Tag: Arab League
Kofi time
Huffington Post has just published my latest on Syria:
With Kofi Annan chosen to be the joint UN/Arab League Special Envoy and today’s Friends of Syria meeting in Tunis, the stage is set for a more serious diplomatic effort to bring the Syrian crisis to a close. Kofi’s marching orders include:
The Special Envoy will provide good offices aimed at bringing an end to all violence and human rights violations, and promoting a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis.The Special Envoy will be guided in this endeavor by the provisions of the General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 and the relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States. He will consult broadly and engage with all relevant interlocutors within and outside Syria in order to end the violence and the humanitarian crisis, and facilitate a peaceful Syrian-led and inclusive political solution that meets the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people through a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition.
This broad mandate, which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council have approved, implicitly points in the direction of the Arab League plan that Russia and China previously vetoed, even if it does not explicitly mention the need for Bashar al-Assad to step aside. The ambiguity is intended to hide the differences of view on the UNSC, but clearly no political solution can meet the democratic aspirations of the Syrian people with Bashar still in office.
Kofi will surely meet with Bashar al-Assad. The question is whether he will be able to tell him that the P5 want him out. Colum Lynch notes that in his last trouble-shooting effort Kofi arranged for power-sharing in Kenya. Bashar has spilled far too much blood in Syria for the opposition to accept sharing power with him. The Russians should by now be wondering whether their best bet for holding on to port access and arms sales in Syria is Bashar. Once they decide differently, Kofi will have the support he needs for defenestration.
Anne-Marie Slaughter today in the New York Times calls for “no-kill” zones established by the Free Syria Army (FSA) near Syria’s borders with Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. This would require a major effort to arm the FSA and provide it with special forces advisors. The notion that this can be done “to protect all Syrians regardless of creed, ethnicity or political allegiance” without precipitating the chaotic ethnic and sectarian civil war that Anne-Marie herself recognizes as the worst outcome is unrealistic. And doing it without taking down Syria’s air defenses would condemn the effort to failure.
Only the U.S. can quickly and effectively destroy Syria’s Russian-supplied air defense and severely damage his artillery, which is bombarding his opponents. At yesterday’s Syria event at the Center for National Policy, colleagues evoked the image of President Clinton reacting to the shelling of Sarajevo, suggesting that President Obama might do likewise.
We too readily forget that Clinton waited three and half years — until Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole started taking him to task for not carrying out his campaign promise to bomb the Serbs — before initiating the military action that ended the war in Bosnia. I doubt even a Republican candidate bemoaning what is happening in Syria would get the White House to drop other priorities in favor of another Middle East war.
The Syrian opposition doesn’t have years, or even months. It needs protection quickly. The best bet is a vigorous diplomatic effort by Kofi Annan.
Today in Tunis the Friends of Syria called for a ceasefire, humanitarian relief to the cities under attack, deployment of UN peacekeepers and the beginning of a dialogue process aimed at a political settlement. They also named the Syrian National Council “a” legitimate representative of the Syrian people and promised further sanctions and diplomatic isolation of Damascus. They did not call for arming of the opposition, which has been left up to individual states. The Saudis made it clear they thought it a good idea (and they will presumably do it).
Few believe Bashar al-Assad will cave. I won’t be surprised if he eventually does, though I’m not prepared to predict when. His army and other security forces are exhausted and won’t want to enter the cities they have been shelling from afar. If Bashar can get the international community to accept responsibility for feeding the inhabitants and maybe even maintaining law and order, he may count himself lucky. His security forces could then lick their wounds and prepare to fight another day, while blaming the internationals for anything that goes wrong.
Syria is showing us the limits of military force. It is a blunt tool that in this instance is likely to bring about the civil war that we should most want to avoid. Diplomacy won’t be pretty. It will require negotiations with Bashar al-Assad and acceptance of compromises that are odious. But it is our best bet for the moment. Kofi time.
