Tag: Arab League
Tune in to state TV
With all the brouhaha this morning about Arab Gulf states agreeing to pay the Free Syria Army, the real news is lost: Syrians in Damascus are continuing to demonstrate nonviolently. This video is from March 30:
Ameer @7__r (“a Syrian guy living in Damascus”) tweets this morning:
Large numbers of Shabiha and security forces arrived to Rukn al-Deen neighborhood of #Damascus to suppress the anti-regime sit-in. #Syria
Nonviolent protests of this sort continue every day in Syria, demonstrating not only the courage of the participants but also the illegitimacy of the regime.
The participants have every right to defend themselves. But if they do so aggressively the resulting violence will discourage others from joining them. It is only by mobilizing many thousands of people, including defectors from the armed forces, that the opposition in Syria will win. If the payments to the Free Syria Army (FSA) get its armed youth to stand by and protect the demonstrators, rather than attacking the Syrian security forces, I suppose they might contribute something. But if the FSA continues to go on the offensive, picking off a soldier or two and maybe even a tank, it will thoroughly discourage not only defections but also the kind of mass participation in the protests that leads to success.
The payments to the FSA will also affect the diplomatic situation. There the impact may be helpful. Moscow has already denounced the Friends of Syria meeting at which the Syrian National Council announced them. But if Moscow wants to avoid further moves in the direction of arming and training the opposition for a military effort against Bashar al Assad, it needs to reconsider its support for him now. The time to switch sides is before he starts to teeter, not afterwards.
There is also some chatter about American “communications” support for the opposition. I’d be amazed, and appalled, if the U.S. government is not already providing cell phones, satellite phones and internet links as well as other equipment.
What the Syrian opposition really needs now from the United States is close coordination with intelligence capabilities, which presumably track the movements of the Syrian security forces. Bashar has had significant military success lately in retaking population centers, blocking the borders and chasing the revolutionaries around Robin Hood’s barn. They need to know where his forces are and where they are headed in order to avoid losing battles that should not happen.
I wish the SNC well, and giving it the money to pay the FSA will hopefully make it stronger and more united (even if I fear it may do the opposite). But there are far more important things to be done in Syria than trying to create an army while fighting a war.
Getting large numbers of coordinated, nonviolent demonstrations of opposition to the regime mounted in Damascus I would put first. These need not be sit ins or street demonstrations. It would work just as well if entire sections of the city shut down on a working day, with everyone staying home and tuning in to state television.
Brevity is the soul of wit, but mockery was what Shakespeare had in mind when he said it.
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Peace picks this week
The big event is Carnegie’s with Islamists on Thursday, but the week somehow starts on Wednesday with an event of my very own, he said unashamedly:
1. Does an Asterisk Make a Difference? SAIS Rome auditorium, 10-11:30 April 4
Belgrade and Pristina–after sustained U.S. and EU pressure–have agreed that Kosovo will be identified with an asterisk in European regional meetings. The asterisk will make reference to both UN Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
The asterisk deal is causing second guessing on both sides. What does it tell us, or not, about Kosovo’s status? How does it affect the relationship between Pristina and Belgrade? What implications does it have for U.S. and EU approaches to conflict management?
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
10:00-11:30 a.m.
Rome Auditorium
1619 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Moderator:
Michael Haltzel
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Speakers:
David Kanin
Adjunct Professor of European Studies
Daniel Serwer
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations
Professor of Conflict Management
2. Delegation of Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party, Georgetown University, 12:30 April 4
Event Details
**Please note venue: Lohrfink Auditorium**
A Discussion with
Official Delegation of Egypt’s Freedom & Justice Party (FJP)
Wednesday, April 4 -12:30pm
Lohrfink Auditorium
Rafik B. Hariri Building (2nd floor)
Georgetown University
Panelists:
Member of Parliament, Freedom and Justice Party – Luxor
Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Freedom and Justice Party
Businessman
Advisor, Muslim Brotherhood and Freedom and Justice PartySondos Asem
Senior Editor, Ikhwanweb.com
Member, Foreign Relations Committee, Freedom and Justice Party
Khaled Al-Qazzaz
Foreign Relations Coordinator, Freedom and Justice Party
Chair:
John L. Esposito
University Professor & Founding Director, Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding
For a map showing the location of the Rafik B. Hariri Building, please visit:
http://maps.georgetown.edu/rafikbhariribuilding/
For more information, please visit:
http://acmcu.georgetown.edu
3. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty CATO 4 pm April 4
Wednesday, April 4, 2012
4:00 PM (Reception To Follow)
Featuring the coauthor Daron Acemoglu, Killian Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; with comments by Karla Hoff, Senior Research Economist, Development Economics Group, World Bank; moderated by Ian Vasquez, Director, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute.
