Tag: Afghanistan
This week’s “peace picks”
Still a bit slow on international affairs this week in DC. Maybe it’s domestic politics and the State of the Union? But still some good picks, unfortunately some clustered on the same day:
1. Is Foreign Aid Worth the Cost? Woodrow Wilson Center, 5th floor, January 23, 2012, 4-6 pm
There will be a live cast of this event.
Many Americans think foreign aid consumes 25 % or more of the federal budget when in fact it costs less than 1%. Some presidential candidates are calling for the elimination of all foreign aid. Yet as the U.S. moves into the global economy that depends increasingly on the economic development and growth of all countries, American aid, trade and investment all play vital parts in the well-being of the U.S. economy. What is the outlook for foreign assistance funding in the current Congress and how are Members’ attitudes shaped by new budgetary constraints being forced by the growing national debt? This panel of experts will explore the value of foreign aid, its successes and failures and how it might be better targeted for maximum effectiveness in the future.
The Panel
Charles O. Flickner, Jr. is former staff director of the House Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, a position he held from 1995 to 2003. Prior to coming to the House, he served as a staff member on the Senate Budget Committee from 1974 to 1994. From 1969 to 1970, he served in a mechanized infantry unit of the U.S. Army in Vietnam. He is author of the chapter, “Removing Impediments to an Effective Partnership with Congress,” in Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership (CSIS, Brookings, 2007). He earned a B.S. degree from Loyola University in 1969, and pursued graduate studies at the University of Virginia from 1970 to 1974.
Donald M. Payne is a Democratic Representative of the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey in the U.S. House of Representatives where he has served since 1989. He is the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health and Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and as a member of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere. He is also a senior member of the House Education and Labor Committee where he serves on the Subcommittee on Early childhood, Elementary and Secondary Education, and the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections. He also serves as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation whose mission is to advance the global black community by developing leaders through internships and fellowship programs, and to inform policy and educate the public. He previously served as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. Prior to his election to Congress as the first elected African American from New Jersey, he served on various municipal and county offices in and around Newark, as an executive of the Prudential Insurance Company, Vice-President of Urban Data Systems, Inc., and as an educator in the Newark and Passaic Public School Districts. He is a graduate of Seton Hall University, and pursued graduate studies at Springfield College in Massachusetts.
Carol J. Lancaster is Dean of the School of Foreign Service and a Professor of Politics at Georgetown University. She previously directed Mortara Center for International Studies at Georgetown from 2005 to 2009 and before that GU’s African Studies Program from 2004 to 2005. During the Clinton administration she served as the Deputy Administration of the U.S. Agency for International Development from 1993 to 1996, and during the Carter administration as a member of the policy planning staff at the Department of State from 1977 to 1980, and then as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at the Bureau of African Affairs. She has published numerous books and articles on the politics of foreign aid and development including, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development and Domestic Politics (2007), and, George Bush’s Foreign Aid: Transformation or Chaos? (2008). She earned a BSc degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown, and MSc and Ph.D. degrees in international relations from the London School of Economics.
Rajiv Chandrasekaran is senior correspondent and associate editor at The Washington Post where he has worked in various capacities since joining the paper in 1994 as a reporter on the metropolitan staff. His positions included being been a correspondent in Cairo and Southeast Asia, assistant managing editor, and bureau chief in Baghdad for the first two years of the Iraq war. He is the author of Imperial Life in the Emerald City, a best-selling account of the troubled American effort to reconstruct Iraq. He recently completed his second stint as a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson Center, this time working on a book that focuses on counterterrorism in Afghanistan. He is a graduate of Stanford University.
2. Regional Implications of the Conflict in Somalia, CSIS, January 24, 10-11:30 am
Freelance Policy Analyst, Horn and East Africa
David W. Throup
Senior Associate, CSIS Africa Program
Moderated by
Richard Downie
Fellow and Deputy Director, CSIS Africa Program
B1 Conference Center, CSIS
1800 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20006
Regional involvement in Somalia’s conflicts has reached a new level, with all of its neighbors directly engaged in combat operations. Please join the CSIS Africa Program for a discussion of how the conflict is reshaping political and security dynamics in the Horn and East Africa region.
