Tag: Al Qaeda
FUBARistan
The military also uses the term “goat rope,” which might be more appropriate to Afghan conditions. Whichever. This war has endured beyond the point at which we can expect results commensurate with the enormous effort involved.
The weekend’s news is particularly discouraging. Afghans killed two Americans advising the Interior Ministry. Ambassador Crocker has sent a back channel cable calling for more troops and military effort to deal with safe havens in Pakistan. Violent, even deadly, protests of the burning of Korans by American troops continue.
But it is not just today. These incidents are symbolic. We haven’t got the kind of relationship with the government in Afghanistan required for a proper counter-insurgency effort. That would require a clean, authoritative regime ready to risk its own and fully committed to the fight. Karzai and his minions are lacking in all those respects. It would also require the Americans to know something about Afghan sensitivities. We are manifestly lacking in this important respect. The Afghans are tired of the foreign presence. Nor have we got the kind of backing in Pakistan that war requires of an ally and massive aid recipient.
It is not, as Ryan Crocker suggests, a question of fatigue. He is right to say we shouldn’t quit because we are tired of the effort, provided the effort can produce the results we want. I don’t see much chance of that any longer.
It is time to cut our losses. This is what the Administration is trying to do under the guise of negotiations with the Taliban, but on a timeline that would waste the better part of another three more years and who knows how many hundreds of American lives. Accelerating the turnover of primary security responsibilities to the Afghans will still leave many Americans exposed to the kind of murderous impulse or plan that led to the losses at the Ministry of Interior. Embedded advisers are the most exposed of all our personnel.
There are two main arguments against accelerating the withdrawal to the end of this year: the Afghans need the time to prepare, and the President needs to avoid an American retreat/defeat before the November election. Both arguments are so reminiscent of Vietnam that it is hard for someone like me who opposed that war to give them a fair hearing. I’ll leave that to others.
Still, we have to recognize that early withdrawal from Afghanistan could have highly negative consequences. These include renewal of the civil war, with the Uzbeks and Tajiks of the Northern Alliance clashing with Pushtun Taliban in the south, a fight that the Taliban won in the 1990s. Assuming the Northern Alliance attracts most of the Afghanistan National Army and gets U.S. and Indian support while Pakistan backs the Taliban, the outcome might be different this time. Stalemate and partition would be a distinct possibility.
There is also a real possibility that early withdrawal will put Pakistan’s stability at risk, as the Taliban move their safe havens into Afghanistan and Al Qaeda takes up the cudgels against Islamabad, whose nuclear weapons are both an attractive target and a good reason for the Americans to stay involved. If I really thought staying almost three more years would improve our odds in managing this problem, I suppose I might try to get us to stay longer. But the problem could arise no matter how long we stay in Afghanistan, which seems either unwilling or unable to protect itself from extremist dominance in parts of the south and east.
I don’t really think we’ll “abandon” Afghanistan, if only because the Republicans would make a lot of political hay out of an early withdrawal and whatever chaos ensues. But I’ve yet to meet an ordinary citizen who cares much about our troops or civilians in Afghanistan, including those politicians who see Islamic terror behind every tree. I do care, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that we are wasting their courage in an effort that is bound to fail.
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Fog of peace
With a gloomy National Intelligence Estimate on Afghanistan summarized in the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post reporting on resumption of peace talks with the Taliban, and the New York Times unveiling the tortured history of the negotiations so far, it is time to consider again the prospects for a negotiated outcome to the war.
For all the heavy breathing and interesting reporting about the negotiations, there is still a lot that is unclear.
The Americans keep on saying the Afghans have to lead the process, but there is little sign of that. The Americans and Europeans had to bludgeon Karzai into accepting the opening of a Taliban office in Qatar, which is no more than a modest but useful preliminary step in the negotiating process. Karzai seems more than a little concerned that his largely Northern Alliance-originated opposition, which fought the Taliban in the 1990s, is not prepared to accept a settlement that brings the Taliban back into Afghanistan’s political life. Will he run the political risks involved?
