Tag: Al Qaeda
Heresies
The Middle East Institute today published my heresies concerning America’s future in the region. Essentially I agree with President Obama that American interests in the region are declining and shifting: the nuclear deal with Iran has postponed the proliferation threat and American dependence on Middle East oil is declining. Other interests like the fight against terrorism and maintaining relations with our allies require less military presence in the region and more attention to civilian functions like state-building, diplomacy to create a regional security architecture, and continuation of democracy support to those who desire it. Military assistance to allies in no way justifies the current massive US military presence in the Middle East, which attracts more problems than it solves.
This is not as different from Ken Pollack’s recent Fight or flight: America’s choice in the Middle East as might be imagined. Ken also emphasizes the important civilian dimensions of stabilizing the region, especially once the civil wars are brought to an end. But he uses the oil issue as his trump card in arguing for continued US engagement and even re-commitment to the region, as he fears breakdown of Saudi Arabia.
I am perfectly willing to concede that is a possibility, but it is one the Saudis have every incentive to prevent. How redoubling American military commitment to the Middle East would contribute is not clear to me. I am confident that any future regime in the Kingdom will want to protect itself and its oil exports. A disruption of Saudi exports, should it occur, can be met more readily by drawdown of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve, coordinated with other countries through the International Energy Agency as well as with China and India. Getting those two major importers of Middle Eastern oil to hold at least 90 days of strategic stocks would do much more for stability of the oil market than the Fifth Fleet, which is ill-suited to respond in any substantial way to internal disorder in Saudi Arabia.
Should an oil supply disruption last a long time, the consequent increase in prices will bring back a lot of “non-conventional” oil and gas. The technology for producing it is spreading around the world, so it is unlikely we’ll see a rise much above $70 per barrel during the next decade or more.
The Saudis could also do some things to improve the security of their oil exports. Existing pipelines that circumnavigate the strait of Hormuz are not used to full capacity. New pipelines could be built. The Kingdom would be wise to improve treatment of its Shia minority, many of whom live in oil-producing areas.
Some think Syria demonstrates that it would be better to fight wars in the Middle East than reduce our commitments there. I’d be quick to admit that President Obama’s inattention to Syria during the peaceful phase of its revolution was a serious mistake. He should have ensured that saying Bashar al Assad needed to step down was translated into action. It was clear from early on that his staying would lead to violence, that violence would lead to sectarian polarization, and that polarization would lead to radicalization.
But I disagree with those who claim the best way of ensuring that Assad left would have been to attack his chemical weapons facilities. That option did not arise until August 2013, which was well after the rebellion turned violent. Two years earlier would have been the best time to act, most likely through diplomatic and political means rather than military ones.
The failure to do so has created an enormous mess in Syria, but it is one that does not actually affect oil production and exports much. Even the humanitarian catastrophe should concern the Europeans more than the US, because of their vulnerability to migrants.
The big challenge in the Middle East today is creation of some kind of security architecture to channel competition into peaceful arenas. While American military capacity has a role to play in shaping the environment in which that is achieved, the task is essentially a diplomatic one requiring Iran and Saudi Arabia to come to terms and seek to reduce the threats that each perceives, stemming in part from the other. That should not be impossible. We did at least that well with the Soviet Union during a period of much greater threat to the US than any today. Detente is not a four letter word.
The Middle East today needs more diplomacy, state-building and democracy. It could do with a lot less saber-rattling and killing.
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It’s about democracy, not the Brotherhood
On Thursday, the Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID) presented ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act? Implications for Egypt and the Region.” Ebrahim Rasool, former South African Ambassador to the US, Nader Hashemi, Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the University of Denver, Neil Hicks, Director of Human Rights Promotion at Human Rights First, and Radwan Masmoudi, Founder and President of CSID, gave their thoughts on how this Congressional bill would affect Egypt and the region.
The Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act passed the House Judiciary Committee on February 24. It calls on the State Department to label the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. If it does not do so, the State Department will need to provide sufficient evidence to indicate why it believes the Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist organization. This bill is intended to support Egyptian President Sisi, who ousted democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood President Morsi and has tried to reimpose military order and autocracy.
Rasool believes that this bill will increase tensions in the Middle East. Quelling political dissent and labeling certain groups as terrorists will cause extremism to rise. The US needs to understand this and distinguish between Islamists and extremists.
