Tag: Arab League
Opinion matters
Shibley Telhami presented his new book, The World Through Arab Eyes; Arab Public Opinion and the Reshaping of the Middle East, at Brookings this week. BBC’s Kim Ghattas was quick to offer an alternative title: “Everything you want to know about the Middle East but aren’t getting from the headlines.”
Telhami explained that Arab public opinion is now the source of real insight into the layers of conflict spread across the Middle East. The Arab uprisings have increased its importance. The essential theme emerging after the first uprisings of 2011 was Arab identity. Understanding identity is central to understanding public opinion.
While domestic issues and authoritarian abuses may have triggered the Arab uprisings, foreign policy was also important. The years leading up to the Arab uprising were not inherently different from decades past in regards to domestic and economic woes. But Arabs are angry about the collapse of Israeli/Palestinian negotiations in 2000, the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq war and the Gaza wars. It was a strikingly violent decade (and more) in international relations.
Arab populations are angry because their leaders and governments were powerless to stand up to foreign invasions and defend the wishes of their citizens. Arab identity and sovereignty were compromised. Arab leaders played no role in stopping it.
Arab public option polls during this period were striking. One question, “who is the leader you admire most in the world?” is a crucial lens for seeing how Arabs judged and chose leaders at that time. Jacques Chirac, Hassan Nasrallah, Hugo Chaves and even Saddam Hussein were the most common answers. Telhami attributes these responses to each leader’s strong and defiant role in foreign affairs. Post Arab spring polls show Turkey’s Prime Minister, Erdogan, as one of the most popular leaders for his assertive stance in foreign policy and his ability to stand up for Turkey’s identity.
Telhami observes that identification with the state has declined while identification with Islam has increased. The adage, “you are what you have to defend” applies here, as Muslims see Islam as under assault. Increased identification as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Arab’ is also correlated with the rise in transnational media in the Middle East. Arabs are associating with others outside their national borders. This has important implications for the relationship between people and their governments, which have to take into account public opinion that extends beyond their borders.
The discussion of transnational Arab identity naturally led to a discussion of Israel and Palestine. For Arabs, the Palestinian issue reflects decades of painful defeats and remains a humiliating reminder of their powerlessness. It as an open wound.
Kim Ghattas disagreed that the Palestinian issue was central to Arab identity. She thought the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has taken a back seat now that people finally have a chance to change their domestic situation. In the past, Palestinian issues were used as a rallying cry for Arab autocrats trying to suppress and distract their own people. Finally, Arabs have a say within their own country, and they are going to speak.
There is no going back. Public opinion has been empowered.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Syria isn’t going away
I couldn’t agree more with Fred Hof’s bottom line in his and Alex Simon’s paper prepared for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Sectarian Violence in Syria’s Civil War: Causes, Consequences, and Recommendations for Mitigation:
Left on its current trajectory, Syria is on the path to state failure and sustained sectarian violence, featuring mass atrocities and cleansing that could amount to genocide in some areas.
That is a clear and compelling alarm, one the Holocaust Museum is uniquely qualified to sound.
As Fred and Alex painstakingly elaborate, all of the likely scenarios, including an opposition victory, will produce serious risks. This is due in no small measure to the history and context of the Syrian war. Syrian society is riddled with cleavages: sectarian, ethnic, regional, urban/rural and ideological. The Asad regime papered over them a thin veneer of secularism but quickly ripped that off when the Sunni majority rebelled. The regime has intentionally sectarianized the war, ensuring itself Alawite and other minority support by making the fight an existential one. As Hof and Simon put it:
Thus, while preaching and promoting secularism, Assad built a system implicitly featuring the sectarian poison pill: any attempt by non-Alawites to bring down the regime would run the risk of taking the country down with it via a bitter sectarian struggle.
- regime victory
- managed transition
- rebel victory
- stalemate, descent into further sectarian violence, possible state failure
They quite rightly conclude that each is worse than the last when it comes to the risks of mass atrocity and even genocide in some areas.
Check: possible future developments foreseen. Check: alarm bell rung. What is to be done?
That’s where the Holocaust Museum paper is less satisfying, but not for lack of good policy proposals. Hof and Simon want an inclusive, tolerant opposition government committed to rule of law on Syrian territory. They want a negotiated settlement that creates a transition regime. They want trust funds to back the transition. They want supply of training and weapons to good guys, while funding to bad guys is blocked. They want a UN-authorized, NATO-led stabilization force, to accompany unarmed observers. They want US support for a democratically oriented, non-sectarian outcome.
I can’t quarrel with wanting these things. But it is not at all clear how to get to them, or even how some of them would help to prevent mass atrocity. In my view, what is needed is a less global set of options targeted on the specific issue of protecting civilians. More than 70,000 Syrians are now dead due to a war that started only a bit more than two years ago. This is a colossal failure of the responsibility to protect, which lies first and foremost with the Syrian government. The options may be quite different in each scenario, but the moral imperative is the same: something needs to be done to save lives.
It is looking very much as if the fourth scenario is the most likely one (stalemate, descent into further sectarian violence, possible state failure). Preventing that or mitigating its consequences is going to require more international political will than has been forthcoming so far. Even if there is an opposition victory, the transition will be a long and painful one. With the withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has dismantled much of its civilian capacity to handle cases of state failure. We need to be thinking about how to fill the gap, either with our own personnel and resources or other peoples’. UN? Arab League? Turkey? One way or another, Syria is going to be with us for a long time. It isn’t going away just because Washington ignores it.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Peace Picks March 18-March 22
A very busy spring break week in DC:
1. Overcoming Obstacles to Peace, Monday March 18, 10 AM- 11:30 AM, US Institute of Peace
Venue: US Institute of Peace, 2301 Constitution Ave NW, Washington DC, B203-204
Speakers: James Dobbins, Laurel Miller, William Durch, Joe Collins
How can societies build enduring peace? This is a simple question that the international community has tried to answer from a variety of different perspectives and efforts. A new book, “Overcoming Obstacles to Peace,” finds evidence that international interventions can in fact build more peaceful nations. Using thorough research supported by metrics, authors James Dobbins and Laurel Miller of the RAND Corporation demonstrate how 16 out of 20 selected conflicts over the past 25 years affirm the international community’s role and effectiveness in building stable nations.
