Tag: Al Qaeda
Fin de regime
My guess is that we are finally in the waning days of the Asad regime in Syria. UN envoy Brahimi was in Damascus yesterday and will talk with the Russians this weekend. His is sounding like a last ditch effort. Moscow has made it clear that it will no longer prop up Asad. Now they have to be convinced to give him a shove in the right direction. It shouldn’t be all that hard. Bashar’s military police chief has famously absconded, joining his foreign ministry spokesperson. The regime is cracking, though not yet crumbling.
This is a delicate moment in which a great deal is at stake. The devil is in the details. Brahimi is still pressing for a solution that jibes with last June’s Geneva agreement, which Moscow and Washington both endorsed, on formation of a fully empowered government with Bashar still in place. I doubt the revolutionaries will accept it. They want him out before agreeing to a ceasefire. Provided that condition is met, a negotiated transition of power to some sort of “unity” government (which means it would include a “remnant” of the Asad regime) with a guarantee of a future transition could be a good thing, provided it genuinely puts Syria on a democratic path and extracts it from the violence now on going. But it could also sell the Syrian revolution short by putting a new autocrat in place and creating conditions for renewed violence.
There will be precious little real international support for a true transition to democracy. The Saudis and Qataris, who have provided the bulk of the arms and money to the revolutionaries, are not much interested in anything beyond getting Asad out and installing a Sunni (preferably Islamist) regime, democratic or not. The Russians, Iranians and Iraqis will fear that outcome and want to preserve a secular regime, whether democratic or not. The Americans and Turks will want a secular democracy, but they are not in a position to insist on it. The Americans have been reluctant to get too involved. Only if Turkey decides to put its boots on the ground inside Syria will it have the kind of clout required. Even then, it may fail to get what it wants.
The Syrians hold the key to the outcome. But of course they point in many different directions. There are lots of Syrians who would prefer a secular democracy, but they are stronger among the nonviolent protesters than among the revolutionary military forces deciding the outcome. The Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, now recognized internationally as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, is trying to project a unified and moderate image. But the results so far are rudimentary: a few press statements, not always on the most pressing issues. There is still no transition government.
Jabhat al Nusra, a leading Islamist group among the fighters, is producing more substantial results. Rejecting the Coalition, it is anti-Western, Islamist, socially conservative and hard-fighting. The United States has designated it a foreign terrorist organization. Washington’s primary concern is its links to al Qaeda in Iraq, which Jabhat al Nusra denies. But I’ve also heard that the designation was done in part to please the Russians, who are genuinely (and justifiably) concerned with Syria becoming a source of Islamist extremism that could infect parts of Russia. Baghdad is also worried about a Sunni extremist regime in Syria that would try to counter Prime Minister Maliki’s increasingly Shia (and autocratic) drift in Iraq.
Few in Syria want the state to collapse or divide territorially. The revolution has not been fought on ethnic or sectarian grounds, even if it has exposed ethnic and sectarian divisions. Only Syria’s Kurds lean in the direction of federalism, inspired and supported by their confrères in Iraq. But I see no real plan on the horizon to prevent revenge killing, despite the very real likelihood it will happen. If there is extreme violence against the Alawites or other minorities thought to have supported the regime, collapse and division become more likely.
All decisions that depend on the will of a single individual, as Bashar’s to step aside does, are inherently unpredictable. There is of course the possibility he will refuse and hang on for a while, even defying the Russians to do so. A Google search for “fin de regime” turns up a lot of hits concerning Syria, in 2011. The longer this goes on, the worse it will be in the end.
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Redlines
The publication last week of a five-step peace process roadmap to 2015 allegedly prepared by Afghanistan’s High Peace Council reopens the issue of whether a negotiated settlement with the Taliban–or parts thereof–is possible. American efforts led first by Richard Holbrooke and more recently by Marc Grossman have failed. With an American drawdown of troops proceeding and Afghan forces all too clearly not yet capable of taking over, it would not be surprising to see the Afghans make another stab at a deal.
But anyone who thinks this plan was prepared in Dari or Pashto is kidding themselves. This document reads to me like an American plan, written in good diplospeak, warmed over. It foresees an increase in Pakistan’s role in the negotiations, but it also includes all the American red lines (admittedly at the very end):
Any outcome of the peace process must respect the Afghan Constitution and must not jeopardize the rights and freedoms that the citizens of Afghanistan, both men and women, enjoy under the Constitution. As part of the negotiated outcome, the Taliban and other armed opposition groups must cut ties with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and verifiably renounce violence.