It is unclear whether that office will represent all the Taliban, or only Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura. How the Haqqani network, which does a good deal of the damage in Afghanistan, fits in no one seems to know. But the Taliban have already let it be known that the Youtube video apparently showing American Marines desecrating Taliban bodies will not make them shy away from talks.
The role of Pakistan is also uncertain. In the past, Islamabad has gone out of its way to prove that no negotiations can go ahead without its consent. U.S. drone strikes have resumed in Pakistan, but are the Pakistanis ready to support a U.S.-sponsored negotiating effort headquartered in Qatar? Islamabad is absorbed at the moment in its own internal power struggles between the civilian government and the army, which was displeased this week when the prime minister fired one of its favorite defense ministers. Maybe the Pakistanis are distracted? Or are they on board?
The agreement to open the office requires an American quid pro quo: release of several Taliban prisoners from Guantanamo. This is not easy for any American Administration to do, especially as the people the Taliban are asking for presumably really are deadly enemies of the United States. Is President Obama prepared to run the gauntlet of criticism he will get for this in the middle of a reelection campaign?
It is being hinted that the Taliban are prepared to forswear support to international terrorism as part of this deal. A verifiable pledge of that sort would be more than a confidence-building measure. It would represent a major diplomatic achievement: separating the Taliban from Al Qaeda. In principle, this is conceivable, since the Taliban’s ambitions are largely limited to Afghanistan (and Pakistan), whereas Al Qaeda is waging a global war for establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The opening of the office in Qatar is certainly not something Al Qaeda would support. But do we really have a verifiable commitment of this sort?
We also need to remember the difficult choices that lie ahead for the United States. If the Taliban are going to lay down arms, they are going to want something in return. There isn’t much to offer. There is a role in governing Afghanistan nationally, a role in governing provinces where the Taliban are strong, and control over economic resources (drugs, minerals, trade and transport). Or more likely, some combination of those things.
Oh yes: and American withdrawal. It is hard for me to picture the United States, which has sought from Karzai a long-term strategic agreement providing for a continuing American presence after 2014, agreeing to withdraw completely. But it is also difficult to picture the Taliban accepting a continuing U.S. presence, which is what they have always said they are fighting against. Compromise on this issue is theoretically possible: a U.S. military training presence but complete transfer of security responsibilities to the Afghans, for example. But I’m not sure our soldiers are going to be comfortable living and working with an Afghan army that has lots of Taliban reintegrated. Nor is it easy to picture the Taliban comfortable with the kind of presence such a training mission would require.
All that said, I applaud Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Special Representative Marc Grossman, Ambassador Ryan Crocker and their German partner Ambassador Michael Steiner for the enormous effort they have made over the past year to open up a negotiating channel. It would not, of course, have been possible without the extraordinary military efforts the U.S. troops have made. If the Taliban are ready to talk, it is because at least some of them are tiring of the fight.
But we are still far from peace, and the fog is thick.
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Who doomed Iraq?
Three of Iraq’s leading politicians write in the New York Times this morning:
Unless America acts rapidly to help create a successful unity government, Iraq is doomed.
Is it true? And if so, who doomed it?
I confess my strong sympathy with the plight of these Iraqiyya leaders: former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, current parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi and current Finance Minister Rafe al-Essawi garnered more seats in the March 2010 elections than any other coalition but for almost two years have been unable to convert that victory into meaningful power. Their complaints about Prime Minister Maliki, who dreads the prospect of a Ba’athist coup, are well founded: he does abuse the security services and manipulate the courts.
I nevertheless find myself gagging on their plea for American help. These are the same politicians who refused to speak up publicly for a continuing American troop presence in Iraq. Their colleagues–Vice President Tariq al Hashemi and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq–were among the strongest voices calling for American withdrawal. They are now hiding out in Kurdistan, having lost the protection that the American troop presence once provided.