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Wising up
Two weeks ago, I was getting ready to write a post suggesting that Bashar al Assad would likely win his current contest with Syrian protesters. It looked as if they had made a definitive choice in favor of a violent uprising, one that the Syrian security forces are capable of defeating. The net result would have been a low-level insurgency, aka civil war, one that would lead to increasing sectarian separation and destabilization of neighboring countries, including Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq. That outcome–the worst of all possible worlds for the United States–is still possible.
But Friday’s 41 peaceful demonstrations in Damascus, a few of them large, suggest that the opposition has wised up. Rather than a force-on-force confrontation they are bound to lose, the protesters spread out their efforts and kept them non-violent. Such coordinated risings in the capital are far more important for gaining adherents and defying the regime than killing a few soldiers or even Shabiha (non-uniformed regime goons) would be. It has forced the regime today to rush its security forces into the capital to squelch the defiance and re-establish fear. With any luck, they’ll find nothing to repress, as the protesters will hopefully be ready to ignite efforts elsewhere.
This is smart revolution. Drawing lines around specific territory and trying to defend it would be dumb revolution, because it identifies precisely the territory that the regime has to attack to kill its enemies. It has shown no hesitancy to do that. Safe areas and humanitarian corridors are unsafe unless defended with adequate force, which no one has yet shown any sign of readiness to field.
Meanwhile on the diplomatic front, the Chinese are showing some signs of veto remorse, averring openly that they support the Arab League plan calling for Bashar al Assad to step aside and allow his vice president to take charge of a transition to democracy. I’d be the first to admit that a similar scheme is not looking so great in Yemen, where yesterday’s one-candidate election will presumably lead to Vice President Hadi’s takeover of power and initiation of some kind of transition. The problem in Yemen is that those sharing power do not include the protesters who initiated the revolution and who reject amnesty for former President Ali Abdullah Saleh.
The situation in Syria is different. There really is no question of amnesty for Bashar. The best he can hope for is exile in Iran, which backs him to the hilt. But he could just as well end up dead like Muammar Qaddafi or on trial like Hosni Mubarak, prospects that are presumably inspiring his murderous attempts to repress the demonstrations.
“Friends of Syria,” the international coalition in favor of the revolution, plans to meet Friday in Tunisia. This is a good occasion to reiterate support for the Arab League plan, tighten sanctions, press for greater unity among the Syrian opposition and reiterate support for nonviolent protest. It may also be a good opportunity to strategize about bringing China and even Russia into the fold. The Chinese seem halfway there. The Russians will need some guarantees on access to port facilities in Syria before signing on.
Meanwhile, watch those Iranian warships that traversed the Suez Canal yesterday. They have now docked at Tartus. If they deliver weapons or personnel to Syria, it would be a good moment for someone to intervene. That’s not trivial, since there is no arms embargo, but that’s why we’ve got all those clever lawyers in the State Department. I hope they are busy scribbling the decision memos.
PS: The Iranians claimed the ships docked, but the Pentagon says they never did. Maybe someone in Tehran understood the risk.
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A not so luminary 57
Colleagues over at the Foreign Policy Initiative and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies have lined up 57 luminaries to advocate the following policy prescriptions on Syria:
- Immediately establish safe zones within Syrian territory, as well as no-go zones for the Assad regime’s military and security forces, around Homs, Idlib, and other threatened areas, in order to protect Syrian civilians. To the extent possible, the United States should work with like-minded countries like Turkey and members of the Arab League in these efforts.
- Establish contacts with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and, in conjunction with allies in the Middle East and Europe, provide a full range of direct assistance, including self-defense aid to the FSA.
- Improve U.S. coordination with political opposition groups and provide them with secure communications technologies and other assistance that will help to improve their ability to prepare for a post-Assad Syria.
- Work with Congress to impose crippling U.S. and multilateral sanctions on the Syrian government, especially on Syria’s energy, banking, and shipping sectors.
Does this approach have merit? Let’s look at the components one by one.