Please RSVP to Katie Havranek at africa@csis.org
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Member of Congress
Michael O’Hanlon
Director of Research and Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Joshua Foust
Fellow, American Security Project and Correspondent, The AtlanticWith US troop withdrawals moving forward, is an end in sight for the decade long war in Afghanistan? Will peace talks with the Taliban yield results? Join CNP President Scott Bates and an expert panel to discuss what the end of the Afghan War might mean for American interests and the people of the region.*A light lunch will be served*
Where
Center for National Policy
One Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 333
Washington, DC 20001
202-682-1800
Map
Click here
4. The Syrian Uprising Seen From The Arab World, IISS, January 24, 2-3:30 pm
Emile Hokayem
Senior Fellow for Regional Security
IISS-Middle East
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
Coffee 1:45 pm – 2:00 pm
Discussion 2:00 – 3:30 pm
IISS-US
2121 K Street NW
Suite 801
Washington, DC 20037
Emile Hokayem will discuss developments in the Levant region, specifically Syria’s descent into civil war.
Mr Hokayem is the Senior Fellow for Regional Security at the IISS-Middle East in Manama, Bahrain. Previously, he was the Political Editor and international affairs columnist of The National and a resident fellow at the Henry L Stimson Center. He holds a Master of Science in Foreign Service from Georgetown University. He recently returned from Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey and Lebanon, where he met with members of the Syrian opposition and the Free Syrian Army.
This meeting will be moderated by Andrew Parasiliti, Executive Director, IISS-US and Corresponding Director, IISS-Middle East.
IISS-US events are for IISS members and direct invitees only. For more information, please contact events-washington@iiss.org or (202) 659-1490.
5. Yemen’s Stalemate, January 25, GWU, 12:30-2 pm
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street NW
Stacey Philbrick Yadav, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Hobart and William Smith Colleges
Sheila Carapico, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, University of Richmond
Laurent Bonnefy, Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, France; Centre français d’archéologie et de sciences sociales de Sanaa, Yemen
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs; Director, Institute for Middle East Studies; Director, Middle East Studies Program, GW
Three leading political scientists discuss political dynamics and prospects for Yemen.
A light lunch will be served.
RSVP at: http://go.gwu.edu/yemenstalemate
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS) and the Institute for Middle East Studies
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False patriotism
The airwaves are so crowded with Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta condemning the desecration of Taliban corpses it may come as a surprise that CNN commentator Dana Loesch has no problem with it “as a citizen of the United States”:
Even more surprising to me yesterday was David Welch, a “former Republican National Committee Research Director,” who tweeted:
Marines pee on dead terrorists and this is a story? I could care less. Liberal media at work…
For Welch, blame falls not to disgraceful behavior by a few Marines who dishonor their 240,000 comrades in arms and undermine the moral standing of the United States, but rather to the “liberal media.”
I have to wonder in what world the media would not have run this video and story. North Korea for sure. Russia and China maybe. And if it hadn’t been run by the “liberal” media in America, would it still not have caused enormous damage to the United States abroad?
Lest you think this is an aberration, let me urge you to search for “liberal media” on Twitter and read a few of the tweets and links they contain. Here’s one:
US TROOPS ACCUSED OF URINATING ON AFGHAN CORPSES…MILITARY-HATING SNEAKY LIBERAL MEDIA IN AN UPROAR. COUNTRY APPLAUDS
The link is to a “Russia Today” report on the incident. When did “Russia Today” become the liberal media? And which country was applauding?
David Welch added to me on Twitter:
Now 3 marines who defend our country are going to be destroyed. Feel free to gloat
Spencer Ackerman has noted the uncomfortable atmosphere among Pentagon correspondents, liberal and conservative, yesterday. Anyone who thinks those who–like me and apparently the Pentagon correspondents–are disgusted by the video are “gloating” is mistaken.
But then I realized: Welch doesn’t really think I’m gloating. He thinks saying that will gain him adherents and attention in the great struggle against the liberals (most of whom would regard me as pretty conservative). The larger struggle between good and evil is so important that you just have to ignore a boyish prank by a few Marines, who after all are men who defend their country. This is false patriotism.
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Fog of peace
With a gloomy National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan summarized in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post reporting on resumption of peace talks with the Taliban, and the New York Times unveiling the tortured history of the negotiations so far, it is time to consider again the prospects for a negotiated outcome to the war.
For all the heavy breathing and interesting reporting about the negotiations, there is still a lot that is unclear.
