Tag: Bahrain
An opportunity that may be missed
The Middle East is in a rare period of rapid change. The Assad regime in Syria is gone. Its successor is still undefined and uncertain. Israel has crippled Iran’s Hamas and Hizbollah allies. It is trying to do likewise to the Houthis in Yemen. Egypt is on the sidelines, preoccupied with civil wars in Libya and Sudan. A weakened Iran is contemplating whether nuclear weapons would help to restore its regional influence.
The global powers that be are not anxious to get too involved. Russia, stretched thin, let Syria go. The United States is inaugurating a president known to favor withdrawal from Syria. He will support almost anything Israel wants to do. China is doing its best to guarantee access to Middle East oil but wants to avoid political involvement. The European Union has a similar attitude.
So what will be the main factors in determining the future of the Middle East? Who has power and influence in the region and outside it?
Turkiye
The Turks are so far the big winners in Syria. They are getting an opportunity to send back Syrian refugees and will try to decimate their Syrian Kurdish enemies. They have influence over the ruling Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) leadership in Damascus, whom they supplied and unleashed.
When it comes to reconstruction in Syria, Turkish companies are experienced and nearby. Turkish pockets aren’t as deep as American or Chinese pockets. But they are deep enough to get things started fast, especially if World Bank money is put on the table.
The Turks will try to convince the Americans to leave. They’ll argue that they can and will suppress Islamic State and other terrorists. They may even promise to allow the Kurds to continue their local governance structures. But they would want the Syrian Kurds to cut their ties to Kurdish terrorists inside Turkey.
The Turks will want a not-too-Islamist government in Damascus, something akin to their own. Syria has an enormously diverse population. HTS governance in Idlib was autocratic. But that was during the civil war. It will be much harder to impose that on Damascus after liberation from Assad. Syrians want their freedom. Turkiye has an interest in their getting it. Only inclusive governance will permit the return of refugees.
The Gulf
Some of the big money for reconstruction in Syria will come from the Gulf. The Saudis may be willing, if they gain some political influence in the bargain. How they use that influence will be important. In the Balkans 30 years ago they sponsored Wahabist clerics and mosques. Mohammed bin Salman has marginalized those within Saudi Arabia. We can hope he will not export them now. But he will, like the Turks, want a strong executive in Damascus.
What Syria needs from the Gulf is support for inclusive, democratic governance. The UAE will weigh in heavily against Islamism, but the Emirates are far from democratic or inclusive. Qatar, more tolerant of Islamism, will prefer inclusion, if only because the Americans will pressure them to do so.
Israel
Prime Minister Netanyahu has not achieved elimination of Hamas in Gaza. But he has weakened it. The Israelis have been far more successful in Lebanon, where they have dealt heavy blows to Hezbollah. They are also destroying many Syrian military capabilities. And they have seized UN-patrolled Syrian territory in the Golan Heights and on Mount Hermon.
Israel had already neutralized Egypt and Jordan via peace agreements. Ditto the UAE and Bahrain via the Abrahamic accords, though they were never protagonists in war against Israel. It would like similar normalization with Saudi Arabia. Now Israel controls border areas inside Lebanon and Syria. Repression on the West Bank and attacks on the Houthis in Yemen are proceeding apace.
Netanyahu is resisting the end of the Gaza war to save his own skin from the Israeli courts and electorate. Whether he succeeds at that or not, his legacy will be an “Israeli World.” That is a militarily strong Israel surrounded by buffer zones. But he has done serious damage to Israeli democracy and society.
Iran
Iran is weakened. That will encourage it to quicken the pace of its nuclear program. It won’t go all the way to deploying nuclear weapons. That would risk giving the Israelis an excuse for a massive attack, or even a nuclear strike. Nor can Ankara adopt the Israeli policy of opaqueness, as it is a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That requires openness to inspections. So transparency about its nuclear threshold status is the likely policy.
Bottom line
Turkiye, Israel, and the Gulf (especially Saudi Arabia) are the big winners from the current Middle East wars. They would be even stronger if they were to cooperate. All have an interest in preventing Iran from getting nuclear weapons, in stabilizing Syria, and in preventing terrorist resurgence. So does the US. There is an opportunity, but one that may be missed.
