Tag: Al Qaeda
Refugees are not the problem
The flow of refugees into Europe from the Middle East and North Africa is now attracting widespread attention. The 71 Syrians who suffocated last week in a truck in Austria, and the three-year-old who drowned in the Mediterranean, have done what close to 250,000 dying in Syria over the past 3.5 years (that’s an average of about 200 per day) could not: they have mobilized public opinion. Germany and Sweden are rightly praised for opening their doors. Hungary is trying to seal itself off. The Americans may take more than the trickle of refugees they have accepted so far, but still an insignificant number. The UN is appealing for funds, which have been sorely lacking. More than $8.4 billion is needed.
But refugees are not the root of the problem. Nor are the ones who arrive in Europe and the US the Syrians most in need or most at risk. They are the symptom–a relatively small and distant one–of a much larger and more challenging problem: the multi-sided conflict in Syria, to which we’ve become unfortunately inured. Four million people have managed to escape Syria, mostly fleeing to neighboring countries. They are the relatively fortunate ones, when not jammed into a truck in Austria or drowning in the Med. Seven million have been displaced inside Syria, where relief is much harder to find.
Of course problems are much more visible when up close and personal. But we need to keep the focus on the disease, not only the spreading ripple of symptoms.
The disease has its origins in the Syrian dictatorship’s response to peaceful pro-democracy protests. Determined to stay in power, it cracked down violently, concentrating its efforts against relative moderates and the majority Sunni community, both of which were a real threat to Bashar al Assad’s hold on power. The natural result was the growth of Sunni extremism, which has helped Bashar demonstrate that the only alternative to his rule is Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. To this day, his forces continue to focus disproportionately not on jihadi terrorism but rather on those who say they want a secular, democratic state.
There is no way to run this history backwards. The extremists will not disappear if Assad falls. It is highly unlikely that relative moderates would replace him. The best we can hope for now is to create some relatively safe places inside Syria where moderates can govern, providing protection for civilians and beginning to service their needs so that they don’t flee.
The northern area that the Americans and Turks are contemplating for this purpose is hardly ideal. Large parts of it are barren rural areas over which control will be hard to establish. Turkomans populate much of the border area with Turkey, along with Kurds against whom the Turks have been fighting. The Kurds already control much of the rest of the border, where the key to making things safer for civilians will be cooperation between them and the Arabs who live both among them and farther south.
The area along the Jordanian/Syrian border in the south is another possible protected zone, one dominated by relatively moderate Sunni insurgents, including some with US training, and the non-Muslim, Arab Druze. The Druze have tried to hold their fire and avoid close alignment with either the regime or the insurgents. Self-preservation is their priority. Bringing them into closer alignment with the insurgents would require giving them the confidence that they will be protected from the vindictive reaction of the regime.
Protected areas north and south would not solve Syria’s problems, but with Coalition (read US plus at least some European and Gulf) support, they might begin to stem the tide. If nothing is done to enable Syrians to remain in their country, it is a virtual certainty that next year’s outflow will be much greater than this year’s, with economic and political consequences for both the neighboring countries and Europe that will dwarf what we are seeing today. But the refugees will still not be the root of the problem.
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Anatomy of a possible “safe zone”
In late July, it was announced that the US would be allowed to use Incirlik airbase in Turkey to conduct airstrikes against ISIS. This move came immediately after ISIS claimed responsibility for a bombing in Suruç, Turkey that killed 33 people. It has been widely reported that the US/Turkey deal also included a provision for some sort of safe zone, or ISIS-free, zone along the Turkish-Syrian border.
US officials have denied that this zone would be a true safe zone or no-fly zone, but rather that the US and Turkey would collaborate to clear a zone from ISIS control and look to man it with moderate opposition fighters. According to Foreign Policy, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has said that the zone will not be an official no-fly zone but will have US air support. President Erdoğan has stated that the zone could allow for 1.8 million Syrian refugees to be repatriated.
