Tag: Algeria
The pandemic weakened the weakest governments and social groups
The Middle East Institute June 15 hosted a seminar discussing the impact of COVID-19 on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This was in collaboration with the recently released 6th wave of the Arab Barometer, an expansive regional survey. Using the results from this survey and analysis from the Brookings Doha Center, the panel assessed the pandemic’s effects on the region and the perceived efficiency of government responses. As the survey was held in three rounds throughout 2020-2021, the Arab Barometer could also register changes over time. Bottom line: the pandemic exacerbated the region’s existing problems and the hardest hit were the most vulnerable communities (refugees, the poor, and women).
The speakers were:
Yasmina Abuzzuhour
Visiting fellow
Brookings-Doha Center
Salma Al-Shami
Senior research specialist
Arab Barometer
Shala Al-Kli
Non-resident scholar
MEI
Deputy regional director
Mercy Corps
Karen Young (moderator)
Senior fellow and director, Program on Economics and Energy
MEI
Exacerbating existing problems
Shahla Kli COVID has worsened existing issues, particularly for IDPs and refugees. She highlighted two of these structural weaknesses in particular:
- Lack of institutionalization: This is manifested in weak healthcare systems and social welfare programs. COVIC pushed these to their limits. Furthermore, some countries (such as Syria or Lebanon) lack well-structured recovery and vaccination plans, exacerbating and lengthening the crisis.
- Unemployment/the ‘youth bulge’: Problems in the labor market abound in the MENA region. Many of its youthful populations work in informal, day-to-day jobs. This is particularly true for migrants and refugees. Often these jobs disappeared during lockdowns. Conversely, many poor citizens and migrants had no choice but to continue working despite the pandemic, potentially falling ill themselves.
Public opinion
Salma al-Shami outlined the relevant results of the Arab Barometer on this topic. The Barometer gathered data on seven countries (Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) due to financial and access constraints. She summarized the findings in five main points:
- Concern for COVID is still high in these countries, but it is significantly higher among women than among men.
- The loss of education for children and increased cost of living were the the number one and two concerns. In Jordan some 140 days of education were lost according to UNESCO, and even more in Iraq.
- Public opinion on government response to COVID varies with the assessment of the healthcare system and inflation control. If these are positively rated, the government’s response also tends to be. This is the case in Morocco and Tunisia for example, while Lebanon and Iraq lack such public confidence. Morocco was also the only country where significant relief packages were deployed. Some 49% of respondents in that country indicated they received some form of aid, where that number didn’t top 20% in any of the other countries.
- Concerning vaccines, there is still some hesitancy. Where trust in government is high, so is the willingness to take a vaccine, as in Morocco which has already seen an exemplary vaccine rollout compared to its neighbors. However, in Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Tunisia, only 35-42% indicate they are willing to take a vaccine. Abouzzouhour added that in Jordan conspiracy theories surrounding the vaccines are rampant, and that the government is often not the public’s primary source of information.
- The survey data also indicates that COVID has exacerbated issues of income inequality and unemployment. Few respondents indicated they lost their jobs because of COVID-related lockdowns, although many did experience a temporary job interruption. Women and migrant labor in general suffered greater consequences.
Government responses
Adding to the statistics related to government response to COVID, Abouzzouhour commented that governments overpromised and underdelivered. The first wave saw major lockdowns and task forces with health experts, leading to a comparatively strong performance. However, the initial best cases (Tunisia and Jordan) failed to follow through on their success because they favored opening up for their economies. Additionally, relief packages and strong vaccination drives often faltered, despite government promises. In general, countries that previously underinvested in healthcare (as a percentage of their GDP) suffered high mortality rates.
Two interesting cases emerged from her story. Once again, Morocco was underlined as a strong performer in vaccination compared to its neighbors. Algeria is less clear-cut. It has some of the lowest infection rates in the region. However, its mortality rate is comparatively high, indicating that case numbers are likely underreported more than in other countries. Algeria was also criticized for failing to set up significant relief packages, despite the nation’s hydrocarbon resources.