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The regional war is likely to intensify
With Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu about to address the US Congress, it is time for an assessment of where things stand currently in the Middle East. Israel is fighting Arab opponents on four fronts. In Gaza, it is fighting Hamas and killing a lot of civilians. In the north, Israel is fighting Hizbollah and sometimes Syria. In the south Yemen’s Ansar al Allah (the Houthis in a word) has taken up the cudgels against Israel and shipping in the Red Sea. And on the West Bank, settlers and the security forces are fighting Palestinian civilians.
Iran stands behind it all
Iran supports all of Israel’s opponents, the “axis of resistance,” in the Middle East and North Africa. It supplies training and equipment as well as some degree of central coordination and financing. Hamas, Hizbollah, the Houthis may each have their own interests and initiatives, but they are broadly consistent with Iran’s denial of the legitimacy of the Israeli state and its objective of destroying it in favor of a one-state solution on the entire territory of Palestine.
From Tehran’s perspective, the fighting is a good deal. It is confronting its sworn enemy using non-Iranian forces not on Iranian territory. Only once, in April, has Iran tried to attack Israel with its own missiles and drones, in response to an attack on an Iranian diplomatic facility. Israel responded, but in a way that did not escalate the direct tit for tat.
The fourth front
The fourth front in the current fighting is the West Bank. There Israel is not only fighting armed resistance, some of which might or might not be connected to Iran. It has unleashed Israeli settlers, who are establishing new outposts, destroying Palestinian property, and killing Palestinians. 2023 was an especially bad year but 2024 is not far off the pace.
The West Bank fighting redounds to Iran’s benefit as well. It keeps Israeli security forces busy and makes it difficult for the Palestinian Authority, a secular organization with little connection to Tehran, to claim it can effectively govern.
Arab states are mostly maintaining the peace
Egypt and Jordan are maintaining their peace agreements with Israel. Saudi Arabia is continuing to pursue a similar accommodation, albeit one that would necessarily open a path to a Palestinian state. It would also need to give Saudi Arabia a formal US security guarantee of some sort. Iraq talks tough but is not either willing or capable of joining the fight. Turkey has suspended trade with Israel and speaks up for the Palestinians, but it is unwilling to go further. Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan are more or less maintaining their “Abrahamic” agreements with Israel, though Khartoum may rethink that after its civil war.
Qatar is acting as a mediator, along with Egypt, in talks that engage both Hamas and Israel. While often accused of supporting Hamas, Doha views its relations with Hamas as fulfilling requests of the US government, as does Cairo. Egyptian President Sisi is no friend of the Muslim Brotherhood, which gave birth to Hamas.
Hamas has survived, many hostages haven’t
The immediate cause of the current fighting was Hamas’ ferocious, unconventional attack on Israel last October 7, which killed about 1200 people. Israelis understood that to be an existential threat. Its ferocious conventional response has killed in the past 8 months about 40,000 Palestinians and others, according to the Hamas health ministry.
Israel’s main objective is to eradicate Hamas’ military and governing capabilities. Hamas appears to have survived the intense bombing campaign and numerous ground incursions. While there are signs of dissatisfaction with Hamas among Gazans, polling has not confirmed that sentiment.
Israel also seeks release of hostages seized on October 7. Netanyahu claims military pressure will achieve that. Many Israelis prefer a deal. Hamas or other Palestinian groups still hold about 120. More than 100 were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners held in Israel. Few have been rescued. Dozens have been killed.
No agreement means the regional war will intensify
Prime Minister Netanyahu, apparently against the wishes of many in his government, has refused to sign on to a proposed ceasefire agreement with Hamas that the Americans say originated with Israel. Hamas claims to have agreed, but it appears to be asking for changes as well. There is no sign of a real agreement emerging.
Many in Israel wanted Netanyahu to sign on before coming to Washington. He did not do that. It seems unlikely he will sign on during his visit, if only because doing so would help the Democrats. Netanyahu has allied himself firmly with Donald Trump. I expect his address in Congress to be more of the same fire and brimstone that he preaches in Israel.
The result will be more fighting in all four directions. The Houthis are unbowed. Lebanese Hizbollah is less belligerent but will have little choice if Israel continues to kill its commanders. Hamas hopes its continuing resistance will give it traction not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank, where the settlers can be expected to continue rampaging.
Hamas reportedly agreed in Beijing this week to join the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognizing it as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people (a key provision of the Oslo accords with Israel). Such reconciliation agreements have not stuck in the past. If this one does, it could put the Palestinians in a better position to negotiate with Israel, or it could incentivize the Israelis to continue the fighting. Or both. Stay tuned.
