Tag: Al Qaeda
Couphobia
Fear of coups (couphobia?) has broken out in all too many places. Turkey’s President Erdogan is cracking down on the Gulen movement members for fear they are plotting against him. Russia’s President Putin has done the same with foreign funding of nongovernmental organizations. Egypt’s President Sisi fears the Muslim Brotherhood will do to him what he has done to their (former) President Morsi, who languishes in prison.
Even in Macedonia, an EU candidate country, the Prime Minister says the opposition was plotting to oust him. Then again, the United States is said to be orchestrating an anti-Victor Orbán coup d’état in EU member Hungary.
I can’t be sure all these claims are as baseless as that last one. Washington just doesn’t care enough about Hungary to engineer a coup there. My guess is that Sisi has plenty to worry about, as he has vastly overdone the repression, creating a growing reservoir of resentment that might fuel an effort to oust him one day, though Egyptians are so tired of disorder (and the army so satiated) that it is unlikely a coup there would be popular. Erdogan and Putin are likewise doing their best to fulfill their own prophecies by making life hard for their legitimate opponents, whose natural reaction will be to think about their options. A coup might be one of them.
Then there are the guys–and they are guys–who really should fear a coup. Syria’s President Asad has destroyed his country in order to prevent anyone else from challenging his hold on power. North Korea’s Kim Jong Un presumably thinks he protected himself, but who knows which uncle or cousin still alive might make the attempt?
Yemen’s President Hadi is facing a coup in everything but name. The Houthi rebels who have him trapped don’t want to displace him, partly for fear that would end military assistance against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula from the Americans the Houthis love to hate. Libya can’t have a coup because it is unclear who has power. It is having a civil war instead.
All the couphobiacs should remember Nouri al Maliki. He was so afraid of a coup that he appointed cronies to command his army and grabbed as much direct control over the other institutions of the state as he could. The result was collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces when faced with the Islamic State and his removal from power because even the Iranians and his own Dawa party turned against him. It doesn’t always work that way, but the example should serve to illustrate the perils of concentrating power too much.
The couphobiacs are unlikely to be chastened however. Once they start down the road of repression, it is hard to turn around or back out. They fear removal from power means they lose their lives as well. What Erdogan, Putin and Sisi need more than anything else is assurance that they can retire gracefully and live out their natural lives. Not everyone can afford to keep autocrats in power well into senility, as the Saudis do. But countries that want their autocrats to retire need to follow the Vatican’s lead and provide funding and protection (before they start committing war crimes and crimes against humanity). Come to think of it, that’s America’s solution too.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Producing more enemies than you can kill
No doubt one of the few international issues President Obama will highlight in tonight’s State of the Union speech is the threat of international terrorists associated with the Islamic State and Al Qaeda. He will cite the American military response in Iraq and Syria as vital to our national interests and claim we are making progress, at least in Iraq.
He is unlikely to acknowledge that the problem is spreading and getting worse. In Libya, there are two parliaments and two governments, one of which has ample extremist backing. In Yemen, rebels have laid siege to the government the Washington relies on for cooperation against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In northeastern Nigeria, Boko Haram is wrecking havoc. In Syria, moderates have lost territory and extremists have gained. Taliban violence is up in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Fourteen years ago when the World Trade Center was attacked in New York City Al Qaeda amounted to a few hundred militants hiding out mainly in Afghanistan, with small clandestine cells in Europe and the US. Now estimates of the number of extremists change so rapidly it is hard to know which to cite, but there are surely more than 100 times as many actively engaged in extremist Islamist campaigns or recruitment efforts in close to a dozen countries, including (in addition to the ones cited above) Somalia, Egypt, Niger, Mali, Algeria, Palestine and Tunisia. Counting the numbers of sympathizers in Europe, Russia and the United States is just impossible.
The long war against Islamist extremism is not going well. It can’t, because we are fighting what amounts to an insurgency against the existing state system principally with military means. Drones and air strikes are killing lots of militants, and I am even prepared to believe that the collateral damage to innocents is minimized, whatever that means. But extremist recruitment is more than keeping up with extremist losses. We are making more enemies than we are killing. Insurgencies thrive on that.
The Obama administration is apparently prepared to make things worse, as it now leans towards supporting UN and Russian peace initiatives in Syria that are premised on allowing Bashar al Asad to stay in power. The Islamic State will welcome that, as it will push relative moderates in their direction and weaken the prospects for a democratic transition. Bashar has shown no inclination to fight ISIS and will continue to focus his regime’s efforts against democracy advocates.
