Tag: Al Qaeda
Peace picks, October 24 – 28
- Cultural Heritage: A Target in War, An Engine of Peace | Monday, October 24th | 8.45am – 5.30pm | US Institute of Peace | click HERE to register
Recent wars offer no greater example of cultural heritage turned to healing than the work in Afghanistan of the charity Turquoise Mountain, the subject of a stunning, 11-month exhibition by the Smithsonian Institution. “Turquoise Mountain: Artists Transforming Afghanistan,” at the Arthur M. Sackler Gallery, shows how historians, artisans, young students and communities are preserving and renewing traditions, crafts, economic livelihoods and a historic district of Kabul.
This symposium at the U.S. Institute of Peace will gather scholars, museum professionals and policymakers to explore what we have learned from recent wars about the role of cultural heritage. The daylong symposium aims to improve our understanding of how cultural heritage initiatives, such as Turquoise Mountain, can contribute to peace. How can this work empower marginalized women and communities? How can it strengthen the reconciliation, civic engagement and economic bases needed to build peace in the shadow of violent conflicts? Discussions will include the emerging role of new technologies and the ways in which Afghanistan’s lessons, with other case studies, apply elsewhere in the world. Funding for this symposium, and for the Smithsonian exhibition, has been provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Middle East and Regional Transition, Terrorism, and CVE: What The Next President Will Face | Monday, October 24th | 12pm – 1.30pm | Middle East Institute | click HERE to register
The Middle East Institute and the American Academy of Political and Social Science are pleased to host the special editors of the November volume of The ANNALS from the American Academy of Political and Social Science.
When the next American president takes office in January 2017, he or she will encounter a challenging landscape with regard to terrorism, countering violent extremism, regional turmoil, and failed states in the Middle East and surrounding region. Even if the United States and its allies disrupt ISIS and other terrorist organizations, the problems of violent Islamist extremism and the social and demographic conditions that enable it will persist.
The November volume of The ANNALS from the American Academy of Political and Social Science examines the state of these issues today and provides some paths and priorities for the next president and administration.
Please join Rand Beers (MEI Board Member), Richard A. Clarke (MEI Board Chairman), Emilian Papadopoulos (Good Harbor), and Paul Salem (MEI) for a discussion of these issues and what the next president can do about them. Mary Louise Kelly (NPR) will moderate the panel.
- Coping With the Refugee Crisis and Violent Conflict: Bold Ideas for the Next US President and UN Secretary General | Monday, October 24th | 4.30pm – 6pm | The Stimson Center | click HERE to register
Mandated to “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” and to seek a “life in larger freedom”, the United Nations has helped the world succeed in halving extreme global poverty, slowing the spread of nuclear weapons, and managing many long-standing conflicts. Yet, hardly anybody with an insight into global politics or economics would use the words “just” or “secure” to describe the world today. From Syria and Ukraine to Afghanistan, Iraq, and sub-Saharan Africa, rising violence has erased human rights, increased mass atrocities, and reversed the global decline in political violence seen since the end of the Cold War. These deadly conflicts have further fueled more than 60 million displaced persons, creating the largest refugee crisis since World War II. Despite noteworthy efforts to contain these conflicts and the attendant refugee outflow — including President Obama’s September 20 Leaders’ Summit on the Global Refugee Crisis at U.N. Headquarters, mounting evidence suggests that the United Nations and international community are losing the battle against several of the most pressing security and justice challenges of our time.
The panel discussion will bring together leading policy analysts and former senior international and U.S. officials for a moderated discussion on how the next U.S. President and U.N. Secretary-General, with the support of countries and global civil society, can better cope with the current refugee crisis and the underlying violent conditions that sustain it.
Featuring:
Vikram Singh (moderator), Vice-President for National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress, and former U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for South and South-East Asia
Ibrahim Gambari, former Nigerian Foreign Minister, U.N. Undersecretary-General for Political Affairs, and Co-Chair of the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance
Melanie Greenberg, President and CEO, Alliance for Peacebuilding
Cindy Huang, Co-convenor of Idealists4Hillary, Visiting Policy Fellow at the Center for Global Development, and former Deputy Vice President for Sector Operations at the Millennium Challenge Corporation
William Durch, Distinguished Fellow at Stimson and former Director of Research, Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance
Hardin Lang, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a former senior U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations official for Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, and Mali.
- Geopolitics, Security, and Energy in the Arctic | Tuesday, October 25th | 1pm | Atlantic Council | click HERE to register
While commercial, environmental, and local community development aspects of the Arctic have received increasing attention in Washington in recent times, the US also faces growing national security challenges in the Arctic region. This is a worrying development, as the United States risks not being able to appropriately respond and posture for a rapidly changing security situation in the Arctic.
