Tag: Al Qaeda
Finding a way forward in Syria
March 16, on the fourth anniversary of the Syrian conflict, the Middle East Institute convened a panel discussion focusing on the way forward for Syria. Led by MEI’s vice president Paul Salem, the panel featured resident scholar and former ambassador to Syria Robert Ford, senior political advisor to the Syrian American Council Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, deputy director and fellow at CNAS Dafna Rand and fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Michael Eisenstadt.
Paul Salem reminded the audience about the somber development of the Syrian crisis. The conflict has cost the lives of an estimated 300,000 Syrians, has injured many more and has displaced another 9 million. The economy has been devastated, and will likely take 30-40 years to return to pre-crisis levels. Moreover, fallout from the conflict threatens both the region and the world at large. Salem argued that the US and its allies have so far been unable to cope with these challenges, as they have yet to produce a strategy that deals with the root cause of the conflict: a regime that refuses to budge or compromise.
Ambassador Ford argued that current US policy falls short of the intended goal of containing and eventually rolling back the Islamic State (ISIS). In particular, Ford noted that recruitment of Syrians to ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra continues unabated – driven by the brutality of the Syrian civil war. The bombing campaign against ISIS might be helpful as a stop-gap measure, but it will not succeed in rolling it back.
To achieve this, the US must instead push for a political transition process, Ford argued. This requires that the opposition accept negotiations with the Assad regime and that they provide war-weary regime supporters with a vision of Syria that is neither Assad’s nor the Islamists’. It also requires increased material support to the moderate opposition so that the regime feels compelled to negotiate. Ford concluded by pointing out that support for the opposition in Syria is about bringing both parties to the table, not about toppling the regime.
In a similar vein, Mohamed Alaa Ghanem argued for a more robust American response to the Syrian crisis. Ghanem pointed out that in October 2011 Syrian protesters had come out in large numbers to demand the establishment of a no-fly zone in Syria. He argued that if a no-fly zone had been established in July 2012, when the Free Syrian Army controlled a majority of populated areas in Syria, it could have meant the effective end of the regime. Similarly, Ghanem argued that the current US train-and-equip program would flounder if these forces did not have protection against the regime’s aerial bombardments. He therefore urged the US to support Turkish proposals of an air exclusion zone – a limited form of no-fly zone that would shield Aleppo and allow some space to the moderate rebels.
He also urged more significant support to the rebels, noting that the FSA-affiliated ‘Southern Front’ that is currently making progress pays their fighters about $85 per month, as opposed to Jabat al-Nusra’s $300 and IS’ $500-1000. Ghanem warned that de Mistura’s plan of local freezes would likely free up regime forces for the offensive in the south, and argued that the only framework for a political settlement acceptable to Syrians was the Geneva communique.
On a slightly more optimistic note, Daphna Rand said that the US policy of fighting the ISIS could be helpful in pushing for a transition process, provided it was leveraged the right way. Rand suggested four reasons why the two goals were related. First, the current battle map of Syria requires the removal of IS from the the North-West – particularly from the Turkish border, in order to create governing space for the opposition. Second, recent opinion polls show a significant increase in public support for intervention in Syria after the anti-ISIS campaign was announced in October 2014. Third, experience from previous interventions suggests that the US-led anti-ISIS campaign will not remain in its current limited form. Intervention will require the US to pick a side, as indicated by the current training of a non-jihadist, non-regime force. Finally, the architecture of the anti-ISIS coalition suggests that the current intervention might overcome the strategic disparity that characterized early efforts by the US and its allies, when the support for widely different groups helped fragment the Syrian opposition.
Michael Eisenstadt argued that the US policy in Syria amounts to supporting an insurgency. Since insurgencies are inherently political, this requires coordination between political and military efforts. Such coordination so far has not been forthcoming, in part due to muddled thinking about the use of military power. Obama’s mantra on Syria has been that there are no military solutions to the conflict – an approach that the Assad regime clearly disagrees with.