President Obama knows what it takes to shrink extremist appeal: states that protect their populations with rule of law and govern inclusively and transparently. This is the opposite of what Bashar al Asad, and his father, have done. But President Obama has no confidence the US or anyone in the international community can build such states in a matter of months or even years. So he does what comes naturally to those whose strongest available means is military power: he uses it to achieve short-term objectives, knowing that its use is counter-productive in the longer term.
But producing more enemies than you can kill is not a strategy that works forever. The Union is recovering from a devastating economic crisis and can now afford to take a fresh look at its foreign policy priorities. I’ll be with the President when he calls tonight for completion of the big new trade and investment agreement with Europe (TTIP) and its counterpart in the Pacific (TTP). These are good things that can find support on both sides of the aisle, among Democrats and Republicans.
I’ll groan when he calls for a new Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) but says little or nothing about building the kind of states in the Greater Middle East that are needed to immunize the region against extremism. Support for restoration of autocracy in Egypt and for Gulf monarchies is not a policy that will counter extremism. We are guaranteeing that things are going to get worse before they get better.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Je ne suis pas Charlie
This is what the remaining staff of Charlie Hebdo had to say this morning on the first cover published since the murder of most of its editorial staff:
It’s a mixed message: defiant in asserting Mohammed would identify with the terrorists’ victims and shed a tear for them, but also forgiving in pardoning the assailants.
That second Catholic message, which looks to me like an afterthought, is the more difficult one for me to swallow. Reconciliation needs to be based on mutual acknowledgement of harm. Neither Charlie Hebdo nor its assailants have yet acknowledged any harm they may have done to each other. It is difficult to picture how that can happen, since the harm is so wildly disproportional.
Before evaluating that judgment, it would be wise to read and view this Mohammed Image Archive. The much-vaunted prohibition on depictions of Mohammed is, as demonstrated there, a relatively recent phenomenon. It dates from the 16th and 17th centuries, not earlier, and is not necessarily observed even today, especially among Shia. Of course that does not mean Charlie Hebdo‘s irreverent depictions are not offensive. They certainly were, and were intended to be. But the mere fact of depicting Mohammed is not so unusual as many in the Muslim community today claim.
Charlie Hebdo‘s sense of humor is not mine. Satire is difficult, as it requires exaggeration of some traits over others. It is also risky, because it easily laps over into exceedingly poor taste. A single Saturday Night Live episode is enough to convince most people of that. I prefer sardonic, even snarkey. But can there be any question about the right of others to say and draw whatever they like?
The answer is “yes.” Certainly I object to the use of the pejorative label “Redskins” as the name of the Washington area football team. So do many others. But none of us have seen fit to murder the team owner or staff. We haven’t even tried. We expect lawsuits, demonstrations and popular sentiment to convince the owner to change the name. He has deep pockets, but eventually the costs will exceed whatever benefits he imagines the name brings.
That is the point. Muslims have every right to object to Charlie Hebdo, which would not be doing its self-created job if they did not. Certainly Jews and Christians had their own bones to pick with the magazine. But where did the Kouachi brothers get the notion they could kill the messengers? What leads anyone to murder random people doing their grocery shopping in a Kosher deli?
The terrorists themselves are claiming inspiration by the Islamic State and Al Qaeda (sometimes one, sometimes the other). We should take them at their word. The sad fact is that violent extremism is proving its appeal to some young Muslims, even those who live in democratic societies. Their communities need to find ways of inspiring them in other directions.
And non-Muslims need to help. We won’t be able to catch or kill all those who might find violence an attractive outlet for their feelings of alienation and hostility. Nor should we want to. We should hope that Muslim citizens in the West find dignity and well-being without resorting to murder and suicide. Inclusion, not exclusion, is the right direction.
Je ne suis pas Charlie. Nor am I Muslim. But I want to live in a society in which both Charlie and Muslims can coexist.
PS: more on depictions of Mohammed here and here.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Squishy is good
It may be a waste of substantial brainpower, but Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro have produced a well-reasoned analysis of the threat of foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq as well as measures to counter that threat. Yes, it exists, they suggest, but no we shouldn’t overreact or react in ways that will make it worse.
They take a systemic approach to the problem, defining a series of steps that lead to eventual terrorist attacks in home countries and identifying steps that can be taken at each stage to provide “off ramps.” Their main policy conclusions are eminently doable:
- increasing community engagement efforts to dissuade potential fighters from going to Syria or Iraq;
- working more with Turkey to disrupt transit routes;
- improving de-radicalization programs to “turn” returning fighters into intelligence sources or make them less likely to engage in violence; and
- avoiding blanket prosecution efforts.
