Tag: Balkans
Who should decide Bosnia’s fate?
I am delighted to see Milorad Dodik, president of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska (RS), held accountable. A Bosnian court convicted him Wednesday for his refusal to implement decisions of the international community’s High Representative.
But let’s not celebrate too much. Some of us remember how war criminal Radovan Karadzic behaved after the war in Bosnia. He continued to govern in the RS even though barred from office. Only when he went underground to escape capture did he lose control.
Dodik can pay a fine to escape the one-year prison sentence. The six-year ban on holding office will prove meaningless unless his loyalists are removed from power.
Is the bear a paper tiger?
That said, Dodik, known as the “Bosnian bear,” has so far been unable to rouse his supporters to outright rebellion. His threats of secession are proving hollow.
Serbian President Vucic will make a show of backing Dodik, but Belgrade doesn’t want the RS to secede. That would put Vucic in a tight spot. If he recognizes an independent RS, the European Union will be unhappy. If he doesn’t, his own ethnic nationalist constituency will be unhappy. Better for him if Dodik remains non grata and unable to compete politically. Vucic isn’t the first Serbian president to fear competition in Belgrade from a Bosnian Serb nationalist.
Only time will tell, but Dodik could be a paper tiger.
The self-licking ice cream cone
That won’t solve Bosnia’s problems. They are rooted in a stubbornly unreformed constitution the US and EU imposed at Dayton in 1995. It ended the war at the cost of functional governance. Changing that will require a new configuration of Bosnian politicians willing to risk the disapproval of ethnic nationalists. That configuration is difficult to produce because the constitution favors the election of ethnic nationalists. It’s a self-licking ice cream cone.
Dodik is only one mainstay of this self-perpetuating system. Croat nationalist Dragan Covic is another. He is still in place. Dodik’s plight will frighten Covic and make him an even harder line ethnic nationalist. He wants a “third entity” in Bosnia and is currying Moscow’s favor to get it.
Bosniak politicians also play the ethnic nationalist game. But they are more divided than either the Serbs or the Croats. They are also less fearful of a one-person/one-vote system. Their numerical majority gives them more confidence they can defend their vital interests.
The reforms needed
The needed reforms are no secret. The European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly said what Bosnia needs to do for EU membership. Jasmin Mujanovic has analyzed the options. Ismet Fatih Cancar has has outlined a route to Dayton 2.0, including NATO membership. But political leadership in these directions has been lacking.
Also lacking is international pressure in the right directions. The Biden Administration chose to appease Vucic and allowed the HiRep to coddle Covic. Jared Kushner’s business interests in Belgrade compromise the new Trump Administration from the start. Trump himself is an ethnic nationalist. If he agrees to partition of Ukraine, even temporarily, all bets are off for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
So the fate of Bosnia is where it should be: with its citizens. The conviction of Dodik can help, but far more is needed.
Peace in our time will bring more war
Pete Hegseth announced a major change in US policy on Ukraine today. The most unqualified Defense Secretary ever offered to appease Russia by
- Ending US support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO;
- Abandoning Ukraine’s war goal of regaining control of all its sovereign territory;
- Anticipating an end to most US assistance to Ukraine;
- Excluding US troops from any post-war peacekeeping force;
- Asking European allies to provide such a force without a NATO Article 5 guarantee.
This gives Russian President Putin everything he hopes for except direct and immediate control over the government in Kyiv.
This is not peace through strength
Hegseth claimed he was proposing peace through strength. But that is pure illusion. He is pulling the rug out from underneath Ukrainian President Zelensky. At best (from Ukraine’s perspective), his remarks would make Ukraine a buffer state between NATO and Russia.
But maintaining Ukraine as a buffer state would be impossible. The Europeans would need to monitor a confrontation zone between Russia and Ukraine that is more than 1200 miles long. Kyiv, abandoned by the US, would want nuclear weapons to ensure Ukraine’s survival. That Russia would not allow.