Hashemi believes that the misguided bill is a gift to ISIS and Al Qaeda. It gives these groups the opportunity to exploit turmoil. The US may see a dictatorship as the lesser evil because it seems to provide stability. But if dictatorship had been stable, it would not have collapsed in the first place. Authoritarian regimes are so fragile that they collapse quickly when there are mass popular protests. A dictatorship only appears stable if it is able to ensure both prosperity and repression. Dictatorships merely create conditions for future, more intense chaos.
Hashemi further argued that Egypt is becoming another breeding ground for Islamic extremism. When the opposition to the Arab Spring came in full force, the promise of peaceful change ended and led to more extremism and violence in the region. Radical Islam thrives as a result of repressive regimes. In the 22 months since Sisi came to power, 700 terrorist attacks have been conducted. Only 90 attacks occurred in the 22 months prior to Sisi. Only two options exist in Egypt today, to be silent or join a revolutionary group that has a voice. Most young people in Egypt do not like ISIS, but they refuse to accept life under tyrants any longer.
Hicks agreed that the Muslim Brotherhood Act is misguided and contributes to more instability in the Middle East. Some Muslim Brotherhood members have been involved in violent activities, but others have participated in non-violent electoral processes. Tunisia exemplifies the non-violent faction of the Muslim Brotherhood. Hicks believes the US has clear interests in Islamists dedicated to nonviolent political activities. As human rights violations and poor governance under the Sisi administration continue, instability increases and harms the US and its allies.
Masmoudi said he disagrees with many of the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies, but that in no way justifies the Muslim Brotherhood Terrorist Designation Act. When a group makes mistakes, they should pay at the ballot box, not by taking away their human rights. His purpose in arguing against the US Congress decision to label the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group is to defend democracy, not the Muslim Brotherhood. Democracy must be inclusive, which involves the Muslim Brotherhood’s participation.
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Exploiting disorder
The International Crisis Group (ICG) takes appropriate transnational aim in its latest report at Al Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS), introduced Monday at Brookings by ICG President, Jean-Marie Guehenno. The main thesis is that success of the terrorist dual threat is the result of instability. No surprise there. Few of their supposed enemies in the Middle East and North Africa regard either Al Qaeda or the Islamic State as their top priority. Again no surprise. Neither is invincible, though AQ in Guehenno’s view is underrated at present. It is learning to apply a lighter, more gradual touch that has greater prospects of success than IS’s draconian approach.
It is when we get to the policy prescriptions that I start to part company, as usual with ICG reports. Guehenno and the report argue for containment, or perhaps marginalization, rather than outright victory, because we would not in any event know what to do if we win. It is already apparent in Iraq that the government lacks the means to govern effectively and inclusively in all the territory recaptured from IS. But nowhere does ICG advocate that we acquire the state-building capacities needed to eliminate the disorder in which the terrorists thrive or to repair the societies that they have broken. This is not only short-sighted; it is a formula for unending warfare. The very least ICG should have done is to point out the incapacity and put forward some sort of idea how it can be repaired.
The report argues for keeping open lines of communication, by talking with whomever will talk with us, apparently including the Islamic State and Al Qaeda provided they meet that condition. This includes “unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others.” I like that, since official talking lends an air of legitimacy that many groups don’t merit. But the argument offered in favor is the US rejection of Taliban offers in 2001 as well as similar reluctance in Somalia, Mali, Libya and Nigeria. None of those examples pertain to the Islamic State or Al Qaeda per se, both of which are arguably an order of magnitude or two less acceptable than the people and groups specifically mentioned. My guess is that we are in communication, directly or indirectly, with many of the groups mentioned, if only to try to free American hostages. It is hard to see how to do that with either Al Qaeda or the Islamic State.
Other recommendations get stronger grounding. Their suggestion for narrowing the countering violent extremism (CVE) agenda seems to me intellectually correct, even if the bureaucratic temptation to tie the development and peacebuilding agendas to the latest well-funded pet rock is irresistible. Respecting international humanitarian law, curbing targeted killings and investing in conflict prevention also make good sense to me. Neither the drone wars nor coddling of autocrats in the Middle East has served our strategic purposes well. Both have done more to spread the terrorist problem than defeat it.
In the end I thought Guehenno was correct in his talk at Brookings when he admired President Obama’s effort to keep the terrorist threat in perspective by noting its limited capacity to affect American national security. That effort Guehenno suggested was intellectually correct even if politically damaging. Unfortunately, the ICG report is less prudent:
World leaders’ concern is well-founded: IS’s attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies’ cohesion.
It then urges us not to make mistakes that risk aggravating the situation, but it nowhere says what Guehenno did: the jihadists are not a threat on the order of the Soviet Union and should not arouse us politically in the way the nuclear threat once did.