The Cato Institute
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
If you can’t make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org.
Institutions — not geography, culture, or other factors — explain why some nations succeed and others fail. So says Daron Acemoglu in an ambitious new book drawing evidence from thousands of years of human history and from societies as diverse as those of the Inca Empire, 17th century England, and contemporary Botswana. Inclusive political and economic institutions, influenced by critical junctures in history, produce virtuous cycles that reinforce pluralism in the market and in politics. Acemoglu will contrast that pattern of development with that experienced under extractive institutions. He will also describe the conditions under which institutions favorable or inimical to development tend to arise. Karla Hoff will provide critical comments.
4. Islamists in Power: Views from Within, Carnegie but at the Grand Hyatt
Thursday, April 5, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
8:45 AM – 4:45 PM EST
Islamist parties have emerged as the strongest contenders in recent elections in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco, and are likely continue to do well in future elections in other countries. It is clear that Islamist parties will have a dominant impact on the outcome of Arab transitions, but there is little understanding in Washington of what that will mean for governing.
On April 5, high-level representatives of Islamist parties from Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, and Libya will participate in a one-day event convened by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Agenda
| 8:45-9:00 a.m. | Opening RemarksJessica Mathews, President Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |
| 9:00-10:45 a.m. | Building New Regimes after the UprisingsModerator Marwan MuasherPanelists Mustapha Elkhalfi (Morocco) Abdul Mawgoud Rageh Dardery (Egypt) Nabil Alkofahi (Jordan) Sahbi Atig (Tunisia) |
| 11:15 a.m.-1:00 p.m. | Writing a New ConstitutionModerator Nathan BrownPanelists Khaled Al-Qazzaz (Egypt) Osama Al Saghir (Tunisia) Mohamed Gaair (Libya) |
| 1:00-2:30 p.m. | Recess |
| 2:30-4:30 p.m. | Economic Challenges of the TransitionModerator Masood AhmedPanelists Hussein Elkazzaz (Egypt) Mondher Ben Ayed (Tunisia) Nael Al-Masalha (Jordan) Abdelhadi Falahat (Jordan)—not yet confirmed |
| 4:30-4:45 p.m. | Closing Remarks |
5. What is in and what is not in the much-disputed newest constitution in Europe: the Fundamental Law of Hungary, National Press club, 4 pm April 5
Jozsef Szajer
April 5, 2012 4:00 PM
Location: Zenger Room
National Press Club “AFTERNOON NEWSMAKER”
News Conference
Thursday, April 5, 2012, 4 p.m.
National Press Club (Zenger Room)
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) and Author of the new Hungarian Constitution,
JOZSEF SZAJER
Contacts: National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN, 301/530-1210 (H&O/T&F), 301/367-7711 (C), 202/662-7540 (NPC, pjhickman@hotmail.com
Mr. Szajer: Andras Szorenyi (Embassy of Hungary), 202/415-3653 (t), Andras.Szorenyi@mfa.gov.hu
For More Information On This Event,
Please Contact:
Peter Hickman
301-530-1210
6. The Afghanistan Security Transition: the Role and Importance of Afghanistan’s Neighbors, USIP, 10-12 April 6
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 10:00am on April 6, 2012 at www.usip.org/webcast.
As the 2014 security transition in Afghanistan approaches, multiple tracks need to be pursued to ensure sustainable peace in the country. A regional solution is often touted as a critical element in achieving such a peace. Without collaborative buy-in for such a solution, however, the potential increases that Afghanistan’s neighbors will play a destabilizing role in the country given their own domestic and international objectives. Despite much debate on this issue, the core interests policies, and views of Afghanistan’s neighboring states are still not well understood.
