Tag: Afghanistan
The friends we need in Islamabad
If all roads lead to Islamabad, which one do we take to get out?
Max Boot says we have to begin treating our “frenemies” in Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate the way we do Iran’s Quds force in Iraq:
Apply economic sanctions against its vast range of business interests. Limit the travel and freeze the assets of its leaders, starting with its current head, Lieutenant General Ahmed Shuja Pasha. A designation of the ISI as a formal state sponsor of terrorism might also be in order. No doubt the Pakistani military would react angrily to such steps, but many civilians in Pakistan—including President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani—who chafe under heavy-handed military dominance might quietly welcome them.
Vali Nasr understands the temptation, but urges that we make nice anyway, in order to keep to our 2014 date for drawdown from Afghanistan:
Confrontation with Pakistan presents Washington with a dilemma that will make leaving Afghanistan harder. If the United States truly wishes to change Pakistani behavior for the greater good of the region, then Washington has to be prepared to do what it takes to get that job done. That includes potentially keeping large numbers of U.S. troops in Afghanistan indefinitely to protect that country against the fallout from our policy and to convince Islamabad that it is futile for Pakistan to pursue its own goals in Afghanistan.
But if our goal is to leave Afghanistan in short order, then the prudent course of action is a return to stability in U.S.-Pakistan relations. That would have to start with ending the recent public acrimony but also confronting head-on what Pakistan is after in Afghanistan.
This is as sharp a policy choice as diplomats ever face. Which option is the right one?
Neither Max nor Vali discusses the issue I would regard as paramount: Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Nothing about Afghanistan–even our withdrawal–is more important than making sure they do not threaten the United States. This could happen if the Pakistani government were to fall under extremist control or if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear technology or materials to people who would use them against the United States. For those who think that unlikely, it is important to remember that Pakistan’s A. Q. Khan already transferred sensitive technology to Libya, Iran and North Korea in the 1990s.
It seems to me that what we need to ensure our interests are protected is a two-pronged approach. We should isolate and target (I would say even with military means) those who insist on supporting the Haqqani network and other Taliban forces, as Max suggests. At the same time, we need to make nice, as Vali suggests, to both civilians and military in the Pakistani government who understand the responsibilities of a nuclear power and are prepared both to cut off support to extremists and ensure that Pakistan’s weapons and technology remain under tight control. We will also have to provide Pakistan with assurances on limiting the role of India in Afghanistan and with a role in any peace negotiation there.
It is no easy matter to make these distinctions. What if we don’t find reliable civilians and military in the Pakistani government willing to opt unequivocally against extremism? Then, as Vali suggests, full withdrawal from Afghanistan becomes impossible and we’ll need to hunker down for a long confrontation across the Durand line that marks the border with Pakistan. That is an unattractive proposition that should make us try all the harder to find the friends we need in Islamabad.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
All roads lead to Islamabad
The commentariat is rarely as unanimous as it has been on the assassination of Barhanuddin Rabbani: Dexter Filkins, Marvin Weinbaum, Anand Gopal, Alissa Rubin and others (including Kate Clark of the Afghanistan Analysts Network) all agree that it will set back hopes for a negotiated agreement with the Taliban.
This despite the fact that the Taliban have not rushed to take credit for the assassination. Jihad Watch terms them “oddly quiet.” While no one seems to know why, the guessing focuses on differences of opinion within the Taliban, some of whom may want to pursue negotiations.
That suggests to me that the gloom about negotiations may be overdone. In a study published before the assassination, James Shinn and James Dobbins come an interesting conclusion in their primer on Afghan Peace Talks:
Close examination reveals that the priorities of all the potential parties to an Afghan peace process overlap to a considerable degree. For instance, each desires a withdrawal of Western armed forces—a situation especially desired by the publics in all of the Western countries. All Afghans want foreigners to stop interfering in their affairs. All foreign governments want assurances that Afghan territory will not be used to their disadvantage, whether by third parties or the Afghans themselves, and thus want to ensure that terrorists hostile to their countries cannot use Afghanistan as a sanctuary.
The problem of course is that it is not clear what the Taliban are prepared to do about terrorists, with whom at least some of them are allied. The killing of Rabbani is likely to come from sectors of the Taliban most tightly linked to international terrorists, who will want to do everything they can to prevent a negotiated settlement.
I would certainly expect a moment of hesitation in pursuing peace talks. Who is going to be brave enough to replace Rabbani, or meet the next time with a delegation that supposedly comes from the Taliban? Who among the Taliban would want to take the risk? Violence of this sort has consequences.
