Tag: Afghanistan
“Make or break” Pakistan elections
The upcoming Pakistani general elections will be a “make or break event,” Samina Ahmed said at Tuesday’s Carnegie Endowment for International Peace event on “Elections, Stability, and Security in Pakistan.” Ahmed, project director of the South Asia program at the International Crisis Group, supported her claim with an analysis of the challenges and opportunities this election presents. More of her thoughts on this issue can be read here, and the full International Crisis Group policy briefing on election reform in Pakistan can be read here.
Though it is not yet clear when the Pakistani elections will be called, as they could occur at the end of the normal five year term or be called early, preparations suggest these elections could be the first in Pakistan’s history when leadership passes from an elected government to the next in accordance with the constitution. If the Pakistan Peoples Party serves its full five year term, it will be the first democratically elected government to do so in Pakistan since 1977.
Recent decades have not included the opportunity for credible elections: a military regime was in power, previous election committees have been complicit in rigging elections, or the voter registration and identification system allowed millions of fraudulent votes.
Recent legislative changes, however, make possible a legitimate transfer of power. Cooperation between the party in power, the Pakistan Peoples Party, and its primary opposition, Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim Party (PML-N), has prevented the exploitation of political tension in order to rig elections. The recently passed 18th Amendment, which restores the country to a parliamentary republic by undoing some of the changes General Pervez Musharraf made to the constitution, deprives the president of the power to appoint the chief of the election committee. Instead, a committee made up of members of the main party and its opposition decide. The tenure of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) members has been increased from three to five years, and the responsibilities of the chief are now shared by the rest of the commission.
In addition to changes in the ECP, the process for establishing a temporary caretaker government has changed. The president no longer has the whole responsibility for its appointment, responsibility for which is shared with the opposition.
Technological changes also bring hope that this election will be more legitimate than previous ones. All Pakistanis will be required to have computerized national identity cards. These cards include security features that will make them difficult to duplicate. All voter information will now be stored in a central location. An SMS-based system will allow Pakistanis to contact the election commission in order to confirm they are registered and find out where they must vote.
Despite the exciting opportunities this election presents for increased democracy and stability, Ahmed noted serious challenges and risks. Though the process for establishing a caretaker government has been improved, the main party and its opposition have not yet been able to agree on a leader. If a consensus is not reached soon, this might allow spoilers the opportunity to interfere with the electoral process. Additionally, the reforms have not yet addressed the staff of polling locations, who have been implicated in rigging elections. There is still need for reform of the election tribunals, infamous for their corruption and sluggish settlements.
Two potential sources of electoral interference are the military and the judiciary. The judiciary has a history of dismissing elected government officials such as former Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani, who was removed by the Supreme Court because he did not open charges of money laundering against President Asif Ali Zardari. The military has also intervened repeatedly in the political process. Both institutions have pushed back against reform attempts.
Ahmed views the elections as a “make or break event,” but the recent reforms, party cooperation and time in office of the current government already suggest some progress in Pakistan.
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This week’s peace picks
There is far too much happening Monday and Tuesday in particular. But here are this week’s peace picks, put together by newly arrived Middle East Institute intern and Swarthmore graduate Allison Stuewe. Welcome Allison!
1. Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Political Progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Monday September 10, 10:00am-12:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, The Bernstein-Offit Building, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 500
Speaker: Patrick Moon
In June 2012, the governing coalition in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had taken eighteen months to construct, broke up over ratification of the national budget. In addition, there has been heated debate over a proposed electoral reform law and the country’s response to a ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. Party leaders are once again jockeying for power, and nationalist rhetoric is at an all-time high in the run-up to local elections in early October.
Register for this event here.
2. Just and Unjust Peace, Monday September 10, 12:00pm-2:00pm, Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs
Venue: Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, 3307 M Street, Washington, DC 20007, 3rd Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Daniel Philpott, Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Lisa Cahill, Marc Gopin
What is the meaning of justice in the wake of massive injustice? Religious traditions have delivered a unique and promising answer in the concept of reconciliation. This way of thinking about justice contrasts with the “liberal peace,” which dominates current thinking in the international community. On September 14th, the RFP will host a book event, responding to Daniel Philpott’s recently published book, Just and Unjust Peace: A Ethic of Political Reconciliation. A panel of Christian, Muslim, and Jewish scholars will assess the argument for reconciliation at the theological and philosophical levels and in its application to political orders like Germany, South Africa, and Guatemala.