Watch the recording of the event here:
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Beyond success and failure lies attractive possibility
Michael Picard, a first-year Conflict Management student at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, writes:
The Wilson Center February 24 hosted a panel discussion on “Revisiting the Arab Uprisings at 10: Beyond Success and Failure.” that weighed the societal impacts of the Arab uprisings 10 years after they broke out. The term “Arab Spring” is a misnomer as the revolts did not result in democratic reform – the term Arab uprisings was used instead.
The key question was whether the Arab uprisings werea failure that is now over or are they the beginning of a longer process of societal transformation?
Panelists
Liz Sly (moderator): Beirut Bureau Chief, Washington Post
Amy Austin Holmes: International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Asher Orkaby: Fellow, Transregional Institute, Princeton University
Anas El Gomati: Founder and Director, Sadeq Institute
Focusing specifically on the experiences of Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya, the panelists presented and weighed the legacy of each country’s uprising 10 years on. Despite initial popular hope, there was never a serious expectation among observers that these states would transition to democracy overnight. What we have witnessed so far is the beginning of a long-term transformation of the MENA region. The memories of pre-uprising realities are still pertinent, and the youthful composition of Arab societies highlights the need for political and economic reforms.
Several panelists noted the US must examine how its policies and signals have impeded demoratic transitions. Regarding the 2013 coup that deposed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected leader, the African Union immediately expelled Egypt in response to this setback. The US did not react until the Rabaa massacre, which killed hundreds of pro-Morsi demonstrators. This reflects a broader theme: that the US must consider its democracy promotion goals and what its precise role ought to be in realizing these goals.
The panel also discussed the role of the Gulf monarchies in the Arab uprisings, noting that they saw such movements – both those originating domestically and in nearby states – as existential threats. Ottaway offered an anecdote about a Saudi official who anticipated expatriate students would demand greater civil liberties. This compelled the Gulf states to act – near unanimously – to crush domestic uprisings and take an active international role in promoting counterrevolutions. This has caused immense destruction throughout the region, derailing local conflict management efforts and restraining Gulf proxies from negotiating settlements.
Ottaway observed that perhaps the most pessimistic lesson of the Arab uprisings was that removal of large, unitary, Arab regimes that dominated political life has revealed that the building blocks of democracy were absent, with the narrow exception of Tunisia. Tunisia was able to avoid fates similar to Libya and Yemen because it is a) socially homogenous with relatively few ethnic and sectarian minorities, and b) politically pluralistic. Historically salient political organizations already existed and held society together, albeit in uneasy, unstable balances.
The panelists spoke to new dynamics and outcomes that continue to emerge. Several elaborated on “second generation” protest movements in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan. In these contexts, protestors demonstrated greater understanding of how their movements could be more inclusive, better organized, and better at extracting meaningful government concessions. This has helped them avoid the high-stakes losses of the “first generation” protest movements.
The panelists noted unanimously that the Arab uprisings have had positive implications for women and some minorities. In several countries, women initiated the initial protest movements, focused on detention of their kin. In war-torn states, women have taken on a more active role in daily economic and social life. The panelists hope that these gains will be locked in with female participation quotas in emergent governance institutions. In Egypt, the Nubian minority gained recognition in the constitution and procured the right to return to ancestral lands from which they were forcibly displaced.
Conclusion
The panel agreed that the Arab uprisings were not failures that are now over but the beginning of a longer transitional process and state-building experiment. Orkaby noted these uprisings sparked the creation of local civil society organizations or strengthened existing ones. El Gomati noted the renewal of social protests in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan, indicating civilians are still willing to take to the streets. Austin Holmes emphasized that much will depend on how the Biden administration postures itself toward the region, especially with regard to countries that have retained despotic features.
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Ten years of Arab protests but little change
Almost ten years have passed since the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi sparked mass protests in Tunisia, sparking regime change and brutal civil wars across the Arab world. While most consider the initial uprisings in 2011 an abject failure for the cause of democracy in the region, the resurgence of mass protests over the last two years in Lebanon, Iraq, Algeria and elsewhere demonstrate that the Arab Spring continues to smolder. The Wilson Center convened a panel of scholars to address the future for a region destabilized by ten years of civil unrest.