The timeline for the plan began in early 2012. Some of the action items concerning release of prisoners and assurance of safe passage for negotiators seem to have been fulfilled. But a critical step, announcement that the Taliban are cutting their ties to al Qaeda, to my knowledge has not been taken (the deadline was March 2012). The Taliban have denied media reports to that effect. I know of no credible evidence that the Taliban have softened their position on education and participation of women, though they may have gotten savvier about (not) attacking girls’ schools. Nor have they renounced violence.
The devil, as always, is in the details. The roadmap proposes that in the second half of 2013 the negotiating parties
…agree on the modalities for the inclusion of Taliban and other armed opposition leaders in the power structure of the state, to include non-elected positions at different levels with due consideration of legal and governance principles.
I wrote about this for the Washington Post more than two years ago, when I first heard rumors of State Department officials looking for a settlement that would give over a large portion of southern Afghanistan to Taliban governance in exchange for cutting their ties with al Qaeda and laying down their arms. It is still a distasteful proposition.
But less so than two years ago because American and Afghan efforts have failed to install anything like functioning governance in much of Afghanistan outside urban centers. The Northern Alliance opponents of the Taliban may not like it, but the Americans will find it easier to twist their arms than those of the Taliban. The alternative to a negotiated settlement with the Taliban might just be their military success in the countryside, where they are doing relatively well.
It is reasonable under current conditions to pursue a plan like the one McClatchy uncovered. But those redlines are important. If the Taliban don’t break with al Qaeda and accept women as human beings, we’ll regret a settlement that brings them into Afghanistan’s governing structures. So will Pakistan.
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Bashar al Asad’s apocalypse
I published a daring series of predictions at the end of last year. Very few were correct. The only two that came close were these:
Balkans: Serbia gets candidacy status for the EU but that fails to save President Tadic’s Democratic Party from a parliamentary election defeat. Kosovo meets all the requirements but continues to be denied the European Union visa waiver. Bosnia gets a new government but no constitutional reform.
United States: Republicans nominate Mitt Romney. Economy continues slow recovery. Barack Obama is reelected, by a smaller margin than in 2008. Al Qaeda succeeds post-election in mounting a non-devastating suicide bombing.
Even then, you’ll need to ignore the part about Kosovo meeting all the requirements (it hasn’t yet) and that last part about a successful Al Qaeda bombing in the U.S. (that hasn’t happened yet either). Is it an accident that the two places I know best were also the subject of my most accurate predictions?
I’ll rely on other people for my next big prediction: Andrew Tabler and Jeff White, who know Syria much better than I do, were at the Washington Institute yesterday predicting the end of the Asad regime within weeks, at most a few months. Even if the Mayan apocalypse hasn’t happened, Bashar al Asad’s will.
According to Jeff, the regime’s military capacity to defend itself is way down. Its air power, artillery and Scuds are little avail. Its large-scale maneuver capacity is declining, as are its numbers. There is fighting in 12 of 14 provinces. Regime armor and mechanized infantry can no longer move freely. The only potential major game changers out there are Hizbollah, Iran and chemical weapons. Iran and Hizbollah are not likely to risk more than they already have.
Rebel offensive performance is improving. They are taking objectives and interrupting lines of communication. They appear to be self-sustaining now in arms, their numbers are still growing, and they are capable of more sustained and coordinated action. The Islamists are playing an increasing role. Rebel losses are up, especially among commanders, but their recruitment stream is still strong.
Jeff suggest five possible endgames:
1. Province by province dismantlement of the regime, which has already begun.
2. Chaotic collapse of the regime.
3. Controlled regime contraction to Damascus or the coast.
4. A headlong rush to the coast.
5. Regime recovery, which looks unlikely.
Possible indicators the end is near: there may be desperate pleas for a ceasefire, evacuation of Russian nationals, senior defections or flight, military units abandoning the regime, a coup attempt and last (but not entirely in jest) burning papers at the Iranian Embassy.*
Andrew agreed. There is a marked deterioration in the humanitarian situation, with food in short supply, refugee and displaced people camps overcrowded and ill-equipped. The revolution is turning in an Islamist direction, in part because of U.S. unresponsiveness to its needs. Anti-Western sentiment is strong. It was a mistake to designate Jabhat al Nusra as a terrorist organization before recognizing the Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
The Coalition remains badly divided by sect, class, rural/urban and by personality. While the military and civilian leaderships have met and issued a joint statement, how the two insurgent efforts will be combined at various levels is not at all clear. The armed rebellion, with which the U.S. is not well-connected, is likely to be in the lead once Bashar falls. The U.S. should be sending arms, more to gain influence than anything else, as they are no longer needed as much as once they were for military purposes. We need to be ready also with civilian assistance, which has been too slow. The aid should be overt and direct, not covert and indirect, if we want to gain influence over the outcome. Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia may well move faster than we do, as they have with arms, with consequences for our interests.