Register for this event here.
3. The New Struggle for Syria, Monday September 10, 12:00pm-2:00pm, George Washington University
Venue: Lindner Family Commons, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 602
Speakers: Daniel L. Byman, Gregory Gause, Curt Ryan, Marc Lynch
Three leading political scientists will discuss the regional dimensions of the Syrian conflict.
A light lunch will be served.
Register for this event here.
4. Impressions from North Korea: Insights from two GW Travelers, Monday September 10, 12:30pm-2:00pm, George Washington University
Venue: GW’s Elliot School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052, Room 505
Speakers: Justin Fisher, James Person
The Sigur Center will host a discussion with two members of the GW community who recently returned from North Korea. Justin Fisher and James F. Person will discuss their time teaching and researching, respectively, in North Korea this Summer and impressions from their experiences. Justin Fisher spent a week in North Korea as part of a Statistics Without Borders program teaching statistics to students at Pyongyang University of Science and Technology. James Person recently returned from a two-week trip to North Korea where he conducted historical research.
Register for this event here.
5. America’s Role in the World Post-9/11: A New Survey of Public Opinion, Monday September 10, 12:30pm-2:30pm, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20004, 6th Floor, Joseph H. and Claire Flom Auditorium
Speaker: Jane Harman, Marshall Bouton, Michael Hayden, James Zogby, Philip Mudd
This event will launch the latest biennial survey of U.S. public opinion conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and is held in partnership with them and NPR.
RSVP for this event to rsvp@wilsoncenter.org.
6. Transforming Development: Moving Towards an Open Paradigm, Monday September 10, 3:00pm-4:30pm, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, Fourth Floor Conference Room
Speakers: Ben Leo, Michael Elliott, Daniel F. Runde
Please join us for a discussion with Mr. Michael Elliot, President and CEO, ONE Campaign, and Mr. Ben Leo, Global Policy Director, ONE Campaign about their efforts to promote transparency, openness, accountability, and clear results in the evolving international development landscape. As the aid community faces a period of austerity, the panelists will explain how the old paradigm is being replaced by a new, more open, and ultimately more effective development paradigm. Mr. Daniel F. Runde, Director of the Project on Prosperity and Development and Schreyer Chair in Global Analysis, CSIS will moderate the discussion.
RSVP for this event to ppd@csis.org.
7. Campaign 2012: War on Terrorism, Monday September 10, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Josh Gerstein, Hafez Ghanem, Stephen R. Grand, Benjamin Wittes
With both presidential campaigns focused almost exclusively on the economy and in the absence of a major attack on the U.S. homeland in recent years, national security has taken a back seat in this year’s presidential campaign. However, the administration and Congress remain sharply at odds over controversial national security policies such as the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. What kinds of counterterrorism policies will effectively secure the safety of the United States and the world?
On September 10, the Campaign 2012 project at Brookings will hold a discussion on terrorism, the ninth in a series of forums that will identify and address the 12 most critical issues facing the next president. White House Reporter Josh Gerstein of POLITICO will moderate a panel discussion with Brookings experts Benjamin Wittes, Stephen Grand and Hafez Ghanem, who will present recommendations to the next president.
After the program, panelists will take questions from the audience. Participants can follow the conversation on Twitter using hashtag #BITerrorism.
Register for this event here.
8. Democracy & Conflict Series II – The Middle East and Arab Spring: Prospects for Sustainable Peace, Tuesday September 11, 9:30am-11:00am, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, ROME Building, 1619 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Azizah al-Hibri, Muqtedar Khan, Laith Kubba, Peter Mandaville, Joseph V. Montville
More than a year and a half following the self-immolation of a street vendor in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, Arab nations are grappling with the transition toward sustainable peace. The impact of the Arab Spring movement poses challenges for peaceful elections and establishing stable forms of democratic institutions. This well-versed panel of Middle East and human rights experts will reflect on the relevance and role of Islamic religious values and the influence of foreign policy as democratic movements in the Middle East negotiate their futures.