According to Eisenstadt, it is clear that some form of military action is required to bring about a diplomatic solution to the Syrian conflict. Moreover, US Syria policy appears to be held hostage by the ongoing nuclear negotiations with Iran. Eisenstadt stressed that these negotiations should not constrain US options in Syria and pointed to the fact that the Iranians themselves do not appear to be notably constrained in their Syria policy.
The US needs to recognize its role in perpetuating the conflict. US inaction has been a recruitment bonanza for ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra and encouraged the perceived passive alliance with Iran in Iraq. The fact that early airstrikes protected minority groups but not Sunnis has helped cement a view of the US as opposed to the Syrian revolution. Einsentadt concluded by warning against separating US policy in Syria from Iraq. Without according equal weight to efforts in both countries, the US cannot succeed in defeating ISIS.
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Still more on Free Syria
Dylan Clement, a Syria Program Assistant at the International Republican Institute, asked some good questions in responses to my pieces advocated Free Syria on protected areas inside the country. Here are his questions and my answers:
Q: Through its usage of chemical weapons, the regime has proven its willingness to break international norms and in particular defy the United States. With that in mind, how would the regime react when faced with the possibility an alternative Syrian government taking hold in these de facto no fly zones?
A: The regime would certainly test the will of those who say they will protect them. We would need to be prepared to respond with proportional force against whatever applied the test. The problem will be that the artillery, mortars or aircraft concerned may disappear, or be parked next to mosques or schools. Then we need to be prepare to widen the circle of targets. This might well lead to escalation that we would have to be prepared to match.
The elimination of the bulk of the regime’s chemical weapons is perhaps a better indicator of its response to threat than its continued use of chlorine.
Q: I’m not sure the opposition structures that exist, ie the SOC/SIG, are competent and cohesive enough to provide actual governance alternatives in these free areas inside the country…
A: I don’t think the SOC/SIG would in the first instance be responsible. It would have to be local councils. Their connections to the SOC/SIG are tenuous at best. It is their connections to local liberated communities that are important.
Q: What if [Jabhat al] Nusra takes refuge in these areas as well? Given the level of cooperation between Nusra and ‘moderate’ rebel groups up to this point (and the lack of precedent for civilian opposition leaders in denouncing al Qaeda), a situation may arise whereby the US is providing air cover for Nusra’s attacks against the regime. That would be awkward.
A: This is a serious question, as a successful protected area would necessarily attract Nusra or other extremists. The Syrian forces responsible for protection on the ground would have to take care of that issue. My understanding is that the US-trained forces are prepared to oppose Nusra and the Islamic State, and their logistic and financial train presumably provides the US with leverage to insist.
But we have to be careful. Treating all Islamists as enemies would only make things worse, and there is necessarily an area of ambiguity: is the guy with the beard who disapproves of women appearing in public Nusra, Islamic State or just a devout Muslim with conservative social views? There will be no way to avoid issues of that sort as things unfold in Syria.
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Countering violent extremism
Last week’s Countering Violent Extremism White House Summit triggered many events on the subject around town. Matt Melino, a SAIS student in my post-war reconstruction and transition class, summarizes one held at CSIS last week:
Host
• Bob Schieffer: Chief Washington Correspondent, CBS News, Anchor, CBS News “Face the Nation”
Panelists
• Farah Pandith: Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, First-Ever Special Representative to Muslim Communities, US State Department
• Nancy Youssef: Senior National Security Correspondent, The Daily Beast
• Juan C. Zarate: Former Deputy National Security Adviser for Combating Terrorism, Senior Adviser, CSIS
Juan Zarate noted that the White House wanted to address the issue directly by gathering representatives from around the world. This deviated from past efforts where the US was hesitant to talk about this sensitive topic. Now it is recognized as a long-term challenge. Farah Pandith pointed out that conference is different from the approach President Obama took after his inauguration, when in his speeches in Ankara and Cairo he told the Muslim world he wanted to work directly with them. In 2015, the issue of violent extremism is a global phenomenon and Muslims need to help lead the effort to combat its spread. This includes not only governments, but also local communities and the private sector. Nancy Youssef raised the issue of using the term “Islamic.” The concern is that this will play into the hands of the extremists, who are anxious to frame the issue as a battle of Islam versus the West.
