theirs.
The trouble here is that the Ryan budget guts the foreign affairs budget, including foreign assistance. There won’t be any American generosity to be matched with theirs if Romney is elected. This is where Romney departs definitively from Obama and shows his reliance on George W.’s playbook.
I hasten to add that I’d be all for organizing our assistance efforts in the greater Middle East under one official. That would be a good idea.
One last issue: with all this overload of American values as the basis for our foreign policy, I’m curious what Romney plans to do about Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco and other less than fully democratic friends in the region? They get no mention in this speech, but of course they really can’t be mentioned in a speech that gives unequivocal backing to both our friends and our values. What would Romney do when there is a choice between the two? Keep silent would be a good guess.
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