Register for this event here.
9. Israel’s Security and Iran: A View from Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, Tuesday September 11, 9:30am-11:00am, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036, Falk Auditorium
Speakers: Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, Kenneth M. Pollack
While Israel and Iran continue trading covert punches and overheated rhetoric, the question of what Israel can and will do to turn back the clock of a nuclear Iran remains unanswered. Some Israelis fiercely advocate a preventive military strike, while others press just as passionately for a diplomatic track. How divided is Israel on the best way to proceed vis-à-vis Iran? Will Israel’s course put it at odds with Washington?
On September 11, the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings will host Lt. Gen. Dan Haloutz, the former commander-in-chief of the Israeli Defense Forces, for a discussion on his views on the best approach to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Brookings Senior Fellow Kenneth Pollack will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion.
After the program, Lt. Gen. Haloutz will take audience questions.
Register for this event here.
10. Montenegro’s Defense Reform: Cooperation with the U.S., NATO Candidacy and Regional Developments, Tuesday September 11, 10:00am-11:30am, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 1625 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, Room 211/212
Montenegro has been one of the recent success stories of the Western Balkans. Since receiving a Membership Action Plan from NATO in December 2009, in close cooperation with the U.S. it has implemented a series of defense, political, and economic reforms, which were recognized in the Chicago Summit Declaration in May 2012 and by NATO Deputy Secretary General Vershbow in July 2012. Montenegro contributes to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan and offers training support to the Afghan National Security Forces. In June 2012 it opened accession talks with the European Union.
Register for this event here.
11. Inevitable Last Resort: Syria or Iran First?, Tuesday September 11, 12:00pm-2:00pm, The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
Venue: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 N. Stuart Street, Arlington, VA 22203, Suite 200
Speakers: Michael S. Swetnam, James F. Jeffrey, Barbara Slavin, Theodore Kattouf, Gen Al Gray
Does the expanding civil war in Syria and its grave humanitarian crisis call for immediate international intervention? Will Iran’s potential crossing of a nuclear weapon “red line” inevitably trigger unilateral or multilateral military strikes? Can diplomacy still offer urgent “honorable exit” options and avoid “doomsday” scenarios in the Middle East? These and related issues will be discussed by both practitioners and observers with extensive experience in the region.
RSVP for this event to icts@potomacinstitute.org or 703-562-4522.
12. Elections, Stability, and Security in Pakistan, Tuesday September 11, 3:30pm-5:00pm, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speakers: Frederic Grare, Samina Ahmed
With the March 2013 elections approaching, the Pakistani government has an opportunity to ensure a smooth transfer of power to the next elected government for the first time in the country’s history. Obstacles such as a lack of security, including in the tribal borderlands troubled by militant violence, and the need to ensure the participation of more than 84 million voters threaten to derail the transition. Pakistan’s international partners, particularly the United States, will have a crucial role in supporting an uninterrupted democratic process.
Samina Ahmed of Crisis Group’s South Asia project will discuss ideas from her new report. Carnegie’s Frederic Grare will moderate.
Register for this event here.
13. Islam and the Arab Awakening, Tuesday September 11, 7:00pm-8:00pm, Politics and Prose
Venue: Politics and Prose, 5015 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
Speaker: Tariq Ramadan
Starting in Tunisia in December 2010, Arab Spring has changed the political face of a broad swath of countries. How and why did these revolts come about–and, more important, what do they mean for the future? Ramadan, professor of Islamic Studies at Oxford and President of the European Muslim Network, brings his profound knowledge of Islam to bear on questions of religion and civil society.
14. Beijing as an Emerging Power in the South China Sea, Wednesday September 12, 10:00am, The House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: The House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2170 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515
Speakers: Bonnie Glaser, Peter Brookes, Richard Cronin
Oversight hearing.
