Tag: Al Qaeda
The Maliki quandary
There is good reason for the many calls for Nouri al Maliki to quit his post as Iraq’s prime minister. In office for eight years, he has accumulated a great deal of power but delivered little to Iraq’s citizens. The country still lacks electricity, water, infrastructure, educational facilities, employment and health care. While the press and civil society are freer than in many Arab-majority countries, Maliki has largely neutralized parliament and the courts. He controls many of the so-called independent institutions the Americans left behind, including Iraq’s central bank. The Prime Minister has campaigned and governed in a blatantly sectarian and increasingly authoritarian way, mobilizing Shia support and attacking (sometimes arresting) Sunni politicians.
But…Maliki is also the most popular single politician in Iraq, with over 700,000 personal preference votes in April’s election. His State of Law coalition won more than twice as many seats in parliament as its nearest competitor. His belligerence towards Sunnis is popular among Shia in the south and Baghdad. Those who call for him for him to step down, step aside or otherwise quit are ignoring the clear message of the last election: most Shia want him to stay in place and crack down on a Sunni insurgency that is a potent mixture of Sunni Islamist extremism and Ba’athist nationalism. Compromising with that is not what people who identify as Shia and suffered under Saddam Hussein want.
So what is to be done?
I don’t know, but I’d prefer the decisions be made in Baghdad than in Washington. John McCain, who wants Maliki out, should not count for more than the voters of Najaf or Basra. President Obama has gone far enough by insisting on a cross-sectarian, cross-ethnic coalition as a condition for American assistance. That may be impossible with Maliki at the helm. But it is Iraqis, not Americans, who should tell Maliki that and make it stick. McCain hasn’t had brilliant success in American politics. It is hard to picture him more successful in Iraq.
The prospects for Iraq are not good. As Peter Galbraith notes in Politico yesterday, the Kurds now have much of what they need and want to go for independence. Kirkuk, which they took over when the Iraqi army fled, can provide Kurdistan with the revenue it needs to replace the Kurdistan percentage of Iraq’s oil revenue Maliki has been withholding, in a dispute over accounting for the proceeds and over the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) decision to export its oil without Baghdad’s permission. I imagine the Americans will hold KRG President Barzani back from announcing the referendum on independence he has promised. But the day is coming. With Kirkuk and other “disputed territories” in hand, it is hard to imagine that the Kurds will want to stick around while Sunni Islamists and Ba’athists shoot it out with Maliki’s Shia supporters.
The big losers in all this are predictably the Sunnis, whose insurgent forces will not be able to take most of Baghdad even if they are successful on its western outskirts, which include Baghdad International as well as Abu Ghraib prison. The headlines if those are attacked will be big, but the strategic consequences less so. The Ba’athists and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) will clash sooner or later. Even if they don’t, “Sunnistan”–Anbar, most of Ninewa, most of Salahedin, parts of Baquba and Tamim as well as a few suburbs of Baghdad–may have lots of natural gas, but it is undeveloped. Ninety per cent of Iraq’s current oil production would remain in Shia control, far away in the south. Once Kurdistan pulls out of Iraq, the Sunnis won’t want to stay in it, but they won’t have the resources or territory needed to establish a viable state.
Ironically, the Shia will, as they have the oil. But Tehran will not want an independent Kurdistan, as that would threaten Iran’s own territorial integrity, which includes the province of Eastern Kurdistan. A weak Iraq in which Iran exercises influence is what Tehran wants, not one that breaks up, threatens to redraw the map of the Levant and gives birth to ISIS’s hoped-for Sunni caliphate.
Let’s hope it doesn’t come to that. Iraq is not lost so much as it is broken. A new political pact, with or without Maliki as prime minister, is what it needs. A state worth fighting for will take years to build. Iraqis, not Americans, should be the prime movers in that process.