Join USIP to discuss how Afghanistan’s immediate neighbors – Pakistan, Iran, and the bordering Central Asian Republics – view the present situation and impending transition in Afghanistan, and what their role and policies are likely to be between now and 2014, and beyond. What measures can the U.S. and other allies take to incentivize policies of cooperation and collaboration from these neighbors with the ultimate objective of promoting stability in Afghanistan? USIP works on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote the nonviolent resolution of conflicts and build local capacity to prevent and address disputes through nonviolent means.
This event will feature the following speakers:
- Abubakar Siddique, panelist
Senior News Correspondent
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
- Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, panelist
Associate Researcher, Peace Research Institute Oslo
Professor MPA/Sciences Po (Paris) - Alireza Nader, panelist
Senior International Policy Analyst
RAND Corporation
- Moeed Yusuf, moderator
South Asia Adviser
United States Institute of Peace
7. Global Nuclear Security and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, National Press Club, 10 am April 6
Location: Zenger Room
Panel to Discuss Global Nuclear Security and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism
Date and Time: April 6 at 10 a.m.
Place: Zenger Room, National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th floor
With the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran a concern of many world leaders, particularly those in the United States and Israel, a panel of foreign policy practitioners will speak at a Press Club Newsmaker on global nuclear security and ways to prevent nuclear terrorism.
Panel participants will be:
• Robert Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and former chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994
• Sharon Squassoni, director and senior fellow, Proliferation Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
• Joseph Cirincione, president, Ploughshares Fund
• Alexander Glaser, assistant professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
Contact Info: Keith Hill (khill@bna.com)
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Maliki wins another bet
Nouri al Maliki, the prime minister orginally chosen in 2006 because he and his Dawa party were regarded as too weak to threaten the bigger fish of Iraqi politics, is improbably completing his sixth year in office (give or take a month or two) with another relative success: the Arab League Summit he hosted this week in Baghdad. It marks the reemergence of Iraq as a regional player, one which borders both Syria and Iran, the West’s two big preoccupations in the Middle East these days.
While the Western press is underlining that fewer than half the 22 heads of state attended the summit, the Iraqis will be glad to have gotten 10 of them to a security-handicapped Baghdad, including the Emir of Kuwait. That’s significant, not only because of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 but also because relations between the two countries were tense until recently.
Also significant is the absence of the other Gulf heads of state, who want to see better treatment of Sunnis in Iraq. Boycotts are not my style of diplomacy–they’d have done better to attend and complain. But I suppose the message was clear enough.
The main substantive issue was Syria. The Arab League is now backing Kofi Annan’s plan, which to Baghdad’s satisfaction backs off the demand that Bashar al Assad step down. Instead it talks about “an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people.” Anyone who has followed Maliki’s elastic interpretation of his domestic political commitments over the past year–in particular to his putative coalition partners Iraqiyya and the Kurdish bloc–will understand immediately that this language will not constrain him to insist that Bashar has to go.
That said, it is not really Iraq’s role, or even the Arab League’s, to push Bashar aside. That role belongs mainly to the Russians, who have so far protected him from a UN Security Council resolution. They are showing signs of impatience with their protégé, who is not looking so reliable these days. The Americans need to convince the Russians that they have better chances of maintaining their port access and arms sales in Syria with a successor who can last rather than a wobbly Bashar.
In the wake of the Summit, Iraq will take over the presidency of the Arab League from Qatar. This will put Baghdad in a decisive role vis-a-vis Syria during the period in which a denouement is likely to occur. Iraq will want to make sure that the successor regime in Damascus is one that does not feed Sunni insurgency in Iraq and treats Alawis gently.
Baghdad will face enormous challenges if Bashar al Assad does step down. The West will look to the Arab League for answers to difficult questions: how will law and order in Syria be maintained? What will have to be done to help it revive its flagging economy? Where will the necessary relief come for what are now likely more than a million refugees and displaced people? Iraq, not far itself from having been a basket case, will have a major role fixing another broken state.