15. The Caucasus: A Changing Security Landscape, Thursday September 13, 12:30pm-4:30pm, CSIS
Venue: CSIS, 1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006, B1 Conference Center
Speakers: Andrew Kuchins, George Khelashvili, Sergey Markedonov, Scott Radnitz, Anar Valiyey, Mikhail Alexseev, Sergey Minasyan, Sufian Zhemukhov
The Russia-Georgia war of August 2008 threatened to decisively alter the security context in the Caucasus. Four years later, what really has changed? In this conference, panelists assess the changing relations of the three states of the Caucasus — Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan — with each other and major neighbors, Russia and Iran. They also explore innovative prospects for resolution in the continued conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the possibility of renewed hostilities over Nagorno-Karabakh. This conference is based on a set of new PONARS Eurasia Policy Memos, which will be available at the event and online at www.ponarseurasia.org. Lunch will be served.
RSVP for this event to REP@csis.org.
16. Author Series Event: Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Little Afghanistan: The War Within the War for Afghanistan”, Thursday September 13, 6:30pm-8:30pm, University of California Washington Center
Venue: University of California Washington Center, 1608 Rhode Island Ave NW, Washington, DC 20036
Speaker: Rajiv Chandrasekaran
In the aftermath of the military draw-down of US and NATO forces after over ten years in Afghanistan, examinations of US government policy and efforts have emerged. What internal challenges did the surge of US troops encounter during the war? How was the US aiding reconstruction in a region previously controlled by the Taliban?
Rajiv Chandrasekaran will discuss his findings to these questions and US government policy from the perspective of an on-the-ground reporter during the conflict. This forum will shed light on the complex relationship between America and Afghanistan.
Register for this event here.
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GOP critique: Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan
This is the second installment of a series responding to the Romney campaign’s list of failures in Obama’s foreign and national security policies.
Failure #1: No Results In Slowing Or Stopping Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program
True: Iran’s nuclear program has not stopped. Iran is enriching uranium at an accelerating pace, albeit likely slower than whatever pace it would have managed without the Stuxnet virus, sanctions and other measures. Romney claims Iran is “on the cusp of nuclear weapons capability.” Assertions of this sort have been made many times in the past. As of February, American officials believed Tehran had not made a decision to proceed to nuclear weapons. You can be sure we’d have heard about it if the situation has changed.
Iran is certainly closer to nuclear weapons than four years ago, but what Mitt Romney would or could have done about it isn’t clear. Certainly George W. Bush did nothing but threaten regime change, which likely redoubled Tehran’s determination. We don’t know what Romney would do, as he has refused to say, but his critique of Obama suggests at a minimum the following:
- No engagement with Iran. The unproductive multilateral talks would presumably be ditched.
- Support for the Green Movement and other efforts at regime change.
- Stronger sanctions, including no waivers for importers of Iranian oil.
- Stronger commitment to missile defense.
- Talk up the effectiveness and advisability of military options in order to reestablish the credibility of the military threat.
The trouble with this approach is that it was tried under George W. Bush and failed. That’s why Obama is trying something else. We may well have to go back to an “axis of evil” approach to Iran, but insofar as it threatens regime change it risks accelerating Tehran’s push for nuclear weapons. The Iranians regard nukes as a guarantee of regime survival, one that is needed more the greater the threat.
The notion that the military threat is necessarily more credible under Romney than under Bush is unconvincing. Obama hasn’t been shy about using military force. There is strong support across the political spectrum in the U.S. that Tehran not be permitted to get nuclear weapons. Iran will need to reckon with a military threat after November 6 whoever wins the election.
Failure #2: Endangering Our Mission In Afghanistan And Weakening Our Relationship With Pakistan
While giving credit to Obama for killing Osama, the Republicans claim the President is planning a withdrawal from Afghanistan by a date certain, without regard to conditions on the ground. This is at best inaccurate. What is planned is the turnover of primary security responsibility to the Afghans and withdrawal of a substantial portion, but not all, U.S. troops. The Republicans further claim that these decisions were not only unwise but also politically motivated and make it harder to ensure “that Afghanistan never again becomes a launching pad for terror like it was on 9/11.”
I don’t give presidents demerits for politically motivated decisions. Americans want out of Afghanistan. Obama is giving them as close to that as he thinks prudent before the end of 2014. Republicans complain that President Obama “has led our Afghan and Pakistani partners to doubt our resolve and hedge their bets rather than fully cooperate with us.” If hedging their bets means building stronger Afghan security forces and reaching a political settlement with the Taliban that meets the key American red line–no return of al Qaeda to Afghanistan–we shouldn’t be too concerned.