The Arctic is an inherently challenging region to operate in, with vast distances, limited infrastructure, and harsh climate. As human activity in the region grows, these conditions give rise to a range of pressing security issues, from Russia’s growing militarization of the region and China’s interest in the Arctic, to disaster and accident response and search and rescue operations.
Please join the Atlantic Council as it convenes a leading group of officials and experts to address these challenges and take forward the debate on how the opening Arctic region impacts US national security.
Featuring:
The Honorable Amy Pope – Vice Chair, White House Arctic Executive Steering Committee;
Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor; National Security Council Staff
Admiral Robert J. Papp, Jr., USCG (Ret.) – Special Representative for the Arctic, US Department of State;
General Joseph Ralston, USAF (Ret.) – Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe
NATO;
Dr. Janine Davidson – Under Secretary, US Navy
Rear Admiral Donald P. Loren, USN (Ret.) – Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, US Department of Defense
Admiral James M. Loy, USCG (Ret.) – Former Deputy Secretary, Department of Homeland
Sherri Goodman – Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense; Former CEO, Consortium for Ocean Leadership; Board Director, Atlantic Council
Rear Admiral David Titley, USN (Ret.) – Director, Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk, Pennsylvania State University
- War and Tweets: Terrorism in American in the Digital Age | Tuesday, October 25th | 3pm – 5pm | New America | click HERE to register
“Here in Orlando, we are reminded not only of our obligations as a country to be resolute against terrorists,” President Obama said in the wake of the Pulse nightclub shooting, “we’re also reminded…that what unites us is far stronger than the hate and the terror of those who target us.”
In the past year, terrorists have struck not only in Orlando, but in cities all over the world, from Beirut to Brussels, seeking to generate fear and anger. But what really determines public reaction? Is it, indeed, possible to be resolute in the face of terrorism?
Join us on October 25th at New America as we examine these questions and launch a new report as part of the “Building Civic Resilience to Terrorism” project, a partnership between New America and the charitable organization Democracy Fund Voice.
Orlando Mayor Buddy Dyer will join the Hon. Sharon Burke, Director of the Resource Security program at New America, Juliette Kayyem, CNN National Security Analyst, and Dr. Peter Singer, Senior Fellow of the International Security Program at New America to discuss how political rhetoric, news media, and social media shape the public reaction to terrorism. The panel will also look at how to use strategic communications to build community resilience in the aftermath of an attack.
- The 25th Annual Arab-US Policymakers Conference | Wednesday, October 26th – Thursday, October 27th | 8am | National Council on US-Arab Relations | click HERE to register
Since 1991, the National Council’s annual Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference has gathered internationally renowned specialists to analyze, discuss, and debate issues of over-arching importance to the American and Arab people’s needs, concerns, interests, and key foreign policy objectives. Over two-days, Arab and American leaders from government, the military, business, and academe share privileged information, insight, and recommendations that are vitally important to the definition of issues, the ordering of priorities, and the direction of policy formulation and implementation in American and Arab governments alike.
The 25th Arab-U.S. Policymakers Conference is scheduled for October 26-27, 2016, at the Ronald Reagan Building & International Trade Center in Washington, DC. The conference will again provide attendees with two days of shared ideas, intense discussions and debate, and extensive networking.
- Tackling the Root Causes of Conflict in the Middle East and How to Tackle Them | Thursday, October 27th | 9am – 12 am| Atlantic Council | click HERE to register
The decades-long unravelling of the economic and social fabric of the Middle East has played an instrumental role in the rise of civil strife. From undiversified economies and ineffective political institutions to inadequate education and youth unemployment, there are many root causes of conflict in the region.
Please join the Atlantic Council and Sweden’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs on Thursday, October 27 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. for a half-day conference that will explore the underlying causes of conflict in the Middle East and propose new ways to strengthen cooperation among the United States and its European allies in the region.
Annika Söder, Sweden’s State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, will deliver keynote remarks, followed by two panel discussions. A light breakfast will be served.
What happens in the Middle East will have major importance for the global system. An international peace settlement would help rebuild global cooperation and could be the first step toward a reinvigorated, rules-based order. Join our discussion to help shape and achieve this future scenario.