Zarate noted that the US is fearful of offending its allies or describing the threat as a war on Islam. This was evident in former President George W. Bush’s speech in October 2005 when he said
some call this evil Islamic radicalism, others militant jihadism, still others islamo-fascism. Whatever it is called, this ideology is very different from the religion of Islam, this form of radicalism exploits Islam to serve a violent political vision.
President Obama is struggling with the same issue. The problem is, without publically recognizing the Islamic underpinnings, how do you defeat it?
Nancy Youseff added that the region as a whole is also struggling with the problem. The Mosul campaign conducted by ISIS is very similar to the one al-Qaeda in Iraq conducted against US troops in 2005 and 2006. We can continue to fight extremist groups with military force. But a solution will prove elusive if practices such as poor governance, and prison structures where jihadists mix and are then released to put into practice the lessons they learned in prison, continue.
The panelists acknowledged that extremist ideology is succeeding in the real world. Individuals realize they can have a strategic impact and therefore take it upon themselves to conduct acts of terrorism. Examples include the attack on Charlie Hebdo and the recent attacks in Denmark. So long as ISIS exists in Syria and Iraq, the messages it projects will continue to attract youth and the ideology will continue to spread. New hot spots are emerging. Human rights abuses include the use of child soldiers and sexual slaves, as well as the emergence of polio in Western Pakistan and the desecration of cultural heritage. The US has not figured out a way to react effectively to these developments.
The panel then discussed the appeal of the ideological message. Farah Pandith explained how there is an identity crisis among the global population under 30, many of whom have grown up with the words “Islam” and “Muslim” on the front page of news outlets. This has a profound impact on how they think about themselves. Young Muslims ask questions such as why a family dresses a certain way, or prays a certain way. The loudest and clearest answers come from extremists, who provide an identity young people understand. It is not about being rich or poor, educated or not, but how individuals feel about themselves.
We are failing to connect the dots of this phenomenon. We have become so fixated on a particular region and particular countries that we are missing the global impact. A boy in the Maldives can publicize an idea online and a girl in Denver picks it up and says “that makes sense to me.” And thus starts the spread of potentially radical ideas.
The panelists concluded by discussing what we should do moving forward. All three agreed that we should amplify credible voices in civil society to counteract the ideological narrative and the jihadist movement as a whole. The problem with efforts to this point is they haven’t been taken to scale. Perhaps the Summit can be the trigger that gathers the funds, builds the connections, and spurs the larger countermovement. A persistent effort is required at the community level. Efforts cannot come in fits. There needs to be a constant drum beat all day, every day to proactively pull kids away from extremist ideology. This will be uncomfortable, but it is what is needed.
Audio of the event is available.
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Negotiations fail, force prevails
The United States is closing its embassy in Sanaa in the aftermath of the takeover (that’s a coup by another name) by Houthi insurgents, who Friday issued a constitutional declaration. It provides for dissolution of the existing parliament, formation of a “more representative” 551-member National Transitional Council that will elect a five-member presidency council, and a two-year transition period. The goals are laudable:
- achieve a dignified life for the popular masses,
- end corruption through an effective national strategy, reform public service,
- eliminate flaws in community justice,
- relieve oppression,
- reform the security and military institutions on national bases as well as
- restore trust and respect for these institutions,
- improve the livelihood of their members,
- achieve security in society,
- face down criminal takfiri forces and their allies and supporters,
- build a strong, cohesive Yemeni society that does not exclude any person or party, and
- end conflicts, divisions and ruptures.
What could go wrong?