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Better than expected, but not good
Two weeks into the cessation of hostilities in Syria and just a weekend before proximity talks are scheduled to reconvene in Geneva, UN envoy Stefano De Mistura is saying that the chances for peace have never been better. There is, he says, “momentum” behind both humanitarian assistance and de-escalation. His hopes for a political settlement come from the newfound agreement of Moscow and Washington as well as the backing of others in the international community.
All of that is true, but it is a low bar. The prospects for a political agreement in Syria have long been dim to negligible. The current momentum comes from putting aside the central issue: whether Bashar al Assad will continue in power. Moscow and Tehran show no sign of dropping their support for him, even if both say repeatedly that they are not wedded to him. Washington might like to abandon the opposition entirely, but even if it does some of them will continue fighting as long as Assad is in power.
The cessation of hostilities has however held better than I and many others anticipated. The question is why. It seems to me that the Iranians and Russians had achieved most of their objectives and needed to consolidate their gains. In recent weeks, they and the Syrian armed forces were responsible for the vast majority of the attacks. If they had continued much longer they’d have ended up laying siege to the opposition-held part of Aleppo, where several hundred thousand people remain. That would have made them responsible for either starving them or feeding them. Better to stop when they did and let the international community do the heavy lifting required and pay the bills.
The United States has spent upwards of $5 billion on humanitarian relief in Syria, much of it through international organizations. Russia and Iran to my knowledge have spent nothing through the international community, though the Russians have dropped a few pallets of food in a feeble effort to get some credit. Many sieges continue in Syria. I’ve seen no comprehensive account of where humanitarian aid has been delivered and where not, but the relief provided so far will have been marginal and temporary at best. Nor have tens of thousands of political prisoners been released.
The Syrian government and their Russian allies continue to pummel some rebel-held areas from the air. They do not target only the Islamic State and Jabhat al Nusra, extremists not covered by the ceasefire. They have also attacked civilians in areas close to Damascus and in other parts of Syria. The Syrian Network for Human Rights reports 435 ceasefire violations, as of yesterday. That’s an average of about 30 per day.
People in opposition-held areas are appreciating the respite from war, which has engulfed civilian areas of central and northern Syria since the Russians started bombing in September. It should be no surprise that they have taken advantage of the opportunity to go out in the streets to demonstrate against Bashar al Assad. Syrians are not lacking in courage and conviction.
Bashar al Assad isn’t either. He has announced parliamentary elections for April 13, in an effort to preempt talk of a political transition. I see no sign that he is headed out the door.
So yes, things are better than expected, but they are not good. Or as Fadl AbdulGhani, Director of the Syrian Network for Human Rights, puts it:
I would say that on a scale between terrible and bad, the truce has been a marginal success—but this is only based on the limited options facing Syrians.
Odds are still against a political settlement that will lead to transition.
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Assad is fulfilling his own prophecy
With Syrian government and Iranian forces encircling Aleppo aided by Russian air attacks, it behooves us to consider what happens if President Assad wins. He is close to achieving his main goal by taking control of what he regards as “useful” Syria, which includes the corridor north from Damascus at least to Aleppo and west to Lebanon and the Mediterranean.
This Assad victory would not defeat ISIS, which controls territory to the east of this corridor, or the Kurdish forces that control most of the border with Turkey. Neither ISIS nor the Kurds have clashed more than occasionally with Syrian government forces, the Iranians and Russians. The Kurds appear to have an explicit understanding with the regime, which maintains government facilities within Kurdish-controlled territory. The regime and ISIS stay out of each other’s way.
Aleppo was once the largest city in Syria, with more than 2 million inhabitants. How many remain is unclear. Tens of thousands have fled in recent days north to the Turkish border, where they are blocked from entering. Many more presumably remain in the city, some in areas that have long been regime-controlled. If the encirclement of opposition areas is successful, they face starvation, bombardment and eventual surrender. Large parts of the city are already destroyed.
Idlib, to the soutwest of Aleppo, is also under attack and at risk of being cut off from Aleppo and from Turkey.
Judging from what has occurred elsewhere, there will be little effort to rebuild, except in areas dominated by or repopulated with Alawites and Shia. Syria’s Sunnis and others who have opposed Assad will be left to fend for themselves. Neither Russia nor Iran has provided significant reconstruction aid, the bill for which will be well over $100 billion. The Europeans, Americans and Gulf have provided most of the humanitarian assistance, relying in part on the United Nations, but they will presumably be unwilling to pay for reconstruction in areas where the regime regains control.
