Tag: Al Qaeda
U.S.-Iraq relations after the withdrawal
I’m speaking at noon with Assistant Secretary of State Jeffrey Feltman and former Iraqi UN Deputy Perm Rep Feisal Istrabadi at the Middle East Institute (the event is at SEIU, 1800 Massachusetts). Here are the notes I’ve prepared for myself (but I’ll vary it depending on what they say):
–Tony Blinken, speaking last month at Center for American Progress, said: “Iraq today is less violent, more democratic and more prosperous…than at any time in recent history.”
–There are some indications that violence, especially from Al Qaeda in Iraq, is up since late last year. But even if true, Tony’s statement sets a low bar and the gains are still reversible.
–If our goal is a “sovereign, stable, self-reliant country, with a representative government that could become a partner in the region, and no safe haven for terrorists,” we are not there yet.
–On security, Iraq still endures an unacceptably high number of attacks: deaths per month in politically motivated attacks are way down from the peak, but they are still sufficient to keep sectarian tensions high, which is what Saddam Hussein loyalist Izzat al Duri said was intended in his recent video.
–The economy is not really in good shape. High Iraqi oil production helps Baghdad’s budget and moderates world prices, which Americans like, but it does not an economy make.
–Democracy in Iraq does not yet include an independent judiciary, protection of basic human rights, vigorous parliamentary oversight, effective provincial and local governments or fulfillment of many constitutionally mandated procedures.
–Looking to the future, there are three fundamental threats to Iraq that might vitiate U.S. efforts there:
- First is the threat of breakdown: an Iraq that becomes chaotic and dysfunctional, a more or less failed state like the one Prime Minister Maliki took over in 2006.
- Second is the threat of breakup: an Iraq that fragments along ethnic and sectarian lines, with broad regional consequences as each of the neighbors seeks advantage.
- Third is autocracy: fear of breakdown or breakup may motivate Maliki, or someone else, to centralize power and refuse to transfer it in accordance with the will of its people, expressed in verifiably free and fair elections.
–None of these Iraqs can be the kind of partner the United States seeks, but I won’t spend much time on the first two possibilities. It is the third that worries people these days.
–We need an Iraq that respects the rights and will of its people.
–The question is what influence we have, apart from the usual diplomatic jawboning, which Jim Jeffrey and the embassy have mastered beyond a shadow of doubt.
–There are four specific potential sources of U.S. influence in today’s Iraq: arms, aid, oil and what—for lack of a better term—I would call relationships.
—Arms transfers, some people say, give us “leverage”: we should make providing our support conditional on Iraqi adherence to democratic norms, or meaningful power-sharing, or depoliticization of the security forces.
–Those are all worthy objectives, but this seems to me easy to say and difficult to do. Once you’ve embarked on a program of transferring F-16s, it is going to take a big issue to override the vested interests involved. Conditionality would encourage the Iraqis to get their arms elsewhere.
–The best we can do it seems to me is to make it clear—preferably in writing in advance—that none of the weapons systems the U.S. provides can be used against Iraq’s own citizens exercising their legal rights.
–We should also make it clear that we will cooperate only with a professional army under civilian control. But Iraq’s specific governing arrangements are no longer ours to determine, so long as they remain representative and democratic.
—Aid is a more flexible tool. It should be targeted towards democracy and rule of law. I would focus on encouraging a more independent judiciary and promoting a civil society that will demand real democracy while carefully monitoring government expenditures and corruption.
–To be clear: there is no reason why the U.S. should still be spending hundreds of millions in Iraq for economic and agricultural development. The Iraqis have more than enough incentive, and their own resources, to do those things.
–Iraqi resources come from exported oil, more than 90% of which is shipped through the Gulf under Iranian guns, even when the existing pipeline to Turkey is operating.
–This is where we have so far failed clamorously: shipment of Iraq’s oil by pipeline to the north and west—once Syria undergoes its transition—would help to reduce Iranian pressure on Iraq and align Iraqi interests with those of Europe and the United States.
–Of course this means Iraq’s oil, and eventually gas as well, would have to traverse Kurdish and Sunni-populated territory, which means domestic political reconciliation is a prerequisite.
–Some will see that as an insurmountable obstacle. I see it as a challenge, one well worth overcoming. Iraq should be tied umbilically to Turkey and the Mediterranean, not to Hormuz.
