Tag: Al Qaeda
No free country without free women
Forty-two year old Ahmed al Sharaa is the leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). That makes him the de facto main power in Syria today. HTS led the successful assault on Syrian government-controlled territory that ended in the surprising fall of President Bashar al Assad.
Early indications
The question is how al Sharaa will use his power. We have some early indications. He has tried to reach out to the Syrian Kurds and other minorities. He has sought to reassure them that HTS intends to build an inclusive regime. But he has also appointed an interim government that HTS itself dominates. The ministers are the ministers of Idlib Province’s Syrian Salvation Government. It has ruled in Idlib for the last several years. The Health Minister is al Sharaa’s HTS-affiliated brother, who is a physician.
Al Sharaa’s political origins lie in Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq. The Americans imprisoned him there from 2006 to 2011. He established Jabhat al Nusra (JN) in Syria in 2012 with AQ support but broke with AQ in 2016. In 2017, JN rebranded to HTS, which established primacy in the parts of Idlib Assad did not control.
So al Sharaa is no cure all. His political pedigree is extremist. He was less draconian in Idlib than the Islamic State, but he was autocratic and jihadist. He applied what he called Sharia. Women and minorities were not treated equally with HTS-loyal men. His nom de guerre was Abu Mohammed al Jolani, that is father of Mohammed from Golan. Though born in Riyadh, his parents were from the Golan Heights, now in Israeli hands. He says the second Palestinian intifada radicalized him.
Current pressures inside Syria
Inside Syria, al Sharaa faces pressure from HTS cadres to reward them and to rule the way they would like. His coalition includes even more extremist forces. Its ideology is Islamist. Many of the fighters will have little use for minorities or women. They won’t bother with democracy. They will want an extreme version of Sharia that privileges men and their strict interpretation of Islam.
But al Sharaa also faces pressure from relatively liberal Syrians. Many of them want a secular regime based on equal rights, including for women and minorities. Pro-secular demonstrations have already occurred in Damascus. And al Sharaa has appointed a woman (for women’s affairs) to the interim government to respond to public pressure.
International pressures
The US, Europeans, UN, Turkiye, Arab Gulf states and others have united to call for an “inclusive” government in Syria. By this they mean one that includes minorities and women. Western governments are far less concerned about democracy than at times in the past. Islamist-governed Turkiye will want to clone something like its own semi-democratic system. Saudi Arabia and the UAE can live with that, even if they suppress pluralism and political Islam at home.
International leverage comes from two main sources. The first is al Sharaa’s need to get the Western countries to lift sanctions. That would allow international financing to flow. The second is Syria’s need for aid of all sorts. Once sanctions are lifted, the main lever will be aid flows, especially from the IMF and the World Bank. They have far greater resources available than those from individual governments.
Western governments are acutely aware of the Taliban precedent. The Taliban made all sorts of promises, but once in charge of Afghanistan they relapsed to extreme Islamism. Girls no longer go to school and they prohibit women from speaking and singing. No one in the West, or even in the Gulf, wants to finance that.
Triangulating
Whatever his own views, al Sharaa is a good triangulator. He is aware of the different pressures and looks for ways to respond, albeit only partially, to all of them. He has forsworn any new wars (read: with Israel) and has welcomed many different opposition forces to Damascus. Al Sharaa has met with foreign diplomats, including the Americans. He pledges himself to a unified and free Syria. He says he wants to implement UN Security Council resolution 2254, which calls for elections in 18 months. The Americans can depend on him to fight the Islamic State, which is more rival to HTS than ally.
But at some point there will be contradictions that he will need to resolve. The interim government is in place only until March 1. It is not clear how or with what it will be replaced. Nor is it clear how the new constitution al Sharaa has promised will be written and by whom. HTS has closed Syria’s courts. They will need to re-open under new management. Where will that come from? What laws will it apply? How will accountability be handled? What will be done to restore and ensure property rights? How will the health and education systems be reformed?
These would be difficult issues for any governance transition. They will need decisions that displease one constituency or another. It is not yet clear what kind of Syria will result. It could be a free and inclusive state. Or an autocracy like the previous one but with a different family in charge. Or Syria could break apart into warring fiefdoms. Al Sharaa won’t be able to decide, but his decisions will influence the outcome. Let’s hope he is wise beyond his 42 years.
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Strategic failure has consequences
9/11 produces lots of reflections. Here are mine.
