Tag: Arab League
Difficult is better than the alternatives
All three of these fine commentators agree: stabilization requires a recognized Palestinian state and international forces in Gaza. The international forces are needed at a minimum to monitor the ceasefire, protect civilians, preside over unification of the West Bank and Gaza, and organize Palestinian elections or some other means of validating legitimate authority. Gershon Baskin wants an Arab-led force for only two years. Sultan Barakat wants the international presence for two or three years to be non-Arab and mentions South Africa, Belgium, and Finland. Any deployment of that sort is likely to last far longer.
But all three are vague about how this international presence would be constituted and organized. We have learned a good deal from the past almost 35 years of such interventions. How should we apply this experience in Gaza?
The international intervention
First things first: the mandate. A strong, detailed, and comprehensive mandate is vital. For Gaza, that likely means a UN Security Council mandate voted unanimously. That will be difficult. The US has consistently prevented any resolution that the Israelis object to. A resolution that assigns them responsibility for the destruction of Gaza, no matter how objective or restrained, will attract a US veto. Any resolution that doesn’t condemn what the Israelis have done and provide for their complete withdrawal will arouse Russian, Chinese, and other objections.
What we know beyond that is not scientifically validated but derived from the 20 or so international interventions over more than three decades, starting in 1990. Jim Dobbins summarized his conclusions about a hypothetical country of 5 million in this table:
Illustrative Costs of Nation-Building
| Sector | Personnel | Cost(millions of US$) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Local | Int’l | ||
| Light peacekeeping | |||
| Military | 8,000 | 360 | |
| 15,000 | 50 | ||
| Police | 1,000 | 170 | |
| 11,000 | 18 | ||
| Rule of law | 18 | ||
| Humanitarian | 170 | ||
| Governance | 260 | ||
| Economic stabilization | 30 | ||
| Democratization | 50 | ||
| Development and infrastructure | 390 | ||
| Total, light peacekeeping | 26,000 | 9,000 | 1,520 |
| Heavy peace enforcement (additional requirements) | |||
| Military | 57,000 | 12,640 | |
| Police | 7,000 | 1,080 | |
| Development and infrastructure | 360 | ||
| Total, heavy peace enforcement | 26,000 | 73,000 | 15,600 |
NOTE: Estimated annual costs in a hypothetical country of 5 million people with a per capita gross domestic product of $500. Total costs do not sum due to rounding.
Gaza will require “heavy” rather than “light” peace enforcement, not least because remnants of Hamas and other violent groups will necessarily try to harass the intervention. Before the war Gaza had a significantly higher GDP per capita than this illustrative example, which complicates and increases the burden of peacekeeping.
Assuming about 2.2 million people in Gaza, Dobbins’ guesstimates would mean about 30,000 troops and 4,000 police. The troops could be from non-Arabic speaking countries. The force would then be more than twice the size of the largest UN peacekeeping operation in 2023 and perhaps the largest UN peacekeeping ever. Raising and deploying such a large force will be a monumental task. An effective police force will need to be capable in Arabic, which means literate as well as Arabic-speaking. For comparison, there are about 10,000 Palestinian Authority police in the West Bank, which has a population of 3 million, or 50% more than in Gaza. So 8000 is not excessive.
Trying to handle Gaza with fewer forces and a lesser mandate would be incredibly perilous. A return to extremist rule or chaos would be the likely outcomes.
Political conditions
Arab countries will only contribute to an international intervention with troops or money if the settlement guarantees at the least an eventual recognized Palestinian state, includingg by Israel and the US. It is going to be difficult for both even to promise that as a future step. Right now, President Biden cannot do it because it would undermine his political position in the US, even if it might help him among Democrats. Obviously Prime Minister Netanyahu won’t do it either. Recognition can only happen after his removal from power.
Even then, it would require a revolution in Israeli attitudes. A opposition-led government in Israel would certainly impose conditions. Those would include Hamas and other extremists out, nonviolence pledged, demilitarization accomplished. The Palestinians and most Arab countries will also condititon their cooperation. They will want Israeli troops out of Gaza and the West Bank, settlements withdrawn from much if not all of the West Bank, East Jerusalem clearly inside the Palestinian state.
All these are reasonable conditions lots of us would endorse. But getting Palestinians and Israelis to agree to them will, again, be a monumental task.