Safe zones would require a major U.S. military operation to take down Syria’s air defenses and a major military ground operation, presumably by Turkey and the Arab League, to push back the Syrian army armor and artillery from the safe areas. This would still leave Damascus and Aleppo in Bashar al Assad’s hands. It would also divide the country in a way likely to exacerbate sectarian tensions: Sunnis would likely flee to the safe areas, if in fact they are safe, and Alawis and Christians away from them to Damascus, Aleppo and other areas. Some of this of course is already happening, but it could get worse.
“Full range of direct assistance” presumably means arms to the Free Syria Army (FSA). This will reinforce the drift toward civil war, but it is unlikely to give the FSA means sufficient to win on the battlefield. A prolonged, increasingly sectarian armed conflict in Syria is among the worst outcomes from the U.S. perspective. It could destabilize Lebanon, Iraq and other countries in the Middle East.
I can only agree with the improving coordination with the political opposition and provision of more secure communications technology. But I’d be surprised if the Administration didn’t claim it was already doing the former and more surprised if it hasn’t begun to do the latter.
Crippling sanctions seem to me a good idea–at least as crippling as what we are already imposing on Syria’s sponsor Iran. The war, as the 57 point out, is already a proxy war–we may as well treat everyone on the other side equally.
So I’m with the luminaries half way: the non-military half. They are correct that more than humanitarian considerations are at stake, but they have failed to show how the military action they recommend would improve the situation.
If they really believe military action is possible and desirable, they should come up with a better proposition: destroy the command, control, communications and intelligence centers of the Syrian state and you will see a quick and decisive end to the killing of civilians by the Syrian army as an organized force. The trouble is you won’t know what will eventually take over, and in the interim you could trigger sectarian bloodletting that would make the current situation look like child’s play.
I remain convinced that
- the U.S. and Europe are not interested in intervening militarily;
- diplomatic and political means have not been exhausted, even if they so far have been ineffectual.
I am every bit as appalled as the 57 luminaries by what Bashar al Assad is doing in Syria. But before we do something big and expensive, best to make reasonably sure that it will improve the situation, not make it worse.
“Friends of Syria” will meet at the ministerial level in Tunisia next Friday. That is a good time and place to consider an amplified diplomatic and political effort. I’m sure the military options will be discussed as well, but I’ll be surprised if anyone is ready and willing.
P.S.: Here is what will bring down Bashar al Assad faster than “safe zones” and arming the FSA. This is one of a claimed 41 mini-protests staged in Damascus today:
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More thunder, no lightning
The UN General Assembly today passed a resolution supporting the Arab League plan for Syria, which would have Bashar al Assad step aside from his presidency and turn over power to his vice president, who would form a broad coalition government and initiate a democratic transition. The vote was 137 to 12, which is pretty lopsided even in the UNGA, where lopsided votes are common.
The opponents were: Belarus, Bolivia, China, Cuba, DPRK, Ecuador, Iran, Nicaragua, Russia, Syria, Venezuela, Zimbabwe. This is a crew that needs a name: something like the antidemocrats, but snappier.
So what practical effect will this have? Hard to say, but the legal effect is nil. UNGA resolutions are like preseason football: the games may be well played and show off talent, but they have no direct impact on the standings. Only UN Security Council resolutions have legal effect.
But legal effect isn’t everything and doesn’t guarantee implementation either. The important thing is that the “international community” has made an appropriate noise in response to Bashar al Assad’s military assault on Syria’s citizens. This will weaken Bashar’s position both internationally and within Syria and give inspiration to his opponents, who will also bemoan international community ineffectiveness.
The real question is what should be done now. Some will want to resort to military intervention or arming the Syrian Free Army. This is a serious error in my book. The worst outcome for the U.S. is a prolonged civil war in Syria, which could have a destabilizing impact on Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and more widely. “Safe areas” and “humanitarian corridors” would, in the absence of Syrian government cooperation, require major military intervention.