Rami Khouri: Former Public Policy Scholar; Director of Global Engagement, American University of Beirut, columnist, Agence Global Syndicate, USA, and The New Arab, London and Nonresident Senior Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School
Marina Ottaway: Middle East Fellow, Former Senior Research Associate and Head of the Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Ziad Abu-Rish: Co-Director, MA Program in Human Rights and the Arts, Bard College; Co-Editor, Jadaliyya
Merissa Khurma, moderator: Program Manager, Middle East Program
The genie is out of the bottle
Rami Khouri, Marina Ottaway and Ziad Abu-Rish all concurred that mass protests were a “new normal” for the Middle East that should be expected throughout the region into the future.
Khouri points to several factors that prompt citizens across the region to protest their governments. The economic situation has become dire for many citizens of Arab states. The middle class has all but disappeared and most governments are no longer able to provide basic necessities for their citizens. Citizens are overwhelmingly turning to civil society for support. COVID-19 has increased inequality regionwide. MENA is the only region that is overwhelmingly authoritarian and adept at suppressing discontent. The resulting clash between the desperation of the citizenry and repression will lead to more mass protests until one side finally gives way.
The speakers concur that the same economic factors that stir discontent can also deprive protests of their strength. Abu-Rish notes that fatigue from economic deprivation has caused a lull in the Lebanese protests after the explosion. Arab governments understand this, and thus are playing a war of attrition against protestors.
Solidarity has grown through shared strife
Rami has noticed another new phenomenon created by a decade of protests – a cross-cutting sense of national identity. Ottoway echoed this sentiment, explaining that as protestors from different walks of life interact with each other, they realize that they are protesting for the same set of basic human needs and are able to overcome their ideological differences. But she cautions that not all Arabs share the same principles of citizenry; some are happy to live under authoritarian leaders if doing so grants them security and privilege.
But opposition needs leadership
Ottaway and Abu-Rish were less optimistic about the prospects of democratization and liberalization in the Middle East than Khouri. The protestors, while they are united in the belief that the status quo must be changed, have competing visions about what should replace it. Ottaway also notes that, historically, change almost always occurs from the top down. The decentralized nature of the protests means that protestors will find it difficult to persuade policymakers that change is needed. She points to Tunisia, Sudan, and the American civil rights movement to argue that change only occurrs because there are leaderships within the opposition that persuaded the ruling elites to make changes.
To watch the event in full, click here.
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Peace Picks | June 22-28
Notice: Due to recent public health concerns, upcoming events are only available via live-streaming.
- Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves | June 22, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
Algerian officials in the northeastern border area between Algeria and Tunisia continue to permit the cross-border smuggling of petrol and other commodities. In turn, smugglers have participated in the authorities’ efforts to neutralize security threats, even as they continue to engage in the illicit trade. The two ostensibly adversarial parties effectively complement each other. In her new paper, Algeria’s Borderlands: A Country Unto Themselves, Algerian political scientist Dalia Ghanem examines such paradoxes and argues that state formation remains an evolving process in the country.
Speakers:
Dalia Ghanem: resident scholar at the Carnegie Middle East Center.
Max Gallien: political scientist at the Institute of Development Studies.
Isabelle Werenfels: senior fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).
- Assessing the Implications of the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act | June 22, 2020 | 11:00 AM – 12:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On June 17, the long-awaited Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act came into force, imposing the most comprehensive set of sanctions against Syria’s Assad regime to date. Aimed principally at preventing further war crimes by preventing any foreign investment into the Syrian regime, the sanctions will almost certainly have a consequential impact on Syria’s politics and economy. As the act comes into force, Syria is already beset by a spiraling economic crisis, the effects of which have generated unusually defiant and persistent anti-regime protests in the Druze-majority governorate of Suwayda and rising levels of discontent within regime-held territories. Southern Syria faces an expanding insurgency, ISIS is slowly resurging in the central desert, Turkey is doubling down on a permanent presence in the northwest and for now, U.S. troops appear to be staying.
How will the Caesar Act’s sanctions be enforced and with what goals in mind? What effect are they likely to have within today’s context? Does a policy of escalating pressure on the Assad regime promise diplomatic progress or humanitarian suffering?
