Tag: Afghanistan
Barbarities
It doesn’t get much more senseless than this: a pastor in Florida conducts a mock trial of the Koran, then burns it. No one notices, until Afghan President Karzai denounces the Koran burning and arouses the sensibilities of Muslims almost half a world away. A group of them compounds the evil by attacking a local UN office and killing twelve, none of whom have any connection to the Koran burning (and at least four of whom were Afghans). Another nine people died today in Taliban-inspired protests in Kandahar, where the Americans have made an enormous effort to win over the local population.
This isn’t a clash of civilizations; this is a clash of barbarities.
They are not the only barbarities in today’s world. The Red Cross says 800 were killed in fighting over a town in western Ivory Coast between the forces of president-elect Alassane Ouattara and incumbent Laurent Gbagbo. An American testified at trial that he and his U.S. Army comrades wantonly killed innocent Afghans, for the sake of entertainment.
Apart from the obvious, several of these incidents have in common something surprising: the passion to do something “good.” The pastor thinks the Koran is evil–that’s the avowed reason for the mock trial and Koran burning. Those who attacked the UN compound in Mazar-i-Sharif were led by imams seeking to punish the evil that had been done to Islam. Outtara and Gbagbo are both fighting for what they claim was the legitimate outcome of an election.
What about those Americans? Entertainment is I guess a “good” of sorts, but it really doesn’t match up with the other good causes implicated in these barbarities. What makes it possible for Americans to kill for entertainment?
They can do this only if they view the Afghans as the “other,” a group that does not merit respect for human life. This is likely to be the case in the other instances of barbarity as well. The “othering” of individuals or groups is at the root of much interethnic and sectarian violence. Americans are not immune, especially if they have reason to fear, or want to instil fear in adversaries (two sides of the same coin).
How to respond to such senselessness? Prosecutions in Afghanistan are clearly in order. The UN, desperately needed in Afghanistan to help with everything from negotiations with the Taliban to feeding and sheltering the poor, will not be able to stay if its staff can be murdered with impunity. The incitement in Florida is truly irrelevant to the need for accountability in Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kandahar.
That said, the church in Florida–I don’t want to name it or give its pastor any more of the publicity he so obviously craves–is abusive. Symbolic acts like the burning of the Koran (or of the New Testament) are constitutionally protected in the U.S. The church folk know this and are using that protection as a shield while they attack Islam. I have no idea how the American justice system will handle this–there is precedent for restraining people from symbolic acts that incite violence. But it seems to me that those ideologically close this pastor have a clear responsibility to stop him from further provocations. This includes his own parishioners as well as much of what is known today as the “Christian right,” which has been quick to ask that American Muslims restrain their own from extremism. Good for the goose, good for the gander.
Accountability in Ivory Coast seems far off, but if Ouattara wants to avoid Gbagbo’s fate he’ll tend to it even before the fighting is over. The appeal for Gbagbo’s people to come over to his side that I’ve published in the previous post is not enough. He needs to restrain his own people and prevent harm to civilians, no matter whom they support. Starting his regime with a massacre will do him no good at all.
The Americans have already tried and convicted one of the U.S. Army perpetrators. He got off with a relatively light sentence, apparently in exchange for testimony against his buddies. I find that disgraceful, but I suppose also unavoidable. Let’s hope the others get what they merit, as a clear signal to the rest of our soldiers and marines that the institution they work for will hold them accountable.
My personal inclination would be to put all these perpetrators in the same prison cell together and let them sort it out. I suppose it is better that what will happen is that the respective justice systems will slowly sort out which punishments are merited. Let’s hope they do it quicker and better than usual. Preventing future barbarities requires ending impunity for past ones.
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It takes a region
The Pickering/Brahimi report on negotiating an end to the war in Afghanistan is on less than firm ground in claiming that its publication happens to coincide with the perfect moment to launch negotiations to end the insurgency in Afghanistan (see my previous post), but its discussion of the regional interests in Afghanistan is better framed. They do not limit themselves to Pakistan, as so many reports seem inclined to do, but look farther to Iran, India, China and Russia.
