Tag: Al Qaeda
Trump’s future crises
My recommended reading for today is Eric Chenoweth’s Let Hamilton Speak, which is the best argument I’ve seen to date for the Electoral Colleges meeting today in state capitals to fulfill the founders’ intent by rejecting Donald Trump and electing Hillary Clinton, who beat him in the popular vote by close to 3 million votes. Virtually none of those votes has been officially questioned.
But Trump is going to win in the Electoral College. Nate Cohn has an admirably short explanation for how that happened:
Mr. Trump had an advantage in the traditional battlegrounds because most are whiter and less educated than he country as a whole.
The electors, who are basically chosen for their party loyalty, are not going to desert Trump en masse, even if a few may be tempted to bolt. The situation Hamilton anticipated and believed the Electoral College designed to prevent is about to happen. We will elect a prevaricating demagogue spectacularly ill-suited to wield the powers of the American presidency, one who is demonstrating daily by means of ill-considered tweets and soundbites that he has none of the good judgment and restraint required.
It is anyone’s guess how this will end. Some hope Trump will moderate, despite ample evidence to the contrary, in particular in his radical cabinet appointments. Others hope the Congress and courts will block his less judicious moves. But Congressional Republicans are lining up to salute and restraint by the courts is always delayed and rarely applicable to foreign policy. As Trump is astoundingly concerned with his image, public opinion might have an impact. But he has been remarkably successful at making any publicity into good publicity. There is no sign yet that any of these forces will be sufficient to block Trump’s worst instincts.
My own guess is that we are headed for an early international crisis.
Trump has already provoked China twice, once by accepting the Taiwan president’s phone call and once by a harsh remark about Chinese military activity in the South China Sea. Beijing reacted mildly to the first, suggesting it was Taiwan’s fault, and more harshly to the second, seizing an American underwater drone. Much worse could lurk in the future, as Trump has promised a trade war with China that would cause Beijing to retaliate and devastate American exports.
While provocative towards China, Trump is accommodating towards Russia. He has indicated he will end US support to the Syrian revolution (even while promising safe areas that cannot be created due to Russian air defenses) and try to make common cause with Russia against the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. Secretary of State Kerry has been trying to pull off that partnership for months, without success because the Russians are unwilling to target extremists. They prefer to help Assad retake territory, most recently Aleppo, without regard to civilian casualties. This will strengthen extremism, even as it benefits Russia and Iran. Trump will no doubt be tempted to strike out at Iran, not Russia, but doing so would propel the world into another major Middle East crisis.
That may not, however, be the first Middle East crisis Trump precipitates. He and his nominated ambassador to Israel, who is a strong supporter of West Bank settlements and an opponent of a two-state solution, have pledged to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, a promise other presidents-elect have made but never fulfilled. The reason is clear: it is a final status issue that needs to be part of the negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. Jumping the gun will make it even more difficult than it is today for the US to enlist Arab support for American goals, as will abandonment of the Syrian revolution.
There are other possible crises in the offing. Trump’s promised renunciation of the Iran nuclear deal would certainly precipitate a sharp break with Europe and make it likely that the US would need to use force to block Tehran from nuclear weapons. Conceding Crimea’s annexation to Russia would create serious doubts inside NATO about US willingness to fulfill its alliance obligations. Withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership will cast a pall over trade worldwide and raise serious questions about whether China rather than the US will lead in setting the pace of trade liberalization.
All these possible crises can be brought on more or less unilaterally by the new president quickly and easily. I’ll be in Beijing on Inauguration Day. It will be an interesting perch from which to see what happens.
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Jihad and the next administration
USIP’s discussion today of “Getting Ahead of the Curve: the evolving threat of violent extremism” was a study in contrasts. The first panel, of experts who contributed to The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda and Beyond was devoted to hard-nosed analysis. The second, which discussed both CSIS’ Turning Point and Communities First: A Blueprint for Organizing and Sustaining a Global Movement Against Violent Extremism, was devoted to right-minded but airier policy propositions, at least until I left about 45 minutes before it ended.