But those challenges lie in the future. For the moment, Maliki can enjoy his earnings from what was a high stakes bet.
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Here’s the rub
We are coming to a critical and delicate moment in the diplomacy about Syria. The Annan peace plan, which does not call explicitly for Bashar al Assad to leave power, has gained Arab League and UN Security Council backing. Bashar has said he accepts it. The Syrian opposition has not.
They are going to get their arms twisted, hard. The clear signal comes from David Ignatius, who argues in this morning’s Washington Post that they should go along with the deal. This is the opening salvo in what will no doubt be an intense U.S. government effort to convince the Syrian National Council and anyone else who will listen to go along. There is a strong likelihood that the pressure will split an already fractious opposition.
Ignatius simply assumes that the Annan plan will lead to the departure of Bashar. That is where the opposition, and the United States, have to be very careful. So far as I can tell, the Annan plan addresses this question only obliquely, by requiring that the Syrian government work with the UN envoy
in an inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people
I have been a supporter of Annan’s efforts, but I have to confess that this is a very weak reed on which to hang anyone’s hopes for a serious political transition. That Bashar al Assad needs to step aside in order “to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people” may be perfectly obvious to me. But it is not obvious to Bashar, who has repeatedly claimed that he understands and expresses the aspirations and concerns of the Syrians.
This of course is the issue that precipitated the Russian and Chinese vetoes of Security Council resolutions. Neither Moscow nor Beijing wants to be seen as carrying out regime change in Syria at the behest of the West or the Arab League.
The question is whether they are prepared to do it, even if they are not prepared to say it out loud. There is a big question mark here, one that the Syrian opposition needs a clear answer to, at least in private, before it signs on. Washington needs to help them get that answer and be prepared to guarantee it will happen.
The rest of the plan is a re-hash of things Syria has already agreed to do, and then not done: stop fighting, cessation of hostilities, pullback of the Syrian army and heavy weapons from population centers, deployment of UN monitors, humanitarian assistance, release of detainees, access for journalists and respect for free association and the right to demonstrate.
Opinion on whether Bashar can be made to comply with the plan this time is split. I don’t really think there is any possibility he will if he stays in power. His removal is a prerequisite for the Annan plan to have a chance to work. But he is feeling buoyed by recent military success, even as it becomes clearer with every passing day that his regime has lost legitimacy with the vast majority of the Syrian people.
There’s the rub: it is more than time for him to go, but he clearly intends to stay.
PS: Here is footage of a Syrian government helicopter allegedly rocketing ‘Azaz near Aleppo on March 25. If anyone in the Obama administration is looking for a reason to impose a no-fly zone, here it is:
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Geography and oil are fate
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki seems for the moment to be winning his high stakes bet on hosting the Arab League summit this week in Baghdad. The first bar is set pretty low: if the meeting comes off without any major security incidents or diplomatic kerfuffles, Iraq will be able to herald it as a successful milestone marking the return of Baghdad to regional prominence and a renewed role in the Arab world.
It could amount to more. It already says something about the Arab League that a Kurdish president and a Shia prime minister are leading an Arab League summit. Maliki has successfully courted improvements in relations with Sunni-dominated Egypt, Algeria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the last couple of months. Some are hoping he might use the occasion to tilt Iraq away from Iran, perhaps even capturing a significant role with Russia in the effort to manage a negotiated transition in Syria.
Of course the whole thing might still blow up, too. Either literally, if Al Qaeda in Iraq slips through Baghdad’s well-manned but still porous security cordons, or figuratively, if heads of state decline to attend or the Syria issue leads to a serious diplomatic breach with the Sunni Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Qatar that would like to boot Bashar al Assad.
A successful Arab League summit could significantly improve Maliki’s standing at home, where he has also been doing some fence mending. His big achievement was passing the budget in parliament. His Sunni and Kurdish putative allies in parliament might still like to bring him down, but they have been unable to mount a serious threat and have not managed even to suggest an alternative majority. Besides, they like their cushy jobs.
Maliki may be mending his fences, but they are still fences. His majority is increasingly dependent on support from the Sadrists, whose reliance on Iran will limit his room to maneuver.