Join the U.S. Institute of Peace and the RAND Corporation in this important discussion on March 18, 2013 from 10-11:30 AM at the U.S. Institute of Peace Headquarters.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/overcoming…
2. Obama to the Middle East: Expectations and Implications, Monday March 18, 12 PM- 2 PM, Washington Institute of Near East Policy
Venue: Washington Institute of Near East Policy 1828 L Street NW, Suite 1050, Washington, D.C. 20036, Stern Library and Conference Room
Speakers: Dennis Ross, Michael Singh,and David Makovsky
President Obama embarks on the first foreign travel of his second term next week, and despite talk of a tilt toward Asia and disengagement from Middle East wars, he is headed into the heart of the region, visiting Israel, Jordan, and the West Bank. To discuss why he is visiting the Middle East, what his priorities are for the trip, and what implications it may hold for such key policy issues as the Iran nuclear challenge, the worsening Syria crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, TWI will host a Policy Forum luncheon with Dennis Ross, Michael Singh, and David Makovsky.
Ambassador Dennis Ross is counselor to The Washington Institute. Previously, he served on the Obama administration’s National Security Council staff as senior director for the Central Region, responsible for U.S. policy toward the Middle East and North Africa.
Michael Singh, the Institute’s managing director, served in the George W. Bush administration as senior director for Middle East affairs on the National Security Council.
David Makovsky, the Institute’s Ziegler distinguished fellow and director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process, just returned from a trip to Israel and the West Bank.
3. Economic Turmoil in Arab Countries: Can Partners Help?, Monday March 18 12 PM- 1:45 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Marwan Muasher, Uri Dadush, Ibrahim Saif, Jean-Pierre Chauffour, Nemat Shafik
More than two years after the outbreak of democratic revolutions in several Arab countries, the economic situation in the region remains precarious. Progress in restoring confidence as well as sustainable and rapid economic growth will depend overwhelmingly on internal forces and the return of political stability. However, external partners can also play a role in helping normalize and eventually improving the underlying growth fundamentals of these economies. How will the Arab economic outlook evolve? What more can the United States and Europe-the region’s largest trading partners-do to support democratic transition and economic liberalization in the countries affected? What is the respective role of trade and aid?
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
4. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War, Monday March 18 12:30 PM
Venue: Cato Institute 1000 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001Hayek Auditorium
Speakers: Fred Kaplan, Spencer Ackerman, Janine Davidson, Christopher Preble
In “The Insurgents”, Fred Kaplan tells the story of how a small group of soldier-scholars revolutionized the United States military. Their aim was to build a new Army that could fight a new kind of war in the post-Cold War age: small wars in cities and villages, against terrorists and insurgents. These would be wars not only of fighting but of nation building, often not of necessity but of choice.
Kaplan describes how these men and women maneuvered their ideas about counterinsurgency – or COIN, for short – through the bureaucracy and made it official policy. But it is also a cautionary tale about how creative doctrine can harden into dogma, how smart strategists – today’s best and brightest – can win the battles at home but not the wars abroad. By adapting the U.S. military to fight the conflicts of the modern era, they also created the tools – and made it more tempting – for political leaders to wade into wars that they would be wise to avoid.
If you cant make it to the Cato Institute, watch this event live online at www.cato.org/live and follow @CatoEvents on Twitter to get future event updates, live streams, and videos from the Cato Institute.
Featuring the author Fred Kaplan, War Stories Columnist, Slate, with comments by Spencer Ackerman, National Security Correspondent, WIRED; and Janine Davidson, George Mason University; moderated by Christopher Preble, Vice President, Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute.
Website: http://www.cato.org/events/insurgents…
5. Ambassador Marc Grossman on the Campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Monday March 18 3 PM-5 PM, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Venue: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Ambassador Marc Grossman, Jessica Tuchman Mathews
In his first public event since stepping down as special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador Marc Grossman will discuss efforts to reach a political settlement and the future of American diplomacy in the region. Carnegie’s Jessica T. Mathews will moderate.
Website: http://carnegieendowment.org/events/?…
6.Afghanistan in Transition: A Trip Report, Tuesday March 19, 9:30 AM, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Anthony Cordesman
CSIS Burke Chair Anthony Cordesman will discuss his recent trip to ISAF headquarters in Afghanistan, and the prospects for a U.S. transition. This event will also launch the Burke Chair’s latest report, a complete analysis of the Afghan transition.
Tuesday, March 19, 2013
9:30 am – 10:30 am EST
B1 Conference Center
CSIS 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC 20006
Please click here to RSVP
Follow @CSIS for live updates
Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contact imisadmin@csis.org
Website: http://csis.org/event/afghanistan-tra…
7. A Delegation of Syrian Opposition Leaders, Tuesday March 19 10:00 AM, National Press Club
Venue: National Press Club, 529 14th St. NW, 13th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20045, Zenger Room
Speakers: Haytham Manna, Rim Turkmani, Riad Drar Al-Hamood
A delegation of Syrian opposition leaders critical of President Bashar al-Asad, and which opposes foreign intervention and Saudi Arabian-backed ‘rebels’ in the current situation,
The speakers will discuss creating sufficient political momentum for a negotiated settlement to the present Syrian Crisis, and moving toward a democratic, secular future for the country.