Looking more closely at the New York Times piece, the plea sounds more like a threat. Nowhere is there any sign that Iraqiyya is prepared to go into opposition, ally with other political forces to bring down Maliki’s government in parliament, or take other political measures to solve the problem. They say they will come to an American-supported national conference aiming to resuscitate a power sharing government, but the preconditions for doing so are legion:
But first, Mr. Maliki’s office must stop issuing directives to military units, making unilateral military appointments and seeking to influence the judiciary; his national security adviser must give up complete control over the Iraqi intelligence and national security agencies, which are supposed to be independent institutions but have become a virtual extension of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa party; and his Dawa loyalists must give up control of the security units that oversee the Green Zone and intimidate political opponents.
In other words, Maliki has to disarm first, or else.
What is this “else”? Are our Iraqiyya friends threatening civil war, as the Times headline writer suggests? Or are they just suggesting that they will press for further regionalization, trying to free Iraq’s Sunni-majority provinces from Baghdad’s rule? I might wish it were the latter, but there is no sign at all in their piece that this is the case. And to be fair, Maliki has done everything he can to block regionalization efforts, in both Sunni and Shia majority areas. It was unsettling, and possibly instructive, that the warrant for Tariq al Hashemi’s arrest quickly generated an Al Qaeda in Iraq spate of bombings targeting mainly Shia in Baghdad. Are our Iraqiyya friends getting support from those committed to violence?
Vice President Biden, who once proposed that Iraq be broken up along sectarian and ethnic lines, is now scrambling to keep the country together. He has leverage over Maliki, who values American security assistance and intelligence cooperation as well as diplomatic help in reestablishing Iraq as a regional power. Using that leverage is not cost-free however. At the very least, he should insist on peaceful methods from all sides, including those who say:
For years, we have sought a strategic partnership with America to help us build the Iraq of our dreams: a nationalist, liberal, secular country, with democratic institutions and a democratic culture. But the American withdrawal may leave us with the Iraq of our nightmares: a country in which a partisan military protects a sectarian, self-serving regime rather than the people or the Constitution; the judiciary kowtows to those in power; and the nation’s wealth is captured by a corrupt elite rather than invested in the development of the nation.
Hard to dissent from the preferences expressed here, and America should be prepared to help. I have spent many hours in recent years talking with Iraqi parliamentarians about national reconciliation. They need to begin doing some. The issues are difficult but not insoluble.
If Iraq is doomed, it is Iraqis who are dooming it.
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The end is nigh, again!
I made a bunch of predictions a year ago. Here is how they turned out:
- Iran: the biggest headache of the year to come. If its nuclear program is not slowed or stopped, things are going to get tense. Both Israel and the U.S. have preferred sanctions, covert action and diplomatic pressure to military action. If no agreement is reached on enrichment, that might change by the end of 2011. No Green Revolution, the clerics hang on, using the Revolutionary Guards to defend the revolution (duh). I wasn’t far off on this one. No Green Revolution, no military action yet.
- Pakistan: it isn’t getting better and it could well get worse. The security forces don’t like the way the civilians aren’t handling things, and the civilians are in perpetual crisis. Look for increased internal tension, but no Army takeover, and some success in American efforts to get more action against AQ and the Taliban inside Pakistan. Judging from a report in the New York Times, we may not always be pleased with the methods the Pakistanis use. It got worse, as suggested. No I did not anticipate the killing of Osama bin Laden, or the increased tensions with the U.S., but otherwise I had at least some of it right: growing internal tension, no Army takeover, some American success.
- North Korea: no migraine, but pesky nonetheless, and South Korea is a lot less quiescent than it used to be. Pretty good odds on some sort of military action during the year, but the South and the Americans will try to avoid the nightmare of a devastating artillery barrage against Seoul. I did not predict the death of Kim Jong Il, but otherwise I got it right. There was military action during the year, but no artillery barrage against Seoul.
- Afghanistan: sure there will be military progress, enough to allow at least a minimal withdrawal from a handful of provinces by July. But it is hard to see how Karzai becomes much more legitimate or effective. There is a lot of heavy lifting to do before provincial government is improved, but by the end of the year we might see some serious progress in that direction, again in a handful of provinces. This is pretty much on the mark.