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Due for a rethink
As US policy towards the Middle East is floundering, the Center for American Progress (CAP) released a timely report Monday entitled “US Middle East Policy at a Time of Regional Fragmentation and Competition,” based on field research in four countries. At CAP to discuss the results of the report were Peter Mandaville of George Mason University, Haroon Ullah of the State Department, and Brian Katulis, CAP Senior Fellow and coauthor of the report.
Islamists are at the center of the regional struggle, but fissures within and between different groups are multilayered and run deep. The Sunni-Shia rivalry is only one element of the conflicts embroiling the Middle East. The intra-Sunni rivalry is another, if less prominent, aspect. The division between rich and poor countries is an additional ingredient, as wealthier states tend to fight out proxy battles in weaker and more divided nations.
In Egypt, for instance, Qatar and Turkey threw their support behind the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are backing the new military regime. Saudi Arabia sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a potential competitor, rather than just another disjointed Salafist group. A key dynamic is between countries with more resources and less division at home, who fear the success of an alternate model of governance. This complicates US policy, as it is difficult to execute a cohesive strategy in the region while Qatar and Saudi Arabia are locked in a struggle over Egypt’s future.
Mandaville said that the US must look beyond the Sunni-Shia frame to recognize that we are witnessing a potential unraveling of the entire post-Ottoman order. The aftermath of 9/11, coupled with Arab uprisings of 2011, has seen a withering away of post-WWI arrangements. The upheaval is comparable to what we saw in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, when groups whose identities had been in check during the Cold War emerged and began questioning, and ultimately restructuring, the existing order.
One of the major weaknesses of US policy in the region is our tendency to oversimplify the debate. Whether or not American troops should have stayed in Iraq misses the larger picture. American diplomatic engagement needs to be better informed about the regional dynamics of movements in the Arab world. Even after many years, the Arab nationalist-Islamist divide is still not well understood. Americans are good at understanding groups who want to attack us, but we need to peer further into what drives these conflicts in the first place.
Katulis suggested that Obama has bungled his attempts to reengage with the Muslim world. By addressing them as a separate community, he signaled that they are a single constituency, one that should be handled with kid gloves, an approach comparable to George W. Bush’s. The implication is that all Muslims subscribe to a single, transnational identity, a message that is echoed by groups like al Qaeda.
Political Islam has always existed in the background. Partial openings in the political and media environment after the Arab uprisings have allowed some Islamist groups to come to the fore. Islamism, as a point on the political spectrum, has broadened significantly. Despite Egypt’s best efforts to silence Islamists, they are here to stay. Ullah noted that, while President Sisi wants to dismantle the Muslim Brotherhood’s comparative advantage in Egypt and revert to the weaker Sadat-era Brotherhood, this is not possible in modern media environment.
He also noted one positive development in America’s attitude towards political Islam, pointing to Assistant Secretary of State Patterson’s comments last week:
Some people in this region conflate Islamists with terrorists and desire to eliminate the Islamists entirely from the political scene. Our difficult fight against violent extremists is made more complicated by this viewpoint. The need for compromise is underscored by political experience in the Arab world as well as our own.
One of the myths the report attempts to debunk is the so-called moderation thesis. This is the false belief that Islamists will moderate their positions if they join the political fray. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood failed to accommodate more moderate positions. Islamist groups have fared better in other countries in the region, including Tunisia’s Ennahda party, partly because they had to contend with a large secular/liberal bloc. Nonetheless, many mainstream Islamists have internalized only the procedural spirit of democracy, without embracing pluralism.
Another myth is that socioeconomic conditions are the primary drivers of extremism. Research has found no causal link between poverty and extremism. The key constituency for Egypt’s Salafist al Nour Party, for instance, is that country’s urban-based middle class.
One persistent challenge to foreign policy is US counterterrorist doctrine, which relegates violence committed by Muslims to the “terrorist” category. This neglects the fact that in places like the Sahel, conflicts are based on ethnic, rather than religious, differences. In Obama’s speech at West Point, he called for additional funding of counterterrorism programs, but the real problem in many of these countries stems from long-running ethnic conflicts.