Speakers:
Amb. James F. Jeffrey: Special Representative for Syria and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS
Rime Allaf: Syrian writer and commentator; board member, The Day After Project
Qutaiba Idlbi: Non-resident scholar, MEI; Syria fellow, International Center for Transitional Justice
Charles Lister (Moderator): Director, Syria and Countering Terrorism and Extremism Programs, MEI
- U.S. Grand Strategy in the Middle East | June 22, 2020 | 2:00 PM – 3:00 PM | Center for Strategic and International Studies | Register Here
While prominent voices in Washington have argued that U.S. interests in the Middle East are dwindling and will require the United States to “do less” there, Jake Sullivan argued in a recent Foreign Affairs article that the United States should be more ambitious using U.S. leverage and diplomacy to promote regional stability.
Speakers:
Jake Sullivan: Nonresident Senior Fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Jon B. Alterman: Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program
- Iranian Kurds: Challenges, Existence, and Goals | June 23, 2020 | 11:00 AM | Washington Kurdish Institute | Register Here
With 12 million people, the Iranian Kurds make up the second largest population of the Kurds in the greater Kurdistan. Similar to Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, the Iranian Kurds have been struggling for decades for freedom under the current Iranian regime. The Kurdistan region of Iran (Rojhelat) has the highest rate of political prisoners in the country. The regime’s discriminatory economic policies in Rojhelat have resulted in poverty and poor living conditions for the Kurds, which led many to become border porters known as Kolbars. Hundreds of Kolabrs are victims of the Iranian border guard attacks and executions every year. The dire political, economic, and security situation of Rojhelat continues under the current regime that has been suppressing its citizens on an ethnic and sectarian basis.
As the first founders of the Kurdish nationalism and political parties in greater Kurdistan, the panel will discuss the current situation of the Iranian Kurds and their goals. The panel will also discuss the Iranian Kurdish relations and cooperation with other opposition groups in Iran and potential future understandings.
Speakers:
David L. Phillips: Director of the Program on Peace-building and Rights at Columbia University’s Institute for the Study of Human Rights
Arash Salih: Representative of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan to the United States.
Salah Bayaziddi: Representative of the Komala Party to the United States.
Kamran Balnour: Representative of the Kurdistan Democratic Party to the United States
- The World Economy After COVID-19: A Conversation with President Romano Prodi | June 23, 2020 | 12:30 PM – 2:00 PM | Johns Hopkins SAIS | Register Here
Join Johns Hopkins SAIS for a conversation with Romano Prodi, Former President of the European Commission (1999-2004); Former Prime Minister of Italy (1996-1998; 2006-2008). The event is moderated by Justin O. Frosini, Adjunct Professor of Constitutional Law, SAIS Europe; Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies and Democratic Development and Associate Professor, Bocconi University.
- The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division | June 24, 2020 | 7:00 AM – 8:00 AM | Carnegie Middle East Center | Watch Event Here
The 2011 uprising in Syria totally transformed the religious establishment in Damascus. The regime sent into exile many prominent, influential religious figures who, forced to work from abroad, formed a religious opposition group called the Syrian Islamic Council. The regime also restructured what remained of the capital’s competing religious institutions. This robbed the religious establishment in Damascus of the financial and administrative independence that had been its key privileges. But it also presented new Sunni clerics from the capital’s hinterland with opportunities to enter the competitive religious arena — as well as posing a major challenge to the SIC, obliged to operate in exile. In her latest paper, The Sunni Religious Establishment of Damascus: When Unification Creates Division, Laila Rifai mentions how the religious sphere in Rural Damascus Governorate is poised to become a political battleground as both the regime and the exiled opposition seek to court a new rising group of religious leaders.
Speakers:
Laila Rifai: writer and researcher, specializing in Syrian religious affairs.
Thomas Pierret: senior researcher at CNRS-IREMAM, Aix-en-Provence.
Muhammed Mounir Al Fakir: fellow at the Omran Centre for Strategic Studies.
- Turkish-Israeli Relations: Prospects for Improved Diplomacy | June 25, 2020 | 12:00 PM – 1:00 PM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
Over the past decade Israel-Turkey relations have been strained. There have been recent positive signs, however. Israel’s decision not to sign a statement by France, Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and Egypt condemning Turkey’s actions in the eastern Mediterranean and a tweet posted by Israel’s official Twitter account praising its diplomatic relations with Turkey raised hopes. Turkish analysts saw the moves as a sign of both countries’ willingness to cooperate when it comes to eastern Mediterranean energy but tensions remain.