Featuring:
Paige Alexander – Assistant Administrator, Bureau for the Middle East, USAID
Michele Dunne – Director and Senior Associate, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Paul Hughes – Interim Operations Chief for Middle East and Africa, United States Institute of Peace
Mohamed Younis – Senior Analyst, Gallup World Poll
Syria’s future
It would be foolish to have much hope well into the sixth year of the Syria’s wars that Saturday’s meeting of the US, Russian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish and Qatari foreign ministers will lead to a way out of the current impasse. But it is reasonable to ask what would make the meeting more than just one more boon to Lausanne’s luxury hotels.
The current situation is not propitious. Syria’s government is feeling confident as it rides a ferocious wave of mostly Russian and Iranian attacks on the opposition-held neighborhoods of eastern Aleppo, which it is “cleaning.” It figures the fall of Aleppo will be a tipping point leading to government victory in much of more populated Syria. The government has already negotiated an end to sieges of several areas near Damascus, transporting their populations in an effort to adjust their demography. President Assad has no intention of welcoming back the more than 7 million Syrians who have fled the country. He wants, and thinks he can get, a Syria over which he can restore his autocratic rule by violent means.
At this point, the only thing that would increase the likelihood of a negotiated diplomatic solution is a change in the military balance that threatens Assad. There are ways that might be accomplished without directly engaging Russian forces, which the Americans don’t want to do: stand-off attacks on the Syrian air force or on Hizbollah ground forces or giving more and better weapons to non-extremist opposition forces, to cite two examples. The Americans are hesitant to move in that direction for fear of hitting commingled Russians or enabling an extremist takeover. They have spent the last week or two pondering options.
Washington isn’t likely to do anything before Saturday, but if Secretary of State Kerry can go to the Lausanne meeting with an option to re-balance the military equation in his pocket he might be able to make some diplomatic progress. He needs a credible threat, one Moscow and Tehran feel they need to forestall, to get a serious cessation of hostilities. The beginning of serious talks on transition is likely a bridge too far. Iran and Russia have doubled and quadrupled down on their bets favoring Assad. They are unlikely to risk losing him, since any successor regime that is even remotely democratic would throw them out.
What happens if/when Aleppo falls? Assad will force the opposition adherents out, either leaving eastern Aleppo destroyed and deserted or repopulating it with loyalists. Will the government and its allies then turn its attention to Idlib, where there really are extremists (and infighting among them)? Or will they try to drive farther north to the Turkish border, risking clashes with Turkish and Turkish-backed groups advancing there?
Or will they be content to rest on their laurels? That seems unlikely. Many of us, including me, have underestimated Assad’s sticking power and his determination to retake territory. Now that he is on a roll, he won’t want to stop. Nor will the extremist and non-extremist forces leave him alone. I’m afraid more war rather than less is still in Syria’s future.
Russian views on Syria
On Tuesday the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies hosted a discussion with Ambassador Sergey I. Kislyak, Russian Federation Ambassador to the US.
Ambassador Kislyak acknowledged that things are not developing in the best fashion for Russian or US interests. The US has been taking unfriendly steps towards Russia, including the imposition of sanctions and calls to isolate and pressure Russia. He warned that these approaches do not work with Moscow. Russia, he said, has tried hard to work with the US and sees many opportunities for cooperation. These are being missed, but it is not Russia that started or is fuelling the current situation.
Regarding Syria, Kislyak believes that the US and Russia have a common enemy in terrorism. Russia is even more vulnerable to the risks of revived terrorist groups due to its regional proximity and an estimated 4000 Russian speakers fighting in Syria. Syria must continue to preserve the state as the alternative is total failure, which would be a greater problem for everyone. Russia came to Syria on the invitation of its government to assist in the fight against terrorism, no more and no less. Russia’s presence is consistent with international law, as opposed to the presence of other states that have not received the permission or invitation of the sovereign Syrian state.
Commenting on the current situation in Aleppo, Kislyak said that East Aleppo is controlled by Al Qaeda and other “so called” opposition forces who are holding the population hostage. He offered examples of Al Qaeda executions of civilians attempting to leave. He denied that hospitals have been bombed in Aleppo and stated that the Russians never attack civilians. If hospitals had been bombed it was because they had not been identified as such. The Russians are only targeting Al Qaeda. When they request that the US provide information of who is Al Qaeda and who is opposition they never receive a helpful response to deal with the issue in a precise manner. According to Kislyak, the US has been promising since February that the opposition would be separated from Al Qaeda but this has not happened.
Russia is still open to cooperation with the US on Syria. Priorities going forward are to stop the fighting, delineate between opposition forces and Al Qaeda, and start building the environment to start negotiations.
