Tag: Africa
Justice delayed
The conviction of former Liberian president Charles Taylor more than a decade after the war crimes he aided and abetted during the period 1996-2002 answers one important question about his role in the war in Sierra Leone: did he bear some responsibility for rebel atrocities, even if he did not command them directly or conspire to produce them? The court said yes, though an alternate judge held a dissenting view.
Judging from Helene Cooper’s graphic piece in the New York Times about her own family’s experiences, the conviction also provides an important occasion for victims. Even more than ten years after the fact, even though the indictment covered only crimes in Sierra Leone and not in Liberia, they take some satisfaction from knowing that justice has not been denied but only delayed.
But what does it do, and not do, to prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity in the future? When Charles Taylor was indicted, it was widely believed that the court action would disrupt the then ongoing process of beginning the reconstruction of Liberia. Helene Cooper notes that he was tried for crimes in Sierra Leone rather than Liberia to avoid political problems that might have arisen in the country of which he was once president. So far as I can tell, these fears have proven unfounded. Charles Taylor is not today an important political factor in a Liberia that has made substantial progress in becoming a normal, functioning country, even if a frighteningly poor one.
Many diplomats bemoan the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment of President Omar al Bashir of Sudan, because they say it makes him hold on to power more tightly and interferes with diplomatic efforts to resolve the various conflicts embroiling his country. That view readily prevails in Syria, where President Bashar al Assad’s obvious responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity cannot lead to an ICC indictment because Russia will prevent the necessary referral from passing in the UN Security Council. Ugandan religious leader Joseph Kony, an ICC indictee, is still at large, despite a U.S.-aided manhunt. ICC indictment of Muammar Qaddafi, his son Saif and their security chief in Libya does not appear to have had much impact on their behavior.
So what good is an indictment that won’t produce justice for decades? It is unlikely that the indictees themselves will moderate their behavior in response to an indictment. Their discount rate is high and the results too uncertain and too far in the future to make them behave. But there are other possible benefits. First, an indictment may give pause to some of those below the top leadership, who will want to avoid also being held responsible. Second, an indictment is a concrete expression of international community will to remove a leader from power. It may not help in cutting deals, but it makes the bottom line remarkably clear.
Charles Taylor is the first head of state to be convicted since the Nuremberg trials. He is likely not the last. International justice is agonizingly slow, frustratingly incomplete, and potentially damaging to prospects for negotiated settlements. But even justice delayed can shed light on past events, moderate behavior and provide satisfaction to victims.
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Make sure time is not on his side
President Obama issued a statement Friday (that’s when we say things we don’t want too widely noticed) marking the 18th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide:
…we pause to reflect with horror and sadness on the 100 days in 1994 when 800,000 people lost their lives. The specter of this slaughter of mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters haunts us still, and reminds the nations of the world of our shared responsibility to do all we can to protect civilians and to ensure that evil of this magnitude never happens again.
The irony here should not be lost: we are in the midst of a much slower and less bloody but still brutal repression of civilian dissent in Syria, where the toll amounts to something over 10,000 during the past year. No one has called it genocide, but it is certainly what the trade knows as politicide: an effort to murder political opponents, especially of the Sunni Islamist persuasion, into submission. Human Rights Watch reports today on extrajudicial executions.
I can imagine the discussion among the White House staff. Some will have argued: let’s get the President to put out a statement on Rwanda that is also applicable to Syria today. Maybe that will get some action. Others will have added that phrase at the end about the magnitude of the evil, hoping to avoid the obvious implication that we really ought to do something to stop Bashar al Assad. The result is a statement that sounds vigorous but implies nothing.
Don’t get me wrong: I understand full well why the White House would hesitate to take military action in Syria. But we should be asking ourselves if we are doing everything in our power short of military force to end Bashar’s brutal crackdown as soon as possible. The Obama Administration will claim it is doing its best. Here is a checklist to make sure:
1. Provide financial, communications and intelligence support to the Syrian opposition provided it unifies and keeps its efforts as peaceful as possible. This should include real-time intelligence on the operations of the Syrian army, which is necessary for protection of civilians.
2. Encourage the opposition to flesh out its National Covenant with more specific provisions to protect minorities and regime loyalists from revenge killing should Bashar al Assad step aside.
