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Petraeus determined, Pentagon reports some progress

With David Petraeus in Paris vaunting the necessity of success in Afghanistan, the Pentagon has just issued a nuanced account of where things stood on September 30.

The Pentagon:

“Progress across the country remains uneven, with modest gains in security, governance, and development in operational priority areas. The deliberate application of our strategy is beginning to have cumulative effects and security is slowly beginning to expand. Although significant challenges exist, some signs of progress are evident.”

General Petraeus:

“Il est vital que l’Afghanistan ne redevienne jamais plus un sanctuaire pour les extrémistes”, a-t-il résumé lors d’une conférence à Sciences-Po Paris. La seule façon d’atteindre cet objectif est, selon lui, “d’aider les Afghans à assurer leur sécurité eux-mêmes”.

Or, for those without enough French to challenge my translation:  “It is vital that Afghanistan never again become a sanctuary for extremists,” he said in a lecture at the Institute of Political Studies in Paris, “the only way of achieving this objective is to help the Afghans to ensure their own security.”

Fool me once…

The New York Times reports this morning that the supposed Taliban commander reported to have been in talks with the Coalition and the Afghan government was in fact an impostor.

Embarrassing as it is to be snookered even once, it would be much worse if it happens again.  Maybe the demand for cash should have aroused more suspicion even the first time around.  Would a genuine Taliban representative really require payment?

“Forlorn Karzai breaking with the west”

Ahmed Rashid in the FT tries to convey how the world looks in the eyes of President Karzai: he sees in the West mixed messages, inability to get Pakistan to do the right things, a cacophony of ambassadors, vacillation about staying and going, unfair criticism, and manufactured rumors of mental imbalance.  Preparing for NATO departure, the President is reasserting Afghan nationalism and trying to cut deals with the Taliban supported by Pakistan and Iran.

Larry Korb reporting from Kabul confirms that the President is largely in tune with others there, who are frustrated and unappreciative of the Administration’s surge and other efforts.

Meanwhile, in Lisbon NATO is preparing to reaffirm July 2011 as the beginning of its drawdown, with 2014 as the target date for completing the turnover of primary security responsibility to Kabul (a training/mentoring mission would remain). This reflects political feasibility in Europe and the U.S. as much as it does Afghan reality, but it is still an enormous additional investment.  The question remains:  is Karzai worth the candle?  But it is the kind of question that won’t be asked once this NATO Summit has set its course.

Is Karzai worth it?

Five months ago James Traub in Foreign Policy asked the question:  is Karzai worth the War in Afghanistan? General Stanley McCrystal had just been cashiered and David Petraeus had just taken over.

This is still the vital question.  There is no point in conducting a counterinsurgency war unless the host government has legitimacy with the population.  Karzai understands this perfectly well, which is why he complains bitterly about night time raids by U.S. forces, even if they are as effective as Petraeus claims.

The main American complaint about Karzai at the moment is corruption, which is rampant.  The problem is that what the Americans view as corruption Karzai views as his system of governance, which relies heavily on a coterie of strongmen and large quantities of cash.  Afghans are much less impressed than Americans with elections as the basis for legitimacy.  They regard deliver of services, even those delivered through less than transparent means, as more important.

The Americans are working hard on anti-corruption efforts, but the opposite of corruption is not anti-corruption.  It is good, transparent, accountable governance.

That should start at home, as Karzai rudely points out:  American contracting for security and other services appears not only to be corrupt but also to be putting money in the pockets of insurgents.

But even if he has a point, the question remains:  is Karzai worth it?  This should be a focus of the December policy review, if it is going to be of any real use.