There are clearly areas of common interest for cooperation between the US and Russia on Syria. Both agree that Jabhat al-Nusra is an Al Qaeda force which must be dealt with. A totally failed state will be fertile ground for such groups. There is a disagreement however on the nature of the groups fighting Assad, with Kislyak denouncing ‘opposition forces’ as an American term. If Russia was invited by Assad to combat terrorists, and follows Assad’s definition of all opposition groups as terrorists, there is a fundamental gap in understanding that must be filled before progress in negotiations can be successful. There remains however the issue of separating moderate opposition forces from the complex network of militant groups operating in Syria, which the Russians see as one Washington must take on.
Plan B options
The Administration is considering plan B for Syria. In order to be effective, it has to somehow rebalance the military situation to enable the non-extremist Syrian opposition to resist effectively the Russian/Iranian/Syrian government/Shia militia onslaught and to fight the Islamic State.
I take as a given two limits: 1) Washington does not want to directly engage Russian forces and 2) it does not want to put significant numbers of troops on the ground in Syria. Nor do I think it will be possible for the President to gain Congressional approval for an expanded Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF).
Here is a summary of options, all of which I think I have previously discussed on peacefare.net:
1. Encourage Congress to pass and sign the pending sanctions bill. This would have broad political significance, but mainly affect helicopter and airplane parts, if we are prepared to enforce third party prohibitions (i.e. threaten suspension of business with US companies if foreign companies ship parts to Syria).
2. End the impunity of the Syrian air force by destroying helicopters that drop barrel bombs on civilian targets. This can be done with stand-off weapons and does not require US aircraft over Syrian territory. It would likely have to be done as covert action in order to get around the AUMF, which covers only Al Qaeda (and via a stretch Al Qaeda-descended organizations like the Islamic State).
3. Tell the Russians and Iranians we are no longer going to turn a blind eye to Hizbollah engagement in Syria. If they don’t leave, we would need to target them (again as covert action with standoff weapons).
4. Create safe areas inside Syria we are prepared to protect from the air. The opposition, or Turkey, would have to provide ground forces in order to govern there without fear of regime and Islamic State violence. This option would also entail financial and technical assistance to the civilian opposition on a scale not yet attempted.
5. Provide (or allow others to provide) anti-aircraft and other more advanced weapons to vetted opposition groups. Possible use of these weapons against civilian aircraft either in Syria or in the region is the obvious downside. Remember Malaysia Air flight 17.
None of these ideas is a slam dunk. All could generate unintended consequences, in particular Russian and Iranian escalation. It is not clear that Washington would be willing to meet and exceed their responses. Nor is it guaranteed that the non-extremist opposition would be able to take advantage of the opportunities Washington generates.
But without something that changes the military equation, Aleppo is lost and the Syrian/Russian/Iranian alliance will continue its depredations against civilians in Idlib and other opposition strongholds. This would strengthen extremist recruitment and postpone the prospect of any political settlement.
I don’t envy this president, or the next one, in facing the choice among these options, or doing nothing.
The epitome of resolve
AP has published the Syria cease-fire deal that the US government refused to make public. It is instructive, even though the cessation of hostilities is in tatters as Russian and Syrian government forces have launched major attacks focused on Aleppo.
The deal was more or less as anticipated and described in the press: it entailed an effort to stabilize at least parts of Syria by ending attacks on non-extremist forces, thus permitting them to receive humanitarian assistance. Had this happened as agreed for a week, the US and Russia would have jointly targeted extremist forces (ISIS, Jabhat al Nusra and others) while the Syrian air force would have stood down from attacks in designated areas.
Special provisions would have allowed relief to arrive from Turkey to Aleppo in sealed trucks. Checkpoints on the Castello Road north of Aleppo were to be monitored initially by the Syrian Arab Red Crescent and later by the UN. The area near the road was to be demilitarized, with both government and opposition forces pulling back. Syrians were supposed to be allowed to leave Aleppo, including fighters with weapons. At least one other route was to be opened into Aleppo.
The joint Russian/American military action against extremists depended on the delineation of areas controlled by Nusra and opposition groups, starting right away but more “comprehensively” once the joint implementation center responsible for coordinating attacks on extremists was established. The Russians have been claiming that the Americans failed to fulfill their commitment to delineation, which also requires separation of more moderate forces from the extremists.
Why hasn’t it worked?
Some blame the failure on a lack of monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. To be sure, this is a complicated agreement with many moving parts that might have been marginally more successful had there been some sort of third-party monitoring.