Contacts:
National Press Club: PETER HICKMAN
301/367-7711 (c), 301/530-1210 (t), 202/662-7540 (NPC),pjhickman@hotmail.com
Speakers (Global Policy Forum):
DAVID GRANT
david67grant@gmail.com, 202/577-3145
MEL DUNCAN
mduncan@nonviolentpeaceforce.com, 651/245-8706
Website: http://www.press.org/events/delegatio…
8. Syria’s Humanitarian Crisis, Tuesday March 19 10 AM, US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Venue: Dirksen Senate Office Building, Constitution Avenue and 1st Street, NE, Washington, DC Room 419
Speakers: The Honorable Anne C. Richard, The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg, Mr. Tom Malinowski
Website: http://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearing…
9. US Policy in the Middle East on the Verge of Obama’s Trip, Tuesday March 19 12 PM- 1:30 PM, Center for American Progress
Venue: Center for American Progress, 1333 H Street NW, 10th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005
Speakers: Rudy deLeon, Martin Indyk, Bruce Jentleson
On March 20 President Barack Obama will arrive in Israel in the first part of a regional visit that includes the West Bank and Jordan. The President’s trip to the region comes at a time of change in Israel and the region. On his upcoming trip, President Obama will face a full slate of challenges and opportunities, including concerns over Egypt’s continued political transition, Syrias civil war, the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, and the threats posed by Iran.
Please join the Center for American Progress for a keynote speech by Sandy Berger, chair at the Albright Stonebridge Group and former national security advisor to President Bill Clinton, previewing President Obamas trip to Israel and the regional challenges that face him there. Following his keynote speech, Berger will join a panel discussion with Rudy deLeon, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy at CAP and former deputy secretary of defense, who just returned from a CAP delegation to Israel and the West Bank; Martin Indyk, vice president and director of foreign policy at Brookings and former assistant secretary of state for Near East affairs; and Bruce Jentleson, professor of public policy and political science at Duke University and an expert on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.
As part of this event, the Center for American Progress will release findings from a report based on discussions with Israeli and Palestinian officials during a recent visit to the region by members of the National Security and International Policy team.
Website: http://www.americanprogress.org/event…
10. After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I), Tuesday March 19 1:00 PM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Seth G. Jones, Kimberly Kagan, Peter Bergen, Daniel S. Markey
Chairman Chabot on the hearing: “U.S. national security interests in South Asia are both dire and immediate. The 2014 withdrawal plan from Afghanistan is strategically risky and threatens to plunge Afghanistan into a state in which terrorists will once again thrive. At the same time, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan has deteriorated dramatically and falters over Pakistan’s involvement with terrorist organizations and the drone war in the tribal bad lands. While Islamabad claims U.S. and Pakistani interests can be brought into alignment, we must remain skeptical of its internal divergent interests that risk undermining U.S. interests, the relationship with India, and the chance for a stable, peaceful, and independent Afghanistan. This hearing is an important opportunity to examine the President’s hasty withdrawal plan from Afghanistan and evaluate how events in Pakistan over the next year may affect U.S. national security interests throughout the entire region.”
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen on the hearing: With President Obama’s announcement last month that the U.S. will draw down our forces in Afghanistan by the end of this year without a clear withdrawal plan, it is necessary to have a hearing that will examine the security implications of this decision and analyze the capacity of the Afghani and Pakistan government to address crime and corruption while ensuring secured territories in their countries. This is imperative particularly in light of recent inflammatory accusations made by Afghani leader Hamid Karzai which have further strained U.S. – Afghanistan relations and put our troops at greater risk. We must do everything we can to prevent al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist militants from taking over and undoing the efforts and sacrifices made by the U.S. and our allies for over a decade.
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
11. Iraq, 10 years later: A conversation with Senator John McCain, General Jack Keane, and Frederick W. Kagan, Tuesday March 19 3:30 PM- 4:30 PM, American Enterprise Institute
Venue: American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036
Speakers: Frederick W. Kagan, General Jack Keane, John Mccain
Ten years ago, the United States entered Iraq and in a few short weeks ended Saddam Hussein’s reign of tyranny. What followed — wild swings between victory and defeat, liberation and occupation — and ended with President Barack Obama’s decision to withdraw all US forces from Iraq in 2011, is likely to be a source of contention for years to come.
As we approach the anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq War, many questions remain: Is Iraq a success? What role will Iran and al Qaeda play in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of American forces? Were the war and the liberation of 25 million Iraqis worth the high price Americans paid in blood and treasure? Please join us as we reflect on a conflict that helped shape the beginning of the 21st century in American foreign policy. Senator John McCain will be joined by a panel featuring General Jack Keane (ret.) and AEI’s Frederick W. Kagan.
If you are unable to attend, we welcome you to watch the event live on this page. Full video will be posted within 24 hours.
Website: http://www.aei.org/events/2013/03/19/…
12. Crisis in Syria: The US Response, Wednesday March 20 9:45 AM, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Robert S. Ford, Anne C. Richard, Nancy E. Lindborg
Chairman Royce on the hearing: “Unfortunately, we are watching conditions in Syria continue to deteriorate precipitously. The Assad regime has killed tens of thousands of Syrians. Millions more have been displaced or have fled to neighboring countries increasingly strained by their influx. This is a regional crisis. It’s time for the Obama Administration, which has struggled on Syria, to present and defend its policy on all fronts, including its humanitarian efforts. The Committee will focus on how the U.S. can best protect its vital national interests and effectively promote a stable and peaceful Syria.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
13.Changing Challenges for the Gulf States- A Panel Discussion, Wednesday March 20 12:00 Pm- 2: 00 Pm, Elliott School of International Affairs
Venue: Elliott School of International Affairs, 1957 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20052Lindner Family Commons
Speakers: Christopher Davidson, Kristin Smith Diwan, Gwenn Okruhlik, Marc Lynch
Christopher Davidson, Reader in Middle East Politics, School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University
Kristin Smith Diwan, Assistant Professor, Comparative and Regional Studies, School of International Service, American University
Gwenn Okruhlik, President, Association for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Studies
Moderated by:
Marc Lynch, George Washington University
Three leading political scientists will discuss the current challenges facing the Gulf States.