How does Israel and Turkey’s involvement in Syria and increasing opportunities for economic cooperation affect the prospect of improved bilateral relations? How will Israel’s plans for annexation and Turkey’s public support for the Palestinians affect diplomatic relations? Are there enough incentives to normalize Israel-Turkey relations or will the barriers be insurmountable?
Speakers:
Nimrod Goren: Founder and head of Mitvim, The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Karel Valansi: Political columnist, Shalom Newspaper
Gönül Tol: (Moderator): Director of Turkey Program and Senior Fellow, Frontier Europe Initiative, MEI
- The Broader Implications U.S. Disentanglement from Afghanistan| June 26, 2020 | 10:00 AM – 11:15 AM | Middle East Institute | Register Here
On 29 February, the United States signed an agreement with the Taliban designed to allow for an orderly withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Afghanistan by next spring if not sooner. Coming after many months of difficult negotiations, the decision carried a promise from the Taliban to deny to any terrorist group or individual the use of Afghan soil to undertake an attack on the United States or its allies. The accord also carried a Taliban commitment to participate in an intra-Afghan dialogue quickly aimed at a peaceful resolution of the civil conflict. American policy for Afghanistan must be seen as well on a broader canvas of continuing U.S. diplomatic, political and military disengagement regionally. As in Afghanistan, withdrawal leaves unanswered many questions about how American national security interests may be affected, particularly at a time of increased great power competition.
What might be the impact of a full U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan on the course of the civil war and prospects for peace talks? What would the United States do if after departure the Taliban broke the terms of their agreement or threatened the survival of the Afghan state? How would the end of an American military presence affect relations with Pakistan? And is the United States prepared to accede to strongly increased Iranian, Russian, or Chinese influence in Afghanistan and the region?
Javid Ahmad: Nonresident fellow, Atlantic Council
Ronald E. Neumann: President, The American Academy of Diplomacy
J. Alexander Thier: Senior advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Elizabeth Threlkeld: Senior fellow and deputy director, South Asia Program, Stimson Center
Marvin Weinbaum (Moderator): Director, Afghanistan and Pakistan Studies, MEI
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The waiting game should end
Since February 2019, millions of Algerians throughout the country have assembled en masse to demonstrate frustration and dissatisfaction with the political system of former president Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, who had announced his candidacy for a fifth mandate. The combination of rampant corruption within the ranks of the senior officials alongside Bouteflika’s physical and mental impairment led Algerians to say enough. As the popular movement (Hirak) expanded and demonstrations grew larger and more consistent with each passing Friday, Bouteflika’s long-standing reign over Algeria came to an end in April with news of his resignation. Hirak now is in its 22nd week, maintaining its peaceful nature despite arrests and imprisonment of protesters and opposition figures.
Realizing the importance of Algeria, the Brookings Institution hosted an event on “Algeria’s Uprising: Protesters and the Military” on July 17. While the event was introduced by Vice President and Director Bruce Jones, the panel was composed of Africa Policy Analyst Alexis Arieff, Visiting Fellow Sharan Grewal, former Ambassador to Algeria Robert Ford. Brookings Senior Fellow Tamara Cofman Wittes moderated.
The event revolved around the findings of a survey Grewal conducted of over 9,000 Algerians via Facebook advertisements that targeted Algerians above the age of 18 and living in Algeria. In order to perform a comparative study between civilians and military personnel, the program used targeted individuals who showed an interest in or stated that they are part of the military in any way.
Of the 9,000 Algerians surveyed, over 7,000 were civilian, while just under 2,000 were military. Grewal presented the data through a series of graphs that covered topics such as support for protest goals, the scheduled July 4th Presidential elections, and potential civil-military frictions. Results showed a divide between junior and senior officers in the military, as soldiers and junior officers tended to side with the protest movement and the civilian population at large.