News sources are generally in agreement that the zone would extend west along the Syrian border from Jarablus on the Euphrates. Some reports state that the zone will extend as far as Marea, while others state that it will extend as far as A’zaz. The depth of the zone is less certain, but reports indicate that it will be 40-50 km deep. Assuming a depth of approximately 45 km, the zone would look like this if it extends to Marea:
Here is a larger zone extending to A’zaz:
- The red line is the Turkey-Syrian border and the yellow line is the possible extent of the zone, if it goes to A’azaz.
The larger population centers, as well some towns and villages where fighting has recently taken place, are marked with pins. Those marked in black are under ISIS control and those in green are under rebel control. Zahraa, in red, is a Twelver Shiite, regime-controlled city, and Aleppo, in white, is under mixed rebel and regime control. It is worth noting that the eastern portion of the zone is sparsely populated, but Manbij and Al-Bab are larger cities, with populations of ~100,000 and approximately ~60,000, respectively. The Western part of the zone is more heavily cultivated and densely populated; whether the zone would contain the sizeable towns of A’zaz (population ~30,000) and Tel Rifat (population ~20,000) is an important question.
Below is a map of areas of control created by Dutch student Thomas van Linge and updated on August 18. I have overlayed a portion of the map onto a Google Earth view of the zone:
If the zone extends to Marea it will encompass almost entirely ISIS-held territory (shown in gray). Marea itself is under ISIS siege and is controlled by a mix of the FSA, the Islamic Front and Jaysh Al-Mujahideen. A’zaz is controlled by a mix of the FSA and the Islamic Front and Tel Rifat is controlled by a mix of the FSA, Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, the Islamic Front, Faylaq Al-Sham (also known as the Sham Legion–a group of moderate Islamists who have had ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, but are trying to distance themselves from it).
Andrea Taylor and Abigail Kukura have suggested that a coalition of rebels known as the Levant Front (or Jabhat al-Shamiyya) could be at least partially relied upon as a ground force to protect the zone. The Levant Front is an alliance between the Islamic Front (which includes Ahrar Al-Sham), Jaysh Al-Mujahideen, and three other Islamist rebel groups. Ahrar Al-Sham is a hardline Islamist group, that supports the creation of a Sunni Islamic theocracy in Syria. It coordinates tactically with the Nusra Front, but also works with more moderate and secular rebel groups. Ambassador Robert Ford and Ali El Yassir have argued that the US should open a dialogue with Ahrar Al Sham, because it is one of the most powerful rebel groups. Given the composition of rebel groups in the western portion of the zone, the US will be forced to cooperate with Ahrar Al Sham, at least indirectly through Turkey.
The zone has been the scene of significant fighting in the past few weeks. In the following maps, I have once again used Thomas van Linge’s map of areas of control, and marked the sites of recent clashes with red flames. I excluded clashes in Aleppo proper. I obtained information about these clashes primarily from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.
There are four primary hotspots:
- The area along the front lines between ISIS and the rebels, especially around Marea.
- A cluster of villages and a gas factory near the Turkish border on the front lines between ISIS and the rebels.
- Areas on the far edge of the zone where clashes have occurred between rebels and regime positions in the Twelver Shiite cities of Zahraa and Nubl.
- Clashes between the regime and the rebels in the northern outskirts of Aleppo.
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Two birds with one stone
There are still a few weeks before the Congressional votes are completed September 17 on the Iran nuclear deal, but it looks as if President Obama will win enough votes to prevent his veto of disapproval from being overridden. He will have then hit a political grand slam: I am counting as the first three wins gay marriage, Obamacare and Trade Promotion Authority, which opens the possibility of completing negotiation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and continuing negotiation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.
Let’s leave aside the reopening of full diplomatic relations with Cuba, a win in the Supreme Court on housing discrimination, executive action to limit greenhouse gases that cause climate change, and half a dozen other less visible items.
The latest GDP growth number, a revised 3.7% in the second quarter, is icing on the cake.
Whether you agree or disagree with him, this has been a remarkably successful few months for the lame duck. He is on a roll.