The analysis panel, ably chaired by Robin Wright of USIP and the Woodrow Wilson Center, offered a gloomy picture: each generation of jihadis is larger than the last, mobilizes faster, draws on more diversified sources of foreign fighters, gets more extreme, and spreads to more locations and causes.
That said, Brookings’ Will McCants noted that ISIS has lost perhaps half its territory as well as 50,000 killed, Raqqa and Mosul are under attack, and its finances are under pressure. It won’t disappear but will return, as it did during the near-defeat in Iraq in 2008/10, to terrorist tactics and prison breaks. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies concurred that the ISIS star has fallen, because of its brutal tactics and readiness to make enemies of too many people. But Al Qaeda is reviving and spreading, especially in Syria, Yemen, Libya, Mali and Somalia. It is even controlling territory, it financing has become more open, and it is embedding Al Qaeda Central cadres, like the Khorasan Group, with its franchisees.
The franchises are increasingly important, Carnegie Endowment’s Fred Wehrey concurred. Al Qaeda has been more successful than ISIS in establishing durable franchises, partly because it focuses on “Dawa” (proselytizing), is relatively “moderate” in behavior towards the local population, and integrates more effectively with local forces. Egypt is particularly fertile ground, as is Yemen.
Hassan Hassan of the Tahrir Institue for Middle East Policy underlined that jihadism is not going away any time soon. Its narrative and appeal are increasingly entrenched. Al Qaeda and ISIS share the objective of creating a caliphate, but Al Qaeda is the more dangerous as it often works quietly and is more successful at “marbling” (interweaving) local and global strategies.
McCants views state failure as fuel for the protean diversified jihadist resurgence we are witnessing. The diversification and rapidly shifting organizational landscape are big problems, as they make prioritization difficult. Gartenstein-Ross believes the Middle East states will continue to weaken, as they face dramatic challenges like lack of water and parlous finances. Internet penetration in the region is still low, so jihadi mobilization is likely to become more effective and quicker as it expands. Social media are particularly adapted to boost secret identities across boundary lines. Hassan concurred, noting that ISIS in defeat will retreat into the desert, as it did in Iraq in 2008, leaving sleeper cells who will kill its enemies in newly liberated areas. Sunni disenfranchisement, alienation, and lack of leadership make ISIS a viable political option.
Wehrey concluded the first panel by underlining that terrorism is a political strategy and requires in part a political response. Jihadism is not really about religion but about the need for reform. Governance issues are central, vastly compounded by population displacement and Western intervention.
The second panel chaired by USIP’s Georgia Holmer focused, far less decisively, on non-military responses to jihadism.
The National Security Council’s Amy Pope underlined that countering violent extremism (CVE) is now established as an important part of the response to terrorism focused on its root causes in particular communities. She and State Department Under Secretary Sarah Sewall were confident that this community-focused approach, based on civil society and holistic investments, is the right one. We need to be able to tell this story across the security and human rights communities.
Shannon Green of CSIS cited the “measured security response” advocated in Turning Point, noting that anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant sentiment reinforces extremism. So too have some of America’s traditional partners in the Gulf, who have financed extremists. We need to be able to levy punitive sanctions in response, undertake a global educational partnership to ensure that extremism has no place in curricula, and review assistance to oppressive governments. She also thought an assistant to the president for CVE would help the cause.
The Prevention Project’s Eric Rosand emphasized community-level engagement that recognizes communities have many problems other than violent extremism and offers them incentives to engage locally in CVE. Law enforcement should have a limited, not a dominant, role.
Asked about what they would advise the incoming Trump Administration, Sewall emphasized the need to coordinate military and intelligence counter-terrorism with civilian CVE and the relative lack of resources for the latter (amounting to no more than .1% of the total). Pope also thought the balance out of whack. CVE needs to grow much bigger. There is lots of evidence that democracy and inclusion work and that alienation and exclusion don’t.
Asked to adduce some concrete examples of CVE that has worked, Pope cited a roundtable in The Hague, Sewall an ongoing project pilot project in East Africa and an AID project in Pakistan. Rosand noted that all too often autocrats readily take up the anti-messaging banner, as it enables them to crack down on dissident voices. That, he suggested, does not work.
