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“Forlorn Karzai breaking with the west”

Ahmed Rashid in the FT tries to convey how the world looks in the eyes of President Karzai: he sees in the West mixed messages, inability to get Pakistan to do the right things, a cacophony of ambassadors, vacillation about staying and going, unfair criticism, and manufactured rumors of mental imbalance.  Preparing for NATO departure, the President is reasserting Afghan nationalism and trying to cut deals with the Taliban supported by Pakistan and Iran.

Larry Korb reporting from Kabul confirms that the President is largely in tune with others there, who are frustrated and unappreciative of the Administration’s surge and other efforts.

Meanwhile, in Lisbon NATO is preparing to reaffirm July 2011 as the beginning of its drawdown, with 2014 as the target date for completing the turnover of primary security responsibility to Kabul (a training/mentoring mission would remain). This reflects political feasibility in Europe and the U.S. as much as it does Afghan reality, but it is still an enormous additional investment.  The question remains:  is Karzai worth the candle?  But it is the kind of question that won’t be asked once this NATO Summit has set its course.

Is Karzai worth it?

Five months ago James Traub in Foreign Policy asked the question:  is Karzai worth the War in Afghanistan? General Stanley McCrystal had just been cashiered and David Petraeus had just taken over.

This is still the vital question.  There is no point in conducting a counterinsurgency war unless the host government has legitimacy with the population.  Karzai understands this perfectly well, which is why he complains bitterly about night time raids by U.S. forces, even if they are as effective as Petraeus claims.

The main American complaint about Karzai at the moment is corruption, which is rampant.  The problem is that what the Americans view as corruption Karzai views as his system of governance, which relies heavily on a coterie of strongmen and large quantities of cash.  Afghans are much less impressed than Americans with elections as the basis for legitimacy.  They regard deliver of services, even those delivered through less than transparent means, as more important.

The Americans are working hard on anti-corruption efforts, but the opposite of corruption is not anti-corruption.  It is good, transparent, accountable governance.

That should start at home, as Karzai rudely points out:  American contracting for security and other services appears not only to be corrupt but also to be putting money in the pockets of insurgents.

But even if he has a point, the question remains:  is Karzai worth it?  This should be a focus of the December policy review, if it is going to be of any real use.

And Petraeus channels Petraeus

The General’s transition plan to phase out NATO combat operations by 2014 bears a distinct resemblance to the Iraq phase-out now being completed.

Karzai channels Maliki

Afghanistan President Karzai, in an interview published this morning in the Washington Post, asks for a reduced U.S. military presence and an end to night-time raids on Afghan homes.  He sounds a lot like Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki three years ago, but he has shown none of Maliki’s grit (remember the Iraqi attacks on Moqtada al Sadr’s people in Basra and Sadr City?).  Karzai also blames corruption in Afghanistan on American contracting practices.  Maybe we should cancel all those Afghanistan reports (as well as the December policy review) and leave Karzai to his own devices.

Flood of Afpak reports begins

Clear a shelf:  the flood of reports on Afghanistan and Pakistan has only just begun.  Earlier in the fall (it would be nice if they put dates on these reports!), the self-appointed Afghanistan Study Group (wish I had trademarked “study group” when I was executive director of the Iraq Study Group) has already recommended winding down and eventually out the military effort, while somehow increasing economic assistance and regional cooperation: A New Way Forward | Report of the Afghanistan Study Group.

Now the Council on Foreign Relations (Sandy Berger and Rich Armitage chairing) weigh in with a lukewarm endorsement of the current military and civilian “surge” approach, but only if it starts to show results by the time of the President’s December policy review.  Absent that, they too advocate a drawdown and narrowing of the military effort to the fight against al Qaeda:  U.S. Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan – Council on Foreign Relations.

At least two more due out soon.  Center for American Progress should have a report out within a couple of weeks that focuses at least in part on the defects of the Karzai government and raises questions about whether it is worth supporting (as all the reports do, in one way or another).  Century Foundation has got Tom Pickering and Lakhdar Brahimi working on another report that focuses at least in part on the prospects for “reconciling” some of the Taliban.  Brahimi, remember, was the UN Special Representative who wanted to bring the Taliban into the political  process, a move the Americans blocked.

The Administration has already let it be understood that the December presidential review is not expected to produce any dramatic policy moves, and Gates/Clinton have been anxious to let the Taliban and al Qaeda know that they expect the U.S. to still be militarily active in Afghanistan and Pakistan until 2014, when Karzai claims the Afghans will take over.  But at the very least the reports already out suggest that there are profound doubts about the legitimacy, capability, honesty and efficacy of the Karzai government.

The CFR report defines a desirable end-state in Afghanistan this way:  “An acceptable end state in Afghanistan would be one in which the Afghan people are secure and strong enough to prevent the rise of new terrorist safe havens inside Afghanistan and avert a return to civil war without relying upon U.S. or international military forces.”  Can that be achieved with Karzai?