- Iraq: no one expects much good of this government, which is large, unwieldy and fragmented. But just for this reason, I expect Maliki to get away with continuing to govern more or less on his own, relying on different parts of his awkward coalition on different issues. The big unknown: can Baghdad settle, or finesse, the disputes over territory with Erbil (Kurdistan)? I did not anticipate the break between Maliki and Iraqiyya, but I pegged Maliki’s intentions correctly. The Arab/Kurdish disputes are still unsettled.
- Palestine/Israel (no meaning in the order–I try to alternate): Palestine gets more recognitions, Israel builds more settlements, the Americans offer a detailed settlement, both sides resist but agree to go to high level talks where the Americans try to impose. That fails and Israel continues in the direction of establishing a one-state solution with Arabs as second class citizens. My secular Zionist ancestors turn in their graves. Wrong so far as I know about the Americans offering a detailed settlement, even if Obama’s “land swaps” went a few inches in that direction. Right about failure and Israel’s unfortunate direction.
- Egypt: trouble. Succession plans founder as the legitimacy of the parliament is challenged in the streets and courts. Mubarak hangs on, but the uncertainties grow. Pretty good for late December, though I was happily wrong about Mubarak hanging on.
- Haiti: Not clear whether the presidential runoff will be held January 16, but things are going to improve, at least until next summer’s hurricanes. Just for that reason there will be more instability as Haitians begin to tussle over the improvements. Presidential election was held and things have improved. Haiti has been calmer than anticipated. Good news.
- Al Qaeda: the franchise model is working well, so no need to recentralize. They will keep on trying for a score in the U.S. and will likely succeed at some, I hope non-spectacular, level. Happy to be wrong here too: they did not succeed, but they did try several times. And they did not recentralize.
- Yemen/Somalia: Yemen is on the brink and will likely go over it, if not in 2011 soon thereafter. Somalia will start back from hell, with increasing stability in some regions and continuing conflict in others. Yemen has pretty much gone over the brink, and parts of Somalia are on their way back. Pretty much on the mark.
- Sudan: the independence referendum passes. Khartoum and Juba reach enough of an agreement on outstanding issues to allow implementation in July, but border problems (including Abyei) and South/South violence grow into a real threat. Darfur deteriorates as the rebels emulate the South and Khartoum takes its frustrations out on the poor souls. Close to the mark, though Darfur has not deteriorated as much as I anticipated, yet.
- Lebanon: the Special Tribunal finally delivers its indictments. Everyone yawns and stretches, having agreed to ignore them. Four indictments were delivered against Hizbollah officials. I was also right about yawning and stretching.
- Syria: Damascus finally realizes that it is time to reach an agreement with Israel. The Israelis decide to go ahead with it, thus relieving pressure to stop settlements and deal seriously with the Palestinians. Dead wrong on both counts.
- Ivory Coast: the French finally find the first class tickets for Gbagbo and his entourage, who go to some place that does not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (no, not the U.S.!). The French and UN settled it by force of arms instead of the first-class ticket. Not cheaper, but less long-term trouble.
- Zimbabwe: Mugabe is pressing for quick adoption of his new constitution and elections in 2011, catching the opposition off balance. If he succeeds, the place continues to go to hell in a handbasket. If he fails, it will still be some time before it heads in the other direction. He failed and the predicted delay ensued.
- Balkans: Bosnians still stuck on constitutional reform, but Kosovo gets a visa waiver from the EU despite ongoing investigations of organ trafficking. Right on Bosnia, wrong on Kosovo.
I’m content with the year’s predictions, even if I got some things wrong. Of course I also missed a lot of interesting developments (revolutions in Tunisia, Libya and Syria, for example). But you wouldn’t have believed me if I had predicted those things, would you? Tomorrow I’ll discuss 2012.