It is clear Syria will need a lot of help once this is over. Post-war reconstruction has stumped the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, where it has boots on the ground, which isn’t going to happen in Syria. Working through and with the Coalition, which we’ve now recognized as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, to produce a decent outcome is going to be an an enormous challenge. Failure could ignite a broader conflict in Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq and Jordan. Success would damage Hizbollah and Iran. This one is worth a candle.
*This morning I would add use of cluster bombs.
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The EU kicks the can
Carl Bildt, Sweden’s long-time and much-followed Foreign Minister, tweeted earlier this week from the General Affairs Council of the European Union:
Finally everything done. Cyprus presidency, Stefan Füle and Cathy Ashton moved all EU enlargement issues successfully forward. Off we go.
I wondered at the time what this meant. Now I know.
It meant nothing: no date for Serbia or Macedonia to begin accession talks, no date for Kosovo to negotiate a Stabilization and Association Agreement. Croatia’s membership next year is expected to proceed on autopilot (with some corrections in Zagreb’s course requested) and Montenegro will continue accession talks. Albania still awaits for a date to start accession negotiations.
Admittedly it is difficult to get too excited about anything in the Western Balkans these days. Syria is imploding. Egypt is turning its judicial system over to religious supervision. Iran is making progress towards nuclear weapons. North Korea is successfully launching a longer-range ballistic missile, disguised as a space-launch vehicle. Afghanistan and Iraq are teetering. Al Qaeda is setting up shop in Mali. The euro is going down the tubes. Who cares what the Greeks want to call Macedonia or whether the former belligerents who run Serbia and Kosovo get dates to begin negotiations (Belgrade for accession, Pristina for a Stabilization and Association Agreement) with Brussels?
The people who live in those places do, that’s who. However insignificant the Balkans look these days from Washington, which is busy with its own domestic quarrels above all else, the region is important to those who inhabit it and has the potential to make life difficult for the rest of us, as it has proven repeatedly over the past 100 years.
A closer reading suggests that things might unfreeze in Brussels in the spring. Macedonia at least can expect a framework for negotiations then, provided it delivers on reforms in the meanwhile. Likewise Serbia, which is asked specifically for
…irreversible progress towards delivering structures in northern Kosovo which meet the security and justice needs of the local population in a transparent and cooperative manner, and in a way that ensures the functionality of a single institutional and administrative set up within Kosovo.
Also important is
…the agreement of the two Prime Ministers to work together in order to ensure a transparent flow of money in support of the Kosovo Serb community…
While couched in the EU’s usual obscurantist language, we see emerging here a detailed understanding of the real challenges that have so far blocked reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo. Bravo to the EU for acknowledging them!
Some of the same perspicacity is evident in the discussion of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU finds the need to reiterate
…its unequivocal support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU perspective as a sovereign and united country enjoying full territorial integrity.
It’s not good news when Brussels kicks off this way, though I’d be the first to admit that its subsequent suggestions of what needs to be done to fix the problem are thoroughly inadequate.
Pristina gets a pat on the back for its engagement in the talks and language identical to that addressed to Belgrade on northern Kosovo, plus a recommendation to develop an outreach plan.
Don’t get me wrong: it is correct for the EU to insist on specific reforms and benchmarks in dealing with the Western Balkans. Unfortunately, it is still true that conditionality is what moves things forward in many of these countries. In most of them, I expect the EU carrot will bring real changes, albeit in fits and starts. The most concerning is Bosnia, where the EU acknowledges the challenges to sovereignty that Milorad Dodik and Republika Srpska pose but fails to offer adequate responses and continues to quarrel with Washington over whether the High Representative should stay or go.
The EU has kicked the can down the road. The best we can hope for is a spring thaw.
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Recognition is the beginning, not the end
Reuters published my piece today, under the title, “Washington’s next steps on Syria”:
The United States has officially recognized the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people. It has also designated al Qaeda in Iraq-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, which often leads the fighting effort in Syria, as a terrorist organization, thus making it illegal for anyone to buy it even a cup of tea. This double-barreled political action, after months of hesitation, is intended to convey the message that Washington supports the relative moderates of the Syrian opposition wholeheartedly but wants to exclude from its ranks Sunni extremists.
The trouble is both moves come late in the game. At this point, U.S. influence may not be sufficient to accomplish the objectives.