Humanitarian and economic requirements
The financing requirement Jim Dobbins cites is less daunting. In today’s world, $7-8 billion per year is doable. It might be more like $10 billion per year given the extensive destruction in Gaza. But getting humanitarian aid to the right people and money spent responsibly will still be challenging. Israel will want to inspect everything shipped into Gaza and monitor its use. Ditto with the funds. Israel will not again risk resources being used to dig tunnels and build rockets rather than feed the needy. Arab Gulf countries will not want Israel to maintain its stranglehold on their resources.
UNRWA is also an important issue humanitarian and economic issue. Once the fighting ends, it will be damaged but hopefully still capable. If you want to rid Gaza of Hamas, UNRWA or something derived from it is indispensable. But the Israelis are trying to destroy it. If they succeed, the difficulties of delivering aid after the war will be redoubled.
Neighbors are the good news
Another rule of thumb from previous interventions is that neighbors matter. If they are hostile to the post-war effort, they can and likely will hinder it. For both Jordan and Egypt, the neighbors with the longest borders with Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank, success in Palestine would be welcome. They will try to be helpful so long as they believe Palestinian interests are well-served.
That will be less true of Lebanon and Syria, which have borders with Israel but not Palestine. Both Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria have their own issues. Neither is in a position to do much to undermine a serious peace settlement between Israel and Palestine. Even Iran and the Houthis in Yemen, other components of the “axis of resistance,” will be unable to do much to undermine a settlement that legitimate Palestinian leaders endorse.
The challenges are great but the alternative is worse
An international intervention isn’t a bad idea. It’s just a collosally challenging one. The alternative however is worse. In the absence of peacekeeping troops and police Gaza will see protection rackets, organized crime, and further radicalization. Hamas could revive. The only outcomes then will be autocratic, draconian, or both, not democratic. Neither Palestinians nor Israelis should welcome that. The difficult is better than the alternatives.
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The day after should not be Iran’s
While Americans have opined, Israel has so far said little about the “day after” in Gaza. This interview with retired Israeli Brigadier General Amir Avivi provides a hint of at least some of the thinking near the Israeli government. He says essentially that Israeli security the day after will require two things: closing off Gaza from arms supplies shipped through Egypt and allowing Israel to raid as it wants inside Gaza.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has also suggested that Israel will need to provide security for a long time to come, which would mean in essence reoccupation of Gaza (or some portion of it). The Americans are opposing that.
The open air prison
The Israeli proposition amounts to a heightened version of the outdoor prison approach that failed on October 7 to protect Israeli security. It is not clear whether the Israelis are thinking the Egyptians will agree to tighten security at Gaza’s southern border or if they have something else in mind. Nor is it clear why the Israelis think their raiding would be any more effective after the war than it was before October 7. Israeli ground incursions into Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank have not been successful in curbing militancy there.
There are other problems with this option. Reconstruction in Gaza will require tens of billions of dollars. Why would any Gulf country ante up if Israel is reserving to itself the privilege of destroying whatever is rebuilt? If the rebuilding doesn’t occur, Gaza’s inhabitants will be living in even greater misery than before the war. Why would that not lead to more resentment and extremism rather than less?
An international intervention
Another option would be an international intervention. This could be like the ones executed with a measure of success (at least in re-establishing security) in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. Gaza, with a population of about 2 million, is small enough to be comparable, even if the conflict there is far more intense.
Using RAND’s data for “heavy peace enforcement,” a similar operation in Gaza would require about 23,000 international troops and 3000 international police. This would be on top of 6000 local troops and 4500 local police. Annual costs would run over $6 billion. You can quarrel with these numbers. But given the dire situation in Gaza they are more likely too low than too high.
Troops and police will not be readily available
The Gulfies could ante up the money, but the troops and police are a serious problem for them. Peacekeeping troops might be available from the more usual UN suspects, but it would be the biggest UN peacekeeping operation in the world today. Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Rwanda, and Pakistan are now the main UN troop contributing countries. India, now more than ever allied with Israel, might be a problem for the Gazans, but the others are possible.
The international police however would have to be Arab speakers. Which Arab countries have thousands of excess police they would be willing to contribute? Libya, Sudan, Yemen, and Syria can be counted out due to their own civil wars. Egypt will resist, as it has spent decades trying to avoid responsibility for Gaza or Gazans. Jordan will likewise hesitate. The King has his hands full at home. The Gulf countries may be willing to foot the bill, but they won’t provide the personnel.