The Republican complaint that Obama failed to ensure a clean Afghan presidential election in 2009 is patently spurious. It was President Karzai’s responsibility to ensure a clean election. It was ours to try to prevent a dirty one and recognize one when it happened, which is what Washington and allied capitals did. The complicated story that ended in Karzai’s challenger, Abdullah, withdrawing would vitiate this Republican claim. Nor is it clear what Romney would do differently.
The Republicans also complain that the Obama administration is negotiating with the Taliban while they are killing U.S. troops and “know President Obama wants a deal more than they do.” I don’t really know how much the Taliban want a deal. Michael Semple, who knows about as much about Afghanistan and Pakistan as anyone on earth, believes that important elements of the Taliban do want a deal. It would be criminally negligent for the administration not to try its best to negotiate an early end to the conflict.
It is true that Obama is responsible for frayed relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan. He has criticized Karzai, including for corruption as well as the election mess the Romney campaign points to, and conducted drone strikes inside Pakistan whenever the opportunity to kill al Qaeda militants presents itself. Those moves aren’t going to make you friends in Kabul and Islamabad. The Republicans attribute bad relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan to “the lack of resolute leadership from President Obama.” It would be closer to the truth to attribute bad relations to his stalwart pursuit of U.S. interests in both places.
Next up:
Failure #3: “Unconscionable” Leaks Of Classified Counterterror Information From The White House That Have Been “Devastating”
Failure #4: “Devastating” Defense Cuts That Will Cede Our Status As A “Global Power”
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No easy call
Having written Tuesday that President Obama should be considering a no-fly zone in Syria, I was surprised but pleased to read this tactical level account confirming my view that this is preferable to safe zones or humanitarian corridors. They wouldn’t make much difference at this point because the opposition already control wide swaths of territory. But of course a no-fly zone over all of Syria would need to be strategically as well as tactically good in order to convince a president.
Steven Lee Myers and Scott Shane of the New York Times summed up the argument against any Western military intervention this way:
American military operations against Syria, officials reiterated on Tuesday, would risk drawing in Syria’s patrons, principally Iran and Russia, at a much greater level than they already are involved. It would allow Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad, to rally popular sentiment against the West and embolden Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups now fighting the Assad government to turn their attention to what they would see as another American crusade in the Arab world.
The risk is not only greater Russian and Iranian involvement in Syria, but also losing Russia’s cooperation on Afghanistan and on trying to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. These are serious risks involving important American interests.
But Iran and Russia are already heavily involved in Syria, and it is also an important American interest to prevent the war in Syria from “grinding on,” as Andrew Tabler puts it. That would increase the likelihood of Al Qaeda and other jihadi involvement. It will also increase the risk to Syria’s neighbors. Lebanon and Jordan are already in difficulty, the former from sectarian fighting provoked in part by the Syrian conflict and the latter from the burden of tens of thousands of refugees. Iraq could also be threatened. Kurdish extremists are increasing operations in Turkey, presumably egged on by the Syrian regime, but the Turks can counter that effort both diplomatically (by getting the Iraqi Kurds to restrain their Syrian brethren) and militarily.
A no-fly zone could significantly shorten the conflict in Syria, but of course a great deal depends on how it is authorized and who engages in it. There seems no possibility of UN Security Council authorization. Moscow won’t allow it. The Arab League would need to ask for it. That seems within the realm of possibility. The Americans would have to undertake the major military operation needed to defeat Syria’s Russian air defense system, giving the Iranians a pretty good picture of how we would go about a similar attack on them. A continuing effort to patrol the skies and strike occasionally afterwards might rely on Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The alternative, or possibly a supplement, to a no-fly zone is to supply the Syrian revolutionaries with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (MANPADs). The risk is that these would fall into the wrong hands, as they did in Afghanistan and Libya. Few however have been used effectively against Western targets. I imagine that our geniuses have managed to create MANPADs that don’t last long and are therefore useless after a few months, but I don’t actually know it (and Al Qaeda might be able to defeat any technological wizardry).
