Tag: Al Qaeda
The Cory Remsburg metaphor
The President’s State of the Union speech last night broke little new ground on foreign policy. He is pleased to be finishing two wars and will resist getting the United States involved in other open-ended conflicts. He may leave a few troops in Afghanistan to train Afghans and attack terrorists. Al Qaeda central is largely defeated but its franchises are spreading in Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and Mali. He will limit the use of drones, reform surveillance policies and get us off a permanent war footing. He wants to close Guantanamo, as always, and fix immigration, as always.
He will use diplomacy, especially in trying to block Iran verifiably from obtaining a nuclear weapons and in resolving the Israel/Palestine conflict, but also in destroying Syria’s chemical weapons capability. He will support the moderate Syrian opposition. He will veto new Iran sanctions in order to give diplomacy a chance to work, maintain the alliance with Europe, support democracy in Ukraine, development in Africa, and trade and investment across the Pacific. America is exceptional both because of what it does and because of its ideals.
The President didn’t mention Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Russia or Japan. He skipped North Korea too. His mother must have taught him that when you don’t have anything nice to say you shouldn’t say anything at all. Those countries might merit mention, but all have in one way or another been doing things that we prefer they not do. He mentioned China, but only as an economic rival, not a military one. He skipped the pivot to Asia as well as Latin America. For my Balkans readers: you are not even on his screen. Read more
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What else we can do
The UN-led Syria peace talks known as Geneva 2 are scheduled to convene in Montreux January 22 for a public session and continue in Geneva with only the Syrian warring parties (regime and opposition), under the aegis of UN mediator Lakhdar Brahimi. I’ve betrayed my lack of enthusiasm for Geneva 2, but it is legitimate to ask what else can be done, or what might be done at the talks that would be useful. Let’s assume direct US military action is out of the question, because it is unless Al Qaeda manages to set up a haven in Syria used to launch attacks against the US or its allies.
First is to consider whether convening the talks on the date foreseen is a good idea. The situation on the ground in Syria is in flux. The regime and the opposition may have reached a kind of complex territorial equilibrium, in which neither side can gain much by further fighting. But within the anti-regime forces a lot is happening. The fog of war is still thick, but it appears more moderate Islamist and secular fighters are confronting and at least for the moment undoing the most extreme forces associated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, sometimes ISIL for Levant), at the behest of the population in areas that ISIS has brutalized. This development could solve one of Washington’s biggest problems: it has hesitated to support the opposition with lethal assistance for fear it would fall into the hands of extremists, helping them to take control of a post-Asad Syria. But the outcome of the fight is by no means certain and it may presage greater instablity or even extremist strengthening.
Wisdom suggests awaiting the result before proceeding with peace talks on what might turn out to be false premises. Postponement for a month or so might be wise. Timing is vital in diplomacy. The situation on the ground–who holds power where–is a vital ingredient of any diplomatic resolution. Trying get a resolution before the situation is clear can be a big mistake.
In the meanwhile, one possibility is to try for local ceasefires, since a country-wide ceasefire is bound to be violated quickly by armed groups not at the negotiating table. Both sides of the fight are exhausted in Aleppo. It may be possible to arrange for all sides to suspend the fight, provided the regime doesn’t wreck the prospect by bombing or rocketing. The Russians would have to make it clear to Bashar that doing so would have consequences.
Another possibility is to insist that the regime demonstrably implement freedom of the press and association before it gains the legitimacy that necessarily derives from its presence in Montreux/Geneva. There are brave Syrians trying every day to exercise their rights. Enabling them to do so was an integral part of Kofi Annan’s plan, observed more in the breach. Moderate Syrians would pour into the streets if they thought they would be safe.
A third option would be to formally break diplomatic relations with Damascus and recognize the recently formed Syrian Opposition Coalition government as the legal representative of the Syrian state. Only one or two countries have done this so far. Washington could lead an effort in this direction, including a challenge to the Damascus’ credentials at the UN.
