Tag: Al Qaeda
It wasn’t Colonel Mustard in the study
The New York Times reports that “Israeli operatives” killed Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah (aka Abu Muhammad al-Masri) three months ago in Tehran. He was supposedly Al Qaeda’s second in command (and its number one is rumored to be dead as well).
The killing occurred in such a netherworld of geopolitical intrigue and counterterrorism spycraft that Mr. al-Masri’s death had been rumored but never confirmed until now. For reasons that are still obscure, Al Qaeda has not announced the death of one of its top leaders, Iranian officials covered it up, and no country has publicly claimed responsibility for it.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/13/world/middleeast/al-masri-abdullah-qaeda-dead.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage
There are other mysteries as well: why didn’t the Israelis or the Americans claim credit? President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu would have had an interest in doing so. How do Israelis or someone in their employ kill people on the streets of Tehran? Why was an Al Qaeda commander doing in living in Tehran? And who is the source of this story now and what are their motives?
Starting with this last question, the Times article refers to intelligence officials without identifying their nationality. Best bet is that they are Israeli, but they could also be American, Gulf Arab, or even Iranian. Each might have an interest in either committing the murder or letting it be known, especially in the transition period to the Biden Administration. There are few better ways to curry favor with the Americans than to kill an Al Qaeda commander. Someone might even hope for indirect credit for killing an Al Qaeda commander by revealing it publicly.
The Times suggests al-Masri had been in Tehran for a decade or more, hosted there either because Al Qaeda conducts operations against American interests that Iran likes or as a hostage to guarantee Al Qaeda would not attack Iranian interests. Both could simultaneously be true.
Murders of this sort in Tehran have happened repeatedly. The victims are often Iranian nuclear scientists whom the Israelis want eliminated. It might be Israelis of Iranian origin doing the killing, though it is hard to imagine that the Islamic Republic doesn’t know when they come to visit. Nor would Jewish Iranians still resident in the country be outside the purview of Iranian intelligence. Could it be the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)? I am told that is one reason why some Americans are soft on them. They however would also be closely watched if they dared to return to Iran. Or it could be some other “resistance” organization. Of course it is also possible that the Islamic Republic itself decided al-Masri’s time was up.
The impact on Al Qaeda is far from clear, even though months have supposedly elapsed. I suppose with Zawahiri on his deathbed Al Qaeda didn’t think it wise to announce that his heir apparent was dead. Decapitation of this sort has an uncertain impact on terrorist organizations. But Al Qaeda has survived decapitation before and it may well again.
Of course we may never know all the answers to all the questions about this assassination. But now we have precious few. All we really know is that it wasn’t Colonel Mustard with the candlestick in the study.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, November 14
At US request, Israeli agents killed al Qaeda leader in Tehran.
China reacts to Pompeo statements on Taiwan.
Pew has more analysis of what went wrong with polls.
Defense One has a chapter from Tom Ricks’ new book about the ideas of the Founders.
As a Coloradan who could see Pike’s Peak in the distance when I was growing up, I’ve always had a fondness for “America the Beautiful,” written by Katharine Lee Bates after a visit there. Historian Jill Lepore has the story.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, June 2
– The US Constitution and existing laws place enormous limits on the federal government’s use of force. There is supposed to be civilian control, under the president. In the District of Columbia the president is in direct control of the national guard. That probably explains why guard forces aggressively dispersed protestors even before the DC Mayor’s 7pm curfew last night.
Earlier, in a call to governors, the president said CJCS General Milley was”in charge.” By law, of course, the Chairman is not in the chain of command over the armed forces, only over the Joint Staff. He cannot give combat orders. The White House press secretary said that there would be a “central command center” to deal with the riots nationwide. But the US military can’t be part of that without presidential invocation of the Insurrection Act. Contrary to the press secretary, the Justice Department told FP that it would be in charge, which is consistent with what Attorney General Barr told the governors, that the issue would be handled by the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
BTW, his ignorance of the law also explains the president’s talk of declaring “antifa” a terrorist organization.
I’m troubled by several things: the president’s glorification of military force as the first response to civil protests; his disregard of the laws and norms by urging federal military intervention nationwide; the apparent complicity of the SecDef and CJCS in this situation. I agree with Kevin Baron of Defense One that “Trump now has the war he wanted.” And that’s bad for civilian control and order in law.
-How timely, Former SecDef Gates warns about the “overmilitarization” of American foreign policy.
-A Columbia prof confirms my concerns that US cyber programs are overwhelmingly focused on offense rather than defense and resilience.
– Time and the UN report the Taliban are colluding with al Qaeda again.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Retreat from Afghanistan
The United States has decided to retreat from Afghanistan, promising a complete withdrawal within 14 months if the Taliban keep their commitments, including to not allowing international terrorists to operate from territory they control. The agreement was signed Saturday in Doha.
This is a necessary, even if less than glorious, end to US participation in a war that has gone on far too long. Eighteen years after toppling the Taliban regime in the aftermath of 9/11, the diminishing returns are insufficient to keep the US committed, especially in an election year. America and its NATO allies are leaving the field to the Afghan government and its opponents, which will now be expected to negotiate a political settlement, after a major prisoner exchange.
Everything now depends on the intra-Afghan political settlement. Negotiations on this agreement are supposed to start on March 10. Will it protect the human rights many Afghans have come to enjoy? Will women be forced out of politics and girls out of school? Will minorities suffer as they did under the previous Taliban regime? Will the margins of freedom of speech and religion shrink? Will politics continue in the semi-democratic direction they have taken for two decades, or will a religious autocracy be restored, especially in the countryside from which it has never entirely disappeared.