But his approval rating is down.
The biggest reasons are apparently his handling of the Islamic State (ISIS) and Iran. The Administration clearly underestimated ISIS, which has proven far more dangerous and resilient than anticipated. It poses a serious threat to US and European interests, for the moment mainly in the Middle East and North Africa. Post-deal Iran, with its pockets full of old sanctions money and new revenue from increasing oil exports, will also pose a serious regional threat to US and European interests. Even a supporter of the deal like me should recognize that.
Syria is where those two issues combine. ISIS has thrived on the ongoing civil war there. Iran has invested enormous resources in supporting Bashar al Assad. The United States has engaged from the air against ISIS but not against Assad’s forces.
This isn’t working. It can’t, because Assad is an important part of the reason that ISIS thrives in Syria. He is pummeling the country’s civilians. Sunnis are perhaps 75% of the population. The pummeling by an Alawite-based regime is radicalizing some small portion of that community, which is all ISIS needs to fill its ranks with young fighters. Iran, which has good reason to fear ISIS, responds with ever more support for the regime, including providing it with Lebanese Hizbollah forces Tehran controls.
This escalation is bad for Syria, bad for the region, and bad for the United States and Europe, where refugees are flooding in unprecedented numbers. President Obama needs to rethink his standoffish attitude toward Syria and his single-minded focus on countering only ISIS there. He has good reason to be concerned about what comes next in Syria if Assad falls suddenly, but there is little prospect the inevitable succession will move Syria in a positive direction from the American perspective if the US does not engage.
There are basically two ways to do so: militarily and politically. The best approach will combine the two. Washington is already talking with Turkey about creating a so-called “safe zone” along Syria’s northern border, extending from the Euphrates west for close to 70 miles. That could provide the Syrian opposition with an opportunity to govern and Syrians an opportunity to seek refuge. Widening US air strikes to respond to regime barrel-bombing of civilians or to respond to Hizbollah attacks on civilian population centers is another option.
The diplomatic effort has to focus on the transition from Bashar al Assad to a successor regime that excludes Islamic extremists like the Islamic State and Al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nustra but includes a wide spectrum of Syrian political perspectives. This is critical: no one should want Syria to fall into the hands of a regime that presents the West, the Gulf, Russia and Iran with even greater problems than Bashar al Assad has done.
It makes sense for the pushback against both Iran and ISIS to come in Syria. Two birds with one stone.
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Insider views on ISIS in Iraq
On Thursday, Stimson hosted a discussion in cooperation with the American University of Iraq, Sulaimani (AUIS) entitled Threat Of ISIS In Iraq: Views From The Ground. Speakers included: Stimson Middle East Fellow Geneive Abdo, , Brookings Non-resident Fellow Christine van den Toorn, AUIS Director of the center for Development and Natural Resources Bilal Wahab. Three AUIS students, Noaf, Anas, and Khusai were featured in recorded videos. Lukman Faily, Iraqi Ambassador to the US, also spoke. Stimson President Ellen Laipson moderated.
AUIS was founded in 2006. Students come from many religious backgrounds and Iraqi regions, as well as from neighboring countries.
Van den Toorn, explained that Iraq is more complicated than the discourse in DC. The students from AUIS explained the situation in their regions.
Noaf is from Sinjar. He and his 6 brothers all finished college. He was supposed to study in Mosul after high school but had worked as a translator for US troops and is Yazidi, so he feared for his safety. He got a scholarship to study at AUIS and graduated with a degree in Business Administration.
ISIS still threatens Sinjar and tried to take back his village, Hanasour, two days ago. The northern part of Sinjar was liberated from ISIS five months ago and many different actors are defending the area. Military leaders believe a unified force could liberate the rest of Sinjar in 3-4 days. Noaf wants autonomy for Sinjar with NATO protection. The people of Sinjar have lost trust in both Iraqi and KRG security forces; an international force would allow the IDPs to return. Sinjar has agriculture and oil, so it could have its own economy.