Mandaville noted that the US government still thinks about the world in terms of the blocs that arose during the Cold War. We would do well to shed these outdated notions of the Middle East, although it will be difficult in light of our current investments in the Gulf and rising sectarianism in the region. As Iraq and Syria descend into sectarian-fueled chaos, it is time for the US to reexamine its strategy in region.
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A candidate speaks
With the epidemic of violence sweeping through Iraq and Pakistan, Afghanistan has remained surprisingly calm as it enters the second of round of elections today. The first round of voting in April saw Afghanistan’s highest turnout in history, which was especially remarkable in light of the security situation. However, there has been speculation that the second round of election will be marred by apathy and security concerns. In a telediscussion Thursday sponsored by Atlantic Council, Afghan presidential candidate Abdullah Abdullah rejected this notion, expressing confidence that turnout today would surpass the numbers seen in April. He acknowledged that fraud continues to be an issue, but one that election monitors can mitigate.
US-Afghan relations have deteriorated under President Karzai, who is believed to have supported Zalmai Rassoul for president. Abdullah promised to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) if elected, noting this was crucial to Afghanistan’s future. The Afghan government should have signed the BSA long ago, he said, adding that a lot of damage has been done by the uncertainty created in the absence of any agreement. “Iraq refused to sign a similar agreement,” he noted, vowing not to make the same mistake. The government exists to protect its citizens, not to “sacrifice the rights of citizens under the shadow of peace.” Political stability would pave the way for economic stability: a stable Afghanistan will provide incentives for a wealthy Afghan diaspora to reinvest in the country.
Karzai’s refusal to sign the BSA, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the timeline for US troop withdrawal, has fueled corruption, Abdullah said. The lack of political will among Afghans politicians to tackle fraud was also a major problem. An anti-corruption bill is currently languishing in Parliament; if it is not passed in the next few days, Afghan banks will be blacklisted from the international system. Rule of law has not been a priority in Afghanistan. Abdullah promised to change this by reaching out to those who have not been tainted by corruption.
He also promised to improve his country’s strained relationship with Pakistan. Both nations are struggling to combat terrorism, and both stand to benefit from improved cooperation on security and economic issues. The fact that the two countries will soon be under new leadership presents a unique opportunity to improve what has been contentious relationship.
Abdullah was asked to address the exchange of the five Taliban prisoners for American prisoner of war Bowe Bergdahl. He expressed concern that those who have been released will rejoin the battlefield, noting that a number of prisoners released under similar circumstances quickly returned to combat. He would not speak to the possibility of transferring militants like Mullah Fazlullah to Pakistan, saying only that he opposed the presence of terrorists of any nationality on Afghan soil.
Although his father was Pashtun, Abdullah is usually identified as Tajik, the dominant ethnic group of the Northern Alliance. The Taliban, meanwhile, tend to be composed of ethnic Pashtuns. However, he rejected the notion that his election could aggravate tension between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns as outdated. “People should not start equating Pashtuns with the Taliban,” he warned, noting that many of the terrorists who occupied Afghanistan did not belong to any major Afghan ethnic group, including Osama bin Laden. He pointed out that he won Herat, a largely Pashtun province, by more than 60%.
One lesson from Iraq is that sectarian policies simply do not work. He promised that his administration would include all tribal and ethnic groups. He said that the difference between Iraq and Afghanistan is that in Afghanistan, Talibanization has been rejected. Afghanistan, he maintains, does not face the levels of sectarianism seen in Iraq.
He also dismissed the findings of poll showing a tightening of the race between rival Ashraf Ghani and himself. It nonetheless appears that Ghani, an ethnic Pashtun, may have gained some supporters from Afghanistan’s Uzbek population after choosing Uzbek General Abdurrashid Dostum as one of his running mates.
Asked why Afghanistan should matter to the US, Abdullah said Americans should consider what brought them to Afghanistan in the first place. The US should not forget that in 2001, the Taliban controlled 80% to 90% of the country, and had turned it into an al Qaeda safe haven. While Obama has promised to complete the withdrawal of American troops by 2016, Abdullah said he hopes that “zero option will not mean zero cooperation.”