Even the local troops and police are an issue. All the readily available Gazans will have served in the Hamas brigades and police. Israel won’t want them re-empowered. The Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank has only 10,000 police of its own. Neither Israel nor the PA will want half of them transferred to Gaza. The Gazans might not welcome them given the long contention between the PA and Hamas.
The local option
This forces us to consider the local option. Perhaps we can do without troops on the assumption that the Israelis won’t allow re-armament, even of people not previously affiliated with Hamas. UNRWA, the PLO, and nongovernmental organizations they cooperate with in Gaza should have a pretty good idea of who is who and what they are capable of. At least in the immediate aftermath of a ceasefire, they could provide relief and begin the process of rebuilding education and health care. They could also start to reconstitute a Gazan police force.
The Israelis will be suspicious of UNRWA, the PLO, and their colllaborators. This issue might be alleviated if a good deal of the humanitarian supplies were provided by Israeli nongovernmental organizations committed to coexistence and ready to collaborate with legitimate, non-Hamas, Gazan counterparts. That would complement the usual flow of humaniarian goods from Egypt through the Rafah crossing. Gazans would understandably be hesitant at first about humanitarian supplies from Israel. But the idea would be to flood the zone with clean water (much of Gaza’s water already comes from Israel), food, medical and sanitary supplies, temporary shelters and other vital commodities. That would be hard to resist.
None of this can happen, until…
None of this will happen soon. The war is still raging. There is no sign of the mutually hurting stalemate or the mutually enticing way out that are the classic conflict management conditions for a successful negotiation, starting presumably with a ceasefire.
Israeli goals are clear: to obliterate Hamas’ capacity to attack Israel and compel Hamas to give up the more than 200 hostages it still holds. Some Israeli officials cite even broader objectives: to destroy Hamas’ governing capacity and to eliminate its ideology. But I doubt Israel is willing to lose its own citizens in pursuit of those broader objecdtives.
Hamas’ objectives are less clear. Some of its leaders are telling the New York Times that it wants to create a permanent state of war with Israel. If that is true, we won’t have to worry about the day after for a long time. Others believe the near-term objective is release of all Palestinians in prison in Israel. A hostage/prisoner exchange is certainly within the realm of possibility within months, if not weeks.
Consider the alternative
None of this is edifying. But consider the alternative. If the war ends with no clear plan for reconstruction, the Iranians and Russians will be glad to pitch in. Their resources are limited. But Iran will be glad to let loose the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to help resuscitate something much like Hamas, Hizbollah, or the Houthis. The Wagner remnants would be glad to help arm and train them.
Far better than that would be a Gaza that could join the West Bank in negotiating statehood with Israel. Reconstruction should proceed with that goal in mind. Netanyahu aimed to split the Palestinans between the West Bank and Gaza. That strategy to postpone the Palestinian state is at the end of its useful life. It is time for those who support the Jewish state to welcome Palestinian aspirations for one of their own.
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Syria is in good company in the Arab League
The Arab League decided yesterday in Cairo to readmit Syria. The League had suspended Syria’s membership in response to its violent crackdown on demonstrators in March 2011. President Assad will presumably attend the May 19 Summit in Riyadh. This comes on top of several bilateral normalization moves, including by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
Conditions aren’t likely to be fulfilled
The readmission is supposedly conditional. Though I’ve been unable to find the official statement, press reports suggest the conditions include allowing humanitarian assistance and return of refugees, clamping down on Syria’s burgeoning Captagon drug exports, and the beginnings of a political process called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254.
I’ll be surprised if much of that comes to pass. Assad could and should have done all those things long ago. Preventing humanitarian assistance, blocking return of refugees, financing his regime with drug smuggling, and blocking any transition are all part of his strategy. Readmission to the Arab League is unlikely to change his behavior, which aims at restoration of his personal authority on the entire territory of Syria.
Fighting abates but conflict continues
That is still far off. The mostly Islamist remains of Syria’s opposition control parts of northwestern Syria while Turkish troops control several border areas, where they have pushed hostile Kurdish forces farther east and south. Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces control a large part of the east, with support from the U.S. Damascus requires Iranian and Russian support to maintain sometimes minimal control over the west and south. Israel continues to bomb Syria pretty much at will, to move Iranians and their proxies away from its border and to block military supplies to Hizbollah in Lebanon.