My bottom line: Little in this discussion gave me any reason to believe that the incoming Trump Administration will take up the cause of CVE, which would require it to drop its anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric, agree to support reformist and more democratic states rather than autocratic ones, invest in aid that is difficult to distinguish from conventional development assistance, accept evidence-based indications of effectiveness, and increase funding for civilian rather than military efforts. #fatchance
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The Aleppo defeat
You can always tell when a cause is lost: the UN General Assembly passes a resolution to stop the bombing, allow in aid, and protect civilians. This was the clear signal this week that Syrian opposition forces in Aleppo are on the verge of defeat at the hands of multinational Shia militias as well as Iranian, Russian and Syrian government forces. Russian efforts to arrange a ceasefire for evacuation of civilians have failed, so far. Fighting age men are reportedly disappearing, likely some of them into prisons from which they will never emerge.
Assad is crowing. For good reason: victory in Aleppo will allow him to concentrate his forces against Idlib, which is the last remaining bit of what he has termed “useful Syria” that he doesn’t control. It runs from Damascus north to Aleppo and west to Lebanon and the Mediterranean. If he doesn’t already, Assad will soon control about one-third of the country’s territory and tw0-thirds of its population.
But the war will still not be over. The opposition will have some territory in the south along the Jordanian border and some in the north (west of the Euphrates), while the Kurds will control the rest of the border with Turkey and the Islamic State will control Raqqa and much of the relatively unpopulated east. The defeat at Aleppo and the impending defeat at Idlib will drive more opposition fighters into the arms of extremist jihadis, strengthening both Jabhat al Sham (the erstwhile Al Qaeda affiliate) and the Islamic State.
Assad now seems likely to survive, if only because the Americans will continue to pursue Jabhat al Sham and the Islamic State, which now represent by far the largest threat to his hold on power. This will make life easy for Trump. In order to ally with Russia as he says he wants to do, he’ll need only to cut American assistance to those few non-jihadi opposition who are still fighting Assad and provide support only to those willing to join the campaign against the Islamic State at Raqqa.
How Trump and National Security Adviser Flynn will square this de facto alignment with Iran I don’t know, but who’s watching? Like George W. Bush before him, Trump is likely to open still another door to Iranian power projection to the west.
Assad’s survival is not however the end of the story. Syria is a shambles. It needs hundreds of billions in aid. The Americans have already provided billions, but that has been overwhelmingly humanitarian assistance, much of which went to regime-controlled areas. I doubt however that the Americans will be interested in providing reconstruction assistance to the Assad regime. Even for a Trump administration, that might be a bit much, and in any event Congress likely wouldn’t go along.
The Europeans will be under a lot pressure to provide aid, since Assad will provide them with some minimal reason to hope that refugees will return if the Syrian economy revives. That however will be a false promise, as he doesn’t want them to return and restart the rebellion against him. He prefers to provide homes and livelihoods to non-Syrians, mainly Shia, who have fought on his behalf.
The people who should ante up are the Russians and Iranians, who have caused much of the damage and are coming out on the winning side. That entails obligations that the Washington and Brussels recognize, but Moscow and Tehran don’t. They aren’t likely to do more than minimal assistance calculated to help Assad regain and maintain control over strategically important turf.
Without a significant influx of resources, Syria will remain a fragmented basket case for many years to come. Even after Raqqa and Deir Azzour fall (precisely to whom is not yet clear), Islamist insurgency is likely to continue. Turkey and its Arab and Turkmen allies will control part of the north, with the Syrian Kurdish PYD controlling the rest. A bit of the south will remain in opposition control.
The Aleppo defeat may be the beginning of the end, but it is not yet the end.
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Peace picks, December 5-9
- The Arab Woman: Enhancing Leadership and Resilience | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 3:30pm | United States Institute of Peace | Click HERE to Register
Social and economic empowerment of women has been shown to strengthen stability and resilience. From the national level to the grassroots, Arab women continue to face and overcome challenges to lead their countries and communities, while empowering one another.