–Finally: relationships. American influence inside Iraq comes in part from good relationships with the main political players, with the obvious but I hope declining exception of the Sadrists.
–While they may still resent the occupation, Iraqis of most stripes look to the Americans for protection. Iraqis of all stripes believe that the United States is vital to re-establishing their country’s regional role.
–We should be ready and willing to help, expecting however that Iraq will align with the United States where it really counts: right now, that means supporting the P5+1 effort on Iran’s nuclear program and the Arab League plan for Syria.
–And it means pumping as much oil as possible into a world market concerned with the prospect of war with Iran.
–Just a word in conclusion about the long term. Maliki, whatever his virtues and vices, is not for ever if democracy survives in Iraq.
–We need to use the Strategic Framework Agreement to ensure that our institutions and Iraq’s institutions, our people and Iraq’s people, our economy and Iraq’s economy, our culture and Iraq’s culture, are tied closely together.
–I’ll be glad if the Assistant Secretary tells me I am wrong, but I have the impression that we still have not learned how to fully exploit the potential of this agreement to sharply increase the interconnectedness between Iraq and the United States.
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The joke is on us
The temptation to do an April Fool’s post is great, but the barriers are greater: how can anyone joke about Bashar al Assad murdering Syria’s citizens and managing nevertheless to stay in power? Or about nuclear weapons in the hands of the Iranian theocracy? A war we are losing in Afghanistan? A peace we are losing in Iraq? A re-assertive Russia determined to marginalize dissent? An indebted America dependent on a creditor China that requires 7-8% annual economic growth just to avoid massive social unrest? I suppose the Onion will manage, but I’m not even one of its outer layers.
Not that the world is more threatening than in the past. To the contrary. America today faces less threatening risks than it has at many times in the past. But there are a lot of them, and they are frighteningly varied. Drugs from Latin America, North Korean sales of nuclear and missile technology, Al Qaeda wherever, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the wrong hands, bird or swine flu… Wonks are competing to offer a single “grand strategy” in a situation that does not permit one. Doctrine deprived Obama has got it right: no “strategic vision” can deal with all these contingencies. They require a case by case approach, albeit one rooted in strength and guided by clear principles.
American military strength is uncontested in today’s world and unequaled for a couple of decades more, even in the most draconian of budget situations. A stronger economy is on the way, though uncertainty in Europe and China could derail it. All America’s problems would look easier to solve with a year or two, maybe even three, of 3-4% economic growth. The principles are the usual ones, which I would articulate this way:
- The first priority is to protect American national security
- Do it with cheaper civilian means as much as possible, more expensive military means when necessary
- Leverage the contributions of others when we can, act unilaterally when we must
- Build an international system that is legitimate, fair and just
- Cultivate friends, deter and when necessary defeat enemies
My students will immediately try to classify these proposition as “realist” or “idealist.” I hope I’ve formulated them in ways that make that impossible.
There are a lot of difficult issues lying in the interstices of these propositions. Is an international system that gives the victors in a war now more than 65 years in the past vetoes over UN Security Council action fair and just? Does it lead to fair and just outcomes? Civilian means seem to have failed in Syria, and seem to be failing with Iran, but are military means any more likely to succeed? If the threats to American national security are indirect but nonetheless real–when for example North Korea threatens a missile launch intended to intimidate Japan and South Korea–do we withhold humanitarian assistance?
America’s political system likes clear and unequivocal answers. It has categories into which it would like to toss each of us. Our elections revolve around identity politics almost as much as those in the Balkans. We create apparently self-evident myths about our leaders that don’t stand up to scrutiny.
The fact is that the world is complicated, the choices difficult, the categories irrelevant and the myths fantasies. That’s the joke: it’s on us.
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Time to go
Is there anyone still out there who thinks we can achieve our goals in Afghanistan? Yes is the short answer. Michael O’Hanlon for example. So I’ll try to reiterate why I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that we need to get out as quickly as possible, without however destabilizing the situation.