*A light lunch will be served.*
RSVP: tinyurl.com/a6tvn2m
Sponsored by the Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Website: http://www.elliottschool.org/events/c…
14. Hezbollah’s Strategic Shift: A Global Terrorist Threat, Wednesday March 20 1:30 Pm, US House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC2172 House Rayburn Office Building
Speakers: Will Fulton, Matthew Levitt, Roger Noriega
Chairman Poe on the hearing: “Next week, the TNT Subcommittee will bring together experts to discuss the evolution of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has historically been a terrorist organization whose activity has been isolated in the Middle East. Hezbollah is the puppet of Iran worldwide. Under the guidance of the Iranian regime, this jihadist group has expanded its reach and shifted its strategy to operate in virtually every corner of the world including Latin America and Europe. I look forward to hearing testimony about the relationship between Hezbollah and the Iranian regime, how this threat has grown in recent years, and what implications this dangerous alliance has for U.S. national security.”
Website: http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/heari…
16. The Muslim Brotherhood and the West, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 4:00pm, Foreign Policy Research Institute
Venue: Reserve Officers Association, 1 Constitution Ave NE Washington, DC
Speakers: Lorenzo Vidino, Abdullah Bijad Alotibi, Joseph Braude, Sam Helfont
Few observers foresaw the Arab Spring, but it should not have surprised anyone that the Islamist movements the most organized movements in the Arab world became the main beneficiaries of the turmoil that ensued. Islamism, in its gradualist and pragmatic approach embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots worldwide, seems ready to reap the rewards of its three decades-old decision to abandon violence and focus on grassroots activities. This monumental change has created many concerns among liberals, religious minorities and, more generally, all non-Islamists in the countries where Islamists have won. In addition, Arab states ruled by non-Islamist regimes have expressed concern. The former worry that Islamist ideology even in its more contemporary, pragmatic form remains deeply divisive and anti-democratic, often at odds with their values and interests. The latter believe that on foreign policy issues, most of the positions of various Brotherhood-inspired parties are on a collision course with the policies of established regimes in the region.
In association with Al Mesbar Studies and Research Centre (based in the United Arab Emirates), the Foreign Policy Research Institute has just published as an E-Book The West and the Muslim Brotherhood After the Arab Spring, edited by Lorenzo Vidino. The book provides an overview of each of eight countries’ policies towards Islamism, including the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, and Israel. In this program, Vidino highlights the key lessons of the volume, and comment is offered by Abdullah Bijad Alotibi and Joseph Braude.
Website: http://www.fpri.org/events/2013/03/mu…
16. The Petro-politics of Azerbaijan, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:00pm, Institute of World Politics
Venue: Institute of World Politics, 1521 16th Street NW Washington, DC
Speakers: Vilen Khlgatyan
This lecture is part of a series on the Intermarium, organized by the Kosciuszko Chair of Polish Studies at IWP.
Mr. Khlgatyan will discuss the role Azerbaijan’s oil and gas reserves have played in attracting the Oil Majors to the region, and how this in turn has helped and hindered Azerbaijan’s domestic and foreign politics. Moreover, with Azerbaijani oil reserves having hit their peak in 2010-2011, what does the future hold?
Vilen Khlgatyan is Vice-Chairman of Political Developments Research Center (PDRC), a virtual think tank based in Yerevan, Armenia.
He attended Webster University, where he double majored in International Relations and International Business, and graduated in Spring 2010. He spent a semester studying in Vienna, Austria, where he also attended OPEC and OSCE workshops.
His studies at IWP have focused on national security and the geopolitics of energy. He is writing his honors thesis on the ‘Geopolitics of Energy in the South Caucasus.’
Mr. Khlgatyan was a campaign staffer for Congressman Russ Carnahan of Missouri’s 3rd District, who sat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Important note: Attendance at all IWP events requires an RSVP in advance. In addition, prospective attendees must receive an e-mail confirmation from IWP indicating that seating will be available for them at the event. A government-issued ID that matches your name on the confirmed attendee list must be presented at the door for admission to any event. The use of photographic and/or recording equipment is prohibited except by advanced permission from IWP, the event organizer, and the speaker(s). IWP is a private organization; as such, all attendees are guests of the Institute.
Website: http://www.iwp.edu/events/detail/the-…
17. The Turkey, Russia, Iran Nexus: Driving Forces and Strategies, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:00pm – 3:30pm, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Bulent Aliriza, Jon B. Alterman, Andrew C. Kuchins, Stephen J. Flanagan
CSIS scholars will present the key findings of their 18 month project that has examined the forces and interests driving relations among Turkey, Russia, and Iran and the strategies that these governments are pursuing to manage differences and sustain economic and energy cooperation. They will also discuss how complex and often contradictory interactions among these three countries are shaping regional dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean, Caucasus, and Central Asia, as they have for centuries. The nexus of the three pairs of relations are also influencing each country’s dealings with the other two as well as with the United States, and are being whipsawed by recent events. Starkly differing policies toward the Syrian civil war and the Arab Spring have strained Ankara’s relations with Moscow and Tehran. Understanding these dynamics is essential to avoiding a wider war in the Middle East, renewed conflict in the Caucasus, and instability in Central Asia following the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan.
Please Click Here to RSVP online or email us at KissingerChair@csis.org.
(Note: You must log on to your CSIS account to register online. If you do not have an account with CSIS, you will need to create one. If you have any difficulties, or do not receive ‘password reset’ emails, please contactimisadmin@csis.org).
Website: http://csis.org/event/turkey-russia-i…
18. The Struggle for Democracy in Tunisia, Wednesday, March 20 / 2:30pm – 5:00pm, Johns Hopkins SAIS
Venue: John Hopkins SAIS- Nitze Building, 1740 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036Kenney Auditorium
Webcast: This event will be webcast live beginning at 2:30pm ET on March 20, 2013 at www.usip.org/webcast.
