Tag: arms trade
Stevenson’s army, January 20-23
Charlie has been back a few days, but I’ve been down for the count, so here is a massive catchup edition:
January 23:
The ever-valuable D Brief has this: Norway’s military chief said around 180,000 Russian troops have been killed or injured in Ukraine so far. “Russian losses are beginning to approach around 180,000 dead or wounded soldiers,” and “Ukrainian losses are probably over 100,000 dead or wounded,” Defense Minister Eirik Kristoffersen told TV2 on Sunday. He also said an estimated 30,000 civilians have been killed in the war so far, though he didn’t elaborate on how he arrived at any of his numbers.
[This is interesting because the two subjects NOT covered by the western media are Ukrainian casualties and operational restrictions imposed by NATO couontries.]
– We talked in class about George Santos. New York magazine claims to list all of his lies.
– The pending appointment of Jeff Zients to be WH chief of staff resurrected this story about how he failed to create a Department of Trade. As we’ll discuss in class, congressional committees weren’t happy with either the plan or the reorganization power Zients proposed because it weakened their jurisdiction.
-The Economist often has clever headlines. Politico wins the prize this week for: Who Shot the Serif?
January 22:
Happy Year of the Rabbit!
As I read the accumulated papers, I see these items of special interest:
– Congress and the administration are heading to a fight over arms to Turkey.
– Rifts are emerging in NATO over Ukraine aid.
– NYT has background on Taiwan’s “ambassador”
– Paul Kane laments the retirement of Senate “work horses” and includes data on diminished voting on amendments [because of the filled “amendment tree”]
– Ezra Klein analyzes disconnects in the GOP and interviews an author who says GOP politicians have been dominated by conservative media.
– NYT explains how US got $31 trillion debt.
January 20:
I see that a lot has been happening during my travels. The big news on Ukraine is the dispute between US & Germany over tanks. A good catch-up piece is today’s D Brief, a newsletter worth reading regularly.
WaPo also has good background on Ukraine planning. The CIA Director has also been meeting in Kyiv. WSJ has good info on weapons issues.
The Inspectors General for DOD, State & AID have a combined report on US assistance to Ukraine.
On China & Taiwan, WOTR had a good explanation of the delivery delays in US arms for Taipei. It turns out that National Guard units have been training Taiwanese. And WSJ says China’s brick & road initiative is faltering.
Good news for Congress: NYT says lawmakers changed the rules that in effect give them a $34,000 pay boost which they never would have voted for directly.
More good news at State: Sec. Blinken has ordered a shift from Times New Roman fonts for official documents to Calibri. When I worked on the Policy Planning Staff I failed to persuade Under Secretary Pickering to take advantage of the retiring of the Wang Computers and allow overseas cables to be written with upper and lower case letters instead of the required [by the former technology] ALL CAPS ALL THE TIME.
Also January 20:
Many of you know that I favor a return to Regular Order in Congress, the way the armed services committees do the NDAA, with vigorous oversight, a bill open to many amendments, and a compromise process that allows the ill to be signed into law — for 62 years now. But both Democratic and Republican leaders have opposed those open rules. Speaker McCarthy now wants to bring them back. Here’s what happened last time.
Harlan Ullman, the original proponent of shock and awe tactics, now calls for a major revision of US defense strategy.
Fletcher’s Dan Drezner puts his economic statecraft syllabus in his Substack column. I like his work and will review this for things I should be assigning.
The Partnership for Public Service has a guidebook for new officials that has a lot of good ideas on how to be an effective bureaucrat. I probably should make it required reading.
On Politico a sometime historian compares FDR’s help to Britain before Pearl Harbor to the West’s help to Ukraine today. Good background, but I’d note that FDR was constrained by US public and congressional opinion, not by a fear of provoking war with Hitler. Biden is limited by concerns about Russia reactions.
Two European analysts see conflicts of interest in writers about nuclear weapons policy.
A new CSIS report says we should be thinking seriously about letting South Korea get nukes.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
This is how bad things could get
Russia is expanding its bombing in Ukraine to the west and deploying its artillery for intensified barrages on Kyiv. Poland is reaching the limits of its capacity to take in refugees. So are other near neighbors. Moscow is accusing the US of supporting biological and chemical warfare research in Ukraine. Russian forces have already taken control of several nuclear power plants. Moscow has also thrown a monkey wrench into negotiations on re-entry of the US into the Iran nuclear deal.
How bad could things get?
Pretty bad. Here are some guesses:
- The Russians could lay siege to Kyiv and obliterate its governing institutions, displacing many of those who remain of its 2.9 million pre-war population.
- They could also destroy what remains of Ukraine’s air force and its ability to operate. That is presumaby the purpose of their attacks on airfields in the west.
- Poland could limit the intake of refugees, forcing many to remain displaced and vulnerable inside Ukraine.
- Russia often accuses its adversaries of doing things it intends to do. Mocow’s obviously false accusations about biological and chemical weapons may presage Moscow’s use of them.
- Russian forces have already risked disaster in occupying nuclear power plants. Their continued operation depends on Ukrainians and electricity supplies that are at risk. A meltdown like the one at Chernobyl in 1986 would be far more catastrophic under current conditions.