But if, as I suspect, no one at the State Department wants to go tell John Kerry that his hard-won initiative should be postponed, what can still be done constructively on January 22 and 23?
A step that would be much appreciated on both sides would be prisoner releases. If the opposition negotiators can come home from Geneva 2 having arranged for several hundred of their compatriots to return to their families, that would remove at least some of the stigma associated with attending an international conference that will disappoint most Syrians.
The United States can make it clear that it backs a strict interpretation of the Geneva 1 communique, which provides for a transitional governing body with full executive authority (TGBFEA). It won’t be possible to get that this month, but Washington should leave no one in any doubt that its strategic goal is removal of all power from Bashar al Asad, even if he nominally stays in office (which really isn’t possible once he loses control of the security apparatus). The current wishy washy line is that we are starting a peace process that is intended to lead eventually to a TGBFEA. That line undermines the opposition and encourages the regime.
The United States could put it bluntly to the Russians that they can’t support a peace process that leads to Bashar’s removal from power and arm the Syrian regime at the same time. They need to choose. If they choose to continue supplying weapons that are used against civilians, then the Americans should make it clear they will expand arming the opposition, trying of course to ensure that the weapons are not used against civilians. It would also be possible to offer the Russians something they value in exchange for their defenestration of Bashar. Some flexibility on anti-missile defense in Europe might go a long way.
Geneva 2 could also be an appropriate place to discuss humanitarian access, but the issue should be put clearly. The regime is blocking humanitarian access, not the revolutionaries. There should be no quid pro quo for allowing relief to reach civilians from all of Syria’s neighbors. Both sides have been attacking civilian populations. They should be told to stop, first in a communique from Geneva 2 but then in a vigorous UN Security Council resolution.
The predictable failure of Geneva 2 to move forward on creating the TGBFEA puts the opposition in a difficult spot. Only Bashar stepping aide or down would justify attendance in the eyes of most of the opposition, but the more moderate figures associated with the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Free Syrian Army will have no choice but to attend if they want to get continuing American support. One option is a walkout, coordinated with Washington (or at least foreshadowed to Washington). This could save face for those opposition moderates who feel compelled to attend in Geneva but worry about how it will weaken their standing inside Syria. Some lower-level officials might be left behind to deal with humanitarian issues, which could benefit from detailed coordination.
The purpose of a meeting like Geneva 2 should not merely be negotiation, or to start a process. Washington needs to think hard about what can be achieved that will improve the situation. It needs clarity about its goals and the means it will bring to bear to achieve them.
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The problem with Maliki
Former Ambassador to Iraq Jim Jeffrey argues in this morning’s Washington Post for more wholehearted support to Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki and other allies willing to fight Al Qaeda:
…as also often happens in this region, the administration is sounding an uncertain tone, seemingly signaling to everyone that its top priority is to not get the United States into any sort of military engagement…
Let’s leave aside whether the tone is really all that uncertain and whether President Obama has accurately read the sentiment of the American people. They certainly don’t want American troops going back to Iraq, and there is no clear sign that Maliki wants them either.
There is another problem with Jim’s argument. Maliki has contributed to the problem in Iraq, by alienating the Sunni population.
Jim acknowledges this in passing, but fails to recognize that a more whole-hearted endorsement would send the wrong message and make the problem worse. The challenge for American diplomacy is to restrain Maliki’s autocratic instincts while helping him militarily. This is a difficult trick. It requires not wholehearted endorsement but rather nuance: we’ll help you with what you need on the battlefield, but we expect you to play a more democratic game politically.
Maliki has more than enough reasons of his own to fight Al Qaeda. He doesn’t need our moral support. He does need some military equipment and intelligence shraing. He also needs our wisdom on how to manage dissent and sectarian conflict in a relatively open society.