I don’t think a no-fly zone or giving the revolutionaries anti-aircraft capability is an easy call. But refusing to somehow redress the imbalance that Bashar’s air force is exploiting to kill civilians also has consequences. President Obama appears to have already made his decision not to intervene (I am less sure that we aren’t giving the revolutionaries some anti-aircraft capability), but the mounting toll, especially in Aleppo and Damascus, means that the issue will have to be revisited.
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On course for war with Iran
Ilona Gerbakher reports from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
Yesterday’s Middle East Institute panel at SAIS presented a report on “Prospects for US-Iran Relations on the Nuclear Issue in the Year Ahead.” The predominant mood was tempered pessimism. War is a real possibility, so it behooves us to redouble diplomatic efforts.
Alan Keiswetter (a scholar at the Middle East Institute, senior consultant at C&O Resources and an adjunct professor at the University of Maryland) thought the nuclear negotiations stalemated and likely to remain that way until after the U.S. election. The parameters of a possible agreement are clear: enrichment allowed up to a low level (3.5-5%) combined with strict safeguards and shipment out of Iran of its more highly enriched uranium.
But it is unclear whether Iran wants a negotiated solution or is just stringing along the negotiations to gain more time. Sanctions alone are unlikely to force agreement, as Iran is ready to hunker down as necessary. Some kind of meatier inducement is going to be needed.
Calls in the Israeli government for military action are growing louder and more strident. Israel perceives an Iranian nuclear capability as an existential threat. The debate among Israelis is no longer “will we strike” but “will the strike be effective enough.” It would be a serious mistake to dismiss the possibility of a unilateral Israeli attack. Some Israel watchers say Prime Minister Netyanyahu thinks he can do what he wants without U.S. concurrence; others feel he is bluffing, to force the U.S. to take a hard line and scare Iran into concessions.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is more united in fear of Iranian pretensions in the Gulf than the Iranians imagine.
Next year will be a real turning point in US-Iran relations over the nuclear issue. Without significant diplomatic progress, the trajectory we are on will lead to military confrontation.
Geneive Abdo, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, contrasted the current tense diplomatic situation with Iran-US relations in 2003, when Tehran cooperated on Afghanistan and was more open to negotiation but Washington was not. Supreme Leader Khamenei sent a letter to then-President Bush proposing a diplomatic breakthrough. Today even a minimal goal of building trust with Iran seems hard to reach. Iranian leaders are convinced that the ultimate U.S. goal is regime change. Khamenei’s hardline conspiratorial beliefs about the U.S. are self-fulfilling prophecies.
The Revolutionary Guard, which has grown powerful under Khamenei, no longer bothers to hide its regional interventions in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Although arguably they stand the most to lose from sanctions, a military attack on Iran would serve their interests by reaffirming their ideological position.
Also troubling is the decline of Iran’s educated middle class. Those who once called for reform and might have questioned the nuclear program are marginalized. They were our best hope for breaking three decades of hostility but their voices have been silenced. An attack led by the U.S. or Israel would stifle prospects for democratic reform even further.
Israel is not helping matters with its increasingly hardline rhetoric. The way is being paved for it to appear that all options except an Israel-led attack have been eliminated. Don’t expect President Obama to take action until after the election. The best diplomatic option for the moment seems to be to buy more time.
Roby Barrett, the president of a consulting firm specializing in defense and security technology applications, was dismissive of the possibility of a diplomatic solution because “Iran is not really interested in negotiation.” For Iranian leaders and citizens the nuclear program has become a point of national pride. Iran sees nuclear capability as a part of its destiny as a regional power in the Gulf.
The GCC has resigned itself to the fact that Iran will not give up nuclear weapons capability and that the U.S. will need to do something about it. The alternatives are either a nuclear Iran or war. Despite the consequent global economic disturbance, the GCC wants the Iranian nuclear program stopped by hook or by crook. The idea of a nuclear Iran is a redline issue for most Arab states.
We should “never say never,” but diplomatic efforts will probably not stop the march towards war. Given the calcifying hardline between the Israeli and Iranian positions and the distance between America and Israel on this issue, there is a high probability an Israeli attack will go forward. It is unlikely that the U.S. will initiate a strike or engage cooperatively with Israel.