- Moscow may de facto scupper the nuclear deal and try to trade with Iran despite US sanctions. That would allow Tehran to proceed with enrichment and nuclear weapons research.
- Putin is using the war in Ukraine to impose a dictatorial regime inside Russia, making dissent and protest ever more difficult.
All the while, Russia will continue to attack population centers, medical facilities, and schools throughout Ukraine. This “Grozny” strategy is a war crime, but then so is the war of aggression Moscow launched without provocation.
Sanctions aren’t likely to work quickly
The NATO Alliance meanwhile continues sitting on its military hands while Russia crosses multiple red lines. The EU and US are imposing more sanctions on trade and investment, but those rarely if ever change an aggressor’s mind quickly. You are far more likely to get what you want from them when you negotiate lifting them rather than when you impose them. The day when that might be possible is far off.
Military responses have been ruled out
President Biden has so far prioritized prevention of a wider war. He has repeatedly emphasized that Americans will not fight in Ukraine. The Pentagon has apparently blocked transfer of military aircraft from Poland to Ukraine on grounds that might cause Russia to attack Poland and trigger NATO’s mutual defense commitment. The US can’t send the best air defense systems because they require trained personnel that Ukraine doesn’t have and can’t produce in short order.
The Americans and other NATO allies are sending massive arms shipments to the Ukrainians, whose commitment to fighting for themselves should not be doubted. But it may not suffice. Ultimately, Russia has resources, technology, manpower, and immorality that Ukraine cannot equal. We are all likely to suffer the consequences.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Gulf arms trade
While the US and Western Europe remain major suppliers in arms trade to Gulf states, other regional and global powers have strengthened their relationships with Gulf states as well. On March 25, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington (AGSIW) hosted a panel discussion on “Gulf Security in a Multipolar World: New Defense Ties Reflect Competition for Influence.” The discussion featured five speakers:
Jon Alterman: Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Alexandra Kuimova: Research Assistant, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Shana Marshall: Associate Director at the Institute for Middle East Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs
Bilal Saab: Senior Fellow and Director of the Defense and Security Program at the Middle East Institute
Pieter D. Wezeman: Senior Researcher, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Emma Soubrier: Visiting Scholar, the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, moderated
The West and the Gulf
Wezeman indicated that the US and Europe are major suppliers of weapons, training, technology, and manpower to Gulf states, especially to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Kuimova added that the US, the UK, France and Germany have increased their domination over the Gulf market from 2015 to 2019.
Saab emphasized that there is decreased regional confidence in US security commitment to its Gulf partners. He listed three major breakdowns in their partnership:
- Bush administration’s planning for a never executed attack on Iran
- Obama administration’s nuclear deal with Iran
- Trump administration’s assassination of Soleimani
The US never consulted on these major regional moves with its Gulf allies. But the US is desperate to sell arms to the Gulf, especially now that there is a power competition with Russia and China. Alterman believes nevertheless that the Gulf aims to maintain a close relationship with the US.
Intraregional Dynamics
Marshall stated that intraregional movement of arms has continued throughout Gulf history. The Gulf finances arms transfers from the US and Europe to non-Gulf monarchies and authoritarian republics, including Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon. There have also been smuggling and proliferation. Additionally, regional production forms a basis for intraregional trade. The GCC aims for domestic production for itself and its regional allies, loosening the West’s grip on regional arms and capital transfers. It also broadens the GCC’s geopolitical influence by increasing political and commercial activities. Marshall concluded that having its own indigenous defense industry for arms sales and transfer is an integral part of effectuating Gulf foreign policy.
Wezeman thinks that the development of arms industry shows a state’s desire to be a regional power with strategic independence. It’s difficult to be a self-sufficient arms industry due to the inability to produce all materials and technologies. State indigenous arms industries have to depend on their allies to some extent.
Other players
Wezeman stated that China and Russia have entered the Gulf market by offering niche products. They may play a bigger role in the future. Kuimova indicated they are among the top ten arms exporters in the world and have increased their interests in the Gulf through security collaboration and economic cooperation, including arms trade and investment. Although Gulf states haven’t placed any orders for S-400 missile system or the Sukhoi Su-35 aircraft with Russia yet, the number of Gulf states that receive China’s arms supplies has increased. Kuimova attributed Gulf states’ arms requests from China and Russia to three reasons:
- The Gulf lacks the domestic technological basis needed to design and produce advanced weapons.
- Western suppliers limit their weapons sales to the Gulf for political and humanitarian reasons. Russia and China request few such conditions.
- Duplication of sources allows the Gulf to benefit from competition in terms of prices and conditions.
Alterman stated that China is trying to have comprehensive strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran, and Egypt. While Russia is not a desirable alternative partner to the US in the region, China can be a supplement to the US. He listed China’s motivations as follows:
- The Chinese need to secure energy from the Middle East independently of the US.
- American hegemony isn’t in China’s interests. China’s rising profile in the Middle East can draw US attention away from the Western Pacific and put a wedge between the US, Europe, and China.
He emphasized that China focuses more on business than security. How China-Middle East relations will develop still remains an open question.
Here’s the video for this panel discussion:
RSS - Posts