As Mona Yacoubian, Randa Slim and Aram Nerguizian were at pains to make clear this morning at a Stimson/Middle East Institute Event, there are diplomatic and political courses of action that still need to be played out:
- The U.S. should lead on getting a “Friends of Syria” group up and running;
- The Arab League and Turkey should lead on pressing the Syrian opposition to unify;
- Sanctions implementation needs to be tightened, especially by the Arab League;
- The U.S. and Turkey need to court Russian support, on grounds that their interests require a good relationship with whatever comes after Bashar;
- The Syrian opposition has to work on peeling away Sunni and Christian merchant, as well as military, support for the regime.
As Randa Slim noted, what helps the regime is fear of instability on the one hand and Islamism on the other. These fears would get worse with military intervention, not better. We need more thunder, no lightning.
PS: Somehow this “Dancing and chanting around an independence flag in Qudaysa, Damascus” tweeted by @LeShaque and retweeted by Robert Mackey grabs me this morning. It is a lot more expressive than the important, if dull, session of the UNGA yesterday and reminds us of what the resolution is really about:
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This week’s peace picks: better late than never!
I was ill last night and didn’t get the peace picks up until late today, but here are a few of the best items for the week, heavy on Iraq:
1. Recent Developments in Cyberwarfare
February 13, 2012, 12:00 – 1:30 PM – Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C. Headquarters
Please join Hudson Institute’s Center on Economics of the Internet for an address by Gen. James Cartwright (USMC, ret.), Harold Brown Chair in Defense Policy Studies at CSIS.
General Cartwright served as Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, before being nominated and appointed as the eighth Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nation’s second-highest military officer. During his four-year tenure as Vice Chairman, spanning two presidential administrations and overseeing constant military operations against diverse and evolving enemies, Cartwright became widely recognized for his technical acumen, vision of future national security concepts, and keen ability to integrate systems, organizations, and people in ways that encourage creativity and spark innovation in the areas of strategic deterrence, nuclear proliferation, missile defense, cyber security, and adaptive acquisition processes.
Senior Fellow and Director of the Center, Harold Furchtgott-Roth, will moderate the discussion.
2. The PLA Navy ‘Lobby’ and Its Influence Over China’s ‘National Sovereignty’ Policies, February 13, SAIS
08:30 AM – 05:30 PM
American University Washington College of Law, Room 603
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DCThe revolutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa have captured the world’s attention. As a result, many questions have emerged including whether human rights and international laws have been violated, whether the use of force has been appropriate in certain domestic conflicts, and whether it is likely for similar movements to occur in other regions of the world. Through panel discussions with scholars and practitioners in the field, this symposium will facilitate substantive dialogues that address many of these complex legal and quasi-legal questions. Specifically, symposium participants will discuss how to build the rule of law within this region and the role of the international community in internal state disputes. Additionally, participants will dissect the relevant history and causes of the Arab Spring, and explore the future application of international law norms in light of the on-going civil unrest throughout this region.Presented by the International Law Review PROGRAM AGENDA
Ad Melkert, Joel Rayburn, Marina Ottaway Tuesday, February 14, 2012 – Washington, D.C.
12:15 PM – 2:00 PM EST
5. Is Hamas Changing?
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Foundation to Defend Democracy
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POMED DC Events Calendar
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john.simon@pomed.org
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Hamas and Fatah signed a reconciliation agreement; Hamas leaders are exiting Syria, and Hamas’ funding from Iran may be drying up. Are these events prompting Hamas to consider a change in strategy? To assess this question, FDD is pleased to host a breakfast conversation on Wednesday, February 15 at 9:30 am with Nathan Brown, Hussein Ibish and Jonathan Schanzer. Breakfast and registration will begin at 9:15 am. If you haven’t already, we encourage you to register here. Please RSVP by February 13 to ensure your spot. If you have other colleagues who might be interested in attending, please feel free to share this invitation. For questions, contact Annie at annie@defenddemocracy.org or 202-250-6144.