As Nadwa Aldawsari pointed out at the Carnegie Endowment this afternoon, the Houthi victory marks the death knell of the Gulf Cooperation Council transition plan that UN envoy Jamal Benomar has tried assiduously to implement. It failed, she thought, because it provided immunity to former President Saleh and kept in place much of his regime, while excluding the Houthis. Despite having previously fought against them, Saleh took advantage of his situation to make common cause with the Houthis, an armed group that is dominated by an early Shia sect known as Zaidis.
While Nasser Arrabeyee, speaking by Skype from Sana’a, would prefer that the Houthis leave parliament as is and occupy instead places in the Shura Council, there is no sign they are prepared to do that. The Houthis seem intent on governing through the transition period. The risks that entails are all too obvious: Nadwa pointed to the large ungoverned spaces in Yemen, where Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)–the Sunni takfiris mentioned above–have more or less safe haven, despite the American drone war. It is unclear to me whether that will continue without the embassy open. In any event, it has not been successful at stemming recruitment to AQAP, which appears to be stronger in manpower and weapons today than several years ago.
The situation in Yemen may also evolve into a proxy war between Iran, which has supported the Houthis with money, arms and ideology, and Yemen’s weightiest neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have cut off aid to Yemen, which is an astoundingly poor country. Key Yemeni tribal leaders are thought to be in the Kingdom now. They are no doubt looking for support to do combat with the Houthis.
Yemen’s south, once independent, is once again moving in that direction, hindered only by the disunity of its secessionist advocates. According to Laura Kasinof, the state has evaporated there, with little impact as its presence was already so attenuated. Tribal rather than formal justice is preferred in much of the area.
Nasser underlined that the Houthis are for the moment very much in charge. The powersharing arrangement President Hadi had been using is gone. Former President Saleh is no longer “dancing on the heads of snakes” to govern, but he is still orchestrating the dance and trying to ensure that his son Ahmed eventually takes power.
Negotiations have failed. Force has prevailed. Not clear what is next, but it isn’t likely to be good.
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Yemen: failed policy in a failing state
Speaking at Georgetown University on Tuesday, former ambassador to Yemen, Barbara K. Bodine, took a critical view of current U.S. policy in Yemen. While President Obama in September was praising U.S. successes in fighting Al-Qaeda in Yemen as a model for the ISIS campaign, Ambassador Bodine argued that US policy has largely failed to achieve its aims in the country, and has corroded its relationship with Yemen’s government and people. At a time when Yemen is once more teetering on the edge of disruption, Bodine called for broader US engagement on development and governance.
Yemen, argued Bodine, is a country that has wobbled on the margins of collapse for a long time. Historically, the country has been the host of other states’ proxy battles, from the war between Nasserists and Saudi monarchists in the 1960s to the ongoing war on terror. Domestic challenges have also been prevalent, with Yemen having the youngest population in the Middle East. It is severely lacking in natural resources, including access to water.
At the same time, Yemen has a tradition of pulling itself back from the brink. The former ambassador pointed out that in the aftermath of the 2011-12 uprising that ended the reign of President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen emerged relatively successful. The crisis ended in the negotiated transfer of power, the confirmation of the new president (Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi) in a referendum and the establishment of a National Dialogue Conference that was broadly inclusive. Compared to the rest of the region, Yemen seemed to have fared relatively well in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.
At the same time, challenges have haunted the Yemen transition, leading to the current collapse. The Houthis had been excluded from the political process in the GCC transition plan, along with a number of other political actors. The inability to proceed also led to extension of the terms of the feckless transition government, while criticism of government corruption grew louder within the country. In launching their campaign on the capital in September of last year, the Houthi rebels were kicking in an open door.
Initial steps taken by the Houthis were also largely constructive, including the establishment of a capable technocratic government that could implement the promises of the 2012 political transition agreement. Since then however, the political situation has been spiraling out of control, culminating in the Houthi occupation of the presidential palace and the resignation of president Hadi’s government two weeks ago. Yemen, on the verge of political – and financial – collapse, is now rapidly running out of options.