Panelists, including leaders of government and civil society, will explore opportunities for the League of Arab States to invest in supporting women’s empowerment for the region’s peace and prosperity. The discussion will feature success stories of Arab women leaders breaking barriers, assess Arab and global initiatives focusing on women, and make recommendations for greater inclusivity.
Featuring Ambassador Inas Mekkawy,Head of Women, Family and Childhood Development, League of Arab States, Randa Hudome, Founder, Fahmy Hudome International, Manal Omar, Associate Vice President, Center for Middle East and Africa, U.S. Institute of Peace, Hibaaq Osman, Founder & CEO, El Karama, Donald Steinberg, CEO, World Learning, Representative Ilhan Omar, Minnesota House Representative for District 60B, Linda Bishai, Director of North Africa Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace, Kathleen Kuehnast, Senior Gender Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace, Marwa AlKhairo, Manager of Partnership Development, International Youth Foundation, Hajar Sharief, Co-Founder, Libya Ma’an Nabneeha, Sali Osman, Cybersecurity Risk Advisory, Ernest and Young, “One to Watch” Award from Executive Women’s Forum - The Future of US-Turkish Relations: Cooperation or Frustration | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 11:15am | Bipartisan Policy Center | Click HERE to Register
Change may be in the future for U.S.-Turkey relations. Members of the incoming administration of President-elect Donald Trump have expressed both admiration for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and deep suspicion toward his brand of Islamist politics. Whether the new administration goes all in on Turkey or abandons it, this decision will have profound implications for the fight against ISIS, the outcome of the Syrian civil war, and Turkey’s domestic stability.
At this crucial juncture, join the Bipartisan Policy Center for the release of a new report detailing recommendations for the next administration and a discussion of the future of U.S.-Turkey relationship.
Featuring Charles Wald (Ret.), Former Deputy Commander, U.S. European Command, Co-Chair, BPC’s National Security Program, Eric Edelman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Finland and Turkey, Co-Chair, BPC’s Turkey Initiative, Amberin Zaman, Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International, Center for Scholars, Columnist, Al-Monitor - Global Economic Challenges for Donald Trump | Monday, December 5 | 10:00am – 12:00pm | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump will assume office at a time of considerable strain in the global economy and after an election campaign that has raised serious questions about the relative benefits of globalization.
This seminar will take stock of how the US economy might be affected by the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis, the transformation of China’s economic growth model, and Japan’s renewed efforts to stave off deflation. It will also consider what international economic policies the Trump administration should pursue and the risks that unorthodox monetary policies by the world’s major central banks might pose for the global currency market.
Featuring Alex J. Pollock, R Street Institute, Fred Bergsten, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Jeffrey Frankel, Harvard University, Greg Ip, The Wall Street Journal, Anne Krueger, SAIS, Desmond Lachman, AEI - Strengthening US-Arab Cyber Security Policy Cooperation | Monday, December 5 | 1:30pm – 4:30pm | Middle East Institute | Click HERE to Register
Cyber threats are on the rise in the Middle East, ranging from electronic vandalism or financial crimes to sabotage and virtual acts of war. Governments and businesses in the Middle East have suffered damaging attacks. State actors and hacker collectives in the region are also believed to be targeting the U.S. military, civilian government agencies, and private sector systems.
What systemic problems will the United States and Arab states confront in the next few years? Are there gaps in national policy or in the collaboration between governments and the private sector that render the United States vulnerable? What is the state of the U.S.-Arab dialogue within these global issues, and how can Washington and its Arab partners coordinate better?
The Middle East Institute is pleased to host industry and policy experts for a program examining Middle Eastern cyber threat trends and developments affecting national security, essential services, and the economy. Register now to hear the analysis and recommendations of these leaders in the field.