Tunisia’s 2010-11 ‘Jasmine Revolution’ ignited a flame of political rebellion that quickly spread to Egypt, Yemen, Libya, Bahrain, and Syria. But as the ‘Arab Spring’ enters its third season, Tunisia’s struggle for democracy is beset by escalating ideological and even violent conflicts. What are the key challenges facing Tunisia? How can U.S. officials and nongovernmental organizations help Tunisians address mounting domestic and regional crises?
To discuss these and other questions, the United States Institute of Peace, Georgetown University, Johns Hopkins SAIS, and Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED) are pleased to invite you to a public round-table featuring a delegation of prominent Tunisian political scientists on Wednesday, March 20, 2013 from 2:30pm to 5:00pm at SAIS. Members of the delegation will offer their perspectives on the situation and then participate in a frank question-and-answer session. We hope that you will be able to join us for this very special event.
Website: http://www.usip.org/events/the-strugg…
19. Turkey’s Kurdish Question: A New Hope?, Wednesday, March 20 / 3:00pm – 4:30pm, Brookings Institution
Venue: Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036Saul/Zilkha Rooms
Speakers: Kemal Kirisci, Aliza Marcus, mer Taspinar, Gnl Tol
Turkey’s approach to dealing with its Kurdish minority-the Kurdish question-at home and in the region is once again at a critical juncture. From the prospects for a new constitution to Ankara’s Syria dilemma, virtually all the pressing issues facing Turkey have a Kurdish dimension. After the failure of the ‘Oslo process,’ Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has initiated another round of negotiations, this time called the ‘Imrali process’ and directly involving the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan. The process has been challenging, but extremely cautious expectations and hopes are growing that the rejuvenated process will not succumb to the fate of the previous efforts at solving the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
Given past failures at dialogue and at finding a mutually-acceptable, peaceful, and democratic solution to the problem, how might the ‘Imrali process’ prove different? What do the Kurds of Turkey want? Is the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) ready to meet Kurdish demands? What is Erdogan’s objective? What are the regional implications? At a time when Syria is in turmoil and Iraqi is facing increasing domestic instability, is a major breakthrough possible?
On March 20, the Center on the United States and Europe at Brookings (CUSE) will host a discussion to explore these and other important questions related to Turkey’s Kurdish minority. Featured speakers include Brookings Nonresident Senior Fellow Ömer Taspinar, author and journalist Aliza Marcus, and Gönül Tol of the Middle East Institute. Brookings TUSIAD Senior Fellow Kemal Kirisci will provide introductory remarks and moderate the discussion. The event is part of the TUSIAD U.S.-Turkey Forum at Brookings. After the program, the panelists will take audience questions.
Participants can join the conversation on Twitter during the event using #FPKurds.
Website: http://webfeeds.brookings.edu/~r/Broo…
20. What Should Obama do on North Korea?, Thursday, March 21 / 9:00am, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Venue: Center for Strategic and International Studies1800 K Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20006
Speakers: Victor D. Cha, Walter L. Sharp
Please join us for a Korea Chair Platform event with Victor Cha, Walter L. Sharp, and Joseph R. DeTrani. In the wake of the December 2012 missile launch and the February 2013 nuclear test, our distinguished panelists will share their views on the road ahead and what President Obama should do on North Korea. We hope you can join us!
To RSVP for this event, please email KoreaChair@csis.org.
The Korea Chair Platform is made possible by the generous support of Samsung Electronics America.
Website: http://csis.org/event/what-should-oba…
21. The Rise and Fall of Democracies and Dictatorships: New Perspectives on Democratic Governance, Friday, March 22 / 9:00am – 11:00am, Woodrow Wilson Center
Venue: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20004
Speakers: Scott Mainwaring, Frances Hagopian, Steven Levitsky
Website: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the…
22. Mapping Egyptian Politics: Where Is Egypt Heading and What Does That Mean for the United States?, Friday, March 22 / 10:30am – 12:00pm, RAND Corporation
Venue: Rayburn House Office Building, 45 Independence Ave SW, Washington, DC 2168 Rayburn House Office Building
Speakers: Jeff Martini, Michele Dunne, Samer Shehata, Anne Gearan
Despite widespread unrest, continued wrangling over the election law, and threats of an opposition boycott, Egypt is scheduled to hold parliamentary elections in the coming months. Egypt’s transition has already been punctuated by a series of Islamist victories at the polls. In this session, three Egypt watchers will take a closer look at what past electoral performance and the current political context say about the Islamists’ strength in Egypt and what it means for the United States.
Website: http://www.rand.org/events/2013/03/22..
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Preventing mass atrocity after Assad
Reuters (http://reut.rs/WMw240) published this piece today:
As the second anniversary of the Syrian uprising approaches, close to 80,000 people have been killed, a million are refugees and several million are displaced. The Syrian army and air force are under severe stress and attacking civilian populations, the revolutionaries are increasingly radicalized in a Sunni Islamist direction and Lebanese Hezbollah as well as Iranian Revolutionary Guards are getting deeply engaged in the fight.
It may seem superfluous to worry about what happens to the Alawite community — the mainstay of Bashar Al Assad’s regime – after he falls. But revenge killing is common after an uprising of this sort, and few regimes born in mass atrocity survive as democracies. A massacre of Alawites could be prelude to state collapse, an extremist regime and regional warfare far worse than the spillover we have seen thus far.
How can mass atrocity in the aftermath of the Assad regime be avoided? Above all, it is Syrians who will need to make sure it does not happen. The Syrian Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces has already made clear that it intends to construct a multi-sectarian, multi-ethnic and democratic regime post-Assad. What needs to be accomplished to achieve that goal?