Far be it from me to suggest that the homicidal behavior of a single American staff sergeant should determine what we do, or don’t do, in Afghanistan. The fact however is that incidents like the one Sunday, in which 16 Afghans appear to have been murdered by a single American, really do have a broader significance. It is just no longer possible for many–perhaps most–Afghans to support the effort we have undertaken supposedly for their benefit. The Afghan parliament has said plainly that patience is running out. Wait until they realize how long it will take before the alleged perpetrator is tried and punished!
Of course we left Afghanistan to its own devices once before, after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. That did not work out well, for us or for them. The risks are great that the scenario will be repeated. I’m not sure President Karzai will last as long the Soviet-installed President Najibullah, who managed three years. But I trust Karzai will not stay on in Kabul if the Taliban appear at its gates, as Najibullah did. The Taliban castrated him and dragged him to death with a truck, then hung his body on a lamp post.
I doubt the Taliban, who would certainly gain control of at least parts of Afghanistan upon American withdrawal, would again make the mistake of inviting in al Qaeda. There isn’t much in it for them: al Qaeda is a pan-national movement with pretensions to uniting all Muslims in a revived caliphate.
As Rory Stewart notes, we are not going to be able to get the support we need from Pakistan or create the kind of government in Afghanistan that can gain the confidence of the Afghans. The only thing we’ve got going for us is that the Afghans hate the Taliban more than they hate us, but that is cold comfort.
It may also be in some doubt: the Taliban are having at least some success in governing areas they control. Their courts dispense justice, private and even state schools use their curriculum, and some nongovernmental organizations are allowed to operate. The Taliban district and provincial governors operate with increasing visibility and some degree of legitimacy.
To combat this kind of capillary presence of the Taliban, we would need to continue to distribute Americans widely in the countryside. It just isn’t going to be possible. With U.S. troops already withdrawing, the risk to Americans embedded in Afghan villages and ministries is going to rise sharply. Last month’s attacks on advisors embedded in the Interior Ministry, and the rising frequency of Afghan security force attacks on Americans, make that clear.
Like many Iraqis, at least some Afghans will come to regret U.S. withdrawal. The Pushtuns will not like dealing with the Northern Alliance, which defeated the Taliban in 2001 with help from the U.S., better than dealing with us, and many in the Northern Alliance would already prefer that we stay. Women–still not treated equally with men–stand to lose some of the enormous gains that they have made since the Taliban’s fall.
It would be a mistake to await the outcome of the negotiations with the Taliban, which could drag on for a long time. Better to go into these negotiations stating a willingness to withdraw–by the end of this year if feasible, or shortly thereafter–provided a satisfactory political solution can be agreed. That could actually accelerate the diplomacy rather than hinder it. And in any event the Taliban will know full well that public and political support for the war is fading in the United States.
What we have wanted is an Afghanistan that can defend itself and prevent the return of al Qaeda. It is hard for me to believe that we’ll get any closer to those goals by staying another three years. It is time to go. It should be done deliberately, not precipitously. But it should be done.
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This week’s peace picks
Quiet until Thursday, when there is a boom of interesting events:
1. Domestic Politics and Cross-Taiwan Strait Relations: A Perspective of Taiwan, Johns Hopkins/SAIS, 812 Rome, noon-2 pm March 12.
2. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists, Rumi Forum, noon-1:30 March 13.
Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants.
Dr. Rabasa will discuss the findings of the RAND monograph, Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. The study analyzes deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assesses the strengths and weaknesses of these programs, and makes recommendations to governments on ways to promote and accelerate processes of deradicalization.
BIO:
Dr. Angel M. Rabasa is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He has written extensively about extremism, terrorism, and insurgency. He is the lead author of The Lessons of Mumbai (2009); Radical Islam in East Africa (2009); The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey (2008); Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism Risks (2007); Building Moderate Muslim Networks (2007); Beyond al-Qaeda, Part 1: The Global Jihadist Movement and Part 2: The Outer Rings of the Terrorist Universe (2006); and The Muslim World After 9/11 (2004). He has completed the research on patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe, and is currently working on a project on deradicalization of Islamist extremists. Other works include the International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper No. 358, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorists(2003); The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges, Politics, and Power(2002), with John Haseman; and Indonesia’s Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia (2001), with Peter Chalk. Before joining RAND, Rabasa served in the U.S. Departments of State and Defense. He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the International Studies Association, and the American Foreign Service Association.