None of these conflicts is settled, but fighting has abated from his heights. None of the forces involved has the will and the wherewithal to change the current situation. Assad no doubt hopes that normalization with the Arab world will solve his economic problems and enable him to mount the effort required to regain more territory. He may negotiate to regain territory from Turkey in exchange for promises to clamp down on the Kurds. He’ll wait out the Americans, who aren’t likely to want to remain in Syria much longer.
Autocracy restored
If Assad is successful in restoring his autocracy, he won’t be alone in the Middle East. It is a long time since the Arab Spring of 2011. Tunisia’s fledgling democracy is gone, as is Egypt’s. Bahrain’s democratic movement was snuffed out early. Yemen’s and Libya’s “springs” degenerated into civil war. Sudan is headed in the same direction. Iraq has suffered repeated upheavals, though its American-imposed anocracy has also shown some resilience. Saudi Arabia has undertaken economic and social reforms, but driven entirely by its autocratic Crown Prince. The UAE remains an absolute monarchy.
Only in Morocco and Qatar have a few modest reforms survived in more or less stable and relatively open political environments. They are both monarchies with a modicum of political participation. Though Qatar allows nothing that resembles political parties, there is limited room for freedom of expression. Morocco is a livelier political scene, but the monarchy remains dominant whenever it counts.
America has already adjusted
The Biden Administration has already adjusted. It is treating democratic values as tertiary issues with any Middle Eastern country with a claim to good relations with the US. There is no more talk of Saudi Arabia as a rogue state. Washington is silent on the restorations of autocracy in Egypt, Tunisia, and Bahrain. The Americans want to see negotiated solutions in Yemen, Libya, and Sudan. Those are more likely to restore autocracy, or something like Iraq’s power-sharing anocracy, than any sort of recognizable democratic rule.
The Americans are not joining the Syria normalization parade. They are not blocking it either. Washington no doubt figures the conditions are better than nothing. We’ll have to wait and see if that is true.
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Justice can’t substitute for politics
Anwar Albuni, Director of the Syria Center for Legal Studies and Research in Berlin, gave an overview today at the Middle East Institute of prosecutions in Europe for serious crimes over the past 12 years of revolution, repression, and civil war in Syria. These include at least 60 indictees for war crimes and crimes against humanity, including Bashar al Assad if I understood correctly, as well as many others for money laundering.
Justice as a substitute for political progress
Albuni’s view is that these prosecutions worry the Syrian leadership and send a powerful message to human rights abusers worldwide. He hopes that in the absence of any progress in the constitutional talks in Geneva, the prosecutions in Europe and one potential prosecution in Chicago will exclude abusers from the political process and prevent diplomatic normalization with the Syrian regime. The Russians and Chinese are blocking any action in the UN Security Council. But he hopes the General Assembly may create a special court, at least to prosecute use of chemical weapons.
The diplomatic normalization the Arab countries are pursuing with Syria should be, he thought, expected. The Gulf in particular wants no democracies in the region. Its monarchies even supported extremists in Syria in order to prevent a real democracy from emerging there. An audience member noted that Turkiye today is on a similar wavelength and is preventing Syrian witnesses from leaving Turkiye to testify in European courts.
Hope is not a policy
I might be inclined to hope Albuni is correct. But I don’t see much evidence for his perspective. There are certainly instances where indictments have given pause to abusers, but Syria isn’t likely to be one of them. Twelve years of civil war with only a few dozen lower-level convictions is not going to stop Bashar al Assad from his homicidal ways any more the International Criminal Court indictment will stop Vladimir Putin from kidnapping Ukrainian children.
Human rights abuses are not incidental for Assad and Putin. They are part of the war-fighting strategy and well-documented, including by an organization on whose board I sit. Bashar used chemical weapons because he found them effective. Like barrel bombs, they are cheap and indiscrimately deadly. If you are trying to terrify a civilian population, that is what you want.
Assad won’t soften
So it is unlikely that justice will do for Syria what politics has failed to do so far. Getting some of the worst abusers out of the picture and sending a message to the rest is a good idea but will just as likely stiffen Assad’s resolve as weaken it. Assad knows that softness will get him nowhere. The prosecutions may make some of his cronies think twice, but like Putin’s they can easily find a window to fall out of.