But they need not be permanent. The Americans clearly need a negotiated settlement as they begin to head for the exits. President Karzai wants one too, especially after the spectacular attacks on his allies and half brother in recent weeks. The remnants of Al Qaeda will want to continue fighting, as will some of the Taliban. But the prospects of civil war, so obvious to the American commentators, should be obvious to the Taliban too. Are they willing to test their mettle again in a war with the Tajiks, Uzbeks and others who once constituted the Northern Alliance, this time heavily armed and supported from the air by the Americans?
Taliban decisions on this question will depend heavily on whether they can continue to rely on their Pakistan safe haven. As Admiral Mullen at long last made clear in testimony yesterday, Islamabad is very much part of the problem. We are clearly going to have to figure out how to diminish Pakistani support for Haqqani network operations inside Afghanistan if a negotiation with the Taliban is going to succeed.
PS: For a well-informed view of splits in the Taliban, see Michael Semple’s piece on the Haqqanis in Foreign Affairs.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Rashomon beyond borders
I finished jury duty yesterday, acquitting a guy who was observed by an undercover policeman conducting a drug transaction. The twelve jurors reached agreement in less than an hour.
I went home the night before convinced after hearing the prosecution’s case that we would convict the guy. The policeman said he had seen the accused transfer $25 worth of cocaine and PCP to another person in broad daylight on a Washington, DC street corner.
Yesterday, the defense put the accused on the stand, where he said he was an addict trying to buy, not sell, when he realized the transaction was being observed. He therefore aborted the transaction, asked for and received his money back without receiving the drugs, which were found in a search of the other guy.
None of the jurors was sure this defense account of events was true, and for all I know it is a standard ploy to claim to have been buying when you are accused of “distribution,” which the judge explained requires transfer to another person (not necessarily for payment). But there was no compelling evidence the story was false. Had the policeman seen the tiny packets (“zips”) of drugs transferred? Not really, but he claimed that he saw the second man pick something unidentified out of the accused’s cupped hand.
So here you have two different versions of the same events, with the rules heavily weighted in favor of the defense: the government was obligated to prove the distribution of illegal drugs “beyond a reasonable doubt.” None of us on the jury thought that standard had been met.
It struck me as we proceeded through the careful choreography of a DC courtroom how really very difficult it is to administer justice this way. Jurors randomized, judge impeccable in explaining the law and protecting the integrity of the process but not commenting in any way on the truth or falsity of the allegation, machine to make consultations at the bench inaudible, jurors disciplined about not discussing the case outside the jury room, prosecutor and defense attorney clearly well-educated and experienced.
It is not an exaggeration to say that it is a privilege to have your crimes judged in this fashion, though the drug-addict accused is unlikely to have been grateful. His court-appointed attorney told me after the trial he did not think the guy would take advantage of the big break the jury had given him.
All this for a $25 offense? I still don’t know why the government bothered to prosecute this case, but I imagine they were convinced he was a much bigger fish than he appeared in court.
Which raises the much more important question of how and why Troy Davis was convicted in Georgia when there was no physical evidence and most of the witnesses changed their stories after the conviction, several claiming the police had pressured them to testify as they did. I can’t say Troy Davis was innocent, but was he guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt”?
The world was watching the Troy Davis case. Were I still a U.S. diplomat, I would find it hard to explain the execution of someone about whom there was even a sliver of reasonable doubt. The issue for me is not so much the moral one, which should be more important to those who believe government is an inefficient and ineffective mechanism to do just about anything and therefore inherently untrustworthy. The issue for me is doing something irreversible (and, by the way, frighteningly expensive, as capital cases chew up a lot of resources) when there is no physical evidence. Eye witnesses are notoriously unreliable.
The United States makes a lot of effort these days to promote “rule of law” abroad–it has been a major part of our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ours is such an expensive and difficult system to administer that it gives me pause to ask poorer and less well educated countries to imitate it. But the execution of Troy Davis gives me even greater pause, even if both Iraq and Afghanistan are devotees of capital punishment. Can they really be expected to do any better than we do in eliminating the possibility of executing someone who is innocent? What is the example we are setting?
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Only time will tell
I’ve been busy lately reading articles about how dumb various (but mostly American) negotiators are. If only the diplomats would do some pretty simple things, serious conflicts would be readily resolved.
A former Iranian nuclear negotiator suggests the Americans and Iranians just have to put aside the threats and pressure, then talk nicer about issues of common interest and things will improve. Ahmed Rashid wants us to listen more carefully to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who says he does not intend to monopolize power in Afghanistan. And we could achieve peace in Israel and Palestine if the Palestinians would just recognize Israel, and Israel would provide a few factories to the Palestinians.