Following the presentation of the findings, Grewal was joined by Arieff, Cofman-Wittes, and Ford to discuss the numbers as well as the political climate in Algeria. What makes the Algerian movement so unique is that it has remained peaceful 5 months on—a feat that contrasts with the country’s brutal “Black Decade” civil war in the 1990s.
Arieff, comparing the two events, remarked that Algerians learned from the experiences of Syria and Libya as well as their own: they are reluctant to undergo a repetition of the civil war that traumatized a generation. Additionally, Arieff noted that the senior leadership in the military has observed that repression can backfire, as in Tunisia.
Although the Hirak has endured, it is not clear what will happen next. According to Grewal, the regime is unable to build a roadmap without the people’s consent since doing so will be rejected during the Friday protests. The next step should be a dialogue between the people and the current leadership; however, as Grewal pointed out, without the removal of the 2Bs (Bensalah and Bedoui)—both represent the old regime—such negotiations and talks will most likely not come about.
Ford noted that the next step should the emergence of a candidate or political group that represents Hirak; however, many have been reluctant to do so for fear of being discredited or targeted. Military pressure has not
As Ford remarked, “if you are in the game you can achieve gradual, but real change.” While the tens of millions of Algerians participating in the democratic protests for over 20 weeks is an achievement, setting the gears in motion for a governmental transition should be the next step.
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Hard transition
The Project on Middle East Democracy held a panel discussion April 15 about Algeria’s protests and what will happen next. The panel included Rochdi Alloui, Independent Analyst on North Africa at Georgia State University, Alexis Arieff, Specialist in African Affairs at Congressional Research Service, Amel Boubekeur, Research Fellow at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and William Lawrence, Visiting Professor at George Washington University.
Boubekeur stated that people are protesting on the street asking for a functional state to provide water, electricity, and decent jobs. Since 1962, the regime built its legitimacy on the revolution by painting itself as the ones who got rid of France, built the military, and thus deserve to be leading the country. This narrative echoed for a while. By installing the recently ousted president in 1999, the army had wanted to end the civil war with armed Islamic groups, show the people that a new civil president would lead the country, and extract itself from politics. But throughout Bouteflika era, the president’s circle, the secret services and the army have governed. Ousting Bouteflika peacefully has shown the people that the country can do without him and even build a stronger state. Contrary to the regime’s narrative, he was not the only source of stability and peace.
Alloui pointed out the protests did not happen out of the blue, and the causes are complex. The political structure around Bouteflika seeking a fifth term was drove people to take to the street, in addition to grievances accumulated over decades. The people united around an important theme: kicking Bouteflika out. Once this goal was accomplished, it gave the protest movement a further boost and raised the bar to ridding Algeria of its traditionally bad politics. The protest movement wants to restructure the Algerian state to reproduce a new system and embark upon the second republic. Many pitfalls may lie ahead that can still divide the protest movement.
Lawrence gave an overview of the first Algerian democratic opening started in the late eighties, which Algerians have begun calling the first Arab spring. The Algerian regime since then has acted opaquely, operating on the basis of consensus reached in secret meetings to select the president. But recently many cracks have appeared: the veterans’ association, army officers, the National Liberation Front all turned against the president. High official figures like Algeria’s richest businessman, Ali Haddad, was caught at the Tunisian border trying to escape. The current protest movement is unlikely to be able to replace the regime. It may look like a “soft” revolution like those in 2001, but the Algerian military is likely to come out on top.
Arieff argues Algeria is probably the least market-driven economy in the world. That does not, however, mean young people want to move to a market economy and get rid of the social safety net. Living standards in Algeria have increased quite a bit over the last two decades. People have more access to social services than before, mainly in the restive southern part of the country. Most undemocratic leaders attribute the problems their states are going through to economic grievances rather than political ones. But the Algerian protest movement has grown mature enough to know that the two are intertwined: oligarchic rule and corruption have an impact on an individual opportunity for those without connections.
Bottom line: Pushing the president to resign and asking high political figures involved in corruption to do the same thing might be a good start towards a more democratic country but will certainly have implications on the functioning of the state. It is hard to replace a system that has been running the country for decades with a new one without facing structural challenges. Finding a person who is trusted and with integrity to serve as president will be difficult. It also remains to be seen how successful and democratic the transition will be in Algeria with the military still having a big say in politics.
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