Syria’s Arab neighbors are likely to continue diplomatic normalization, in exchange for Assad’s fake promises of cracking down on the drug trade his regime now uses in lieu of taxes. The Americans show no interest in normalizing but are turning a blind eye. They are convinced that the Arab neighbors will do it even if Washington objects. The constitutional committee is likely to remain stalemated, because Assad thinks he has won the war. He has nothing to gain from the political process. Justice, justice you shall pursue, but don’t expect it to solve political problems.
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Peace Picks November 10-16
Beirut 1958: How America’s Wars in the Middle East Began|November 13, 2019|10:00AM-11:30AM|Brookings Institution|Falk Auditorium, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington DC, 20036|Register Here
On July 15, 1958, U.S. Marines assaulted the beach in Beirut, Lebanon. The amphibious attack was the first combat operation in the Middle East by American troops. It followed months of intrigue, espionage and conspiracy leading to a bloody coup in Baghdad, Iraq the day before the Marines landed. Now more than 60 years later, the United States is engaged in multiple combat operations across the region — seemingly endless wars.
In his new book, “Beirut 1958,” Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel tells the story of the mission and draws lessons on how to better deal with future challenges in the region. Please join the Center for Middle East Policy on Wednesday, November 13 for the launch of “Beirut 1958,” featuring a discussion with Riedel, moderated by Senior Fellow Suzanne Maloney. Following the discussion, the participants will take questions from the audience.
The Middle East in 2020 – What Are the Pathways to Stability?|November 13, 2019|9:30AM-4:00PM|Middle East Institute|JW Marriott Washington DC|1331 Pennsylvania Ave NW|Washington DC 20004|Register Here
The conference will feature a series of panels, one-on-one conversations, and a debate examining key priorities for reducing threats and building long-term stability in the MENA region given rising tensions and an increasingly unpredictable environment.
9:00-9:30am | Arrival and Registration
9:30-9:35am | Welcome Remarks
Paul Salem
President, MEI
9:40-10:00am | Keynote Address: General (ret.) Joseph Votel on U.S. Middle East Priorities
10:00-11:00am | Panel: Are there Pathways to De-escalation in the Middle East?
H.E. Mohammed Baharoon
Director General, b’huth
LTG. (ret.) Michael Nagata
Former director of Strategic Operational Planning, National Counterterrorism Center; Hanada Bridge, LLC
Randa Slim
Senior fellow and director, conflict resolution and Track II Dialogues, MEI
Gonul Tol
Director, Turkish studies, MEI
Muna Shikaki, moderator
Correspondent, Al Arabiya
11:00am-11:15am | Coffee Break
11:15am-11:45am | Debate: How Will the Next Administration Confront Challenges and Meet Opportunities in the Middle East?
The Honorable Jim Moran
Former member of Congress, Virginia’s 8th Congressional District
Michael Pregent
Senior fellow, Hudson Institute
Randa Slim, moderator
Senior fellow and director, conflict resolution and Track II Dialogues, MEI
11:50am-12:20pm | Panel: How Can MENA Countries Reduce the Threat of Cyber Attacks?
Steph Shample
Senior analyst, Flashpoint
Edwin Wilson
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Security
Richard A. Clarke, moderator
Chairman, Board of Governors, MEI
12:20-1:00pm | Lunch buffet
1:00-1:50pm | Panel: How is the Middle East Engaging with the Broader World?
H.E. David Bakradze
Ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to the United States
Intissar Fakir
Fellow, Middle East program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Deborah Lehr
Vice Chairman and Executive Director, Paulson Institute
Aparna Pande
Director, Initiative on the Future of India and South Asia, Hudson Institute
David Lawler, moderator
Editor, Axios World Stream
1:55-2:45pm | Panel: What are the Key Economic Challenges Facing the Middle East in 2020?
Jihad Azour
Director, Middle East and Central Asia, International Monetary Fund
Herman Franssen
Scholar, MEI
Habib Kairouz
Managing partner, Rho Partners
Delila Khaled
Senior advisor, Laurel Strategies
Adva Saldinger, moderator
Associate editor, Devex
2:45-3:00pm | Coffee Break
3:00pm-3:50pm | Panel: How are Arab Youth Innovating and Mobilizing for Change?