Featuring Wendy Chamberlin, President, Middle East Institute, Sean Kanuck
Attorney and Strategic Consultant; former National Intelligence Officer for Cyber Issues, Omar al-Ibrahim, Security Researcher and Consultant, Omprotect LLC; Assistant Professor, Kuwait University, Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Paul Kurtz, Founder and CEO, TruSTAR Technology, Patrick Tucker, (Moderator), Technology Editor, DefenseOne, James A. Lewis, Senior Vice President and Director, Strategic Technologies Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies - Kurds—A Beacon of Hope or a Harbinger of More Chaos | Monday, December 5 | 2:00pm – 3:00pm | Brookings Institution | Click HERE to Register
For the United States, Syrian Kurds are reliable boots on the ground in the fight against the Islamic State. Their agenda for autonomy and self-rule in northern Syria, however, is a source of vexation for Turkey. Ankara is worried about the emergence of a Kurdish state along its borders, which could bolster the demands of Kurds within Turkey for greater political recognition. Limitations on Kurds’ right to social and cultural self-expression is now viewed as a major flaw in Turkey’s democratic edifice. Its actions in Syria against the Kurdish forces also undermine the international coalition against ISIS. In return, these factors hamper Turkey’s relations with the U.S.
How can the actors in this regional theater break through the deadlock? In the latest Turkey Project Policy Paper, “Two routes to an impasse: Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish policy,” Ayşegül Aydın of University of Colorado and historical sociologist Cem Emrence of Leiden University explore how “politics of moderation” could offer the most effective solution to the crisis in the region, and discuss how the different actors involved—Turkey, the Kurds, and the United States—should take a more proactive approach, including a willingness to make compromises, in the interest of forging a lasting peace.
On December 5, 2016, the Turkey Project at Brookings will host a panel discussion on new approaches to the “Kurdish issue” in Turkey and its neighborhood. At the event, Ayşegül Aydın will present conclusions from her co-authored paper. Following her remarks, Nicholas Danforth of the Bipartisan Policy Center and Soner Cagaptay of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy will offer their perspectives. The discussion will be moderated by the Brookings TÜSİAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirişci. - Inside the Islamist Terrorist’s Mind: A Conversation with Former CIA Interrogator James Mitchell | Tuesday, December 6 | American Enterprise Institute | Click HERE to Register
As a key architect of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation program, James Mitchell spent thousands of hours questioning terrorists, including 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). He came to understand the terrorist mind better than anyone in America.
Now, for the first time, Dr. Mitchell will share what KSM told him — including his opinions of US counterterrorism policy, the Bush administration’s response to 9/11, his plans for future attacks, and why he is certain they will ultimately prevail in their war against America.
Join Dr. Mitchell and AEI’s Marc Thiessen for a discussion of Dr. Mitchell’s new book, “Enhanced Interrogation: Inside the Minds of the Islamic Terrorists Trying to Destroy America” (Crown Forum, 2016), as he offers a first-person account of the enhanced interrogation program and his personal interactions with the men behind the deadliest terrorist attack in history. - Afghanistan in 2016: A Survey of the Afghan People | Wednesday, December 7 | 9:30am – 11:30am | United States Institute of Peace | Click HERE to Register
The Asia Foundation, in partnership with the U.S. Institute of Peace, will present the findings of the 2016 Survey of the Afghan People at USIP on December 7. Crucial questions of security, economic stability, and reconciliation face the administration of President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah. As they begin their third year in office, an atmosphere of increasing civilian casualties and unrest in the provincial capitals threatens the fragile but significant progress the country has made toward peace and prosperity over the past decade.
The findings of The Asia Foundation’s 12th annual Survey of the Afghan People are being released at an important moment for Afghanistan. The 2016 survey, based on face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of more than 12,600 Afghan citizens, reveals their views on a range of issues including security, the economy, essential services, governance and political participation, corruption, justice, and gender equality. This year’s survey extends to new areas, including youth issues, migration, citizens’ awareness of legal resources, reconciliation with the Taliban, the Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS), landmines, and access to social media on mobile phones.
Conducted across the country’s 34 provinces, The Asia Foundation’s series of annual surveys since 2004 in Afghanistan provides an unmatched barometer of Afghan public opinion over time. Taken together, the surveys are a resource for policymakers in government, the international community and the broader Afghan public as they seek to navigate a difficult landscape toward a more peaceful and prosperous future for Afghanistan and the region.