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6. Post-Occupation Iraq: The Brittleness of Political Institutions
with
Adeed Dawisha
Public Policy Scholar, Woodrow Wilson Center and
Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Miami University, Ohio
The hope during the American occupation of Iraq was to actively encourage the creation of functioning democratic institutions, so that by the time Iraq attained full sovereignty it would be well on the way toward democratic consolidation. While the democratic structure seems to be in place, its performance leaves much to be desired. Political parties are defined more by ethno-sectarianism than ideology; Parliament is weak; the prime minister exhibits a clear propensity for authoritarianism; and the issue of federalism has been turned into a recipe for the division of the country. Still, politics so far is conducted within the corridors of political institutions. And while violence persists, to date it has not replaced dialogue and discussion as the avenues for settling differences and disputes. Dawisha will discuss how long this delicate balance could persist and whether it could withstand major crises.
The Institute for the Study of War presents
Iraq After the U.S. Withdrawal
ISW cordially invites you to an on-the-record panel discussion on the evolving political crisis in Iraq and its implications for Iraqi stability and U.S. national interests. The departure of all American troops from Iraq in mid-December 2011 removed constraints on Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s political behavior, increased his fears of survival, and accelerated his efforts to consolidate power. Sectarian politics is becoming the norm in the Iraqi government, and violence is increasing. Immediately following Maliki’s visit to Washington days before the last troops left, Iraqi Security Forces issued a warrant for the arrest of Sunni Vice President Tareq al-Hashemi, sparking a political crisis that continues today. This panel will analyze the unfolding political crisis, deteriorating security trends, and prospects for renewed insurgency and civil war in Iraq. The panel will also discuss the ramifications of this crisis for U.S. policy towards Iraq and the Middle East.
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Noon to 2 p.m.
Lobby Conference Center
1400 16th Street NW
Washington, DC 20036
A light lunch will be provided.
Please RSVP no later than Tuesday, February 14.
For more information, contact Tricia Miller at
tmiller@understandingwar.org or 202-293-5550 ext. 210.
Panelists:
Dr. Kenneth M. Pollack, the director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, is an expert on national security, military affairs and the Persian Gulf.
Dr. Laith Kubba is the senior director for the Middle East and North Africa program at the National Endowment for Democracy. He was born in Baghdad, Iraq, and served as a government spokesman and senior advisor to Iraqi Prime Minister Ibrahim Al-Jaafari in 2005.
Marisa Cochrane Sullivan is the deputy director at ISW, where she supervises the Iraq and Afghanistan Projects. Sullivan also conducts research on Iraqi political dynamics and the security environment in central and southern Iraq.
Moderator:
Dr. Kimberly Kagan, the founder and president of ISW, conducted many regular battlefield circulations of Iraq between May 2007 and April 2010. She participated formally on the Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team for MNF-I and U.S. Mission-Iraq in October 2008 and October 2009 and on the Civilian Advisory Team for the CENTCOM strategic review in January 2009.
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Yes, nonviolence, even now
TheAtlantic.com published my call for a return to nonviolence in Syria this morning, under the infelicitous title “Why the Syrian Free Army Should Put Down Their Guns”:
Nonviolent organization has a better chance at unseating Assad’s regime than an armed uprising.
It is remarkable how quickly we’ve forgotten about nonviolence in Syria. Only a few months ago, the White House was testifying unequivocally in favor of nonviolent protest, rather than armed opposition, against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his regime’s awful crackdown. Even today, President Obama eschews military intervention. Yesterday, Yahoo News’ Laura Rozen offered the views of four experts on moving forward in Syria. While one doubted the efficacy of arming the opposition, none advocated nonviolence. When blogger Jasmin Ramsey wrote up a rundown of the debate over intervention in Syria, nonviolence wasn’t even mentioned.
There are reasons for this. No one is going to march around Homs singing kumbaya while the Syrian army shells the city. It is correct to believe that Syrians have the right to defend themselves from a state that is attacking them. Certainly international military intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo, and arguably Libya saved a lot of lives. Why should Syrians not be entitled to protection? Isn’t it our responsibility to meet that expectation?