Sami Hourani
Founder and CEO, Forsa for Education
Joyce Karam
Corresponent, The National UAE
Shady Khalil
Managing partner, Greenish
Yasmeen Mjalli
Founder, BabyFist
Dina Sherif, moderator
Founder and CEO, Ahead of the Curve
4:00pm | Closing Remarks
2019 Czech and Slovak Freedom Lecture: 30 Years of Czech and Slovak Freedom|November 13, 2019|12:00PM-1:30PM|Woodrow Wilson Center|6th Floor, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20004|Register Here
This year‘s Freedom Lecture is co-hosted by the Embassy of the Czech Republic and the Embassy of the Slovak Republic. Both a Czech and a Slovak speaker are featured in order to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, which saw the return of freedom and democracy to both countries on November 17, 1989.
Speakers
Introduction
- Ivan Korčok Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Slovak Republic to the United States
- Hynek Kmoníček Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czech Republic to the United States
Keynote
- Katarína Cséfalvayová Chairwoman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, National Council of the Slovak Republic
- Simon Pánek Former Czech student activist during the Velvet Revolution in 1989; Executive Director and Co-Founder of the largest Czech humanitarian organization, People in Need
Moderator
- Blair A. Ruble Distinguished FellowFormer Wilson Center Vice President for Programs (2014-2017); Director of the Comparative Urban Studies Program/Urban Sustainability Laboratory (1992-2017); Director of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies (1989-2012) and Director of the Program on Global Sustainability and Resilience (2012-2014)
Understanding the New Wave of Arab Protests: An Expert Panel|November 14, 2019|10:30AM-12:00PM|Woodrow Wilson Center|6th Floor, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20004|Register Here
A new series of protests and demonstrations has erupted across the Middle East and North Africa over the past 9 months. In Iraq, Lebanon, Sudan, Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt, these protests were largely triggered by dire socio-economic conditions, corruption and a sense of economic and political disenfranchisement with outright calls for regime change in the case of Algeria, Sudan, and very recently in Lebanon.
Join our discussion with a panel of Wilson and regional experts to analyze these events and understand difference and similarities between the present wave of protests and those that erupted in 2011.
Speakers
Introduction
- Merissa Khurma Project Manager, Middle East Special Initiatives
Moderator
- David Ottaway Middle East FellowMiddle East Specialist and Former Washington Post Correspondent
Panelists
- Rend Al-Rahim Co-founder and President of the Iraq Foundation
- Marina Ottaway Middle East Fellow and Former Senior Research Associate and Head of the Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Hussain Abdul-Hussain Washington Bureau Chief, Al Rai Newspaper
Protests in Chile: The Path Forward|November 14, 2019|12:00PM-1:00PM|Woodrow Wilson Center|6th Floor, Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, One Woodrow Wilson Plaza, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Washington DC 20004|Register Here
Since mid-October, Chile has been rocked by massive protests—some marked by extreme violence, but the vast majority of them peaceful and historic in numbers. Triggered by an increase in subway fares, the protests have laid bare deep inequalities and frustration over unmet needs in one of Latin America’s most prosperous countries. The government of President Sebastián Piñera has called for a dialogue with opposition parties over measures to address the crisis. Talks are ongoing.
Please join us for a discussion with noted Chilean experts over the underlying causes of unrest and, just as important, the path forward. Will the dialogue between the government and the opposition parties be successful? What reforms are on the table? Are there grounds for consensus, and if so, over what? How quickly will the legislature respond to measures introduced by the government or the opposition? How best can constitutional issues be addressed? How will the government address future challenges to public order in the midst of widespread criticism over human rights abuses committed by government forces?
Speakers
Moderator
- Cynthia J. Arnson Director, Latin American Program
Speakers
- Felipe Agüero FellowAssociate Professor, Department of International Studies, University of Miami
- Lucía Dammert Global FellowAssociate Professor, Universidad de Santiago de Chile; Expert on public security issues in Latin America
A Conversation with First Lady of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Rula Ghani: How to Protect Afghan Women’s Rights and Build Consensus for Peace|November 14, 2019|10:00AM-11:30AM|United States Institute of Peace|2301 Constitution Avenue NW, Washington DC 20037|Register Here
To explore the importance of Afghan women in building a sustainable peace process, H.E. First Lady Rula Ghani will join USIP for a timely discussion on her role in the Afghan Women’s National Consensus for Peace (Ejma-e-Mili), as well as other current events on peace, security, and governance in Afghanistan. Following a keynote address by the First Lady, there will be a moderated question and answer session.