Rabasa has a B.A. and Ph.D. in history from Harvard University and was a Knox Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford University.
3. Sudan and South Sudan: Independence and Insecurity, Dirksen 419, 10 am March 14.
U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Full Committee
Presiding:
Senator Kerry
Panel One
Special Envoy for Sudan
U.S. Department of State
Washington, DC
Co-founder
Satellite Sentinel Project
Washington, DC
Co-founder
Satellite Sentinel Project, Enough Project
Washington, DC
4. Two New Publications Examining Iran, Stimson Center, 10-11:30 am March 15
Iran in Perspective:
Holding Iran to Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology
By Barry Blechman
Engaging Iran on Afghanistan:
Keep Trying
By Ellen Laipson
Stimson scholars, co-founder and distinguished fellow Barry Blechman and president and CEO Ellen Laipson have completed new studies that consider how to engage Iran in constructive negotiations. Dr. Blechman will discuss how to achieve greater progress on the nuclear front, while Laipson will outline ways to engage Iran over the future of Afghanistan.
** This event is on the record **
Please RSVP to RSVP@stimson.org – or call April Umminger at (202) 478-3442.
5. Why Does Russia Support the Assad Regime? Middle East Institute, noon-1 pm March 15
Location:
Russia’s relations with Syria – even under the Assad regime – have been more troubled than current press accounts of Moscow-Damascus ties indicate. But despite the internal and external opposition to the Assad regime that has risen up over the past year, the Russian government has defended it staunchly via its Security Council veto and other means. In his talk, Mark Katz will discuss why Moscow supports the Assad regime so strongly as well as why it is willing to incur the costs of doing so.
Bio: Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George Mason University who writes and lectures extensively on Russia and its relations with the Middle East. He is the author of Leaving without Losing: The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012), Reflections on Revolutions (St. Martin’s Press/Macmillan, 1999), Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves (St. Martin’s Press/Macmillan, 1997) and Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), among other publications.
Moderated by NPR’s Tom Gjelten
1:00-2:30 p.m., March 15, 2012
American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th St. NW #1100 Washington, DC
CNN.com will livestream each event. On Twitter? Follow #natsecurity2012for updates throughout the series.7. South China Sea in High Resolution, CSIS 1:30-2:30 March 15
CSIS Southeast Asia Program is pleased to present the inauguration of its innovative new policy tool “South China Sea in High Resolution”.
Presented by
Ernest Z. Bower
Senior Adviser & Director, Southeast Asia Program, CSIS
Followed by an expert panel featuring:
Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson
U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
Admiral Timothy J. Keating
Former PACOM Commander, U.S. Department of the Navy (Retired)
The Hon. Stapleton J. Roy
Former U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia
Thursday, March 15, 2012
1:30 pm – 2:30 pm
CSIS B1 A/B Conference Facility
1800 K ST NW, Washington DC
We are honored to invite you to witness the inauguration of the innovative new CSIS policy tool called “The South China Sea in High Resolution” presented by Ernest Bower, the senior adviser and director of the CSIS Southeast Asia program. An outstanding panel of experts will discuss the presentation and key trends in the South China Sea and its importance to the United States.
The South China Sea in High Resolution presentation will address the myriad issues — ranging from geopolitical to economic to legal — arising from the disputes in the sea. The South China Sea is a topic of vital importance for the Asia-Pacific. American foreign policy rebalance towards Asia has further emphasized the significance of this region. The South China Sea connects the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China, but it contains sizeable natural resources and hosts the world’s busiest trade routes. Concerns about maintaining peace in the sea were raised by President Obama and other Southeast Asian leaders during the ASEAN Regional Forum and East Asia Summit in 2011.
Ernest Z. Bower is senior advisor and director of CSIS’s Southeast Asia Program.
Lieutenant General Wallace “Chip” Gregson (USMC, Ret.) most recently served as assistant secretary of defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.
Admiral Timothy J. Keating (retired) is former commander of Pacific Command (PACOM) and the U.S. Navy’s U.S. Northern Command.
The Hon. Stapleton J. Roy is former U.S. ambassador to Singapore, China, and Indonesia. He is currently the director of the Kissinger Institute on China at the Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars.
Please RSVP to the Southeast Asia Program by noon on March 14. If you have questions, please contact Mary Beth Jordan at (202) 775 3278.