This last one is the easiest to debunk. There hasn’t been a problem with Palestinian recognition of Israel since Arafat did it almost twenty years ago. The problem is that Israel is now demanding recognition as a Jewish state, something that the UN General Assembly already did in its partition resolution. And of course Israel has not recognized Palestine, or allowed it to establish clear borders. The notion that economic development will satisfy the Palestinians in the absence of a political solution is nonsense.
Listening carefully to Mullah Omar is a good idea, but I confess his Eid message did not fill me with hope. Here is what he actually says about negotiation:
The Islamic Emirate considers the presence of the foreign invading troops in the country; their blind-bombardment, night raids, their brutalities; tortures and tyranny as the main cause of the current imbroglio in the country. The issue would come to an end when the said brutalities are meted out. Similarly, IE [Islamic Emirate] considers [the] establishment of an independent Islamic regime as a conducive mechanism for sustainability of religious and worldly interests of the country and the countrymen. For this purpose, every legitimate option can be considered in order to reach this goal. The contacts which have been made with some parties for the release of prisoners can’t be called as a comprehensive negotiation for the solution of the current imbroglio of the country. However, the Islamic Emirate, as an efficient political and military entity, has a specific and independent agenda in this regard which has been elucidated time and again.
Yes, he leaves the door open to future talks, but he also goes on to make it clear that the Taliban will only stop fighting when the occupation has ended. We can be certain Mullah Omar’s message was carefully parsed inside the State Department and the U.S. intelligence community, where its ambiguous character will not have excited too much enthusiasm.
As for Iran, it makes sense to reduce the trash talking and to focus on issues where there may be some common interest, but the hard kernel of disagreement is over nuclear weapons. Making nice and solving some other issues isn’t going to make that one go away, and the time delay could even make it more difficult to solve.
So yes, we do need to make sure we understand our adversaries, deal in a pragmatic way with them and leave no stone unturned in the search for peaceful resolutions of these issues. But it is a whole lot easier to kibbitz from the sidelines than to play the game for real. When the guys calling for more stridency are also the people deciding your budget, there is an inclination to go strident. When the Taliban are as ambiguous as Mullah Omar in his Eid message, listening really does get hard. And when your critics are misunderstanding the problem, it is easy to write them off.
There is one sign of hope in all these cases: the Americans are maintaining radio silence. Iran guru Dennis Ross, Afghanistan lead Marc Grossman and whoever is acting in George Mitchell’s place (Hoff? Feltman?) on Israel/Palestine are suspiciously quiet. Maybe that’s because there is nothing to say. Or maybe it’s because negotiations are quietly producing fruit. Only time will tell.
PS: I’m not the only one less impressed with Mullah Omar’s message than Ahmed Rashid.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Afghanistan war’s last casualty
Steve Clemons has noted how the Afghanistan war, once a magnet for the best and the brightest, has been left to Joe Biden’s lonely ingenuity:
Biden is the right guy to help Obama to deliver the political outcome in Afghanistan that we need to get to. Biden has thought through strategies to deal with components of the Taliban, understands the vital role Pakistan must play, gets the strategic gaming that is also part of the package and which would no doubt involve India, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps China and Russia.
Clemons doesn’t even mention the highly competent Marc Grossman, who replaced Richard Holbrooke as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan. I guess he is just chopped liver.
It is easy to see why the power players are abandoning the Afghanistan account. There isn’t much upside left. President Karzai’s closest associates are being assassinated, the warlords are predominant, the drug trade is resurgent, the country’s biggest bank has failed due to blatant fraud and corruption, and the Americans are beginning to withdraw, with a target date of end of 2014 for full withdrawal.
It’s hardly worth mentioning that USAID and the U.S. Embassy of which it is a part are at odds, or that GAO thinks better accountability for assistance money is required. Except those are perennial problems that go unnoticed when things are improving.
With Osama bin Laden dead and Al Qaeda diminished, the only remaining justification for the U.S. to spend over $100 billion per year on the war in Afghanistan is the prospect that it might one day harbor extremists who would destabilize Pakistan, a nuclear weapons state whose dicey political and economic situation is more likely to worsen than improve. That’s a threat worth worrying about, but it’s hypothetical rather than imminent.