Anas was born in Samarra, Saladin Governorate. His father had refused to join the Ba’ath Party, was forced into the military, and died. He graduated with an engineering degree from AUIS.
The economy in Samarra is bad because Samarra is controlled by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs). Last year, ISIS entered half of the city, but left the next day. ISIS is now 20 km away. Samarra is 100% Sunni, but about 90% of the security forces are Shia. Some PMUs are good; others are criminals. Locals are hesitant to join the PMUs because some of those who fought Al Qaeda in 2006 were later arrested by the government. The PMUs should transfer control to the local police. Tikrit has been liberated, but most residents haven’t returned because the PMUs have arrested some returnees. The PMUs, not the government, decide who can and cannot return to liberated areas. Returnees to some villages have found homes and shops destroyed and Shia flags flying. There is a misconception that Sunnis support ISIS, but ISIS destroyed Sunni regions. ISIS killed two of his uncles. The problem is that Iraq’s central government treats Sunnis as enemies.
Khusai was raised in Baghdad, but his parents are from Najaf. He finished high school in 2008 when the security situation was terrible. He went to AUIS to study in a safe environment. He works in finance in Baghdad.
The security situation was very bad before Ramadan in Baghdad. During Ramadan, the situation improved and the curfew was lifted. ISIS will not invade Baghdad because it is protected by the PMUs. But Baghdadis fear the PMUs because they are armed criminals. Fortunately, their presence in the city center has recently decreased.
Southern Iraq remains safe, but some residents resent the costly war. Additionally, the IDPs in the south are causing higher prices and competition for jobs. But most southerners still believe in one Iraq, and want to liberate the northern cities, because of Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa.
Wahab said that centralization in Iraq has been a failure. There have been attempts to create an Iraqi identity, through both force and co-optation using oil wealth. The 2003 invasion offered the opportunity to decentralize, but centralization has been stronger. In response, the KRG is pushing for statehood. Basra is also looking for more autonomy and some in Kirkuk talk of a distinct Kirkuk region.
The government controls 50% of the economy. The economic power of the executive branch makes it hard to hold it accountable. The collapse of oil prices hurt the economy, which suffers if the government cannot inject enough cash into it. Government expenses have also increased because of military costs.
Without a comprehensive, international strategy to defeat ISIS, regional powers and domestic players will continue to use the crisis to their advantage, e.g., the PMUs. Kurdish society is less united than before as it argues over who deserves the credit for holding back ISIS. Within Iraq, both political and economic reform are needed.
Abdo spoke about how religious identity in Iraq has nearly replaced the identity of Iraqi citizenship. The fight for a united Iraq is true more in theory than in reality. Religion is being used for political gain in Iraq, as it has been in Lebanon and Bahrain. Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa asking his followers to take up arms is rare in Shi’ism and shows urgency, but Sistani can no longer control the PMUs. The Shia have been radicalized too.
Ambassador Faily noted that all sides in Iraq blame others. This is a vicious cycle, with no magic solution. Everyone has agreed to decentralization, but getting there necessitates a dialogue towards a common strategy. ISIS is an existential threat to Iraq and is a problem for all of Iraq’s communities. Dealing with ISIS will take time, but respect for the integrity of the state is key. Those who want power at the state’s expense will harm everyone. The US plays an important supportive role but should give Iraq breathing space to improve its politics.
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Legacy
We all worry about our legacy. President Obama must too. But unlike most of us he has a lot of people telling the world what his will be.
The current favorite is the Iran nuclear deal. I doubt that. Does anyone even remember that it was Bill Clinton who made a nuclear deal with North Korea? It fell apart in George W’s administration. Even that is not remembered, I suppose because the list of his failures is long.
If the Iran nuclear deal falls apart soon, sure it will tarnish the Obama brand. But let’s assume the implementation of the Iranian nuclear deal goes reasonably well. If 10 or 15 years from now Iran makes a dash for a nuclear weapon, will anyone blame Barack Obama, or will they understandably blame his successor’s successor? And credit him with delaying what was inevitable.