3. Make sure sanctions are implemented strictly not only by the United States but also by other countries , especially members of the Arab League. Iraq, which has not signed up for them so far as I can tell, should be high on this list. Syrian oil reportedly traversed the Suez Canal recently, contravening sanctions.
4. Use our significant information operations capabilities to ensure that Syria’s dissident voices are heard throughout the country and that the Syrian military and business elite are encouraged to defect from the regime. If we have begun such efforts, they are a deep, dark secret.
5. Work diplomatically to bring the Russians around to the view that their interests in port access and arms sales will be served best by abandoning Bashar. This we are surely doing, but are we ready to offer Moscow a serious quid pro quo?
6. Get Kofi Annan to beef up his request for ceasefire observers to 1000 and help him deploy them quickly, with the capability to move quickly around the country and communicate instantaneously from wherever they are.
7. If the ceasefire fails to take hold by April 15, as now seems likely, return to the UN Security Council to seek a resolution condemning the Assad regime, calling for Bashar to step aside and instituting an arms embargo against the regime.
8. Seek to block arms and money transfers from Iran to Syria, even if there are no formal multilateral restrictions.
9. Prepare for a major post-conflict Arab League peacekeeping mission, which will be necessary to separate the Syrian army and the Free Syria Army and to protect minorities, in particular Allawis, Druze, Christians and others who have supported the Assad regime.
I doubt any of this will work quickly. Bashar al Assad feels he is winning, has started to back away from the Annan ceasefire supposed to go into effect this week, and no doubt hopes to restore his authority, as his father managed to do after killing tens of thousands in Hama in 1982. Splits in the opposition, including a Kurdish walkout, will give him renewed confidence. But the Syrian regime is on the economic ropes and will not be able to eliminate a resistance that is now widespread and broadly (but not universally) supported by the population. We need to hang tough for the long haul, as we did in Burma, making sure time is not on Bashar al Assad’s side.
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This is called retrenchment
We all anticipated this State of the Union speech would not focus on international issues, but here is my short list of more important things not mentioned or glossed over:
- West Bank settlements (or Palestinians)
- North Korea
- Euro crisis
- Africa or Latin America (not even Cuba),
- Bahrain or Saudi Arabia, virtually no Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen
- China (except as an unfair competitor)
- Turkey, Mexico, Brazil, India or even Russia (except as an emerging market)
- Pakistan (except as an Al Qaeda haven)
- Strait of Hormuz
That’s a pretty spectacular list, even without noting the absence of NATO, Japan, allies, Europe, the UN…
A few notable items that were mentioned:
- Strong on regime change in Syria (putting Assad in the same sentence with Qaddafi could have implications) and on exporting democracy and free markets in general
- Positive about peaceful resolution of the dispute with Iran over nuclear weapons, while keeping all options on the table
- Trade agreements with South Korea, Panama and Colombia
- Burma as the hope of the Pacific!
Of course the President also mentioned withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, security cooperation with Israel, blows delivered against Al Qaeda, and the troops (no mention of civilians serving abroad this time around I’m afraid).
If this is a prelude to the campaign, as rightly it should be, it presages an ever more economically focused foreign policy, with security issues narrowed to a few top priorities and little focus on diplomacy except on a few specific issues. This is a vision for restoring American economic strength at home, not increasing–or perhaps even maintaining–its commitments abroad. This is called retrenchment.
PS: I should have mentioned that Richard Haas calls it “restoration.” That’s a more positive word, but the substance is the same.
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What threatens the United States?
The Council on Foreign Relations published its Preventive Priorities Survey for 2012 last week. What does it tell us about the threats the United States faces in this second decade of the 21st century?