So the United States is suing for peace, trying to arrange an end to the Afghanistan war that is short of ignominious: peace with honor, or at least a minimum of dignity. This will mean accepting a Taliban role in Afghanistan’s future governance–that’s what getting them off the UN’s terrorist lists portends. It will also mean continuing to aid Pakistan, even if Islamabad steals a good part of our money and fails to do a lot of what we would like. As Dennis Kux notes in a recent piece for the Real Instituto Elcano, that kind of muddling through with Pakistan has been going on for decades. Why should it stop now? The foreign policy experts are betting it won’t, despite serious bilateral frictions.
I’m not so sure, but the reasons have more to do with the dueling over the debt and deficit than foreign policy. The United States is in no position to continue spending over $100 billion per year in Afghanistan, but so far we’ve done it because that’s what we’ve locked ourselves into. Those few extra billion (it looks like under $5 billion per year) for Pakistan’s military and economy may not seem like much in the scheme of things, but the Tea Party won’t see it that way. Aid to Israel is sacrosanct even in the Tea Party, but aid to a Pakistani government and military that can’t see its way to helping us get Al Qaeda is not.
So either we abandon Pakistan because we get tired of having our money stolen, or we continue the aid but leave Pakistan at the mercy of whatever arrangements we are able to make on the Afghan side of the border before we leave in 2014. One way or the other, Pakistan will be the Afghanistan war’s last casualty.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The damndest problem
Somehow this invitation to a discussion of India/Pakistan relations prompts me to ask a different but related question: how should the United States deal with Pakistan?
I confess to colossal ignorance when it comes to anything east and south of the Durand line. All I really know is that Pakistan is populous (170 million), ethnically complex (Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis and many others) and mostly poor (about $1000 per capita GNP). It has nuclear weapons and an enduring existential fear of India. The army plays an often outsized role, but civilian politics can be dauntingly agitated as well.
So why should this matter? It is the nuclear weapons that really count to the United States–they are approaching 100 warheads. Their main purpose seems to be to prevent an Indian attack, or to respond to one. American concern is not only that Pakistan might use them, triggering an unpredictable but likely devastating series of events, but that they might fall into the hands of terrorists. Pakistan has a record of having exported nuclear technology to North Korea and elsewhere.
For at least as long as U.S. troops are in Afghanistan, there will be another concern: terrorists harbored in the Pakistan’s border areas. We can quarrel about whether the Pakistani government knew Osama Bin Laden was holed up in Abbottabad, but it is clear that at least some religious extremists have de facto permission from the Pakistani government to destabilize the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, in order to gain “strategic depth” for Islamabad (that is, deny India a foothold in a stable Afghanistan). Our many drone strikes inside Pakistan, with something like tacit permission from Islamabad, are the current stopgap in deal with this problem.
What are our options in dealing with Pakistan?
1. Walk away. Too complicated, too difficult, too far away. We’ve tried this several times over the last few decades. We always end up regretting it and going back, whether because of the nukes or the border with Afghanistan.
2. Get engaged. Pakistan has lots of problems: political, economic, security. We could try to engage more actively in resolving some of these. Dick Holbrooke is said to have thought we needed to help resolve the India/Pakistan conflict, especially over Kashmir, if we wanted Pakistan to help us out more against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. But what makes us think we can have much impact on Pakistan’s internal political and economic problems, never mind its more than 60-year conflict with India?
3. Get selectively engaged. So some things are too hard. That doesn’t mean we shouldn’t ante up to get Pakistan to do the things we need done, like police its border with Afghanistan more effectively and guard its nuclear weapons more carefully. This is pretty much current policy, plus the drone strikes. We don’t know if the American assistance on guarding the nuclear weapons is effective, but we do know that the Pakistani military has been pocketing a lot of our assistance and doing very little in return. So we’ve cut off some of that assistance and they are cozying up to the Chinese.
4. Go with India and contain Pakistan. India is Pakistan’s natural regional rival. We could just throw in our lot with the Indians and use them as a counterbalance to Pakistan, which in turn would become a Chinese surrogate. This kind of “offshore” balancing is much the rage these days among those who resist American intervention abroad but recognize the national security problems that motivate it. But offshore balancing in this case amounts to putting our interests in the hands of New Delhi–does that sound wise? And it might do nothing to prevent nuclear war or nuclear terrorism, and certainly nothing to prevent Pakistan from destabilizing Afghanistan, which are our main concerns.
5. Go regional. Rather than splitting Asia between American and Chinese spheres of influence, we could try to promote the kind of regional cooperation that has proved so effective in Europe and Latin America. Freer trade and investment would eventually lead India and Pakistan to have a bigger stake in peace and stability that they would maintain themselves. But at best this is a long-term bet, not one that produces results in the next year or two, or even five or ten.
Having trouble choosing your preferred option? That’s what I said: the damndest problem.
RSS - Posts