Featuring Nancy Lindborg, President, U.S. Institute of Peace, David D. Arnold, President, The Asia Foundation, Zach Warren, Survey and Research Director in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Idrees Ilham, Director of Governance Programs in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Jena Karim, Former Deputy Country Representative for Programs in Afghanistan, The Asia Foundation, Scott Worden, Director, Afghanistan and Central Asia Programs, U.S. Institute of Peace - Potential for Middle East Cooperation in Various Fields | Wednesday, December 7 | 11:30am – 2:30pm | Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies | Click HERE to Register The Middle East Institute (MEI) and the Conflict Management Program of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) are pleased to host five of the contributing authors, Anthony Cordesman (CSIS), Shahrokh Fardoust (College of William and Mary), Querine Hanlon (Strategic Capacity Group), Ross Harrison (MEI), and Jean-Francois Seznec (MEI & SAIS), for a discussion of opportunities in regional cooperation and the costs of the prevailing competition and rivalries between states. Paul Salem (MEI) will moderate the discussion.
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Mosul yes, Raqqa not yet
As the Iraqi offensive on Mosul progresses and Kurdish forces encroach on ISIS territory in Syria there is an eagerness to finalize the destruction of the ISIS caliphate. An Atlantic Council panel yesterday examined the complex realities on the ground in an attempt to clarify the “day after” issues.
Hassan Hassan of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy considers the Mosul offensive to be an important moment for the Iraqi army and its coalition of forces: it offers a historic opportunity to resolve deep Iraqi wounds. But Mosul poses greater challenges than cities already liberated from ISIS due to the complex political environment and number of stakeholders in the coalition. We are likely to see ISIS attempt to prolong the Mosul fight rather than fleeing immediately for Raqqa, hoping that rising tensions among coalition members will lead to dysfunction.
These concerns were echoed by Jessica Lewis McFate of the Institute for the Study of war, who agrees that the longer the battle rages the more fragile the coalition will become. We can also expect ISIS to accelerate attacks in other areas of Iraq where they have already established a presence, such as Kirkuk and Baghdad, in order to undermine the Iraqi army’s progress and distract from the Mosul battle. Unaddressed Sunni grievances will make it difficult for the Iraqi government to reassert authority in troubled regions. As ISIS is chased out, we are likely to see Al Qaeda pick up the cause of Sunni disenfranchisement. Its affiliates are reportedly already active in Anbar province. The Iraqi government must therefore address the grievances, a move the US should support.
Turning towards ISIS in Syria, Howard Shatz from RAND Corporation noted that the Iraqi coalition in Mosul is stable for now, but a coalition in Syria with Kurdish forces in the lead is a dicey proposition, making the impatient calls for a simultaneous attack on Raqqa risky. Hassan agrees that Washington generally underestimates the fear and suspicion of Syria’s Kurds among the Arabs, who perceive Kurdish ambitions of establishing dominance and depopulating areas to allow the settlement of Kurdish families. This is not an accurate reflection of Kurdish aims, since no one believes they intend to stay in Raqqa, but the fear will be exploited by Jabhat al Nusra and other Islamist groups. McFate agrees that the Arab-Kurd dynamic must be considered in the fight against ISIS, and noted that following Kurdish liberation of Shaddadi in 2015 much of the population fled to territory still held by ISIS.
This leads to what McFate identifies as a fundamental gap in American policy. Due to the current composition of Syrian opposition forces, the defeat of ISIS empowers Al Qaeda affiliates such as Jabhat al Nusra. If alongside the Turkish-backed coalition, which includes Al Qaeda affiliated groups, Kurdish forces liberate Raqqa and then retreat to Kurdish areas, this will leave Al Qaeda in a dominant position to reassert influence over Raqqa. Indeed it was Jabhat al Nusra and affiliated groups who held the Raqqa area prior to the ISIS blitz. Hassan agrees, arguing that unless an appropriate coalition has been built the expulsion of ISIS forces will only open new conflict. The US has been hesitant in supporting appropriate forces, but this must be the priority if we do not want to open another conflict within the Syrian civil war.
