Tag: Al Qaeda
Peace picks, December 16-20
DC is beginning to slow down as the holiday season is fast approaching, but there are still some great events this week. We won’t likely publish another edition until January 5, as the year-end doldrums will likely last until then:
1. The Middle Kingdom Looks East, West, North, and South: China’s Strategies on its Periphery
Monday, December 16 | 9:00am – 10:30am
Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Fifth Floor
China’s recent declaration of an air defense identification zone in the East China Sea and its territorial claims over 80% of the South China Sea are focusing renewed American attention on Chinese strategy. To understand China’s policies, deployments, and ambitions in the Western Pacific, we must analyze China’s attitudes toward all of its 14 border States and Pacific neighbors, and toward its near and more distant seas.
The Kissinger Institute’s 2013 series of public programs will conclude with a talk by renowned author Edward Luttwak, who will lead a discussion of China’s strategy throughout its periphery, with an emphasis on the Diaoyu/Senkakus and other regional disputes.
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Sharp differences on Syria
Al-Monitor and Johns Hopkins SAIS teamed up last week for a full-day conference on “The United States, Russia and the Middle East”. The afternoon session had a panel on the Syrian regional crisis, which moderator David Sanger of The New York Times described as not the typical panel in Washington, with everyone getting along.
Josh Landis, Director of the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Middle East Studies, said the US is now mostly concerned with the al-Qaeda presence in Syria and the refugee problem affecting Syria’s neighboring countries. Inside Syria there are no good guys. The military cannot be a substitute for Assad. The idea that the military and Ba’th Party can stay in power if Assad is removed is fictional. These institutions are expressions of Assad. If there is no plan to remove Assad then the civil war inside Syria is going to continue. The only two alternatives for Syria would be either to partition the country or to allow Russia to support Assad with arms in order to regain control of the country. Neither option is good for the rebels. Read more
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Peace picks, November 18-22
DC’s top events of the week:
1. Oil Security and the US Military Commitment to the Persian Gulf
Monday, November 18 | 9:00am – 2:30pm
George Washington University Elliott School, 1957 E Street NW, Lindner Family Commons Room 602
9:00-9:20: Introduction
Charles Glaser, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
9:30-11:00: Threats to U.S. Oil Security in the Gulf: Past, Present and Future
Salim Yaqub, University of California-Santa Barbara
Thomas Lippman, Middle East Institute
Joshua Rovner, Southern Methodist University
Chair: Rosemary Kelanic, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
11:15-12:15: The Economic Stakes: Oil Shocks and Military Costs
Eugene Gholz, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas-Austin
Kenneth Vincent, George Washington University
Chair: Charles Glaser, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
12:45-2:15: Possibilities for U.S. Grand Strategy in the Persian Gulf
Daniel Byman, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Caitlin Talmadge, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
Rosemary Kelanic, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
Chair: Charles Glaser, Elliott School of International Affairs, GWU
The U.S. strategic objective of protecting Persian Gulf oil has generated little controversy since the Gulf became a focus of U.S. military deployments over three decades ago. This may seem unsurprising given the widely-appreciated importance of oil to the global economy. Nevertheless, quite dramatic changes have occurred in the regional balance of power, the nature of security threats, and the global oil market since the U.S. made its commitment-raising the possibility that the U.S. role should be revisited. This conference examines two critical questions for U.S. grand strategy in the Gulf. First, should the United States continue to rely on military capabilities to preserve the flow of Persian Gulf oil? Second, if the U.S. security commitment remains strategically sound, what military posture should U.S. forces adopt? The conference panels examine the key rationales driving current U.S. policies, the costs and benefits of alternative approaches, and options for revising the U.S. military stance in the region.
Lunch will be served.
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Yes, Syria can get worse
The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (Etilaf) decided yesterday that it would go to a Geneva 2 diplomatic conference:
The G[eneral] A[ssembly] [of Etilaf] endorsed the Syrian Coalition’s readiness to participate in a Geneva conference based on the transfer of power to a transitional governing body (TGB). This body should include full executive powers including presidential powers with control over military and security apparatus. Furthermore, the Assad Regime and those associated with him will have no role in the transitional period and future Syria.
The Syrian Coalition stipulates that prior to the conference access for relief convoys, including the Red Cross and the Red Crescent IFRC and other international relief agencies, to all besieged areas must be ensured, and prisoners, especially women and children, must be released.
What this “based on” language does is to make Bashar al Asad’s removal from power not a precondition for talks as in the past but instead Etilaf‘s desired outcome in the future. Humanitarian access and release of prisoners are standard demands in situations such as this. Likely the Syrian regime will be prepared to offer half a loaf: a few humanitarian convoys and release of some women and children.
There really wasn’t much choice. Washington has been insisting that the Coalition agree to Geneva 2, posing the question as a choice between dealing either with Al Qaeda or with the regime. A refusal to go to Geneva 2 would have led to withdrawal of Western support. Perhaps even the Saudis were convinced to condition their assistance on a start to negotiations.
The truth is that the relatively moderate opposition will need to deal with both Al Qaeda and the regime, one way or the other.