A lot depends on the Syrians themselves. Most Syrians do not want to see sectarian slaughter following the current civil war. The question is whether they will be willing and able to restrain the Sunni extremists in their midst. It will take courage and commitment for today’s revolutionaries to speak up and protect Alawites, Christians, Druze and Shia who are suspected of supporting the Assad regime. Mass atrocity in the aftermath of political upheaval is more the rule than the exception. There is little sign that the international community will be able to mount a serious protection effort.
Jabhat al-Nusra would not hold the leading position it does today except for its relative effectiveness both on the battlefield and in providing services to liberated areas. The moderate Syrian opposition needs to get better at both if it is to compete effectively for mass support. It is trying. It has welcomed the Kurdish National Council into the Coalition and formed a new, more unified military command that excludes Jabhat al-Nusra. There was a meeting this week in Istanbul of the Civil Administration Councils from liberated areas in Syria. They need funds. A lot depends on their ability to provide food and shelter, pick up the garbage, open the schools, restore law and order. And it all has to be done in a fair and transparent way that avoids rumors of corruption and nepotism.
Much also depends on what Washington does to follow through. Once it recognizes as legitimate a government other than the one presided over by Bashar al-Assad, Washington can respond to that government’s requests for assistance. Humanitarian assistance is a no-brainer, but it will take patience and fortitude to get at least some of it delivered through the Coalition’s still primitive governing mechanisms. Political help is also desperately needed: the civil administration councils as well as the Coalition itself will need to construct a governing apparatus that is seen as both legitimate and competent, no easy task while bombs are falling around you.
The question of military assistance is still an open one. There are reports of military training in Jordan for Syrians preparing to try to secure Assad’s chemical weapons and to shoot down regime aircraft. An internationally enforced no-fly zone would be a major step, one that would tilt the battlefield in the revolutionary direction. Yet the Obama administration, anxious to avoid getting too deeply involved and not wanting to provoke the Assad-friendly Russians, is still hesitating.
On the economic front, Syria is in desperate condition. It is more akin to Egypt, which likewise has limited oil and gas, than Libya, a wealthy country with less than one-third of Syria’s population. Economic policy and Syria’s limited natural resources reside with whoever controls Damascus, so the liberated areas in other parts of the country will be doubly impoverished. The liberated areas need major and quick infusions of international funding.
Social conditions are appalling. More than 500,000 people are refugees, mostly in neighboring Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon. While the regime has been cooperating more with international relief efforts in recent weeks, there are likely several million people displaced internally, which makes for an enormous burden in providing food, shelter, sanitation and health care, even at the most basic level.
It is a good thing that Washington is recognizing both the virtues of the Coalition it helped to construct and the vices of Jabhat al-Nusra. But this is the beginning, not the end.
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Are Islamist victories avoidable?
“If democracy is to triumph in the Middle East, then Islamist victories are unavoidable and essential.” This was the resolution debated in the opening panel of last Thursday’s event on “Dictators and Dissidents: Should the West choose sides?” hosted by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Reuel Marc Gerecht of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Brian Katulis of the Center for American Progress affirmed the resolution and Rob Satloff of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and Bret Stephens of the Wall Street Journal opposed it. Though there were two teams, four different positions emerged.
Gerecht argued that democracy takes time and we should have faith in the democratic process. We may not know what the ultimate outcome of a democratic process, but we do know what will happen with the alternative. Dictators in the Middle East did not move their countries any closer to democracy. They created an environment that gave rise to al Qaeda.
Stephens responded arguing that the democratic process will not be successful when those participating, Islamists in his example, are opposed to democracy. Democratic process cannot be conflated with democracy. Stephens added that sometimes we have to make difficult choices, like supporting a dictator if we think the outcome will be more democratic than a democratic process in the same area would yield. Gerecht equated this with Kemalism, which he called “enlightened despotism.”
Satloff denied the inevitability of Islamist victories. In reality, Islamists rarely win – they almost never get more than 1/3 of the popular vote. What really happens is that non-Islamists lose because of in-fighting and lack of coherent vision. Ahmed Shafiq won 48% of the popular vote even though he was associated with Mubarak suggesting desire for non-Islamist leadership. A capable non-Islamist candidate from an organized party would have had a good shot. To believe that people in the Middle East will often elect Islamists is to fall victim to what Satloff calls the “bigotry of low expectations.” We should believe that people in the Middle East are capable of making reasonable decisions and as such, will not elect Islamists every time.
Katulis argued the opposite point. He said debating this resolution is like debating gravity. Islamists are winning. When they do win, he believes they will have to moderate their ideals and policies, which might be the best antidote to extremism.
It was unclear who won the debate. It seems like the root question is about how much faith one has in the democratic process. Election outcomes don’t matter if your faith is strong.
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