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Saleh in the U.S. is not the worst of it
My gut tells me I’m with Andrew Exum, who objects forcefully to allowing Yemen’s former President Saleh into the U.S., supposedly for medical treatment. A serial human rights abuser and murderer of unarmed protesters, he merits neither our sympathy nor our safe haven. It is hard for me to imagine that an angry someone won’t find a way to drag him into a U.S. court.* But does the brain confirm the gut feeling?
I can imagine what John Brennan, the White House counter-terrorism “czar” and chief administration spokesman on Yemen, is arguing. Getting Saleh out of Yemen will remove an obstacle to the transition process there. It will also enable the U.S. to continue support for security forces that fight Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the local Al Qaeda franchise. This is Brennan’s first concern.
Unfortunately those forces are under the control of Saleh’s relatives. So continuing our support for them also helps Saleh to keep his regime in place, if not for his own return then for the ascendancy of one of his sons to power. What we are seeing is the emergence into the open of something that has clearly been true all along: the Americans don’t want too much change in Yemen, as it threatens their top priority, which is the fight against Al Qaeda. The American Ambassador’s recent denunciation of the protesters is part of this picture.
This is a big mistake, a bigger one than allowing Saleh into the U.S. The conditions that enable Al Qaeda to thrive in Yemen are not going away so long as Saleh and his family maintain their autocratic rule. It may be tactically convenient to get Saleh to the U.S., but it is strategically stupid for the United States to remain in his pocket, snookered into supporting his sons as the only bulwark against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The problems that make Yemen home to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula go far beyond terrorism: sectarian and secessionist rebellions are raging north and south, water and oil are running out, qat is king, poverty is endemic and abuse of the population is reaching epic proportions.
Any serious counter-terrorism effort in Yemen should include this bigger picture, as John Brennan knows. But I fear it does not. If Saleh comes to the U.S. it will be a symptom of a much bigger problem with U.S. policy in Yemen.
*This option is outlined by William F. Schulz at Huffpost.
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OK Santa Claus, here’s what I want
I’m hoping it’s true Yemen’s President Saleh is coming to the U.S. As that eagle-eyed young journalist Adam Serwer tweeted: “not to prosecute him…would be, u know, awkward.” That set me thinking about other good fortune that might come our way this Christmas eve:
1. Syria’s president Bashar al Assad decides he really wants to practice opthamology in London.
2. North Korea’s “supreme commander” Kim Jong Un wants to see professional American basketball so much he decides to give up the nuclear nonsense and buy an NBA team for Pyongyang instead. Lots more prestige and very lucrative.
3. Iran follows suit, abandoning its pan-Islamist pretensions, separating mosque and state and restoring close relations with Israel. It also buys an NBA team for Tehran.
4. Iraq’s Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki declares peace on earth and good will towards Sunnis and Kurds, steps down from power and invites Iraqiyya to name a replacement.
5. The new Islamist-run governments in Tunisia, Egypt (and yes, eventually) Libya follow the Iranian example, which convinces them separation of mosque and state are the best protection for religious freedom and will encourage religious devotion, as it seems to do in the U.S.
6. The Saudis rise to the occasion and do likewise, making the king a constitutional monarch to boot.
7. Bahrain does the same. Yemen gets not only a democratic government but lots of water.
8. Without implacable enemies, Prime Minister Netanyahu reaches a quick agreement with the Palestinians, whose state is admitted to the UN with no opposition.
9. The Taliban see that their Islamist counterparts in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya are on to a good thing and reach a power sharing agreement with the Northern Alliance, jettisoning President Karzai and precipitating an early American withdrawal.
10. Pakistan follows up American withdrawal and the new government in Kabul by reaching a broad-ranging agreement with India, including self-determination for Kashmir.
11. Al Qaeda opens a resort on the Somali coast called “The Caliphate.”
12. I retire to observe the peaceful competition between China and the United States, who compete in ping pong but do everything else collaboratively.
If Santa Claus really does exist, children, he’ll bring me those things for the 12 days of Christmas. If he doesn’t, then…
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