The international community has invested a great deal of blood and treasure in Afghanistan. Abdullah argued that best way to honor these sacrifices would be to sustain the achievements that have been made over the last ten years. Whether or not Afghanistan’s first democratic transition can survive endemic corruption, or the Taliban’s attempts to disrupt it, remains to be seen.
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Obama’s options for Iraq
The Hill published my “Obama’s Options for Iraq” yesterday:
President Obama has chosen the tough-love option: American assistance to meet the challenge of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) blitzkrieg moving towards Baghdad will be conditional on a more inclusive political settlement within Iraq. Only a major U.S. combat deployment is ruled out. Here is my list of possible additional options, with some cons:
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No drama Obama needs to act
Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, has fallen to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS ). Its goal is to reestablish an Islamic caliphate, which means it wants to govern Iraq and Syria according to what it considers strict Sharia law. It already controls a big stretch of eastern Syria as well as parts of neighboring Anbar and Ninewa provinces in western Iraq.
Iraq’s Prime Minister Maliki, who won a plurality of seats in the new Iraqi parliament elected in late April, has asked parliament (presumably the old one, since the new one isn’t in place yet) for a state of emergency, which would be the first since the US occupation ended. Police stations and military installations have been destroyed. Tens of thousands of people are fleeing. Military equipment, apparently including helicopters and left-behind American humvees, have fallen into jihadi hands.
Anyone who doubted the Syrian and Iraqi states would be at risk from ISIS should be rethinking. ISIS now controls substantial areas in provinces of both countries. It is possible that they are overextended and will suffer defeat, especially if Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey decide to engage. But such external intervention would also have consequences. The Kurds would be unlikely to want to leave Mosul quickly, and Maliki would be seriously weakened if he relied on Kurdish or Turkish assistance. He would likely have to pay the money Kurdistan says it is owed and also allow export of Kurdish oil directly to Turkey (which the Kurds have already done without Baghdad’s permission).
American interests are directly engaged. If ISIS can carve out a relative safe haven in eastern Syria and western Iraq, the US would want it taken down, for fear it could be used (like the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan) as a training ground launchpad for attacks on the US. The Americans could try to suppress ISIS using drones and air power, but ground forces would eventually be needed. These would not have to be American, but the US could support Baghdad or maybe even Damascus taking action against ISIS.
Some in the US will blame what has happened on President Obama’s decision to withdraw all American troops from Iraq. That is nonsense in two ways. First, it was the Bush administration that negotiated and signed the agreement providing for complete US withdrawal. The notion that it could be renegotiated to allow some American troops to stay is a fantasy, one that proved unrealizable because of stiff political opposition in both the US and Iraq. Second, ten thousand American troops still in Iraq would be far from sufficient to either prevent or react to what has happened in Anbar and Ninewa. They would be hunkered down on a base, or become obvious targets.
The Iraqis may be able to handle Mosul on their own. Anbar and Ninewa my be pacified. Eastern Syria may eventually fall to either Damascus or more moderate rebel factions. But it is all too clear that a situation the US has wanted to ignore should not be ignored any longer. The Syrian implosion is having spillover effects that amount both to humanitarian and regional security disasters. America is not safe when other states are collapsing. Doing stupid shit, as President Obama has so eloquently put it, is not the only way the US gets in trouble. It also gets into trouble when it fails to act to defend its interests early enough.
No drama Obama needs to recalibrate and find an effective way to react.
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What will beat al Qaeda
My piece was published today on The Hill:
The trade of five Taliban leaders held at Guantanamo Bay for American Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl has again underlined the fraught question of how to end the war on terror. Afghanistan was a main theater for that war, but American troops will be drawn down to fewer than 10,000 by the end of this year and completely withdrawn by the end of 2016. Al Qaeda, the organization that attacked the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, is mostly gone from there already.
You have to go here for the rest.
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