Event Schedule
10:15-10:30am: Welcome
10:30am-12:00pm: Panel 1, How Repression Breeds Religious Extremism – and How Religious Freedom Does the Opposite
Panelists: Johanna Kristin Birnir, Brian Grim, Mohammed Hafez, and Monica Duffy Toft (moderator)
12:00-12:30pm: Lunch
12:30 – 2:00pm: Keynote Discussion, Religious Freedom, Religious Extremsim, and the Arab Spring: Bush and Obama Administration Perspectives
Participants: Dennis Ross, Stephen Hadley, Elliott Abrams, and William Inboden (moderator)
2:15-3:30pm: Panel 2, Fostering Religious Freedom & Curbing Religious Extremism in the Arab Spring – Lessons for US Policy
Panelists: Jillian Schwedler, Samer Shehata, Samuel Tadros, and Thomas Farr (moderator)
Featuring
Stephen Hadley
Dennis Ross
Elliott Abrams
Participants
Johanna Birnir
Thomas Farr
Brian Grim
Mohammed Hafez
William Inboden
Jillian Schwedler
Samer Shehata
Samuel Tadros
Monica Duffy Toft
The Brookings Institution
August 04, 2011
Participants
Panelists
Khaled Elgindy
Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy
Shadi Hamid
Director of Research, Brookings Doha Center
Tamara Cofman Wittes
3:00 to 4:00 Panel 1: Domestic Issues
Scott Shemwell, Retired Business Professional, “ Challenges for the International Oil and Gas Markets: A Business Perspective ”
Xu Liu, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies Visiting Scholar, GW; Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, “The Environmental Factor in Russian Energy Policy ”
4:00 to 4:15 Coffee Break
4:15 to 5:45 Panel 2: Foreign Policy
Keun-Wook Paik, Senior Research Fellow, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, ”East Asia Energy Cooperation”
Dicle Korkmaz, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Visiting Scholar, GW; University of Tampere, “Russian-Turkish Energy Relations ”
Oleksandr Sukhodolia, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Visiting Scholar, GW; Fulbright Scholar, “Russian-Ukrainian Energy Relations ”
Discussion Chair: Robert Orttung, Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Assistant Director, GW
RSVP at: http://tinyurl.com/PanelGWU
Sponsored by the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies
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Negotiation time
With all the jabber the last few days about the use of force against both Syria and Iran, media attention is not focused on the prospects for negotiated settlements. But there are such prospects still, even if the odds are getting longer by the day.
Syria
International Crisis Group is out yesterday with a “now or never” manifesto rightly focused on prospects for UN/Arab League envoy Kofi Annan’s efforts:
Annan’s best hope lies in enlisting international and notably Russian support for a plan that:
Arming the Syrian opposition, which is happening already, is not likely to improve the prospects for a negotiated settlement along these lines. To the contrary, Western contemplation of safe areas and humanitarian corridors, loose Arab talk about armed the Syria Free Army, the occasional Al Qaeda suicide bombing and a Russian blank check for the regime to crack down are combining to plunge Syria into chaos. Someone may think that deprives Iran of an important ally, but it also spells lasting (as in decades-long) trouble in a part of the world where we can ill afford it.
The Americans have been mumbling about how arms will inevitably get to the Syrian opposition. This is true enough. But some visible support for Annan, and a behind the scenes diplomatic game with the Russians, would be more helpful to the cause of preventing Syria from becoming a chronic source of instability in Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan.
Iran
Netanyahu came but this time did not conquer. He needed President Obama to be forthcoming on an eventual military action against Iran as much as Obama needed him to refrain from aligning with Republican critics. It fell to Senator Mitch McConnell to crystallize the emerging U.S. position: if Iran enriches uranium to bomb grade (at or above 90%) or shows signs of having decided to build a nuclear weapon (design and ignition work), then the U.S. would respond with overwhelming force. This is the proposed “red line.”
We should not be fooled by McConnell’s belligerent tone. Even assuming very strict verification procedures, the line he proposes is a relatively expansive one that leaves Iran with enrichment technology and peaceful uses of atomic energy, which is what the Islamic Republic claims is its red line.