A lot. Here are just a few of the options that need to be considered:
- A negotiated end to the regime. Atrocities will be far less likely if there is a clear, well-constructed and well-communicated end to the Assad regime, with a roadmap to a future democratic constitution that will respect minority rights. A chaotic collapse of the regime will make mayhem much more likely, including a possible “stay-behind” insurgency like the one in Iraq after the American invasion.
- International supervision. The roadmap could be implemented with oversight from a “contact group” that includes the main international powers with influence, including neighbors and regional powers. The big issue here is whether Iran is in or out, which depends on Tehran’s attitude toward any negotiated settlement.
- An international intervention force. There will be many armed groups in Syria, however the conflict ends. A strong, legitimate international intervention force of both police and military could separate warring parties, establish a safe and secure environment and protect minorities. The big question is: Who would provide these troops and police? Iraq’s neighbors have all been parties to the conflict. The Arab League is inexperienced at stabilization and peacekeeping. The United States and Europe are trying to stay out.
- New security forces. Assad’s army, police, intelligence and other security forces will be thoroughly discredited once the regime is gone. It will be necessary to reconfigure, retrain and reform the security forces so they can reestablish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence accepted by both former regime elements and rebels. It was the failure to do this effectively that has made a mess of post-Qaddafi Libya. Training of a small Syrian “stabilization” force could begin even now outside Syria, for deployment into liberated areas.
- Accountability and justice. It is never possible to punish all those who have supported a dictatorial regime, but victims will be looking for satisfaction. This can initially be offered in a well-articulated plan of action for holding a clearly defined and limited number of senior regime figures accountable for abuses, as well as a broader reconciliation effort to give victims an opportunity to voice grievances and seek eventual redress.
- Outreach by the new leaders to communities that have not supported the revolution. Few countries are blessed with a Nelson Mandela, but even lesser figures could try to reassure those who have supported the regime and provide credible guarantees of security. They might even invite in foreign forces to establish a “safe and secure environment” for particular communities at risk.
- Basic human needs. Many Syrians are lacking food, water, sanitation and shelter. The country will need a rapid infusion of vital humanitarian assistance that is distributed fairly and transparently by a duly constituted authority.
- Quick stabilization of the economy. The Syrian economy will be in free fall. The country will be unable to pay its debts and will need relief from international obligations. It may also need a new currency and a credible central bank. It will certainly need jobs, especially for the many youth already unemployed before the war. They will otherwise find employment with militias unlikely to be sensitive to human rights.
- Local community development. Major development projects will have to wait. They will require a well-functioning government and a credible sovereign guarantee to reopen lending by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. A well-targeted reconstruction effort that local communities help plan and monitor, like the successful National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan, would be a good start, provide livelihoods and contribute to mitigating the likelihood of violence.
- Dispute settlement. As people return to their homes, disputes will break out over property, much of which will be badly damaged and destroyed. It is important to establish a relatively quick administrative procedure for settlement of disputes and recovery of private property, in particular real estate.
- Funding for civil society. Syria under Assad lacked the vigorous nongovernmental organizations that provide advocacy, serve as watchdogs and help protect human rights and minorities in open societies. Funding and empowerment of grassroots organizations committed to a democratic outcome and organized across sectarian and ethnic lines, including the revolutionary local administrative councils that have spontaneously appeared in liberated areas, can strengthen social cohesion and prevent violence.
- Safe havens for particular minorities. Odious though it may be on other grounds, temporary separation of ethnic and sectarian groups in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict can help to prevent violence and reduce risks to vulnerable minorities. Many Syrian neighborhoods are more or less segregated. It may be best to keep them that way for a time, but to move once trust is re-established in the direction of much more sectarian and ethnic integration.
Syrians will have to decide for themselves what they want to take advantage of, or not, from this laundry list. They may well also discover some new tricks. But the country will be far better off in the long term if Syrians and internationals start thinking now about what to do to prevent the worst from happening after Assad falls.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Preventing violent conflict after Asad
This is a paper I prepared for USAID, which hosted a discussion last week. The questions are theirs, the answers mine:
- What is the map of conflict? What is the recent history of the Syrian conflict, including the divisions and connections within Syrian society?
Geographically, the best I’ve seen recently mapping areas of (relative) control is this, from the Institute for the Study of War. But these sharply delineated areas do not convey the complexity of the situation. Confrontation lines are not well defined. Large parts of the north are nominally in rebel hands, or Kurdish hands, or no-man’s land, including most or all of the border points with Turkey. But the regime is still capable of striking, at least from the air, in these areas, and the rebels are capable of striking within regime-held areas. There are neighborhoods within regime-controlled towns that are rebel-held, and vice versa. The most up to date unclassified picture I’ve seen is “Cities and towns during the Syrian civil war” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cities_and_towns_during_the_Syrian_civil_war). They offer this picture of the situation in Aleppo on November 23, 2012 (they have more recent pictures, but I was unable to lift them into this document): 
This fluid, confused, overlapping and uncertain pattern of control among at least three distinct forces (rebels, Kurds and government) will make the post-war period particularly hazardous, as regime and rebel forces jockey for position both before and after a ceasefire, if one is every agreed.
Syria is a diverse society. Pre-war, religious and ethnic groups were more or less distributed this way. Many areas included people belonging to other than the dominant group. This will decline. With more than 2 million displaced and half a million refugees in neighboring countries, towns and neighborhoods will tend to homogenize. People will seek refuge more often than not among their own sect or ethnic group. Individuals in mixed areas may try initially to protect them from ethnic and sectarian cleansing, but some minorities, especially in majority Sunni areas that come under Islamist rebel control, will leave. Syria will have fewer mixed communities and neighborhoods at the end of the civil war than it had at the beginning.
2. What are the vital grievances or interests, how do they threaten other groups, and how may that lead to future violence even after the regime changes?
The main overtly expressed grievance at this point is the persistence in power of the regime, which the unarmed opposition and the armed rebels regard as criminally oppressive, illegitimate and self-enriching. The revolution has been fought in the name of dignity and freedom. It has not on the whole been fought on sectarian grounds, but some of its adherents are Islamist extremists who regard the Alawites and other minorities with hostility, disdain or worse.