But fundamentally it hasn’t worked because the parties haven’t really wanted it to or don’t have the leverage required. The Syrian government has the military advantage around Aleppo and wants to finish off the opposition that has controlled parts of the city for years. The Russians, having doubled down on their support for Bashar al Assad, are in no position to undermine their surrogate. The Americans have not provided sufficient support to the opposition to wean it from the extremists, who provide a good deal of the tooth in fighting against the regime.
Secretary of State Kerry is still trying to revive the cessation of hostilities. Foreign Policy has classified this as the textbook definition of insanity: doing the same thing over and over expecting a different result. But Kerry isn’t nuts. His problem is President Obama, who thinks there is nothing he can do that will improve the situation.
My Republican colleagues see this as a failure of resolve. I don’t. All American presidents since the fall of the Berlin Wall have resisted interventions. All eventually undertook one or more, against their better judgment at the outset. What distinguishes Obama is that he is more resolved, not less. But he is resolved to avoid the slippery slope to “owning” Syria, whereas his critiques wish he would start down it. This is the epitome of resolve, not its failure. Remember: this is a man with two teenage daughters who has spent almost eight years in the White House without a whiff of scandal.
I believe there are still things the President can consider doing about Syria: expanded sanctions, stand-off attacks on helicopters that drop barrel bombs or Syrian aircraft that violate the cessation of hostilities, an ultimatum to get Hizbollah and other Iranian surrogates out of Syria, non-declared attacks on Syrian government command and control. Without these alternatives, Secretary Kerry will not be able to deliver the negotiated political solution that is his avowed goal.
Syria and the next president
Secretary of State Kerry asked the key question about the Syria ceasefire on NPR this morning: “What’s The Alternative?” He had none, because President Obama is sticking with his determination that vital US interests are not at risk there, apart from the terrorist threat. So the President is doing whatever is necessary–even military cooperation with the Russians that Defense Secretary Carter thinks unwise–to attack the Islamic State and Al Qaeda-affiliate Jabhat al Nusra (JAN), now Jaish al Fateh al Sham (JFS). Everything else–in particular support for the Syrian opposition–is at best half-hearted.
The US media often picture Obama as hesitant in Syria, citing this half-hearted attitude and his decision not to bomb in response to chemical attacks and instead seek removal of Assad’s chemical weapons by diplomatic means. That is incorrect. He has been remarkably decisive and resolute in sticking with his initial decision on what matters and what doesn’t in Syria. All American presidents since 1989 have resisted big interventions abroad. He is the only one who has stuck to his guns (or pin stripes, if you prefer). There is every indication that in doing so he is in tune with majority American sentiment: the electorate wants to go after the extremists but not worry about how Syria is governed.
The result is that Secretary Kerry had no leverage in dealing with Moscow. Leverage comes from having a better alternative to a negotiated agreement. You know this from bargaining with car salesmen. If you are willing to walk out, you are going to get a better deal. Kerry couldn’t walk out because doing so would have left the situation entirely in the hands of the Russians and Iranians, who were doing serious harm to civilians and helping the extremists to recruit. He also was unable to threaten action against the Syrian government or the many Shia armed groups Iran has put onto the battlefield in defense of Assad. Obama won’t go there.
For the moment, the ceasefire seems to be holding, with some exceptions. Humanitarian aid so far as I can tell has not started flowing into besieged opposition areas. That is supposed to happen consistently before the military cooperation with the Russians to target the ISIS and JAN/JFS starts on Monday. I’d bet on limited humanitarian aid deliveries, if only because Assad does not want to risk displeasing the Russians too much. But it will be surprising if this unsupervised, unobserved, unmonitored ceasefire lasts more than a few weeks.
All sides in the Syrian conflict will want to use the ceasefire–however long it lasts–to rest, regroup, and rearm. It would be a mistake, in the absence of a firmer and longer-term political solution, for them not to do so. No political solution appears on the horizon. The High Negotiation Commission of the Syrian opposition has published its concept for a transition to a democratic society, but Bashar al Assad is showing no interest. The Iranians and Russians, having doubled down on their support for him, can see no alternative that would be even half as friendly to their interests as Bashar. They can no longer back up without losing their privileges in Syria sooner rather than later.
Later it may be, but strategically Moscow and Tehran have lost. They have linked the fate of their interests in Syria to a dictator who has slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people and destroyed the country. The day will come when Syrians will throw out Bashar and his allies. But there is no guarantee the successor government that does that will be a democratic one. It could just as well be a new, Sunni Islamist one, led by the likes of JAN/JFS or some version of ISIS. President Obama has studiously avoided worrying about how Syria is governed, but his successor will have to.