Still, they leave me with a lot of question marks. They don’t deal with Pakistan’s ISI, which seems rather more wedded to the Taliban than the rest of the Pakistani government. In fact, they treat “Pakistan” as a unified actor, which is certainly not the way it has acted in the past, and I don’t know many analysts who expect it to act that way in the future.
They cite Iran’s interests in controlling drugs, protecting Shia, preventing the Taliban from returning to power and maintaining influence in Herat. But they don’t deal with Tehran’s apparent willingness to provide some military support to Taliban insurgents inside Afghanistan.
The report counts China as a possible influence in the right direction on Pakistan. Beijing might certainly wish it so, as Afghanistan’s minerals are appetizingly close by. But I wonder whether the Pakistan that would have to be influenced is all that interested in what the Chinese have to say on Afghanistan. Again there is that unified actor question.
The treatment of “Central Asian states,” (aka the Stans, I think) and Russia is rather cursory, with a reference to their interests in a stable Afghanistan, their worries about U.S. presence and the possibility of jihadis breaching their borders. It seems to me that they have been surprisingly non-meddling, even helpful. How do we account for that, and is there something more they can do?
The discussion of how the proposed international “facilitator” would deal with the various layers of neighborly and other international interest is well done. The idea would be a series of bilateral consultations, to precede any multilateral meeting (one coming up in Istanbul).
The suggestion that international peacekeepers may be needed post-settlement I find mind-stretching. It’s a bit difficult to imagine Afghanistan safe for peacekeepers, Muslim or not, rather than peace enforcers. But of course that is just the point: if there is a broad political settlement, most of the insurgency would presumably go away.
All of this may be wishful thinking. But it is more realistic wishful thinking–maybe even “visionary” thinking–than believing we are going to be able to withdraw from Afghanistan by 2014 without a negotiated political settlement.
I have feared the terms of that settlement inside Afghanistan for human rights, in particular for women. I’ve too often sat in State Department meetings where assistant secretaries promised not to sell out human rights, only to discover a week later that is precisely what was done. And what real leverage do we have over how women are treated in a Helmand governed by Taliban? The best of intentions somehow go astray when faced with the need for a power-sharing agreement with people who have been violating human rights for years, if not decades. That conflict of interests and values, again.
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Even if Afghanistan is not ripe, negotiations should start
The Century Foundation’s report on Afghanistan: Negotiating Peace, out today, is an eminently reasonable exploration of the issues for resolution and processes required for a broad political agreement that would end the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and lead to the withdrawal of NATO and U.S. forces. The kind of agreement the report advocates is one that meets the stated American war objective: “An accord must include a verifiable severing of Taliban ties with al Qaeda and guarantees that Afghanistan will never again shelter transnational terrorists, with possible UN Security Council measures to support counterterrorism capability during a transition period.”
The question is this: is now the time? Are the conditions “ripe” for negotiation?
Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas Pickering, co-chairs of the task force that wrote this report, argue that the answer is “yes” to both these questions. Afghanistan, they say, is “settling in to stalemate.”
In the conflict management world, “ripeness” is associated with a “mutually hurting stalemate.” But is this a mutually hurting stalemate? Not I think in the description Brahimi and Pickering provide:
While some counsel holding back from negotiations until military momentum is clearly and decisively in their favor, we believe the best moment to start a political process toward reconciliation is now. For the government’s allies, the optimal window would seem to be before their capacities peak, not when force levels have commenced a downward trajectory. For the insurgency, the prospects for negotiating a share of national power are not likely to become appreciably brighter by waiting until 2014. On the contrary, the prospect that the Americans could find a way to reduce the size of their force deployment and yet maintain force lethality for years to come suggests that perhaps the only way they can get the Americans truly out is with a negotiated settlement. For the United States, a negotiating process allows it to shape the ultimate political outcomes with more confidence than by betting on a prolonged and inconclusive war.