In light of the bleak political situation, the former ambassador called upon the US administration to alter fundamentally its approach to Yemen. Bodine lamented the use of drones “as a strategy rather than a tool” of Yemen policy, pointing out that since the use of drones was escalated in Yemen under Obama, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) numbers had swelled from the hundreds to the thousands.
Instead, the US needs to make a commitment to governance and economic development a more explicit part of the its strategy. This would not require a significant change in the resources at the administration’s disposal. Sadly however, neither Americans nor Yemenis seem to be aware of these efforts. Increased publicity abouit this aspect of American policy would be a cheap and effective way to support fragile transition efforts.
Bodine warned against accepting the Saudi narrative of the Houthi rebels as Iranian stooges. While Iranian support of the rebels is evident, the Houthi movement is in essence an indigenous movement, and should therefore be approached as local political actors first and foremost. The prospect of a failed Yemen, with the potential for AQAP expansion in the south, would be a far more threatening scenario to the Saudi monarchy and its Western allies than the specter of increased Iranian influence.
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Why pay attention to Kosovo?
If you stick around international affairs long enough, some of the people you met in the earlier years are likely to turn up in high places later on. I first met the still youthful Hashim Thaci, a two-term prime minister who is now foreign minister, in 1999, when the US Institute of Peace hosted a post-war meeting of Kosovo Albanians at Lansdowne in Virginia.
The issue at the time was not so much conflict between Serbs and Albanians. With notable exceptions, NATO brought large scale interethnic violence to a fairly quick end after the war, until rioting in 2004 unsettled things again. At Lansdowne we were concerned with Albanian on Albanian violence, as different factions vied for post-war dominance. The dialogue and the Lansdowne Declaration they agreed on that occasion are often credited with ending an incipient civil war and turning both the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and its more peaceful rivals in the direction of political rather than military competition.
Hashim Thaci was a key figure at Lansdowne, representing an important faction of the KLA that had fought the Serbs from the mid 1990s until the war ended in June 1999. His role was mainly a political one. He had also been a key figure at the failed Rambouillet negotiations that preceded the war and played a role in the UN administration of Kosovo, though he remained out of power until he was elected prime minister in 2007. He presided over independence in 2008 and governed until this year, when his party won a plurality in parliament but failed to be able to put together a majority without giving up the prime ministry.
His talk here today focused on Kosovo’s post-war transition, its increasing role in the region, Russian efforts to influence the Balkans, Kosovo’s efforts to counter violent extremism, and the importance of keeping the country on its democratic and European trajectory. He is looking for American help to keep the doors to NATO and the EU open, as well as private sector American investment.
I asked the foreign minister about the firing yesterday of a Serb minister from the government. He underlined that the minister was fired for inappropriate remarks he had made, not because he is a Serb. That’s the right thing to say, even if it is a bit of distinction without a difference in this circumstance. No Albanian would have made the same comments. I also asked about the special tribunal Kosovo is supposed to create to prosecute in The Hague crimes committed during and after the NATO/Yugoslavia war. He said he thought there was no need for it to convene in The Hague, but the legislation will pass and the court will be created, enabling EULEX to proceed with indictments.
Thaci pledges cooperation in countering the flow of extremists to Iraq and Syria and the influence of Russia, both of which are inimical to Kosovo as well as the US. Moscow is now more active than in many years in Serbia, Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, Macedonia and even Montenegro, which has rejected the Russian overtures. The number of Kosovar “foreign fighters” is not huge–hundreds rather than thousands–but it represents an important qualitative shift in a country that has generally not taken religion too seriously. The government is now cracking down and has arrested more than 130 returnees.
Washington has a hard time even remembering that it once saved Kosovo from a Serbian onslaught that made half the Albanian population refugees. With threats throughout the Middle East and in Ukraine, few care much about Kosovo. But it behooves us to remember that a bit of diplomatic dynamism to help Kosovo to get into the EU’s visa waiver program and to sign a Stabilization and Association Agreement as well as enter NATO’s Partnership for Peace could go a long way to preventing further radicalization and ensuring that Kosovo becomes the consolidated European democracy it aspires to be.
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