There have been lots of “legacy” proposals these past six months. The two most prominent, quite rightly focused on domestic policy, have been
- Obamacare, which survived its test in the Supreme Court;
- gay marriage, another Supreme Court win.
They will no doubt be counted as important milestones on the way towards a more just society, but really not legacy-defining.
A far stronger candidate in my view is this:
source: tradingeconomics.com
That’s a rapid recovery from the 2008 economic implosion, followed by six years of relatively steady if modest growth, likely to be extended to eight years while much of the rest of the world continues to stagnate. Simultaneously, US government debt has leveled off:
source: tradingeconomics.com
This good economic news is important for American foreign policy. Without it, there would be little hope that Washington could muster the resources needed to engage–even to the extent it has–on major issues like Moscow’s military challenge in Ukraine and Beijing’s somewhat less military challenge in the South China Sea.
In addition, there is the good news about US energy production:
source: tradingeconomics.com
Combined with the decline in global energy prices, this dramatic shift is denying resources to some of our adversaries and providing a serious boost to the American economy.
All that good economic news–rarely credited today but likely to be all to obvious in the future–should not however obscure the very real bad news from the Middle East. Apart from the failure of the Administration’s efforts to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict, we’ve got a civil war in Syria that has killed upwards of 300,000 people and displaced close to half the country’s population, sending 4 million abroad as refugees. We’ve also got a civil war in Libya, allowed to flourish in the aftermath of a successful intervention. And another in Yemen, where Washington is half-heartedly supporting a Saudi intervention that appears to be making things worse.
Just as important: the war against Islamist extremists that began in 2001 in Afghanistan has been notably unsuccessful. Fourteen years later, a few thousand extremists in two countries have metastasized to tens of thousands in more than a dozen countries, despite hundreds of drone strikes and air attacks.
Neither our military might nor our propaganda capabilities have succeeded in stemming the tide. They have arguably made things worse. The American non-governmental organizations are rightly protesting continuation of an approach that simply has not worked.
When it comes to foreign policy, these failures in the Middle East and in the fight against Islamist extremists are likely to be a bigger part of President Obama’s legacy than the nuclear deal. If he wants to worry about something, he should put these things at the top of his list. A serious effort now to enable Syrian moderates to begin governing inside Syria, coupled with a serious European effort to make sure the UN’s Libyan mediation unifies that country’s rival governments and parliaments, would do a great deal to fix the broken Middle East. These are largely diplomatic challenges, not military ones.
We would still be facing terrorist challenges elsewhere. If we want to deal with them, it is clear enough that military means will not suffice. We need a much stronger civilian mobilization, in partnership with other countries and international organizations. More on how to make that part of Barack Obama’s legacy in a later post.
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Tunisia needs more help
On Tuesday, the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa hosted a hearing on Tunisia’s Fragile Democratic Transition. Opening statements were given by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman of the subcommittee, Theodore Deutch, Ranking Member of the subcommittee, and Steve Chabot, member of the committee. Testimony was provided by Ambassador Mark Green, President of IRI, Leslie Campbell, Senior Associate and Regional Director at NDI, Aaron Zelin, Richard Borow Fellow, WINEP, and William Sweeney President and CEO, IFES.
Ros-Lehtinen stated that Tunisia is the only country that has made positive gains after the Arab Spring, but these gains are uncertain. Despite its new constitution and elections, Tunisia has been the victim of two recent high-profile terror attacks. The attacks remind us that tourism accounts for 15% of Tunisia’s GDP. Even before the Sousse attack, economic problems in Europe were hurting Tunisia’s tourism.
President Essebsi has claimed that another attack would cause the collapse of Tunisia’s government. The stability of Tunisia and its democratic transition is in the US’s interest. The designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally last week was an important step. But Tunisia is home to the largest contingent of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria, and returnees from these conflicts pose a threat. The US needs to help Tunisia strengthen its institutions and invest in its future.