While the press was focused on belligerent statements, the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany) have apparently responded to Iran’s offer of renewed negotiations. Iran has also told the International Atomic Energy Agency that it can visit a previously off-limits nuclear site believed to be engaged in weapons research, but procedures have not yet been worked out.
Bottom line
I wouldn’t get excited about the prospects for negotiated solutions in either Syria or Iran. But if ever there was a time to negotiate, this is it. By fall, both situations will likely be too far gone, with serious consequences for the United States, the Middle East and the rest of the world.
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Annan Anon
Today’s news from Syria is bad, really bad for those of us who hope to see a more open and democratic regime there. The usual sources in Baba Amr, the Homs neighborhood that Bashar al Assad has been shelling for a month, have gone silent, apparently because elite Syrian army units are closing in from all sides. Electricity has been cut off. Violent resistance there will be, but sporadic and largely ineffectual. Expect widespread mistreatment of the civilian population, where the regime is trying to re-install the wall of fear that kept people in line for decades.
In the meanwhile, Kofi Annan, the newly appointed joint envoy of the UN and the Arab League, met in New York with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, in the aftermath of still another UN Security Council meeting that failed to reach agreement on his mandate. Annan was modest in his goals:
It is a very difficult assignment. It is a tough challenge and the first thing we need to do as the secretary general has said is to do everything we can stop the violence and the killing to facilit[tate] humanitarian access and to ensure the needy are looked after and work with the Syrians in coming up with a peaceful solution which respects their aspirations and eventually stablizes the country.
My Twitterfeed is disappointed in his failure to mention transition (away from the Assad regime), but Annan is doing what a good diplomat should: lowering expectations and trying to ensure himself at least a first meeting with Bashar. He needs to keep his public remarks in line with the minimalist goals that Russia and China support. UN envoys don’t last long if one of the Perm 5 members of the UNSC object to what they are saying and doing, or a key interlocutor refuses to meet with them.
Kofi Annan knows as well as any of us that stabilization of Syria is not going to be possible with Bashar al Assad still in power. He betrays it with that adverb: “eventually.” Getting Bashar to step aside from power will not be easy. It will require convincing him that he is safer out of power than in it. Several Arab presidents have already chosen that route (Tunisia’s Ben Ali, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak and Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh). Muammar Qaddafi preferred to fight, with well-known consequences. But Bashar will not like any of those precedents: exile in Saudi Arabia, a trial in his home country, exile in Ethiopia and murder victim are not attractive propositions. Maybe Tehran will be?
He will try to sell himself to Annan as a reformer: like the Bahraini and Moroccan monarchies or Algeria’s President Bouteflika, all of whom are engaged in modest reforms intended to co-opt protesters and maintain their regimes intact. Bashar will attribute his obvious excess use of force to the need to fight terrorism, a favorite excuse for violating human rights in this country as well as in Syria. There is just enough evidence of Al Qaeda in Iraq involvement in a few of the bombings in Syria to put some wind in that sail.
We should not expect Annan to get past Bashar’s defenses easily or quickly. As fallacious as the claims may be, he will have to listen and appear to appreciate them. Then, he needs to try to internationalize the situation as much as possible, by getting Arab League and UN monitors back into Syria to prevent renewed violence once a ceasefire is in place. He also needs to maintain his credibility with the Russians, so that he can talk with them about how their interests in port access and arms sales might be better served by a future, democratically-validated regime than by a declining Assad.
Annan will also need to reach out to the protesters in Syria and assure them that their pleas are heard and that their interests will be best served by returning to nonviolence, with international monitors in place to offer what protection they can, which is admittedly not much. In the meanwhile, the Free Syria Army and other militia groups will be arming, but hopefully not fighting. If the protesters resort to violence, Annan’s position will quickly become untenable as the regime returns to the battlefield.
Why is this not more like the situation in Libya or Kosovo, where the rebellions armed themselves and fought the regime tooth and nail? The answer is that the Syrians can be close to certain that no air force is coming to their rescue. The Americans and Europeans are showing no appetite for it. The Turks and Arabs seem almost as reluctant. If any of them were to change their minds and decide to throw their military weight behind the protesters, the situation would be different. But that is unlikely to happen.
Annan’s chances of success are low. But we should wish him the best in his efforts, which should begin as soon as possible. Delay or failure would mean continuation of a war the regime is bound to win.
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