Looking at the ten Tier 1 contingencies “that directly threaten the U.S. homeland, are likely to trigger U.S. military involvement because of treaty commitments, or threaten the supplies of critical U.S. strategic resources,” only three are defined as military threats:
- a major military incident with China involving U.S. or allied forces
- an Iranian nuclear crisis (e.g., surprise advances in nuclear weapons/delivery capability, Israeli response)
- a U.S.-Pakistan military confrontation, triggered by a terror attack or U.S. counterterror operations
Two others might also involve a military threat, though the first is more likely from a terrorist source:
- a mass casualty attack on the U.S. homeland or on a treaty ally
- a severe North Korean crisis (e.g., armed provocations, internal political instability, advances in nuclear weapons/ICBM capability)
The remaining five involve mainly non-military contingencies:
- a highly disruptive cyberattack on U.S. critical infrastructure (e.g., telecommunications, electrical power, gas and oil, water supply, banking and finance, transportation, and emergency services)
- a significant increase in drug trafficking violence in Mexico that spills over into the United States
- severe internal instability in Pakistan, triggered by a civil-military crisis or terror attacks
- political instability in Saudi Arabia that endangers global oil supplies
- intensification of the European sovereign debt crisis that leads to the collapse of the euro, triggering a double-dip U.S. recession and further limiting budgetary resources
Five of the Tier 2 contingencies “that affect countries of strategic importance to the United States but that do not involve a mutual-defense treaty commitment” are also at least partly military in character, though they don’t necessarily involve U.S. forces:
- a severe Indo-Pak crisis that carries risk of military escalation, triggered by major terror attack
- rising tension/naval incident in the eastern Mediterranean Sea between Turkey and Israel
- a major erosion of security and governance gains in Afghanistan with intensification of insurgency or terror attacks
- a South China Sea armed confrontation over competing territorial claims
- a mass casualty attack on Israel
But Tier 2 also involves predominantly non-military threats to U.S. interests, albeit with potential for military consequences:
- political instability in Egypt with wider regional implications
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Syria, with potential outside intervention
- an outbreak of widespread civil violence in Yemen
- rising sectarian tensions and renewed violence in Iraq
- growing instability in Bahrain that spurs further Saudi and/or Iranian military action
Likewise Tier 3 contingencies “that could have severe/widespread humanitarian consequences but in countries of limited strategic importance to the United States” include military threats to U.S. interests:
- military conflict between Sudan and South Sudan
- increased conflict in Somalia, with continued outside intervention
- renewed military conflict between Russia and Georgia
- an outbreak of military conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, possibly over Nagorno Karabakh
And some non-military threats:
- heightened political instability and sectarian violence in Nigeria
- political instability in Venezuela surrounding the October 2012 elections or post-Chavez succession
- political instability in Kenya surrounding the August 2012 elections
- an intensification of political instability and violence in Libya
- violent election-related instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- political instability/resurgent ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan
I don’t mean to suggest in any way that the military is irrelevant to these “non-military” threats. But it is not the only tool needed to meet these contingencies, or even to meet the military ones. And if you begin thinking about preventive action, which is what the CFR unit that publishes this material does, there are clearly major non-military dimensions to what is needed to meet even the threats that take primarily military form.
And for those who read this blog because it publishes sometimes on the Balkans, please note: the region are nowhere to be seen on this list of 30 priorities for the United States.
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More China in Africa: collaboration or colonialism?
There was a second session on Africa at the Achebe Colloquium this morning. Here is my effort to capture main points.
Tijan Sallah, World Bank: Africa is doing well economically, because of Chinese Brazilian trade and investment and because of improved policies within Africa.
Richard Dowden, Royal African Society: China has been good for Africa economically. Western companies moved back in to compete and to subcontract to the Chinese. Africa has been growing ever since The Economist declared the continent hopeless. China has no mission to change Africa. Africans can play off Chinese against the West, freeing Africa from colonial legacy. Problems for the Chinese: political role at the UN, lack of employment for Africans in Chinese projects, illegal immigration of Chinese to Africa, Chinese purchases of land and indiscriminate arms trading.
Mark Wells, Human Rights Watch: In Zambia, Chinese are good investors but bad employers. They have purchased and revived copper mines, but conditions of employment (health and safety standards, hours, pay) are deplorable. Result is many strikes and some improvements. Effective regulation is lacking. It is the African governments that need to protect worker rights. When there is enforcement, the Chinese respond appropriately.
Muna B. Ndulo, Cornell: Chinese have no colonial history in Africa and supported liberation struggles. Africa has benefited from higher commodity prices and Chinese trade and investment. The Chinese are doing what others do. The issue is how Africa can avoid squandering the benefits. In Zambia, regulation is weak not because of the Chinese but because of the period of nationalization of the mines. The Zambians now have to rebuild capacity to regulate. Africa needs improved governance.
Brent Huffman, Northwestern: His documentary film showed the Chinese in Senegal enterprising and successful but preferring to spend time within their own community and importing many needs from China. Ordinary Senegalese are unhappy with cheap, low quality Chinese goods, but official Senegal welcomes the Chinese with open arms.