With moderate rebel forces defeated in the north, the odds are that the extremist forces of Jabhat al Nusra (JN), an Al Qaeda affiliate, and the Islamic State (ISIS) will gain. JN cadres appear to be mainly Syrian. ISIS is not. We should expect that whatever moderate Syrian forces remain will ally with JN, which will continue to fight. ISIS relies heavily on foreign fighters and is much less likely to attract many Syrians. Kurdish and allied Arab forces have been pressing south towards Raqqa, which is the de facto “capital” of the ISIS caliphate, but taking the city would require a far bigger Arab force than appears to exist right now.
In the south, moderate forces are holding up a bit better, but they have not come under the same kind of intensive regime, Russian and Iranian assault mounted around Aleppo. ISIS has been active in a small part of the south, but so far without any big success. It remains to be seen what will happen there.
A regime takeover of Aleppo and Idlib will end any serious military prospects for the moderate non-Kurdish opposition, except in the Azaz pocket near the border with Turkey. Even there, the Kurds and regime, Iranian and Russian forces may combine to push them out and force displaced Arabs into Turkey. Assad would be glad to add to Erdogan’s woes.
Assad has long wanted the contest in Syria to be seen as a fight between his regime and the extremists. He is getting close to driving the relative moderates off the battlefield, fulfilling his own prophecy. The consequences for many Syrians, for Turkey and for the prospects for peace will be disastrous.
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What to do when peace talks stall
The Syria peace talks stalled even faster than I might have predicted, though I wasn’t sanguine about their success. The reason for the suspension is all too clear: the Syrian army is making headway in north Latakia, around Aleppo and elsewhere, with vigorous support from Russian air strikes as well as Hizbollah ground forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps “advisors” (more like commanders). President Assad and his allies see no reason to halt the offensive. The Syrian opposition, which had asked at the talks for an end to air strikes and opening up of humanitarian access, sees no reason to talk while its people are getting slaughtered. Those of us who said this conflict was not “ripe” for peace talks, which includes almost everyone knowledgeable about the situation, were right.
That is little comfort. Nor does it mean the UN was wrong to try.
It is the UN’s role in today’s world order to take on cases no one else wants touch. That’s how it ended up with Libya, Yemen and Syria. The Americans and Europeans left Libya to its own devices, which sufficed for a while but then proved unequal to the state-building challenge. Now there is an agreement of sorts, but no implementation. The Houthis and Saudis wrecked a four-year peace process in Yemen, based on a Gulf Cooperation Council agreement and UN mediation, with military action. A recent effort to reinitiate talks has been postponed until at least late this month. Syria has already seen two failed UN efforts to end the war–Geneva I and II they are called–to no avail. Geneva III looks likely to fail too. Let’s hope they don’t catch up with the Superbowl numbering.
These stalled peace processes are bad for Libyans, Yemenis and Syrians, but they don’t have much say in the matter. Civilians are today the most frequent victims of war, as the contestants are so often vying for power within a state rather than trying to defeat the regular military forces of another state. Moving civilians, or persuading them to accept your rule, is therefore the objective, not an unintended consequence. It is far less perilous to guys with guns (yes most of them are guys, though not always all) to go after unarmed civilians, or even armed insurgents, than to contest another state’s armed forces.
The only real beneficiaries of continued fighting in Libya, Yemen and Syria are likely to be the extremist forces affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. They thrive on disorder–areas that have witnessed chaos are more likely to accept their draconian rule–and the extremists often fill the vacuum as states concentrate their efforts against less extreme insurgents. The one thing we can be pretty sure of from the experience of fighting extremists since 9/11 is that attacking them from the air without establishing order on the ground thereafter ensures that we will have to roll Sisyphus’ rock up the hill once again. And with each iteration the extremists get bolder, smarter and more lethal.
We are all too clearly losing the war against violent extremism. We should be thinking hard about whether the means we are using are appropriate to the task. Washington’s purpose should be to eliminate safe havens for extremists who might strike Americans. Drones have dinstinct advantages. They keep their operators safe while killing bad guys, but they can’t reestablish governance on territory from which extremists have been driven. Only legitimate state authorities can do that. It is time to refocus our attention on where they are going to come from.
Stalled talks are an opportunity. The warring parties in Libya, Yemen and Syria as well as their international supporters should be thinking hard about how these countries will be governed once the killing has stopped. Both the fighting and the peacemaking are worthless without an answer to that question.
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