The notion that changing the American tone in the Middle East would buck up our allies and magically defeat our enemies is silly. Israel and Saudi Arabia, which Jim mentions explicitly, are unhappy with American policy because it is not sufficiently supportive of their absolutist views of Palestine and Iran. Backing those views would not help the Administration succeed in its current efforts to mediate a final settlement of the Israel/Palestine conflict or in its negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program. To the contrary: increased rhetorical support in public to Netanyahu and Riyadh could wreck the prospects for diplomatic solutions to both. Better to do what we appear to be doing: provide Israel with whatever security assistance it needs to ensure that a settlement with the Palestinians poses no danger and consult frequently and in depth with Saudi Arabia on how to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons capabilities.
I agree with Jim that Iraq is important, both because it is a central player in the Arab and Kurdish worlds and because its oil production helps now and can help in the future to stabilize the world oil market. But the problem with American policy is not insufficient support to Maliki. It is insufficient frankness with him about what we expect of our friends and allies.
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The Sunni civil wars
As Liz Sly highlights in this morning’s Washington Post, the Al Qaeda-affiliated Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has managed to ignite war in both countries. But for the moment the war is not the one Al Qaeda would like to be fighting against the Alawite dictatorship in Syria and the Shiite-dominated proto-democracy in Iraq. Instead it is a war between Sunni militants who want to re-establish the caliphate and nationalists–some Islamist, some secularist–who aim to change the governments but preserve the state structure in the region.
The United States has a dog in this fight. It cannot afford to see Al Qaeda gain a base of operations in eastern Syria or western Iraq. Washington will therefore back the revolt of the anti-Al Qaeda forces in Syria as well as the Shia-dominated government of Prime Minister Maliki in Iraq, which is getting at least some help from the Sunni tribesmen who were vital to the American victory over Al Qaeda in Iraq in 2006/7. Ryan Crocker and Bing West were on PBS Newshour Friday saying that Al Qaeda has overreached and will no doubt be defeated in the Iraq front of this Sunni civil war. They may well be right ultimately, but on Saturday Al Qaeda seems to have consolidated control over Fallujah, while losing control of Ramadi, the Anbar provincial capital. It will be a while before we know the outcome of this latest iteration of Sunni on Sunni fighting.
Do the Sunni civil wars threaten state structures in the Levant? Reidar Visser, who knows as much about this part of the world as any Westerner I know, writes:
Today, there is once more a thug [sic] of war between pan-Islamism and Iraqi nationalism, but by no means has the local population universally sided with the Islamist rebels. Despite continuing squabbles among Iraqi leaders, a considerable segment of local Anbar politicians have rushed to support the Iraqi army in its efforts against pan-Islamist elements, showing that the people of western Iraq are once more sceptical about getting too intimately connected with political movements aiming at union with Syria.
His bottom line: “Dammit, It Is NOT Unravelling: An Historian’s Rebuke to Misrepresentations of Sykes-Picot.”
I’m not so sure. As Reidar himself points out, Sykes-Picot was mainly concerned with control over coastal areas. The barren interiors of Anbar and the Syrian provinces of Homs and Deir al Azour were not really an issue a century ago. The Sykes-Picot borders had little impact there.
More importantly: a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Lebanon is the weakest link. It is increasingly suffering tit-for-tat attacks that its parlous internal security apparatus cannot respond to effectively. The second weakest link is the separation between Kurds in Syria and in Iraq. While Syria’s Kurds are nowhere near as concentrated as Iraq’s were, most want at least a federal unit like the Iraqi one. But if the Syrian state collapses, the Kurds will be free to pursue union with their Iraqi brethren, who might themselves be liberated if Iraq continues to descend into chaos.
There is no real possibility of an orderly redrawing of borders in the Levant. If it happens, it will be violent, messy, and even chaotic. Good guys are not likely to come out on top. Like it or not, the Americans and their Gulf friends need to do what is necessary to make sure that Al Qaeda loses the Sunni civil wars in Iraq and Syria.