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Security trumps democracy in the Middle East
Prime Minister Netanyahu is proceeding with his takeover of Israel’s judiciary branch. This is despite objections from massive protests as well as the US government. The State Department has nevertheless announced that US security assistance to Israel will continue. It is “ironclad.”
No surprise
This should surprise no one. The only real leverage the US has is security cooperation. But President Biden, like his predecessors, has deemed it vital to the US, not only to Israel. If you believe that, you don’t want to use it as leverage. Besides, how long would it take for domestic politics to overcome a decision to interrupt security cooperation with Israel?
Israel faces no immediate threat from its Arab neighbors. The Iranian threat is real, but that is another reason the Americans won’t want to interrupt security cooperation. It would significantly relieve pressure on Tehran. The rhythm of US-Israel cooperation for a possible attack on Iranian nuclear facilities accelerated noticeably last year. The US wants to maintain military pressure on Iran, not relieve it.
Consequences
What the Americans don’t do has consequences. Netanyahu’s coup against the judiciary is going to make it easier for his right-wing ultra-nationalist coalition partners to pursue their goals. They seek permanent Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Jerusalem. With the Supreme Court now limited in when it can intervene, legislation that de facto accomplishes that end is not only possible but likely. That will deal the death blow to the already moribund two-state solution.
The Palestinian Authority may cry foul but will remain quiescent. Palestinians will not. Israel is already facing an armed rebellion on the West Bank, where this year more than 160 Palestinians have been killed. It could face attacks from Gaza and perhaps Lebanon, but none of that will change the strategic picture. Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem will be relegated to third class non-citizenship in a one state reality. Palestinians inside Israel proper already are relegated to second class citizenship.
The Saudi reaction
Netanyahu hopes the Saudis will ignore the Palestinian reality and make their peace with Israel, as the Emirates, Bahrain, and Morocco have already done. He could be right. Mohammed bin Salman may tell the world that the Palestinians are the central issue for the Arab world, but four years ago he told American Jewish leaders that the Palestinians need to take what they can get and make their peace with Israel.
This is where the US does have some cards, but it is unlikely to play them. Netanyahu, hoping for an agreement with Saudi Arabia, is pressuring Washington to give MbS what he wants: a civilian nuclear deal and a security guarantee. Biden understandably hesitates about both. US law requires the Administration to get an agreement that its civilian nuclear technology would not be used for enrichment or reprocessing. That the Saudis aren’t likely to accept. Congress would be unlikely to approve a security guarantee. In any event, the Saudis won’t be anxious to give a rabidly nationalist Netanyahu government the satisfaction of a peace agreement. So that seems a bridge too far under current circumstances.
Security suffices
I was asked on Al Hurra last night whether security was a sufficient basis for US relations with Israel. The answer is yes. It has been the basis for American relations with other Middle Eastern countries for decades. Egypt, Jordan, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, and Turkey know they have to listen to American lectures on democracy and human rights. But they also know those values will not interfere with security cooperation.
Where the Israeli departure from democracy will have a real impact is on American Jews, who are devotees of individual rights. A poll recently found “about three-quarters of Americans, including 80% of Democrats and 64% of Republicans, would choose a democratic Israel that’s no longer Jewish, over a Jewish Israel without full citizenship and equality for non-Jews living under its authority.” But that won’t matter, because Christian evangelical support for Israel will more than compensate for any loss among America’s Jewish population. Security trumps democracy in the Middle East.
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A Biden Middle East doctrine full of holes
Brett McGurk, the senior White House Middle East official, last month set out a “Biden doctrine” for the region. It is based on partnerships, deterrence, diplomacy, integration, and values. Best you read it yourself. It is blessedly short and clear.
Jonathan Lord, formerly Iraq director at the Defense Department and now at the Center for New American Security, has taken Brett to task for ignoring both Syria and Iraq, where the US still has a few thousand troops doing counter-terrorism work. In fact, McGurk never mentions terrorism, the threat on which he worked for many years.