Tactical success, strategic failure
The Al Qaeda attacks using commercial aircraft were largely successful. Three of four hit their intended targets and killed lots of people. But that tactical success did not lead to strategic victory. The Americans and others have hunted Al Qaeda for 20 years, killing not only its two leaders and many foot soldiers but destroying much of its organizational capacity.
But that tactical success has also not led to strategic victory. Al Qaeda has splintered and metastasized, spinning off the Islamic State and other extremist jihadi insurgents fighting in many more countries than two decades ago. This includes not only the imploded Middle Eastern states of Syria and Yemen, but also the African states of Libya, Mali, Mozambique, and Somalia.
Thus the prospect of tactical success tempts those with the capacity for violence into enterprises that end in strategic failure. This happened to the US in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We invaded because we could. Tactical success however saddled us with burdens we did not want. It took 10 years to extract most US forces from Iraq, and 20 from Afghanistan. The failure of state-building in Afghanistan has vitiated most gains from the initial military success. In Iraq, the failure is not complete, but the costs have been high.
It’s Russia’s turn
The Russians are now facing their own consequences of strategic failure. Their initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 was largely successful. They annexed Crimea and occupied most of Luhansk and Donetsk using proxies. But President Putin wanted more. This year he tried to take Kyiv, complete the conquest of Donbas, and expand Russian control in the south. The Ukrainians fought off the attack on their capital and are now pushing the Russians back rapidly in Kharkiv province as well as more slowly around Kherson.
The ultimate military outcome is still uncertain. The Ukrainians could over-extend themselves. The Russians could succeed in regrouping and stop the Ukrainian advances or even return to territory they have lost in the past week.
But the strategic failure is already apparent. The Russian army, air force, and navy are in tatters. A reinvigorated NATO is expanding to Finland and Sweden as well as the troop presence on Russia’s borders. Sanctions are sapping the Russian economy. Europe is weaning itself rapidly from Russian oil and gas. States on Russia’s periphery are looking for opportunities to expand ties with the West. Nationalists in Russia who advocated the Ukraine war are turning on Putin. The war is solidifying Ukrainian national identity, increasing support for President Zelensky and the Ukrainian state even among Russian speakers.
The lesson
What should we learn from these strategic defeats of great powers? Confident of their military superiority, they go to war for reasons they think worthy. But war is a political as well as a military enterprise. Tactical military superiority makes it difficult to consider the consequences of strategic failure. Strategic failure is however always a possibility even if you win a war, as the Americans did in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Russians did in 2014 in Ukraine. This failure to take into account the real possibility of strategic failure is a major source of the blunders that lead to war.
Apply it to Iran
A quick footnote on applying this lesson to Iran. Israeli and American military superiority is overwhelming. But Iran is a big country, more or less the size and population of Iraq and Afghanistan combined. No one should be thinking about an invasion. Even hawkish thinking is limited to attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities and supporting infrastructure. Tactical success in that enterprise is not certain, as the Iranians have put a lot of their enrichment facilities deep under ground.
But strategic failure is almost certain. An Iran that has suffered an attack on its nuclear facilities will surely redouble its efforts to get nuclear weapons, as that would make repeat of the attack unthinkable. Sure, the attack could be repeated ad infinitum, “mowing the grass” as the Israelis say. But sooner or later Tehran would succeed in getting nuclear weapons. What then? Tactical success guarantees nothing. Strategic failure has consequences.
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Stevenson’s army, August 15
Late, but here it is:
– Are we training foreign forces in the right way? A Brandeis prof critiques.
– Is capabilities based planning for our military outdated? A retired Army colonel says it is.
– How did Ukraine attack the Crimea air base? WaPo does a deep dive and isn’t sure.
-Why did Senate Approps reject a plan for munitions replenishment? Because it’s a contingency fund and Congress doesn’t like them.
– How close are we to civil war? Cong. Kinzinger sends some scary tweets.
And yesterday’s too:
– Pew has a new survey showing how much Americans dislike the opposition party.
– NYT reports growing right-wing rhetoric urging violence.
– Administration declassified an intelligence report saying al Qaeda has not regrouped in Afghanistan.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Stevenson’s army, August 2
– al-Zawahri assassination: CNN has the tick tock; Fred Kaplan has analysis.
– Pelosi going to Taiwan: Tom Friedman criticizes; White House warns China; Senators Menendez and Graham file big bill on Taiwan policy.
– Sen. Hawley opposes NATO membership for Sweden and Finland, another example of eroding US support for countering Russia policy.