The Americans keep on saying the Afghans have to lead the process, but there is little sign of that. The Americans and Europeans had to bludgeon Karzai into accepting the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, which is no more than a modest but useful preliminary step in the negotiating process. Karzai seems more than a little concerned that his largely Northern Alliance-originated opposition, which fought the Taliban in the 1990s, is not prepared to accept a settlement that brings the Taliban back into Afghanistan’s political life. Will he run the political risks involved?
It is unclear whether that office will represent all the Taliban, or only Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. How the Haqqani network, which does a good deal of the damage in Afghanistan, fits in no one seems to know. But the Taliban have already let it be known that the Youtube video apparently showing American Marines desecrating Taliban bodies will not make them shy away from talks.
The role of Pakistan is also uncertain. In the past, Islamabad has gone out of its way to prove that no negotiations can go ahead without its consent. U.S. drone strikes have resumed in Pakistan, but are the Pakistanis ready to support a U.S.-sponsored negotiating effort headquartered in Qatar? Islamabad is absorbed at the moment in its own internal power struggles between the civilian government and the army, which was displeased this week when the prime minister fired one of its favorite defense ministers. Maybe the Pakistanis are distracted? Or are they on board?
The agreement to open the office requires an American quid pro quo: release of several Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo. This is not easy for any American Administration to do, especially as the people the Taliban are asking for presumably really are deadly enemies of the United States. Is President Obama prepared to run the gauntlet of criticism he will get for this in the middle of a reelection campaign?
It is being hinted that the Taliban are prepared to forswear support to international terrorism as part of this deal. A verifiable pledge of that sort would be more than a confidence-building measure. It would represent a major diplomatic achievement: separating the Taliban from Al Qaeda. In principle, this is conceivable, since the Taliban’s ambitions are largely limited to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), whereas Al Qaeda is waging a global war for establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The opening of the office in Qatar is certainly not something Al Qaeda would support. But do we really have a verifiable commitment of this sort?
We also need to remember the difficult choices that lie ahead for the United States. If the Taliban are going to lay down arms, they are going to want something in return. There isn’t much to offer. There is a role in governing Afghanistan nationally, a role in governing provinces where the Taliban are strong, and control over economic resources (drugs, minerals, trade and transport). Or more likely, some combination of those things.
Oh yes: and American withdrawal. It is hard for me to picture the United States, which has sought from Karzai a long-term strategic agreement providing for a continuing American presence after 2014, agreeing to withdraw completely. But it is also difficult to picture the Taliban accepting a continuing U.S. presence, which is what they have always said they are fighting against. Compromise on this issue is theoretically possible: a U.S. military training presence but complete transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghans, for example. But I’m not sure our soldiers are going to be comfortable living and working with an Afghan army that has lots of Taliban reintegrated. Nor is it easy to picture the Taliban comfortable with the kind of presence such a training mission would require.
All that said, I applaud Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Special Representative Marc Grossman, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and their German partner Ambassador Michael Steiner for the enormous effort they have made over the past year to open up a negotiating channel. It would not, of course, have been possible without the extraordinary military efforts the U.S. troops have made. If the Taliban are ready to talk, it is because at least some of them are tiring of the fight.
But we are still far from peace, and the fog is thick.
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Righting the civilian/military balance
Someone might imagine that I would be unhappy with the President’s strategic guidance for the Defense Department, released last week. It reiterates many of the U.S. military’s more traditional roles: counter-terrorism and irregular warfare, deterring and defeating aggression, projecting power, countering weapons of mass destruction, maintaining nuclear deterrence. It also re-emphasizes some relatively new areas: outer space and cyber space as well as support to homeland defense. Its implications in many of these areas are unclear, maybe even still undetermined. Certainly who watch the Defense budget more than I do aren’t sure yet.
But it includes a clear and unequivocal step back from stability operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan (and before in Bosnia and Kosovo), the design and implementation of which preoccupied me for at least 15 years. This is the President’s guidance on stability and counterinsurgency operations:
In the aftermath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless
be ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability operations if required,operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.
In another section of the document, the guidance also suggests that U.S. forces will be:
...able to secure territory and populations and facilitate a
transition to stable governance on a small scale for a limited period using standing
forces and, if necessary, for an extended period with mobilized forces.