What else isn’t mentioned
Those are glaring omissions, but not the only ones. As Lord notes, McGurk says little about economic issues. He omits oil entirely, though he mentions freedom of navigation. It is hard to imagine the US would be concerned with the Middle East if there were no oil there. He fails to note the growing geopolitical competition in the region with Russia and China. Brett ignores the more than 18,000 deployed US troops in Turkey, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
He forgets the Palestinians entirely, as well as the Kurds, with whom the US is allied in Syria. There is not a word about the disastrous state of Lebanon and Hizbollah’s role there, though he boasts about Beirut’s maritime boundary agreement with Israel. He ignores the plight of women in much of the region.
McGurk also fails to note the contradictions among his five principles. He acknowledges the main tension between values and partnerships with autocrats. But he ignores the current and growing tensions on human rights issues with Israel, as well as the more traditional ones with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. What do the five principles tell us to do about the UAE and possibly Saudi Arabia reestablishing diplomatic relations with Syria? There are also problems reconciling diplomacy and deterrence. The US has essentially abandoned the former for the latter when it comes to Iran. And there are obstacles to integration arising from human rights, like the Saudi refusal to recognize Israel without real progress on creating a Palestinian state.
Iran, Iran, Iran
Brett is clever. I imagine he would reply to this critique that it is about time we had a Middle East policy focused on partnerships rather than oil, the Palestinians, or competition with Russia and China. He might also claim that it is obvious US troops are in the Middle East for deterrence purposes, against both terrorism and Iran. He would be correct to say that any discussion of economic and social issues requires more time and space than this short presentation allowed.
But there is no excuse for many of the other omissions. They reflect prioritization, not ignorance. Brett knows the the current Israeli government is a threat to its already ethnically-limited democracy. He knows Iraq is drifting away from the US, Syria is a drug-exporting nightmare, and Lebanon is in a downward spiral. The Biden Administration has simply decided to ignore these developments and focus on whatever will help the US confront Iran. That is the real purpose of four of the five principles: partnerships, deterrence, diplomacy, and integration. Values play a distinctly secondary role.
If that’s what it’s about, say so
Iran’s role in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and with Hizbollah more than justifies priority treatment. Moreover Tehran’s increasingly successful nuclear program could ignite an arms race in the region. Turkey’s President Erdogan and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman have explicitly stated they will not stand idly by if Iran gets nuclear weapons. That could put the US in an awkward situation, as it would increase the need for security guarantees and make criticism of human rights behavior impossible.
If it’s all about Iran, say so. Don’t hide it behind five nice principles. Then we can debate whether you’ve got the priorities right.
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US withdrawal makes everyone in the Middle East recalibrate
I have long believed the US is overcommitted in the Middle East, given its declining interests in the region, and needed to draw down. I confess I did not anticipate how clumsily we would manage to do it. I also did not fully anticipate how others would react. The American withdrawal has set off a cascade of efforts at improving relations both within the region and with external powers, mainly China and Russia. Not all the improvements are in the US interest, but several are interesting.
First example: the Abrahamic accords. The Saudis, Emiratis, and Bahrainis have understood for some time that the American commitment to their autocracies was weakening. The failure of Washington to react to the drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure in 2019 confirmed that perception. They needed to think about replacing Washington’s security guarantees, which in any event were aimed at external enemies, while the main threat is in these three countries increasingly internal. They have turned to Israel for the technology required to guarantee that their monarchies remain stable.
But, you may object, Saudi Arabia hasn’t yet recognized Israel, as the UAE and Bahrain have. On that, I only have anecdata, but it is compelling. Sitting in a business class lounge in Riyadh some 2+years ago, I found myself surrounded by 40-something males speaking Hebrew. They carried an unusual number of hard-sided cases. When I asked the Israeli next to me why I was hearing so much Hebrew in Riyadh, he smiled coldly and said: “If I told you, I would have to kill you.” I concluded they were techies carrying lots of electronics after providing assistance to Saudi internal intelligence agencies. I suspect Israel’s improving relations with Egypt have a lot to do with internal security as well, inaddition to President Sissi’s attitude toward the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas.
Second I would cite the response to Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter plane in 2015. It initially caused tension in the bilateral relationship, but Turkey had a problem: the US and NATO were not backing Ankara up and instead the Americans were beginning to ally with Kurds, whom President Erdogan regards as terrorists and mortal enemies. Soon Ankara was apologizing, relations between Ankara and Moscow were improving and Turkey was participating in the Russian-sponsored Astana process for ceasefire/surrenders of the Syrian opposition to the Assad regime. Russian and Turkish troops have even patrolled together in both Idlib and northern Syria, though the relationship remains parlous.