There can be no doubting President Ashraf Ghani’s commitment to maintaining what he can of liberal, modern Afghanistan. But he will need to compromise with a potent insurgency that backs Taliban political demands. Few think the Taliban can overrun or seize Kabul, but they can certainly displace the Afghan security forces in many provinces and bring enormous pressure to bear on the capital once the Americans are gone. After the Soviets left, their guy lasted three years in power, but he eventually ended up tortured and hung from a “traffic control box.” I imagine Ghani, who literally wrote the book (or at least a very good book) on statebuilding, will not wait around for that to happen.
Are all the Americans really leaving? I doubt it. I suspect Washington has insisted on some remaining, covert presence for counter-terrorism forces. The Taliban, though religious extremists like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, unlike them do not have ambitions beyond Afghanistan. All three jihadist forces compete for the same political space inside Afghanistan, so it is not completely unreasonable to think the Taliban might secretly welcome the Americans doing their dirty work for them by killing their jihadi competitors.
Only time will tell whether the peace agreement with the Taliban will hold and some sort of political settlement among the Afghans will emerge. The Taliban have good reason to keep the peace during the American withdrawal, which is supposed to slow if they don’t. But they have little incentive to compromise with Ghani once the Americans are gone, unless the Afghan security forces do much better in fighting them than has so far been the case. US and UN sanctions on the Taliban are supposed to come off early in the process.
With this agreement, President Trump gets some bragging rights on foreign policy that he has lacked. Nothing else he has tried has worked: there is no nuclear or missile agreement with North Korea, Iran is not returning to the negotiating table despite “maximum pressure,” Venezuela is still in the hands of President Maduro, only Israel has welcomed the Middle East “deal of the century,” and the trade war with China has failed to produce progress on the main issues, even if a mutual but partial stand-down of tariffs has attenuated some of its worst impacts on Trump’s farming supporters. Trump needs this Afghanistan agreement more than the Taliban and gave up a lot to get it.
For the sake of the Afghans, let’s hope it holds.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Stevenson’s army, February 24
– Administration plans request for coronavirus health measures.
– Islamic State and Al Qaeda are teaming up in the Sahel..
– Big week for congressional hearings.
– Embarrassingly low turnout in Iran elections.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I plan to republish here. If you want to get it directly, To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Defeated, yet still a threat
June 5 the Middle East Institute hosted Ambassador James Jeffery, Special Envoy for the Coalition to Defeat ISIS and Special Representative for Syria Engagement, Edmund Fitton-Brown, coordinator for the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team on ISIS, Al-Qaeda & Taliban, and Jessica Lambert-Gray, First Secretary for Counter-Terrorism and Extremism at the British Embassy for a conversation on countering terrorism in the Middle East. Charles Lister, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, moderated the panel.
Jeffery qualified the declaration of the Islamic State (ISIS)’s defeat. Although it should be lauded and the US-led coalition of over 80 countries praised for their efforts, the United States and other international forces ought to remain wary of ISIS affiliates and pockets of resistance in Syria and Iraq. The US will need to continue to arm and train Iraqi soldiers to fight ISIS resistance. The US will also continue to support the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), despite the recent withdrawal of close to 95% of US ground support in Syria. A small force of American troops and strategic personnel will remain to stabilize and secure the SDF-controlled areas along the Euphrates.
Jeffery touched on how broader political issues in the Middle East catalyzed the formation of ISIS. He pointed specifically to how the Assad regime, backed by Iran, lashed out against peaceful protesters in Syria in 2011, fomenting the unrest needed to strengthen ISIS.
Lambert-Gray echoed Jeffery’s statements, positing that while the caliphate is gone, the threat is not. Her analysis portends the rise of “Daesh (ISIS) 2.0” and “Al-Qaeda 3.0” if international forces do not maintain pressure on these groups in Iraq and Syria. She fears that both groups may be able to expand, evolve, and rise again.
Lambert-Gray notes that ISIS’s most concerning weapon is its ability to inspire extremism and terrorist attacks globally. The production of online propaganda has become key to the survival of ISIS during its current “hibernation.” Regarding the Al-Qaeda, Lambert-Gray argues that the threat had never actually subsided. Its Iran-based leadership is becoming increasingly powerful, but she declined to provide any further details, stating that her team is still researching the issue.
In an effort to reduce risks, the UK has banned travel to Syria and provides no diplomatic support to citizens who elect to travel without authorization. The UK is also trying to diminish the online presence of ISIS. Countering Daesh can only be achieved with strategic patience and by an unrelenting drain of their resources.
Fitton-Brown complemented Lambert-Gray’s comments, noting that the “Islamic State’s covert network is forming now in Syria as it did in Iraq in 2017.” He also fears that ISIS will be able to further spread its network through the ongoing refugee crisis at the border of Turkey. In Iraq the government is having trouble containing and trying detained IS fighters. With the prospect of extremism re-emerging in the Levant and possibly spreading into Turkey, Fitton-Brown identifies building inclusive governments for Sunni citizens as the key challenge for Iraq and Syria. Detaining, trying, and eventually releasing foreign ISIS fighters in Iraq and the possibility for further radicalization present additional challenges.
The key message from the panel is that extremism in the Levant still poses a serious threat , with the potential to generate unrest globally. Mitigation of extremist activity has seen modest success, but continued pressure is essential to ensure that groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda do not recover. Among the most dangerous and far-reaching tools that extremist groups can employ are online propaganda and recruiting campaigns.
RSS - Posts