The situation they are describing is not a stalemate. It is more like mutual anticipation of declining military power, something adversaries find it difficult to do (and which is unlikely to happen on both sides at the same time). Only once the situation is hurting both sides, and waiting will not relieve the hurt on either side, does “ripeness” theory suggest that negotiations will be fruitful. With General Petraeus vaunting progress and the Taliban expanding their operations, it is hard for me to see where the stalemate is.
I think the argument for negotiations at the moment in Afghanistan would be better made on other grounds, some of which are referred to in the Century Foundation report. We need not wait for ripeness. We often don’t: witness Bosnia and Kosovo, for example. The Dayton agreements and the end of the NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo were not negotiated at a time of mutually hurting stalemate, but rather in moments of rapidly shifting military circumstances. Neither was a perfect agreement, and both have been difficult to implement, but the peace has held.
In Afghanistan, we think we know that there is no military solution and that there will have to be a political resolution. We also know that continued fighting will kill lots of people, including a lot of innocent people. While we are reasonably certain we can sustain the NATO effort until 2014, we are not certain that it can be sustained thereafter by the Afghans, even with ample U.S. assistance. This provides the rationale for negotiations: not a mutually hurting stalemate, but rather a desire to limit risks to human beings and to the sustainability of the Afghan state.
In other words, this may not be the best moment for negotiations, but it is the moment we find ourselves in as we begin to develop a real appetite for getting out of Afghanistan. If there is even a small probability of successfully negotiating an early end to the war, that could easily justify the risks and expense involved. The U.S. is today spending on the order of $8 billion per month in Afghanistan; it is hard to picture that negotiations will cost more than one-one thousandth of that number ($8 million per month). Surely there is a one in a thousand chance of success. Negotiating is worth the gamble.
At the very least, negotiations–which Brahimi and Pickering argue should be led by a third party, likely the UN–will teach us a good deal more about the enemy than we seem to know today. Or negotiations may split off at least part of the insurgency and ease the military task. They could also settle some issues and not others, reducing the intensity of the conflict without eliminating it entirely.
In the end, the Century Foundation report may be remembered less for its advocacy of negotiations based on a mistaken assessment of “ripeness” and more for its analysis of regional interests, including but not limited to those of Pakistan and Iran. More on that in a later post.
PS: For a skeptical, on-the-ground perspective about prospects for negotiations, see Martine van Biljert’s piece.
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Doom and gloom
A world that was looking hopeful two weeks ago has taken a sharp turn southwards:
- The earthquake in Japan has not only caused upwards of 10,000 deaths and untold destruction, it has also put in doubt nuclear programs worldwide, not to mention what the prospect of further radiation leaks will do to stock markets today and the economic recovery in the future.
- Counter revolution is on the march in Libya, Bahrain and Yemen–in all three countries repression is winning the day, with the help of hesitation in Europe and the U.S. and Saudi and UAE security forces in Manama.
- Egypt votes in a constitutional referendum Saturday to either approve amendments prepared behind closed doors that would leave its regime largely intact, or disapprove, sending the country into uncertainty once again.
- Violence in Sudan is rising, with local south/south conflicts and tension in Abyei overshadowed for the moment by the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement claim that the north is planning a coup intended to prevent independence in July.
- Iran is succeeding in repressing its Green Movement opposition and in neutering anyone else who might dare to challenge President Ahmedinejad.
- Kurdish and Arab leaders in Iraq are competing to see who can claim Kirkuk is their Jerusalem most convincingly, while their respective military forces face off in the contested town.
It is telling that today’s testimony in Congress by General Petraeus on the situation in Afghanistan, which is expected to be relatively upbeat, is the only good news, though experienced wags will see it as just the latest in a long string of turning points in a war that has never turned.
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The world beyond Egypt
I’ve been so caught up in Egypt for 10 days, and Tunisia before that, I’m feeling the need for one of those quickie updates, so here goes (even if there is relatively little progress to report):
- Iran: P5+1 Ankara meeting at the end of January went badly, some say because Ahmedinejad did not take advantage of what the Americans were offering. I don’t think we’ve heard the last of it.
- Pakistan: Messy (that’s what I call it when a President has to call for a roundtable conference), but no big crisis.