What does this mean for the U.S.? The most immediate issue is Syria: Washington would like Baghdad to help get Bashar to walk the plank. Tehran will resist that mightily, and if it happens will redouble its effort to create in Iraq any “strategic depth” it loses in Syria. Maliki can only gain from an end to the Assad regime if it gets him serious support from the Kurds and Sunnis within Iraq, as well as the broader Arab world. I’d like to believe that would happen, but he is unlikely to have enough confidence it would.
The longer-term issue is the political orientation of Iraq. Will it stand on its own and develop strong ties with the West, as well as with the Arab world and Iran? Or will it tilt inexorably in Iran’s direction, risking internal strife as well as its own independence? The Arab League summit is unlikely to have much long-term impact in determining this question. Iraq’s Sunnis are convinced Maliki is an Iranian stooge. The Americans still hope he’ll come around in their direction.
One major factor determining the outcome is rarely discussed, even in expert circles: how Iraq exports its oil and eventually also its gas. If it continues to put the vast bulk of its oil on to ships that have to pass through the Gulf and the strait of Hormuz under Iranian guns, Tehran’s influence will grow. But there is an alternative. If Baghdad repairs and expands the “strategic” pipeline to enable export of large quantities of oil (and eventually gas) to the north (to Turkey) and west (to Syria or Jordan), any government in Baghdad will see its links to the West as truly vital. Maliki’s government has been doing the needed feasibility studies, but it is not yet clear that it is ready to make the necessary decisions, since export to the north and west would mean crossing Kurdish and Sunni controlled territory.
Iraq once seemed hopelessly divided. But those divisions can be bridged, if there is political will to do so. Geography and oil are fate.
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This week’s peace picks
Maybe I’m getting more exigent. Just four events this week, though the first first one lasts three days:
1. Southeast European Economic Forum: SAIS, Day 1, 7-9 pm March 26
2. The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East, CNAS, 5:30-8:30 pm March 27
Location:The W Hotel
515 15th Street NW
(enter on F Street between 14th and 15th Streets)
Washington, DC 20004
The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) cordially invites you to the book launch for The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East by Dr. Marc Lynch, Non-Resident Senior Fellow at CNAS and Director of the Institute for Middle East Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. On Tuesday, March 27, 2012 from 6:00 to 8:30 p.m., Dr. Lynch will discuss one of the most fundamental changes throughout the history of the modern Middle East: the empowerment of a new generation of Arabs who reject the world they inherited. Hisham Melhem, Washington Bureau Chief for al-Arabiya , will interview Dr. Lynch, followed by Q&A with the audience. Please RSVP online here or call (202) 457-9427.
The Arab Uprising will be on sale and Dr. Lynch will be available to sign copies during the book-signing cocktail reception from 7:15 to 8:30 p.m.
In The Arab Uprising, Dr. Lynch examines the emerging regional landscape in the Middle East, one in which, he argues, the old heavyweights – Iran, al Qaeda, even Israel – have all been disempowered, and nations like Saudi Arabia are powering a new cold war. Dr. Lynch highlights the new fault lines that are forming between forces of revolution and counter-revolution and shows what it all means for the future of U.S. foreign policy. Deeply informed by inside access to the Obama administration’s decisionmaking process and first-hand interviews with protestors, politicians, diplomats and journalists, The Arab Uprising is an unprecedented and indispensible guide to the changing lay of the land in the Middle East and North Africa.
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
5:30-6:00 p.m.: Guest registration and book sales
6:00-7:15 p.m.: Moderated discussion followed by Q&A
Hisham Melhem is the Washington bureau chief of Al-Arabiya, the Dubai based satellite channel. He is also the correspondent for Annahar, the leading Lebanese daily. For four years he hosted Across the Ocean, a weekly current affairs program on U.S.-Arab relations for Al-Arabiya. Mr. Melhem speaks regularly on U.S.-Arab relations, political Islam, intra-Arab relations, Arab-Israeli issues, media in the Arab world, Arab images in American media and U.S. public policies and the Arab world. Mr. Melhem has interviewed many American and international public figures, including Presidents Barack Obama and George W. Bush.