– RUSI analyst has revealing comments on Russian military problems
– Lawyer worries about unintended consequences of new security assistance law.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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The time to remember has come
My esteemed Middle East Institute colleagues Paul Salem and Brian Katulis have set a low bar for President Biden’s trip to the Middle East this week. They want him to send a signal of renewed diplomatic commitment to the region.
There’s a hitch
It’s an important objective, but there is a hitch. It is the signs of reduced US commitment that have incentivized many improvements in relations among Middle Eastern countries. This is clear in Yemen. The current ceasefire came about in part because of US reluctance to continue supporting Saudi efforts to counter the Houthis. Iraq’s current role mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia would be inconceivable if the Americans hadn’t withdrawn most of their forces. The wars in Syria are calming partly because the Americans have mostly withdrawn. The remainder are limiting action exclusively to the Islamic State and Al Qaeda.
Israel’s newfound ambition to help guard Arab Gulf security is also a consequence of reduced American commitment. The Ibrahim/Abraham accords that President Trump initiated essentially trade Arab recognition for Israeli security assistance. The Arab Gulf monarchies regard that as better than American help. The Israelis don’t demand respect for human rights. Spyware and air defense have proven attractive propositions. Diplomatic recognition hasn’t proven costly to the Arab states that have done it so far (UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco), but the Saudis have hesitated.
And a fly in the Saudi ointment
That’s because of the fly in the ointment. Israel is refusing not only to make peace with the Palestinians but even to accept two states as the basis for a future peace. Israel’s current ambitions are clear: to keep the Golan Heights and all of Jerusalem as well as many of the settlements on the West Bank. The Palestinians would then get only a “state-minus.” That would lack not only an army but sovereign control over its very limited territory. Israel’s attitude is unlikely to change, even after its next election. Prime Minister Netanyahu is gone, but not his singular accomplishment: killing the spirit of Oslo.
Plus an elephant in the room
The elephant in the room is Iran. Negotiations for re-entry into the Iran nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are faltering. If they fail, Iran will have the option within a year of producing enough enriched uranium to make several atomic bombs. Attacks on its nuclear facilities and personnel would only delay the inevitable, perhaps by years but more likely by months. They would also give Tehran reason to attack the Gulf states, either directly or through proxies.
The situation will improve only marginally if the JCPOA is revived. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps will then use sanctions relief to reinvigorate their proxy military interventions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. That is precisely what the Gulf states don’t want.
Diplomacy>military
Paul and Brian rightly underline the good things American diplomacy could try to do: improve governance, encourage regional de-escalation and integration, and build civilian ties to the United States, both with citizens and institutions. But Washington has proven inept so far at beefing up diplomatic efforts once the troops are gone. Witness Iraq, where a mostly civilian-focused strategic framework agreement has languished after the military withdrawal. As Chas Freeman pointed out years ago, our diplomats have forgotten diplomacy without force. The time to remember has come.
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Stevenson’s army, September 14
Punchbowl provides several stories on Blinken testimony. Politico: “Blinken lays blame on Trump as he defends messy withdrawal from Afghanistan” … Reuters: “Blinken defends Afghan withdrawal at testy U.S. congressional hearing” … CNN: “Blinken testifies on Afghanistan before House lawmakers angry about the war’s chaotic end” … WaPo: “Blinken clashes with Republican lawmakers over Afghanistan withdrawal”
Look at the talking points the WH sent to its friends.
Here’s a link to the actual hearing. [But if you want to use it for your Hill Observation paper, be aware it’s over 5 hours long.]
– NYT says Iran almost has enough fuel for one nuclear bomb.
– WaPo says US is releasing some aid to Egypt, conditioning the rest.
– WSJ is running a series of articles on how Facebook dodges some of its own rules.
– The Brown University Costs of War project points the finger at contractors.
– What can Hill staffers do whose workplace is toxic? Leak to Buzzfeed.
– A retired USMC colonel says US doesn’t practice what it preaches about mission command.
Our brownbag guest yesterday recommends this article about changing the GOP.
Lots of new material this afternoon. Different reporters are citing bootleg copies of the new Bob Woodward book — WaPo says Milley “pulled a Schlesinger“; CNN has more about the military.
– Different emphases: Intell officials say AlQaeda could rebuild in a year, and greater terror threats are outside Afghanistan.
Congress looks at military role in evacuation. Blinken hearing “marred by politics.”
– Military aid to Guinea cut off.
– How should a Member spend his time? Tweeting about Democratic policies or helping deal with local floods?
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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