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Two birds, two stones
The situation in the predominantly Sunni Anbar province of Iraq deteriorated sharply yesterday, with Al Qaeda-affiliated militants taking over at least parts of Ramadi and Fallujah:
According to @Hayder_alKhoei of Chatham House, that is one of their convoys in Anbar.
This is a serious challenge to Baghdad’s authority. No doubt Prime Minister Maliki will see it that way and use the military force he had withdrawn from Anbar population centers as a peace gesture to reassert the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of violence.
But that is not the only problem Baghdad has in Sunni-majority areas of the country. Demonstrations ongoing for months have been protesting discrimination, neglect and mismanagement. Forty-four Sunni members of parliament have offered their resignations. Moqtada al Sadr, the Shia firebrand, has openly expressed sympathy with the demonstrators and called for early elections.
Maliki has two problems, not one:
- the resurgence of Al Qaeda, due in part to the civil war in Syria, whose border with Iraq is porous;
- an alienated and disappointed population.
Military force may be appropriate in dealing with the first, but it will do nothing to resolve the second.
Maliki is a clever and resourceful politician. He has governed Iraq with an increasingly strong hand since 2006, accumulating power by appointing loyal commanders in the security forces, infringing on the independence of the judiciary, and exploiting oil revenue to distribute patronage. His authoritarian inclinations are clear, but he has also managed to maintain a working majority in parliament with agile shifts: when he is in a tussle with Sunnis, he manages to gain Kurdish support; when he faces Kurdish challenges, he finds Sunni support. He has fragmented his mostly Sunni Iraqiyya opposition and managed to maintain or even enlarge his own “state of law” coalition, even as his Shia competitors appear to have gained ground in last year’s provincial elections.
The current crisis will be an important test of Maliki’s ability to wield the Iraqi state’s military instrument to meet the Al Qaeda challenge even as he uses political means to meet the grievances of the population. If he conflates the two problems and puts too much emphasis on military means, he is likely to face a spiraling security threat. There is little risk that he will put too much emphasis on political means. That is just not his natural inclination. But he needs to meet the political challenge with serious responses to the demonstrators’ complaints, or at least something that looks as if it points in that direction. Prisoner releases and economic investment seem the best bets to generate quick, begrudgingly positive responses.
The key to the military contest lies, as it did for the Americans in 2006-8, with Sunni tribesmen in Anbar. If Maliki is able to keep them on the government’s side in cracking down on Al Qaeda affiliates, he has a good chance of winning the fight. But many of them are demoralized and alienated, having been neglected and ill-treated for years. If their younger militants see Al Qaeda as the better bet, Maliki and the Iraqi state are in trouble.
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How to stay out of trouble
It would be easy to be pessimistic about 2014. But as Adam Gopnik cleverly illustrates it is really impossible to know whether we are on the Titanic, destined for disaster, or its twin the Olympic, which plied the seas for two more decades without faltering.
The question is what will keep America out of trouble? How do we avoid the icebergs of contemporary international relations? Gopnik suggests avoiding challenges to honor and face and worrying little about credibility or position. This seems to me wise. The question of reputation in international affairs is fraught, but anyone of the Vietnam generation will want to be skeptical about claims the United States needs to intervene in the world to prevent its reputation from being sullied or to prove its primacy.
Hubris is the bigger danger. I, along with many others, don’t like the Obama Administration’s aloof stance towards Syria. But the least good reason for intervention there is to meet the Russian challenge, reassert primacy in the Arab world or prevent others from thinking America weak. We are not weak. We are strong, arguably far stronger than we would have been had we intervened in Syria a year ago and gotten stuck with enhanced responsibilities there. The reasons for intervention in Syria are more substantial: the threat of a terror-exporting Sunni extremist regime either in Damascus or in some portion of a partitioned Syria as well as the risk to neighboring states (Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Israel) from Syrian collapse. Read more
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