Dan and Jeremy usefully underlined a number of related points at their public presentation at Brookings this morning. This is a “small numbers” problem, given the size of the populations from which returning foreign fighters come. It is impossible to guarantee 100% security. We need to triage and play the odds.
They also emphasized that most of the potential terrorists are young males, which does not make them readily accessible to the US or other governments. Counter narratives need to come from sources with greater credibility to the target population. Their families and communities will have much greater influence. Giving them alternative ways in which they can contribute to the welfare of those for whom they might otherwise be tempted to fight may be useful. Putting them in prison may well radicalize them more.
I would underline this from the written report:
Efforts to promote a counter-narrative are valuable, particularly if they involve parents, preachers, and community leaders. Community programs deserve considerable attention.
Jeremy and Dan however focus most of their energy on advocating greater resources for security services, which they view as stretched thin trying to fulfill their responsibilities. Personally I’d rather waste a few more dollars on the softer Danish and Dutch community approach rather than the “identify and punish” French one. We already have in the US a pretty good indication that greater inclusion is itself a substantial barrier to radicalization. The numbers of “foreign fighters” originating here are remarkably small, particularly given the saliency of the US in the Middle East.
The White House will host a conference Feburary 18 on countering violent extremism. Indications are that the softer approach will play a major role. Press secretary Josh Earnest says:
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts rely heavily on well-informed and resilient local communities. Boston, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis-St. Paul have taken the lead in building pilot frameworks integrating a range of social service providers, including education administrators, mental health professionals, and religious leaders, with law enforcement agencies to address violent extremism as part of the broader mandate of community safety and crime prevention.
Sounds squishy, but it is the right approach.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Here we go again
French Prime Minister Valls declared war Saturday:
It is a war against terrorism, against jihadism, against radical Islam, against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity, freedom, solidarity.
I guess that was inevitable, but it brings back un-fond memories of George W. Bush declaring war on terror. At least this time the enemy is well-framed: Bush’s war on a means was a lot worse idea than war on the people who use it and the ideas that support it.
But Valls’ is still a bad frame, because declaring “war” makes military and paramilitary means the prime weapons. They are unquestionably necessary, but just as unquestionably insufficient, to deal with the problem. The stand-offs in Paris with three hostage-takers required the French security forces to use their impressive military capabilities. Police vigilance was vital to protecting today’s massive demonstration in Place de la Republique. But countering violent radicalism over the next months and years will entail far more than effectiveness on the part of security forces.
The murders of the Charlie Hebdo staff, several police and four hostages at a Kosher deli were horrendous. But they are still a small percentage of the almost 700 murders per year in France (which has a murder rate one-fourth that of the US). Yes, the numbers are important because of the political purpose and what the incidents may portend for the future. But a crackdown “against everything that is aimed at breaking fraternity, freedom and solidarity” is far more likely to elicit a violent reaction than to calm the situation.
If you doubt the relevance of this point, read Jonathan Turley’s description in this morning’s Washington Post of the French government crackdown on free speech in recent years. He argues:
Indeed, if the French want to memorialize those killed at Charlie Hebdo, they could start by rescinding their laws criminalizing speech that insults, defames or incites hatred, discrimination or violence on the basis of religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, disability, sex or sexual orientation. These laws have been used to harass the satirical newspaper and threaten its staff for years. Speech has been conditioned on being used “responsibly” in France, suggesting that it is more of a privilege than a right for those who hold controversial views.
Ironically, Charlie Hebdo was founded in response to a government ban on a predecessor. It is also ironic that today’s demonstration included the presence of such stalwart defenders of freedom of speech as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Jordan’s King Abdullah II and Queen Rania, Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. That’s the kind of audience a war on Islamic extremism gets you. It should make us all wonder whether we’ve got the signals right.
Protecting Western societies from violent Islamic extremism is a worthy cause. But it should not be conceived as war. Quite to the contrary. The essential tools are those of peacebuilding: a culture of lawfulness, inclusive governance that ensures wide and non-discriminatory distribution of economic benefits, protection of human rights, integration, good understanding and dialogue among diverse social groups, security forces committed to protection of citizens, and citizens committed to maintaining a society they perceive as just and free. There may still be terrorist incidents in such a society, but they will be far less frequent than in one that discriminates against those who wear the hijab and populates vast suburbs with unemployed Muslim youth.