Surprise: I find all of this eminently reasonable, provided the civilian and reserve capacities are built up in a serious way. It is a mistake to use active duty fighting forces in roles that might be carried out at least as effectively by civilians, whether government officials or contractors. Our non-military means are however still lacking. Despite Hillary Clinton’s well-intended Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, we are still far from having in the State Department and USAID the capabilities required.
This matters. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability and governance in Afghanistan that allowed the Taliban to regroup and regenerate. It was the lack of civilian capacity to deal with post-victory stability in Iraq that turned a quick victory into an eight-year nightmare. If ever we need to deal with a post-war or post-revolution Iran or Pakistan (whether the war involves the U.S. as a belligerent or not), or even post-Assad Syria, we will clearly lack adequate civilian capacity, and the military’s reservists won’t suffice either.
So yes, let’s get the military out of the peacebuilding/statebuilding/nationbuilding/postconflict stabilization/reconstruction business as much as possible. Let’s use reservists when possible, as we have for years in Kosovo and Bosnia. As civilians in uniform, they have talents and experience that active duty forces often lack. But let’s not forget that we might still have to do these things, despite the best intention of the Administration to avoid it. If even 10 per cent of what the military saves in following the President’s strategic guidance were to be spent on civilian capacity, it might be enough. But there is no sign of anything like that happening yet.
So yes, I am happy with the strategic guidance, but it has to be backed up with budgetary allocations to the civilian side of our foreign policy apparatus to make it practical. Righting the balance requires not just words but money and people.
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How important is a Taliban office?
Today’s news that the Taliban have agreed to open an office in Doha, where they have been meeting for months with Americans and Germans, has generated a good deal of chatter about the prospects for a negotiated end to the Afghanistan war. That seems overblown to me.
But it is also indicative: the Americans are suing for peace. Vice President Biden’s statement that the Taliban are not our enemy was not a gaffe but a signal, as we said here right away. The Taliban have now indicated that the signal was received and appreciated. There are also indications that they expect release of some prisoners from Guantanamo.
It will be interesting to see if that happens–it is not an easy move for President Obama in the lead-up to an election campaign in which his presumptive opponents are more likely to criticize him for failing to make a maximal effort in Afghanistan than for staying too long. He may try to portray the move, if it comes, as a transfer of prisoners to the control of the Karzai government, as an expected aspect of the U.S. withdrawal and turnover of security responsibility to a fully sovereign government.
The opening of the office is important not so much for establishing a clear channel for communications–that has likely already been done–but also because it begins to establish some clarity about the leadership structure on the Taliban side. The Americans are not going to want to negotiate with more than one or two insurgent forces in Afghanistan. It appears that the Doha office will be one that claims to speak for Mullah Omar, who led the Taliban government in 1996-2001. It is less clear to me whether it can speak for the Haqqani network or other Taliban forces. We may well be expected the Pakistanis to deal directly with the Haqqani network, which at times has appeared to be an adjunct of the Pakistani inter-services intelligence directorate (ISI).
What does this portend for a peace settlement? Hard to tell of course, but I’d put a small amount of coin on the proposition that a role in governing parts of Afghanistan is on offer to the Taliban, with consequences for women and human rights more generally that can only be described as odious. Even if all the words on paper call for protection of women’s rights, getting implementation will be nigh on impossible. When you sue for peace, you don’t get everything you want. Secretary of State Clinton had better be ready to gather whatever women’s rights crumbs she can as the men slice and dice Afghanistan.
Here is Hassina Sherjan, Founder of Aid Afghanistan for Education and co-author of “Toughing It Out in Afghanistan” at Harvard Law School, telling her audience that wearing a burqa made her take six Advils a day:
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The end is nigh, again!
I made a bunch of predictions a year ago. Here is how they turned out:
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh). I wasn’t far off on this one. No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use. It got worse, as suggested. No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right: growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul. I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right. There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces. This is pretty much on the mark.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)? I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly. The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves. Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction. Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow. Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements. Presidential election was held and things have improved. Haiti has been calmer than anticipated. Good news.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level. Happy to be wrong here too: they did not succeed, but they did try several times. And they did not recentralize.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others. Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back. Pretty much on the mark.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls. Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them. Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials. I was also right about yawning and stretching.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians. Dead wrong on both counts.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!). The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket. Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction. He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking. Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.
I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong. Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example). But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you? Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.
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