Deutch hailed the peaceful transfer of power after Tunisia’s 2014 parliamentary elections and the ability of its parties to form coalitions. However, Tunisia’s economy has struggled since the revolution. Unemployment is at 15%, and among working-class youth is nearly triple that figure. Tourism has struggled especially after recent attacks. There are home-grown terror cells, external threats from Libya and Algeria, and the threat of returnees from Iraq and Syria. Tunisia’s government must not sacrifice freedom in the name of security. He praised the designation of Tunisia as a major non-NATO ally, as well as the MOU signed in May.
Chabot echoed the statements of Ros-Lehtinen and Deutch concerning Tunisia’s potential to serve as a model and the terror threat. He also expressed concern that Monday’s disappearance of 33 Tunisian citizens on the border with Libya indicates radicalization in that area.
Ambassador Green also affirmed that Tunisia is the brightest hope for democracy in the Middle East and North Africa. The 2014 elections showed that Tunisia’s stakeholders are committed to democracy in a polarized, unstable region. The US administration must train and help reform Tunisia’s security services, which are a holdover from the Ben-Ali regime.
Unemployment weighs most heavily on young Tunisians. Since 2014, IRI has supported decentralization. Tunisia’s bureaucracy stifles entrepreneurship and foreign investment. Tunisia’s government cannot put off economic reform despite pressing security concerns.
Low youth voter participation is another major concern. Civil society groups are necessary to involve youth and connect them to the democratic transition. The US needs to focus more of its aid on supporting democratic governance. Tunisia will likely hold elections in 2016, so the time to foster genuine democratic competition is now.
Campbell several factors that differentiate Tunisia from other Arab countries:
- Tunisia took time to develop its constitution rather than rush to snap elections.
- The military stayed out of politics.
- Civil society was allowed to flourish.
- Tunisia’s political establishment avoided polarizing rhetoric and sought compromise.
Tunisia’s Islamists defied expectations and peacefully transferred power. The situation in Egypt, international pressure, and popular pressure made them respect the democratic process. NDI helped create space for political debate and the parties’ investments in their internal structures have strengthened the democratic process. Campbell cited the balance between freedom and security as a major challenge.
Tunisia does not appear as corrupt as some other countries but there is crony capitalism controlled by privileged families. If you’re not from the right family or region, there is no way to get ahead. It is important to foster a meritocracy. Business leaders want access to capital and want to join international organizations, but there is a sense that crony capitalists are circling the wagons under the current government.
Zelin stated that there have been 11 known attacks by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS since the last election, as well as 10 counter-insurgency operations by the Tunisian military. The US has provided a lot of assistance. Tunisia’s jihadi problem has been present for approximately 20 years, but is coming to the surface now because many exiled radicals returned to Tunisia in 2011.
From 2003-2011, many individuals falsely accused of being terrorists were imprisoned, only to be radicalized in prison. If Tunisia’s current security bill is passed, we could see a repeat of this. The Ministry of Interior is corrupt and many of the bad practices of the Ben-Ali regime are returning, including possible torture in prisons and arbitrary arrests. These are possible sources of radicalization. The police require retraining and capacity building so they can be seen as protectors, not a group that takes away rights.
The government has had difficulty transparently investigating terrorist attacks and communicating the results to the people. President Essebsi’s comment that the government would collapse following another attack was irresponsible and amateurish.
Tunisia has reinforced its border with Libya and is considering a border fence. However, there are individuals with weapons already inside Tunisia and others who come from Algeria.
Sweeny stated that only 16% of American aid to Tunisia goes toward strengthening democracy. More can be done. Prior to the 2016 elections several things are necessary:
- A standard legal framework for local elections.
- Greater professionalism from the electoral commission and capacity-building in its regional offices.
- Implementation of lessons learned from 2014.
- Focus on unemployed youth, for whom dictatorship and democracy remain much the same.
Sweeny agreed with Campbell’s observations about crony capitalism, and stated that it will hinder foreign investment. Foreign investment will also be constrained by a lack of confidence in Tunisia’s stability.
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