Speakers
H.E Rula Ghani
First Lady of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Nancy Lindborg, moderator
President and CEO, U.S Institute of Peace
Ending Endless War: Lessons from the Counter-ISIS War|November 15, 2019|12:15PM-1:45PM|New America|740 15th St NW #900, Washington DC 20005|Register Here
In December 2011, the last American combat troops left Iraq. The Obama administration celebrated the withdrawal as the completion of a campaign promise to end the Iraq war. Fewer than three years later, the same administration returned the U.S. to war in Iraq to fight ISIS and then extended the war into Syria. In his new report, Decisionmaking in the Counter-ISIS War, New America Senior Policy Analyst David Sterman examines how the United States returned to war in Iraq, the role of preventive war logic in that decision, and what lessons the counter-ISIS war holds for efforts to end America’s seemingly endless counter-terrorism wars.
To discuss the report, New America welcomes Dr. Joshua Geltzer, a New America International Security program fellow and former senior director for counter-terrorism at the National Security Council, and Dr. Alexandra Stark, senior researcher with New America’s Political Reform program. Dr. Stark holds a PhD from the government department at Georgetown University. She was previously a research fellow at the Middle East Initiative of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, and Minerva/Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar at the United States Institute of Peace.
Participants:
David Sterman, @Dsterms
Author, Decisionmaking in the Counter-ISIS War
Senior Policy Analyst, New America International Security program
Dr. Joshua Geltzer, @jgeltzer
Fellow, New America International Security program
Former Senior Director for Counter-Terrorism, National Security Council
Dr. Alexandra Stark
Senior Researcher, New America Political Reform program
Moderator:
Melissa Salyk-Virk
Senior Policy Analyst, New America International Security program
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What an embarrassment!
Israel’s new “basic” law shifts the country away from the liberal democratic ideals (as in “all men are created equal) of its mostly secular and Socialist Zionist founders. Instead, Israel is now an ethnic state, the homeland of the Jewish people committed mainly to their welfare and only secondarily to the welfare of the 20% or so of the country’s population that is not Jewish. The symbols of the state include not only the Star of David flag, a 19th century invention intended to be entirely secular, but also the seven-branch menorah looted from the second Temple by the Romans, an explicitly religious symbol. Arabic is no longer an official language and segregated all-Jewish communities will be encouraged. On top of the move of the US embassy to Jerusalem, this legislation deepens the already deep chasm between Israel and its Arab citizens.
This is inconsistent with the Five Books of Moses (Torah), whose most frequent injunction is to treat the stranger who lives among you the way you treat your own. It is inconsistent with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and I don’t know how many other conventions Israel has signed. It is inconsistent with Israel’s security, which requires that its Arab citizens feel they have a stake in the state and do not turn in the direction of extremists.
But I don’t expect any of those arguments to win the day with those who rejoice at this awful legislation. Maybe though they will think twice if they consider what academic scholarship tells us about states that exclude part of their population.
The evidence is strong: they tend to fail. This is partly for economic reasons: essential ingredients ingredients for prosperity include accountability and responsiveness to all a state’s citizens, and their willing participation in an integrated economy. But it is partly also for political reasons: states that build inclusive civil society, avoid language segregation, and provide public goods to citizens regardless of ethnicity do better. Inclusion is the key to cohesion in states that emerge from civil war (which Israel did, 1948). Social capital is vital to peaceful, successful states.
External factors can also be important. It is going to be much harder for Israel’s Sunni Arab neighbors to deal cooperatively with an explicitly Jewish state than with a civil one that treats its Arab citizens as equals. Palestinians both inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza could be a vital link with the Arab world, but only if they are treated equally. It is also going to be much harder for Israel to find support in the US, where most people who identify as Jews are secular and liberal.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has led Israel in an ethnic nationalist direction that gratifies his more religious supporters and coalition partners, but it cannot be healthy in the long term. Even in the short term it leads in awful directions. Witness the spectacle of his embracing would be Hungarian autocrat and anti-Semite Viktor Orban. What an embarrassment!
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