3. Constitution-Making, Electoral Design, and the Arab Spring, NED, 12-2 pm March 29
a luncheon presentation featuring
Andrew Reynolds, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
John Carey, Dartmouth College
with comments by
Donald L. Horowitz, Duke University
Thursday, March 29, 2012
12 noon–2:00 p.m.
(Lunch served 12:00–12:30 p.m.)
1025 F. Street, N.W., Suite 800, Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone: 202-378-9675
RSVP (acceptances only) with name and affiliation by Tuesday, March 27.
About the Event:
In December 2010, a Tunisian fruit vendor burned himself to death to protest his treatment by police, marking the start of what has become widely known as the “Arab Spring.” Mass popular protests spread throughout most of the region, and a little more than a year later violent conflict is still raging in Syria and Yemen. In Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, however, dictators have fallen, and these countries are currently engaged in the struggle to achieve successful transitions to democracy. Among the most difficult challenges that they face are those of drafting and approving new constitutions and of designing electoral systems that will foster both fairness and stability. Getting their new constitutions and electoral systems right will be of crucial importance to their efforts to build functioning and enduring democracies. Andrew Reynolds and John Carey will assess the various paths chosen by these would-be democratizers, drawing upon and updating their co-authored articles in the October 2011 and January 2012 issues of the Journal of Democracy. Donald L. Horowitz will provide comments.
About the Speakers:
Andrew Reynolds is associate professor of political science at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where his research focuses on democratization, constitutional design, and electoral politics. He has advised a number of organizations including the UN, NDI, and the State Department. He is currently writing (with Jason Brownlee and Tarek Masoud) The Arab Spring: The Politics of Transformation in North Africa and the Middle East (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012).
John Carey is the Wentworth Professor in the Social Sciences and the chair of the government department at Dartmouth College. He is co-editor of the Legislative Studies Quarterly, and his most recent book is Legislative Voting & Accountability (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
Donald Horowitz, the James B. Duke Professor of Law and Political Science at Duke University, is currently a Jennings Randolph Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute for Peace, where he is completing a project on “Constitutional Design for Severely Divided Societies.”
1000 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20001
In the months since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued its November 2011 report, which raised new questions about Iran’s nuclear program, the debate in Washington, D.C., over Iran has grown hotter. Policymakers, politicians, scholars, and pundits are now offering wildly divergent predictions and prescriptions.
While these open debates are an improvement over the Beltway groupthink that accompanied the run-up to the Iraq War, many questions remain about the Obama administration’s policy. This conference examines the two central questions surrounding U.S. policy toward Iran: Can diplomacy work? What are the options if diplomacy fails?
Please join us for a vigorous discussion of these critical issues.
| 8:30 a.m. | Registration |
| 9:00 a.m. – 10:30 a.m. | Panel 1: Can Diplomacy Work?Is the current policy — or any diplomatic offer — likely to work? Has the administration defined “diplomacy” as being limited to sanctions and pressure? Could a different approach hold a better chance of success? How is success defined?Michael Adler, Woodrow Wilson Center Justin Logan, Cato Institute Alireza Nader, RAND Corporation Barbara Slavin, Atlantic Council |
| 10:30 a.m. – 10:45 a.m. | Break |
| 10:45 a.m. – 12:15 p.m. | Panel 2: The Options if Diplomacy FailsIf diplomacy fails, what are the military and non-military options the U.S. administration would have? What are the prospects for success? What likely repercussions would follow from bombing Iran?Jamie Fly, Foreign Policy Initiative Matthew Kroenig, Georgetown University Nuno Monteiro, Yale University Joshua Rovner, U.S. Naval War College |
| 12:15 p.m. | Luncheon |
This Cato Conference is free of charge. To register for this event, please fill out the form below and click submit or email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by 9:00 a.m., Wednesday, March 28, 2012. Please arrive early. Seating is limited and not guaranteed. News media inquiries only (no registrations), please call (202) 789-5200.
The Cato Institute gratefully acknowledges the support of the Ploughshares Fund in helping make this event possible.
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