There is widespread resentment of the Alawites for their support to the regime, the privileges some of them have acquired over four decades of the Assad regime, their loyalty to Assad during the revolution and the behavior of their militia (Shabiha) towards non-Alawites. Few Alawites have joined the rebellion, whose adherents (like Syria itself) are mainly Sunni. Very few of the defectors from the regime are Alawite. There is also a periphery vs. center conflict: people from rural and suburban areas have attacked town centers, poorer neighborhoods have given haven to rebels while wealthier neighborhoods have tended to remain more loyal to the regime.
While many Kurds dislike the regime and the Kurdish National Council has formally joined the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, Kurdish forces have sometimes clashed with rebels and will expect a federal Syria to emerge post-war, with clearly defined and locally governed Kurdish areas. This will be a challenge even under the best of circumstances, given the distribution of Kurds and their relatively small numbers (under 10%?).
Christians, Ismailis and Druze have split, some supporting the regime and others opposing. But some extremist Islamist fighters will view them as adversaries. The (patently false) secularist claims of the regime have garnered it significant support among minorities, who fear Islamist extremists. Both the minorities and secularism are in for a rough ride after the revolution.
The civil war itself will generate new grievances. It has uprooted a large number of people (the total could easily reach 4 million), destroyed vast amounts of property and killed upwards of 60,000 Syrians. When and if people are able to return to their homes and other property, they may find them destroyed, looted or seized by others. Property disputes are likely to be common. Revenge killing in the absence of a viable police force and justice system will occur. Its scale and extent could amount to mass atrocity.
3. Who are the key actors in the Syrian conflict? i.e., who are the likely conflict mobilizers, Peace builders, and neutral players? Who and which are the individuals or institutions that give societal grievances structure and direction to continue the current violence?
There are lots of people trying to stay out of the line of fire, but there are few playing the role of neutrals. The warring parties are the regime and its opponents, not all of whom are advocates or perpetrators of violence. The armed rebels are still not unified. Many in the opposition have not wanted to see militarization of the conflict, and non-violent demonstrations have continued.
At the retail level, almost anyone aggrieved may become a conflict mobilizer, and that will mean almost everyone. But mass mobilization for violence requires more than individuals. Some of the main suspects for larger scale mobilization of violence belong to the former warring parties:
- Regime forces, especially Shabiha and elite forces (Republican guard, for example), who fear revenge or have been instructed to continue resistance (remember the Saddam fedayeen!).
- Rebel armed groups seeking to enlarge their areas of control, enforce discipline and seize property. Jabhat al Nusra, the Al Qaeda affiliate that the United States has declared a terrorist group, and other armed Sunni Islamists will try to dominate the post-war scene.
- Intelligence operatives of both warring parties (including non-Syrians) and others seeking to escape or cover their previous misdeeds.
Some of these potential sources of violence can also play a mitigating role, provided they get an adequate political settlement and are brought under civilian control (witness February 17 and other militias in Libya in the immediate aftermath of the revolution, for example).
4. What does the future of Syria look like? How is the current violence setting the stage for future conflict or peace? What are the trends or triggering events that will create vulnerabilities to violence?
The future of Syria is bleak. Whenever the civil war ends, its economy will be a shambles, its government will be eviscerated, its military will be disgraced, its population will be impoverished, displaced and heavily armed. Outside powers, which have fought a proxy war inside Syria for almost two years already, will jockey for position post-war, each favoring its surrogates and seeking to ensure its vital interests.
Given the uncertainty of where the confrontation lines lie, it would be a miracle if this civil war ended without chaos, internecine fighting, looting and sectarian revenge killing. Little will be required to trigger violence. The main question is the next one: what can be done to stop it.
5. What are the opportunities for reducing conflict? What have we learned from similar conflict in the region?
In the absence of vigorous efforts to mitigate conflict, it will occur and may lead to mass atrocities, chaos and renewed civil war. Main options (not mutually exclusive) for preventing this from happening include the following:
- A clear, well-constructed and well-communicated end to the Assad regime, agreed by the main players, including as broad a spectrum of revolutionary and regime forces as possible, with a roadmap to a future democratic regime that will respect minority rights.
- Implementation of the roadmap under the supervision of an international body that includes the main international powers with influence (neighbors and major powers).
- A strong, legitimate international intervention force of both police and military to separate warring parties, establish a safe and secure environment and protect minorities.
- Tangible outreach by the new leaders to communities that have not supported the revolution, reassuring them and providing credible guarantees of security, possibly using foreign forces (UN, Arab League or other).
- A well-articulated plan of action for holding a clearly defined and limited number of senior regime figures accountable for abuses, as well as a broader effort to give victims an opportunity to voice grievances and seek eventual redress.
- Reconfiguration, retraining and reform of security forces that can reestablish a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence accepted by both former regime elements and rebels.
- Quick stabilization of the economy and infusion of vital humanitarian assistance that is distributed fairly and transparently.
- A well-targeted reconstruction effort that local communities help plan and monitor (like the National Solidarity Program in Afghanistan).
- Establishment of a relatively quick administrative procedure for settlement of disputes and recovery of private property, in particular real estate.
- Funding and empowerment of grassroots people and organizations (including in particular the revolutionary local administrative councils) committed to a democratic outcome and organized across sectarian and ethnic lines.
- Creation of safe havens for particular minorities.
This last item is distasteful to many (including me), but it has often been used and has sometimes worked, at least temporarily. This is what the Americans did when they constructed T-walls around distinctly Sunni and Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad during 2006/7. The French army did it in northern Kosovo in 1999. It is what some believe Alawites will try to do by retreating to the western littoral, where they traditionally are a higher percentage of the population than in the rest of the country. The Kurds may also attempt to create distinctly Kurdish areas, in preparation for the federalization of Syria they will seek in the post-war constitution.