Tony Gambino, former USAID mission director, Democratic Republic of Congo: Collaboration, yes, but for whom and for what? China came into DRC in a big way after 2006. Focus is on commercial benefit (metals) with tied loans for social or infrastructure projects, repaid by profits from commercial activity. Unlike Western companies, Chinese build infrastructure far from their mining interests. DRC presidency benefits from the Chinese activity, contravening World Bank-sponsored mining code. But in the end the Chinese have had to accept internationally-imposed requirements.
Xiaohon He, Quinnipiac University: China’s rural entrepreneurs are the real engine of reducing poverty in China. Unlike the Western model, political development is coming after economic development. Now China is running into labor and environmental issues, as well as criticism of its currency practices. Chinese are being forced to move abroad prematurely, with bad labor and environmental practices. But the Chinese model may be more appropriate for Africa than the Western model.
Joseph E. Ahaneku, Nnamdi Azikiwe University: China is providing a lot of education and cultural aid. Confucius institutes are successful. Chinese are open to a two-way street, including teaching of Ibo in China. Africa should embrace Chinese and propagate African culture in China.
Bottom line: Chinese economic activity in Africa looks positive from the African perspective, even if it raises issues because of the weakness of African states. The right response is to strengthen those states so that they can deal with the Chinese more effectively (but that conclusion is more mine than that of any of the panelists).
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China and the U.S. in Africa
I’m at the Chinua Achebe Colloquium on Africa at Brown this weekend. I thought this session on “China and the United States in Africa: Cooperation or Confrontation” would be of particular interest:
- Robert Rotberg, Harvard: Chinese goods and traders are ubiquitous in Africa, Chinese growth is Africa’s great hope but Chinese human rights record in Africa is appalling. China’s focus is access to resources: trying to convince Khartoum and Juba to settle pipeline issues (which is a good thing), helping with the Zimbabwe crackdown on protests. Chinese and Americans in Africa have different agendas and will have to find a mutual accommodation.
- Walter Carrington, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria: China offers trade and aid without onerous Western conditions. But United States also is there for its own interests, and it was indifferent to moral considerations throughout the Cold War. U.S. business would gladly see Washington behave the way Beijing does. Africom assures access to African oil supplies. We should avoid competition with China, which behaves like the capitalists we hoped they would one day become.
- James Hentz, VMI: Strategic framework is important: either realist, in which China challenges the U.S. (power transition model) and tries to deny U.S. resources, especially oil, metals; or liberal, in which growing trade and commerce is a good thing, Chinese construction of infrastructure benefits other powers as well. China and U.S. both have huge stakes in stability in Africa, but China does not like American advocacy of democracy. Chinese will want good governance and transparency in Africa, but not American-style democracy.
- Scott D. Taylor, Georgetown: U.S. and China so far moving along parallel tracks. How do Africans view the two? China viewed favorably in most countries. Even in Zambia, China has traction. Views of China are approaching the highly positive levels of views of the U.S., which are slipping because of Africom, hunt for Lord’s Resistance Army, use of drones in Somalia, reduction of PEPFAR funding, toppling of Qaddafi. Anti-U.S. sentiment is growing, to the benefit of the Chinese.
- Omer Ismail, Enough! China and the U.S. compete for resources and markets. The approaches are different: China leads with the state, the U.S. with the market. China has now passed the U.S. in trade with Africa, in corporate deals with Africa, in percentage of oil imports from Africa, supplying weapons to all sides. Possible areas for cooperation: agriculture, security and diplomacy, and environment. What is in it for the people of Africa? That is what U.S. and China should focus on. There is a real possibility for cooperation.
- Deborah Brautigan, American University: China represents a big challenge that echoes for Americans the Cold War and Japanese economic competition. It is a developing country with low labor and environmental standards. Chinese foreign policy emphasizes mutual benefit and non-interference. But China is changing rapidly, we often exaggerate Chinese activities in Africa and have little understanding what they are actually doing. Chinese credit practices can be good because they guarantee that the Chinese get what they pay for, which is better than much Western foreign assistance has done.
Overall message: some competition is inevitable, but the Chinese role in Africa is already more positive that many think (finance, infrastructure) and more like U.S. private sector behavior than we like to admit. There is a negative side: supporting unworthy rulers, use of veto at the UN, Chinese racial attitudes, and company exploitation of diamonds in Zimbabwe. But Chinese are evolving in a direction that may allow more cooperation on Africa in the UN and in an Africa that is increasingly democratic and resistant to exploitation.
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