All panel members agreed that defeating ISIS in Iraq is more a political and governance issue than a military issue. They were reasonably optimistic about the opportunity for Iraq to rebuild, but the international community must remain engaged in Baghdad to encourage governance improvements. However they would urge patience in confronting ISIS in Syria if we do not want to see renewed violence and even greater Al Qaeda empowerment.
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What the next president will face in the Middle East
On Monday the Middle East Institute hosted the launch of the November volume of The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The event featured a panel of the Special Editors of the edition, Rand Beers, Richard A. Clarke, Emilian Papadopoulos, and Paul Salem, discussing the issue titled The Middle East and Regional Transition, Terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism: What the Next President Will Face.
Clarke remarked that the next president will face a markedly different Middle East from eight years ago. The volume seeks to make specific recommendations for action as opposed to just a discussion of the issues. Two major and overlapping problems are determining how we see the issues:
- The number and role of failed states in the Middle East, of which there are now six or seven. These will continue to be a source of terrorism for some time.
- The role of ideologies, in particular how to address the violent jihadist ideology that is highly attractive to disaffected youth, not only in the Middle East but across all regions of the world.
Regarding the US role in Syria, Clarke recommends that we must not abandon the principle of ‘Assad must go’, as the US role in the Middle East will be permanently undermined if we do. The US must also take leadership in supporting the stabilization, economic stimulation and return of refugees in post-Islamic State Mosul and Raqqa, as simply removing IS from cities will not resolve any problems. Salem also suggested that the economic rebuilding of conflict zones in the Middle East is an opportunity to coordinate with China, which has demonstrated interest in building infrastructure and ensuring trade relationships in the region.
As former Deputy Homeland Security Advisor to the President, Beers focused on counter extremism measures. Since 2001 the focus has been on preventing the arrival of foreign nationals intending to commit terrorist acts in the US. But the trend has now shifted to radicalized Americans. Ninety-four people have been killed in the US by domestic terrorists since 2001, with 63 of those in the last year alone. The next administration must therefore focus on identifying individuals prior to their radicalization and on redirecting them. As the government itself is not particularly successful in communicating these messages the approach needs broadening beyond law enforcement agencies. Local nongovernmental organizations and religious organizations will be helpful partners in identifying those exhibiting patterns of behavior that suggest a move towards violent extremism.
Clarke remarked that to law enforcement’s credit there has not been a major foreign attack on American soil since 2001, however the next president should identify these successful components of the counter extremism program and cut down the excesses and inefficiencies that also plague the program.
Salem considers the Middle East to be in a perfect storm of dysfunction due to the disrupted regional order, the number of failed and fragile states, and underlying stress factors including demographic issues, climate change, and competing ideologies. He suggests some of the concerns in the Middle East that have dominated administrations in the past, such as Weapons of Mass Destruction and the flow of oil through the Gulf, are largely stable at this point, and Russia and China do not pose a direct threat to US security. Therefore the threat of terrorism should continue to be the primary concern of the US in the region.
The next administration, Salem thought, should continue to address IS and then focus on al Qaeda, try to rebuild the regional order, make more concerted efforts to end civil wars, and help to rebuild failed states. Salem agreed wholeheartedly with Clarke that Syria will not be resolved while Assad is still in power, but while waiting for a political solution the US must address the suffering of civilians. He considers President Obama to have failed in addressing humanitarian concerns. In response to a question on the future of the Sykes-Picot borders, Salem explained that the Middle East’s problems are primarily attributable to poor governance and institutions rather than the borders. The current borders are likely to endure but changes such as decentralization and federalism within states will be important.
The problems the next administration will face in the Middle East are complex, but the volume focuses on realistic recommendations for what can be achieved. The US must balance its military strength with non-military assets and smart power. While the Obama administration has cautiously withdrawn the next administration must reassert American leadership in the region and focus on re-establishing a regional order.
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