I imagine that the French security services are among the most capable in the world. But they missed the radicalization of the perpetrators of the Charlie Hebdo and Kosher deli murders. Someone in Al Qaeda, or Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, managed to reach deep into French society to find and mobilize extremists. Even in the most alert and just of societies, that could happen. But I don’t know anyone who would suggest that most Muslim youth in France feels it has a fair stake in the success of the country. Making that a reality will be far more important, and far harder, than the war on Islamic extremism.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Why we are losing the long war
The United States went to war with Islamic extremism in the aftermath of the murder of nearly 3000 people on 9/11, when its adherents were largely concentrated in Afghanistan. The Bush Administration called this the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a term that misleadingly included the invasion of Iraq. The Obama Administration has abandoned that appellation but continued what others now term the “long” war, which has spread throughout the Greater Middle East into Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Mali, Syria, Egypt, Libya and into sub-Saharan Africa, even as it has subsided in Indonesia, the Philippines and other parts of Asia.
Even this rudimentary description suggests we are not winning. It isn’t even clear what “winning” means, but it almost certainly does not entail spreading the enemy to a dozen or more additional countries, where they are challenging established governments. The geographic spread makes this a tougher fight. Our military much prefers to concentrate forces on a center of gravity whose defeat spells the end of the war.
But now it is no longer clear where the center of gravity is: we used to think it was Al Qaeda Central, holed up in Peshawar or somewhere else along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. But Osama bin Laden’s death did nothing to stem the jihadi tide, even if Al Qaeda Central has lost significance. Today the press would have us believe the center of gravity is with the Islamic State (ISIS), somewhere in eastern Syria or western Iraq. But defeating it there will all too obviously not defeat Al Qaeda-linked terrorists in Yemen and Mali, or the ISIS affiliate in Sinai.
Islamic extremism, despite ISIS’s claim, is still more an insurgency than a state. Insurgencies do not need to win. They only need to survive.
This one is not only geographically resilient but also demographically resilient. I know of no indication that anything we have done for the past decade or more has seriously limited recruitment to Islamic extremism. To the contrary, efforts to repress it using military force seem to make recruitment easier, not harder. New leaders have far more often than not stepped into the roles of those we have killed. Nor have any of our propaganda/psychops efforts worked. There is on the contrary lots of anecdotal evidence that ISIS propaganda efforts do work, at least to recruit cannon fodder.
So we’ve got an enemy that is difficult to locate, whose center of gravity is unclear, and whose psychops are better than ours. What should we do about it?
First is to keep a sense of proportion. For Americans, trans-national terrorism is a vanishingly small threat. The odds are one-ninth those of being killed by a policeman, and comparable to those of being killed by an asteroid. Ninety-nine per cent of the time no American need really fear terrorism outside a war zone, and those who enter war zones do so knowing the risks.
Second is to recognize that if we want to reduce the risk–in particular reduce the risk that the risk will grow in the future–military means are proving massively inadequate and inappropriate. Islamic extremism was far less likely to grow like topsy when confined to Taliban-ruled Afghanistan than it is now, dispersed in at least a dozen weak states. Those cats are out of the bag. We are not going to be able to force Islamic extremists back to where they came from. But we should be cautious about continuing to bombard them with drones wherever they appear. We may think the risks of collateral damage are minimal, but the people who live in Yemen don’t. For those who join extremist groups because of real or imagined offenses to “dignity,” drone strikes are an effective recruiting tool.
This brings us third to the fraught question of countering extremist narratives. I know of no evidence that direct government efforts to counter extremist narratives have been successful. There is evidence that former terrorists and their families can have some influence, working with local communities. But that requires the existence of a relatively free civil society in which religious institutions and private voluntary organizations are at liberty to organize. Community policing is also an effective strategy. But community policing requires the existence of a legitimate and inclusive state that uses security forces to protect its citizens rather than itself.
It is no wonder that we are losing the long war. We are using our strengths, which lie in technology and military action rather than in the far messier (and more difficult) tasks of building civil society and legitimate governance. It is arguable that our technology and military are actually making the task of countering violent extremism even harder. Drone strikes don’t encourage people to think their government is committed to protecting them. Nor do they encourage former terrorists and their families to speak out against extremism, as community-based civil society organizations might.
If the long war is worth fighting, it should be fought to win. For now, we are fighting it in ways bound to make us lose.
RSS - Posts