- North Korea: Quiescent for the moment, but mil/mil talks have stalled.
- Afghanistan: Lots of reports of military progress from David Petraeus, and some sign that the Taliban may be looking for negotiations, or at least that is how I interpret their putting out the word that they might break with Al Qaeda.
- Iraq: some Arab/Kurdish progress that will allow oil to flow north. My friend Reidar Visser doesn’t think that’s good, but I do.
- Israel/Palestine: Biggest news has been the Palestine papers, widely interpreted to suggest Palestinian weakness, ineptitude or both. I think they show the Israelis overplaying their hand to no good purpose.
- Egypt: Trouble. This is what I said at the end of the year: “succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow.” Did I get it right? All but that part about the courts anyway.
- Haiti: Presidential runoff postponed to March 20. President Preval’s favorite will not be on the ballot; former first lady Mirlande Manigat will face singer Michel Martelly.
- Al Qaeda: No news is good news.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen’s President Saleh has so far proved immune to Egyptian flu, but itmay not last forever. Parliament in Somalia has extended its own mandate for three more years, dismaying the paymasters in Washington and other capitals. Nice democracy lesson.
- Sudan: The independence referendum passed, as predicted (no genius in that). Lots of outstanding issues under negotiation. President Bashir is behaving himself, some say because of the carrots Washington has offered. In my experience indictment has that effect on most people.
- Lebanon: Indictments delivered, not published, yet.
- Syria: President Bashar al Assad is doing even better than Bashir of Yemen. No demonstrations materialized at all.
- Ivory Coast: Gbagbo and his entourage are still waiting for their first-class plane tickets. African Union is factfinding, in preparation for mediation. Could this be any slower?
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe continues to defy, sponsors riot in Harare. No real progress on implementation of powersharing agreement with the opposition.
- Balkans: Bosnia stuck on constitutional reform, Kosovo/Serbia dialogue blocked by government formation in Pristina, Macedonia still hung up on the “name” issue. See a pattern here? Some people just recycle their old problems.
- Tunisia: At last some place where there is progress: the former ruling party has been shuttered. Don’t hold your breath for that to happen in Egypt!
PS: on Algeria, see this interesting piece.
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Adult supervision needed
The New York Times reports that President Karzai has agreed to convene Parliament Wednesday, after making a genuine mess of things by trying to get changes made in the results of last September’s elections. Somehow I have a feeling we have not heard the last of this story, but even thus far it tells us something about Afghanistan.
The President had good reason to be unhappy with the outcome of the September parliamentary elections: due to insecurity in the parts of the country where they live, Pashtuns are underrepresented, especially in Ghazni province, and some of his favorites did not get in. The last parliament had become increasingly aggressive in questioning ministers, claiming it had ultimate responsibility for constitutional interpretation, and in general exercising some oversight of the executive branch. This is not fun for any president, especially one who lacks a strong power base of his own and is fighting a counter-insurgency war with allies he regards as fickle while he tries to negotiate a political settlement with the enemy. A little support in parliament would be nice.
What Karzai tried to do was use a panel of judges he appointed expressly for the purpose to outflank the internationally supported electoral commissions that were supposed to have final say on the election results. Normally I might cheer a president who is feisty enough to tell the internationals where to go, but that would not have been the appropriate reaction in this instance. It is hard always to credit the rule of law arguments (“integrity of the electoral process” and all that) my colleagues make, but every once in a while something is so blatantly abusive that we should, if only because the Afghans who did vote are entitled to the parliament they voted for.
So what does this story tell us about Afghanistan? It tells us that the international intervention there needs to maintain its vigilance and act when necessary to counterbalance abuses.
But it also tells us that the Afghans have their own balancing mechanisms–President Karzai apparently backed down after a very long lunch with the people elected to the new parliament, who had been threatening to open their session without him. Maybe, just maybe, the adult supervision that is needed can come in the future a bit more from Afghans than from the foreigners.
We’ve got our own politicians to keep on the straight and narrow. As well as an ex-spy and his friends to rein in.
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