Third are the tentative efforts by Saudi Arabia and Iran to come to some sort of modus vivendi. This has included high-level meetings in Baghdad as well as trips to Tehran and Riyadh. The Saudis and Iranians have no territorial dispute and many symmetrical interests, including not allowing an adversary to rile their respective Shia and Sunni minorities and maintaining their theologically-based and increasingly nationalist autocracies. A mutual stand-down from bilateral tensions could benefit both.
Fourth is the at least partial resolution of a conflict internal to the Gulf Cooperation Council. The Saudis and Emiratis have essentially given up on their latest effort to bring Qatar to heel. Doha weathered the embargo and other sanctions better than the Kingdom and the Emirates anticipated, with assistance from Turkey, Iran, and the US, which wasn’t (yet) interested in abandoning its largest base in the region, Al Udeid. There was no point in continuing a fruitless campaign whose only real impact was to weaken the Gulf Arabs.
Fifth example: OPEC+. After a price war in 2020, the Saudis and Russians found common cause in maintaining higher oil prices, which are essential to both their national budgets. Riyadh and Moscow would prefer prices around $100/barrel, but they can’t push much above $70 or so because that would bring on unconventional sources in the US and elsewhere, especially in a low-interest-rate environment. So they are more or less content to leave prices where they have lingered for much of the epidemic, hoping that stronger growth later will bump up both interest rates and oil prices.
There are other examples: rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE, the UAE push for reconciliation with Syria, and Turkey’s sometime courting of Iran. The point is that US withdrawal is causing everyone to recalibrate and look for alternatives to American support that seems increasingly unlikely. I might like recalibration to push Israel into a more positive attitude toward Palestine, but that seems a bridge too far. Still, US withdrawal is getting the Middle East pregnant with possibilities.
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I hope we’ve learned unilateral withdrawal is a bad idea
Judging from my inbox, a lot of people around the world are thinking the US withdrawal from Afghanistan could be prelude to withdrawal elsewhere. I think the opposite is true. The Afghanistan debacle will make it difficult to discuss withdrawal almost anywhere for at least two and likely three years.
President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan completely, thus fulfilling (four months late) the terms of President Trump’s agreement with the Taliban, has strong support across the political spectrum in Washington. But the way it was done was shambolic. Biden failed to ensure either a negotiated “decent interval” from the Taliban or a commitment of the Afghan security forces to defend the country’s government. There appears to have been no serious transition plan. The Americans literally withdrew from Bagram air base, the biggest in Afghanistan, in the dark of night, without consulting or informing the local Afghan commander.
It may well be that this was done to prevent panic, as President Biden has implied. But that was an ill-considered plan. Did anyone really think things would go more smoothly without Afghan cooperation?
The “Saigon in Kabul” scenes will inoculate the Administration against any further withdrawals, at least until a second Biden term. There will of course be force adjustments for operational reasons, some of them potentially major, like getting the American aircraft out of Al Udeid in Qatar. They are exposed to Iranian missiles and will need to be moved if there are going to be hostilities, or even the threat of hostilities, with Tehran. I wouldn’t mind seeing fewer US troops committed in autocracies like Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, but those would need to be carefully considered and well-executed. We may not like their style of governance, but replacements could be worse. I would expect no major drawdowns in places like Iraq, Kosovo, Cuba (Guantanamo), Japan, South Korea, or Europe, unless they are negotiated and agreed with the local authorities.
The only major US commitment under discussion in Washington these days is to Taiwan. China is growing in military strength. Taiwanese, watching Hong Kong and Xinjiang, are less interested in reunification and increasingly interested in independence. It is no longer as clear as it once was that the US has both the means and the will to defend against a Chinese attack, even if it is eminently clear the Taiwanese would make a takeover difficult for Beijing. But there are no deployed American ground forces in Taiwan, so no question of withdrawal. I assume the US Navy will continue to make its presence felt in Western Pacific and seek to improve its posture in defending the first island chain.
It has been clear for two decades that the US does not want to be the world’s policeman, patroling worldwide. I doubt Americans even want to serve as the world’s fireman, reacting to conflagrations as a first responder. The arguments for retrenchment are strong. But the consequences of withdrawal, especially when unilateral, can be catastrophic. I hope we’ve learned that much.
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