Etilaf is not strong enough to do it with military force. Today’s news includes a regime offensive to retake Aleppo’s airport. Iranian and Russian military assistance to the regime is flowing unrestrained. Al Qaeda in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has become dominant in Raqqa, the one provincial capital in opposition hands and is strengthening across the north. The Supreme Military Council, the military affiliate of Etilaf and nominal coordinator of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) brigades, is less and less in evidence.
There is no sign it is strong enough to counter the regime and ISIS with politics either. Wisely, Etilaf is sending people into Syria to talk with opposition supporters in advance of Geneva 2. They will get an earful. Opposition activists are disappointed with Etilaf, which has been unable to deliver governance and services to liberated areas. Many people inside Syria lean more towards negotiating with the regime, as they hope it will end the military’s campaign against the population. But they have little trust in the mostly expatriate Etilaf to do it.
Etilaf, broadened with some representation of the FSA and opposition activists from inside Syria, may have no choice but to go to Geneva 2. But talks are unlikely to produce a political settlement any time soon. The regime sees no reason to allow itself to be decapitated. It will want Etilaf to agree to participate in the 2014 presidential elections, with Bashar al Asad as a candidate. Doing so would be fatal to the moderate opposition and leave Syria’s fate to a battle between extreme Islamists and the regime.
That is likely in any event. Power today in Syria grows from the barrel of a gun, supplemented by humanitarian assistance. Extremists are proving better at both than Etilaf, which has the additional disadvantage of fickle Western friends. As Syrians see it, the Americans not only backed off bombing of Syria’s chemical weapons facilities but are also now cozying up to Iran in an effort to reach a nuclear deal.
Whom would you back? You have a choice:
- the guys with long beards inside Syria capable of protecting you against the regime and feeding you, even if their methods are brutal and their religious practices oppressive, or
- the closer-shaven ones who meet outside the country, command no army and can’t even convince the internationals to bring their humanitarian assistance in from Turkey and Jordan.
Geneva 2 is unlikely to produce a political settlement. But even if it does, the war will not end because the negotiators there won’t command the extremist fighters. Those who think things can’t get worse in Syria are in for a surprise.
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TGBWFEABMC
That’s a “transitional governing body with full executive authority by mutual consent.” It’s the codeword Washington says you have to give in order to get invited to Geneva 2, the UN-mediated conference at which the US hopes to arrange a political end to the Syrian conflict. What it means is President Bashar al Asad has to step aside, if not down, and allow a transition to a democratic regime to begin.
He isn’t prepared to do that, and neither Iran nor Russia appears willing to make him do it. I don’t doubt their capacity. The alacrity with which Bashar agreed to the destruction of his chemical weapons capability showed Moscow’s clout. Withdrawal of Tehran’s support would quickly put him at serious risk on the battlefield, as Iranian revolutionary guards and Hizbollah forces fighting in Syria are vital to the regime. But why would Moscow or Tehran withdraw support? Read more
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Peace picks, November 4-8
Apologies for the late posting (DPS):
The upcoming week’s top events:
1. Responding to the Rebalance: ASEAN between China and the US
Monday, November 4 | 12:00pm – 1:30pm
East-West Center, Sixth Floor Conference Room, 1819 L Street NW
An Asia-Pacific Security Seminar featuring:
Mr. Julio Amador III
2013 Asia Studies Visiting Fellow, East-West Center in Washington
Foreign Affairs Research Specialist, Philippines’ Foreign Service Institute
Dr. Charmaine Misalucha (Discussant)
Assistant Professor, De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines
The rebalancing of the United States to Asia in an effort to stem China’s surge in regional leadership has placed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in a difficult position. While ASEAN recognizes China as one of its most important Dialogue Partners, the regional association’s members have always recognized that the US plays a special role in the Asia Pacific as the guarantor of security. Meanwhile, China and the US are set on a rivalry that, while not officially acknowledged, is apparent to observers in Southeast Asia. Within this context, how is ASEAN as a regional organization dealing with Chinese-American rivalry?
Mr. Julio Amador III will describe regional perspectives about the direction of ASEAN in the context of the US Rebalance. He will discuss the tensions in the South China Sea as the backdrop for the rivalry between China and the US, and ASEAN’s subsequent attempts at autonomy in settling the issue. He will also assess ASEAN’s internal dynamics and describe how member-states attempt to form a regional consensus while maintaining their national strategic interests. While China and the US contend for primacy in the region, ASEAN still has a role to play, but only if it is willing to move beyond the narrow strategic limits set by its member states.
This program will be off-the-record; thank you for your cooperation.
A light luncheon will be served.
Julio Amador III is an Asia Studies Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington and a Fulbright Scholar at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. He is on leave as a Foreign Affairs Research Specialist at the Center for International Relations and Strategic Studies (CIRSS) of the Philippines’ Foreign Service Institute. He provides policy analysis and strategic advice on ASEAN issues, Southeast Asia security and international relations, and foreign policy to the Department of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Amador has held numerous fellowships in the United States, Europe, and Australia.
Dr. Charmaine Misalucha is currently a US-ASEAN Fulbright Fellow in the School of International Service of American University. She is also an Assistant Professor at De La Salle University in Manila, Philippines, specializing international relations, security studies, and the arms trade. She received her PhD in International Relations from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies of the Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.
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