First on protection: the responsibility belongs in the first instance to the Syrian government. The international community is not obligated to intervene. It may do so under particular circumstances, when the government has clearly failed to protect the population. I don’t see a stomach for overt intervention in the U.S. Nor do I think the Arab League or Turkey will do it without the U.S., as Anne-Marie Slaughter suggests.If the violence continues to spiral, the regime is going to win.
The Syrian government has not only failed to protect, it has in fact attacked its own citizens, indiscriminately and ferociously. Self-defense and intervention are justified. The question is whether they are possible or wise, which they do not appear to be.
The Free Syria Army, an informal collection of anti-regime insurgents, is nowhere near able to protect the population. Their activities provoke the government and its unfree Army to even worse violence. It would be far better if defected soldiers worked for strictly defensive purposes, accompanying street demonstrators and rooting out agents provocateurs rather than suicidally contesting forces that are clearly stronger and better armed. A few automatic weapon rounds fired in the general direction of the artillery regiments bombarding Homs are going to help the artillery with targeting and do little else.
Violence also reduces the likelihood of future defections from the security forces. For current Syrian soldiers weighing defection, it is one thing to refuse to fire on unarmed demonstrators. It is another to desert to join the people who are shooting at you. Defections are important — eventually, they may thin the regime’s support. But they aren’t going to happen as quickly or easily if rebels are shooting at the soldiers they want to see defect.
But if you can’t march around singing kumbaya, what are you going to do? There are a number of options, few of which have been tried. Banging pans at a fixed hour of the night is a tried and true protest technique that demonstrates and encourages opposition, but makes it hard for the authorities to figure out just who is opposing them. The Arab variation is Allahu akbar called out for 15 minutes every evening. A Libyan who helped organize the revolutionary takeover of Tripoli explained to me that their effort began with hundreds of empty mosques playing the call to prayer, recorded on CDs, at an odd hour over their loudspeakers. A general strike gives clear political signals and makes it hard for the authorities to punish all those involved. Coordinated graffiti, marking sidewalks with identical symbols, wearing of the national flag — consult Gene Sharp’s 198 methods for more.
The point is to demonstrate wide participation, mock the authorities, and deprive them of their capacity to generate fear. When I studied Arabic in Damascus a few years ago, I asked an experienced agitator friend about the efficacy of the security forces. She said they were lousy. “What keeps everyone in line?” I asked. “Fear,” she replied. If the oppositions resorts to violence, it helps the authorities: by responding with sometimes random violence, they hope to re-instill fear.
Could the Syrians return to nonviolence after everything that’s happened? As long as they are hoping for foreign intervention or foreign arms, it’s not likely. Steve Heydemann, my former colleague at the United States Institute of Peace, recently suggested on PBS Newshour that we need a “framework” for arming the opposition that would establish civilian control over Free Syria Army. This is a bad idea if you have any hope of getting back to nonviolence, as it taints the civilians, making even the nonviolent complicit in the violence. It’s also unlikely to work: forming an army during a battle is not much easier than building your airplane as you head down the runway.
What is needed now is an effort to calm the situation in Homs, Hama, Deraa, and other conflict spots. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who is visiting Damascus, could help. The continuing assault on Homs and other population centers is a major diplomatic embarrassment to Moscow. The opposition should ask for a ceasefire and the return of the Arab League observers, who clearly had a moderating influence on the activities of the regime. And, this time around, they should be beefed up with UN human rights observers.
If the violence continues to spiral, the regime is going to win. They are better armed and better organized. The Syrian revolt could come to look like the Iranian street demonstrations of 2009, or more likely the bloody Shia revolt in Iraq in 1991, or the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1982, which ended with the regime killing thousands. There is nothing inevitable about the fall of this or any other regime — that is little more than a White House talking point. What will make it inevitable is strategic thinking, careful planning, and nonviolent discipline. Yes, even now.
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