There are pros and cons to each of these options, but this much is clear: in the absence of a concerted effort to prevent violence post-Assad, Syria is likely to suffer a chaotic episode of horrific blood-letting and state collapse (possibly even fragmentation) that may make the civil war seem tame. Those who seek to prevent this need to plan quickly, secure the necessary resources and gain broad international support for an expensive and challenging effort.
6. What are the implications for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts?
Humanitarian assistance provided to civilians inside Syria in the current confused situation, with no stable, clear lines of confrontation between opposing forces and little humanitarian access, is difficult. The upwards of 2 million internally displaced people are a priority. Whatever channels are used—UN and its agencies, Syrian Red Crescent, ICRC, Western and Islamic nongovernmental organizations—it will be challenging to verify that assistance is going to vulnerable people and is not diverted for political or military purposes. Aid agencies should try to ensure that impartiality in evaluating needs and in delivering commodities. But it would be better to flood Syria with humanitarian assistance, especially this winter, than to worry too much about who will receive it. The $210 million provided by the U.S. in 2012 and so far in 2013 will have to increase sharply if the current level of hostilities continues, as seems likely. U.S. humanitarian assistance so far appears to be reaching most of the areas affected by the war.
Reconstruction assistance is different. The United States, though not a belligerent, has chosen to support the rebellion. Providing reconstruction assistance to the Syrian government while it fights a war against its civilian population is not only inappropriate but harmful and counter-productive. Helping some of the liberated communities, especially in the north, begin to provide basic services would however be a positive contribution. This should be done only with a good understanding of the local situation: through what channels is the assistance being provided? Are they legitimate representatives of the local community? How do we know? How can reasonable standards of accountability and transparency be met? Are there groups in the community not represented? How will providing assistance affect relations between ethnic or sectarian groups? Will it encourage conflict or otherwise do harm? Is the overall balance of assistance equitable? Do the recipients and potential recipients agree? There are groups like the Civil Administration Councils that can help to answer these questions.
Relatively little real reconstruction will get done during the fighting. The main thrust now should be planning. This should be done in close cooperation with the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which is expected in the near future to name a government, including a ministry for reconstruction. Ensuring a tight nexus between international assistance and the new government’s plans is vital. Failure to do so would undermine its authority and legitimacy and make the intended transition to a democratic state far more difficult.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
What is to be done
Hashem Alshamy, a Syrian reader, criticized peacefare.net today:
Sincerely, I have been disappointed with your overtly focus on “post-conflict” suggestions, solutions and suggestions, while taking the events of the past 22 months for granted. It seems that the crimes committed by the regime, military and militia should be taken as fait accompli, while the world should be watching out until the hotheads take over and start their witch hunt against regime henchmen and the minorities who supported them.
He goes on to suggest:
I still appreciate your interest in following up the Syrian “conflict” and writing about it, but my suggestion is to read more about its history and its composition to provide pragmatic solutions to your followers, including me.
Thank you, Hashem, you are precisely correct. I should be thinking more about what the regime is doing and how to prevent it from generating a negative reaction that will haunt the transition period.
I’ve already pointed in one direction: a UN or Arab League peacekeeping force that would seek to establish a safe and secure environment in which the new authorities can begin to establish the justice mechanisms required to assign accountability for past crimes.
But I’ve also pointed out that it will be difficult to find and deploy an international force of the size and capability required. So what else can be done?
The Day After report prepared by Syrian opposition representatives recommends beginning the transitional justice efforts before the fall of the regime:
- establishing a Preparatory Committee to begin to map a strategy of transitional justice;
- preparing to safeguard records and documentation;
- beginning public messaging and outreach to avoid revenge attacks and raise awareness of transitional justice mechanisms;
- anticipating international interest;considering appropriate frameworks to coordinate and integrate the variety of transitional justice mechanisms; and
- preparing personnel who will be engaged in transitional justice institutions.
I see some sign of effort to document abuses and to safeguard records. I imagine there has been some public messaging against revenge attacks, but I’ll be glad if others would enlighten me further on that. To my knowledge, little else of this has happened so far, but I would be happy for an update.
The Day After report also recommended immediate measures for the security sector:
- building trust between the political leadership of opposition groups and the Free Syrian Army;
- initiating efforts to improve command and control among armed opposition groups, ensure their compliance with human rights standards, and secure their acceptance of civilian authority;
- creating an oversight committee to manage the process of SSR in the transitional period;
- preparing for the establishment of a transitional security force based on the Syrian National Police and other resources, including by providing the police with appropriate training; and
- conducting a preliminary vetting of retired and active high-ranking officers in the army and police to identify trustworthy individuals who might take leadership roles in security sector reform.
I see some effort to build trust and coordinate between the political leadership (the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces) and the Free Syrian Army, which itself is more unified than in the past. But I don’t see a lot of the rest of this happening. Again, I’ll be happy to be proven wrong.
What is missing from the Day After report is something I would consider vital: efforts at the local level to establish a safe and secure environment and begin to deliver services to all citizens. I am hoping that organizations like the Civil Administration Councils will make this effort. Syrians are naturally more concerned with their current circumstances than with some abstract future enterprise that the internationals call “transitional justice.” Yes, preparation now for the post-war period can help, as the Day After suggests, but so too can cooperation now to meet immediate human needs in areas that have already been liberated. There is a lot of evidence that cooperation on providing services and enabling economic activity helps to prevent sectarian and ethnic violence when the usual forces of law and order break down.
This is the opposite of the answer Lenin gave to the question “What Is To Be Done?” What Syria needs urgently is not central direction by Lenin’s revolutionary vanguard. The Ba’ath party has arguably provided that to no good effect for many years. Syria needs grassroots efforts by its citizens to establish locally the kind of inclusivity and participation that will prevent future bloodletting.
RSS - Posts