Israel knows they don’t have the military capacity to cripple Iran’s nuclear program. If they strike, it will be in desperation, with the objective of bringing the U.S. into the conflict. That is possible if Iranian retaliation makes the mistake of striking back at the U.S.
In closing, Genieve Abdo raised a vital point: what will happen the morning after? What will be the economic and military fallout of an attack? Will an attack have to be repeated to prevent an intensified Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons? What are the implications of repeated attacks on Iran?
Daniel Serwer, a scholar at the Middle East Institute and a senior research professor at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, acted as moderator. He noted that some countries have stood back from nuclear programs, including Brazil and Argentina. Iran is a more difficult case, because Israel will not give up its nuclear weapons and there are several other potential nuclear powers in the region. But if Iran thinks hard about what nuclear weapons might mean for its own security as well as long-term regional and economic stability, it may conclude they are not a good idea.
PS: The video of the event can be downloaded from C-Span.
PPS: Bennett Ramberg comes to similar conclusions.
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Impractical, unenforceable and unwise
A Free Syrian Army (FSA) leader (the Guardian says he is Mustafa al-Sheikh, identified as head of the FSA supreme military council) says:
The fighting is like hit and run, we are not aiming to get control of any city in Syria, but we want to exhaust the regime and speed up its collapse.
This is the most sensible thing I’ve heard out of the FSA, which is still vastly outgunned and outmanned by the Syrian Army. Unfortunately, English-language press coverage seems to focus almost exclusively on the question of territorial control, which not only changes rapidly but is also irrelevant to the outcome of the civil war.
The ebb and flow of control over territory creates enormous risks for civilians who can’t escape to other areas. Collaboration–even if forced or unavoidable–with one side brings retaliation by the other, even as civilians find themselves unable to obtain adequate food and water, not to mention electricity, cooking fuel and health services. We are in the midst of a major humanitarian disaster in Aleppo and other population centers in Syria.
The international response is thoroughly insufficient. Anne-Marie Slaughter proposes a major escalation:
It is time for bold action, of the kind Mr Obama took in deciding to go after Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad and to intervene in Libya. In Syria this would mean putting together a coalition of countries that would commit to providing heavy weapons (and possibly air cover) to all commanders on the ground who sign the “Declaration of Values” supporting a democratic and pluralist Syria put forward by the nine commanding generals of the military council of the FSA. To receive weapons, these commanders must show they control safe zones and admit foreign journalists, civil society activists and the UN to monitor the implementing of the declaration’s principles. They must also allow citizen journalists to upload photographs of what they witness to an official website maintained by the coalition.
The problem is this: the escalation Slaughter proposes could well make things worse rather than better.
Heavy weapons are not going to reduce the intensity or likely even the duration of an increasingly sectarian war. Nor will a “declaration of values” from revolutionaries who are already carrying out summary battlefield executions. The Asad regime will treat the “safe zones” she insists upon as target-rich environments and subject them to intense shelling. The logistics of food and other supplies in these zones will burden the rebellion with responsibilities it will find hard to discharge.
What about our relationship with Qatar and Saudi Arabia suggests that we could constrain their arms supplies in the way Slaughter suggests? They are far more likely to impose their own conditions: arms only to Sunnis, preferably religious ones.
The escalation Slaughter proposes will likely also make Russia abandon the P5+1 talks with Iran. Moscow could also make life more difficult for the U.S. by squeezing the northern distribution network for supplies into Afghanistan, though that option would be far less effective now that Pakistan has reopened its roads and border crossing points.
Some stable liberated areas may well emerge–a number of Kurdish towns along Syria’s border with Turkey seem already to fall in that category. But requiring that the rebellion give up its “hit and run” tactics is not wise. As Bashar al Asad seems to have declared in his latest statement from unknown whereabouts, Syria’s fate will be determined on the battlefield. I would have wished it otherwise, not least because the military forces are likely to dominate Syria’s post-Asad transition.
But best now to leave the military tactics to military people to decide. The highly conditioned transfer of weapons Slaughter proposes is impractical, unenforceable and unwise.
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