Another Russian invasion of Ukrainian territory would be just a matter of time. And in the meanwhile Russia would be doing everything it could to bring down Zelensky. That wouldn’t be difficult if he agreed to anything like what Hegseth proposes.
I hardly need mention that partition of Ukraine as Hegseth proposes will have a dramatic impact in the Balkans. Serbia will try to grab territory in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as Kosovo. American and European troops will be at risk.
Worse: appeasement of Russia in Ukraine will be a signal to Beijing that Washington won’t defend Taiwan. Some of that damage may already have been done with Hegseth’s speech. He has undermined the deterrence he claims to find vital.
Real peace through strength is the alternative?
The Biden Administration pursued a Goldilocks policy on Ukraine. Enough support to make Russia’s territorial gains slow and costly. But not enough to provoke Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, which Putin has contemplated in the event Moscow faced calamity.
That worked well enough given its objectives. But it wasn’t enough–nor did it intend–for Ukraine to win the war. Kyiv, like Moscow, is struggling with manpower shortages. The only way for it to win the war is with overwhelming technological superiority. Ukraine’s forces have developed a lot of their own weapons and tactics. But they will need more unqualified US and European support to win.
The alternative to Hegseth’s appeasement is to provide that support. That would be real peace through strength.
A Ukraine win would strengthen the West
The implications of Kyiv winning are good for the US and Europe. Moscow would then need to abandon its imperial ambitions. Putin might survive using repression, but only as a much-diminished figure at home and abroad. Russia’s economy and demography will need rebuilding. It will be at least another generation before Moscow can threaten a neighbor.
Reasonable people in Moscow would quickly switch the position on Ukrainian membership in NATO. They would come to see that as the best guarantee of a Ukraine without nuclear weapons. They know better than anyone else that NATO membership has kept Germany non-nuclear.
Europe would gain enormously from the opening of a peacetime free market with Ukraine reconstructing itself. The US would get the privileged access to Ukrainian rare minerals it seeks.
Kosovo is democratic but complicated
Kosovo voted yesterday. The electoral mechanism seems to have worked reasonably well except for a cyberattack. That appears to have been overcome. Prime Minister Kurti (LVV) got 41%, his PDK opposition 22%, the LDK opposition 18%, and AAK (Ramush Haradinaj) 7%. Minorities will hold 20 seats. Turnout was relatively low (around 40%), despite a lively campaign. I haven’t yet seen how the preliminary percentages translate into parliamentary seats. That could change the picture.
For background, here is a primer. So far as I can tell, the EU observer mission has not yet reported its findings.
The winner loses…but the losers didn’t win
The Prime Minister led by an almost a 2/1 margin over his nearest competitor. But he lost his absolute majority in parliament. While minority votes could put him in the majority, he won’t get enough of them. He will now need the seats of either the PDK or the LDK to regain the majority. The freewheeling way he has governed will make that difficult. Both the PDK and AAK have said they are unwilling to govern with VV. Still, it can’t be ruled out, especially if he is willing to give up the prime ministry. The LDK seems more open to the idea.
The PDK, LDK, and AAK did not win either. Even if the PDK and LDK join together in coalition, they won’t have enough seats to gain the majority. Putting together a 3-party coalition isn’t going to be easy. Resentment of Kurti might help. The three opposition parties were united during the campaign in criticizing him. They don’t like his handling of the economy and blame him for strained relations with the US and EU.
What next
Parliamentary systems that produce ambiguous results of this sort generally need some time to work things out. Despite strains between them, I suppose President Osmani will give Kurti a chance to forge a parliamentary majority. If he fails, the PDK may get a chance to bring in a government that includes the other opposition parties.
If Kurti keeps the prime ministry in coalition with an opposition party, the US and EU will pressure him to consult more. They want him to show more flexibility in dealing with Serbia. That isn’t likely to produce results, given past experience.
Almost any conceivable alternative prime minister will try to reduce strains with the US and EU. All the other political parties have criticized Kurti for inflexibility.
But all have governed in the past, with not much better results when it comes to dealing with Serbia. Belgrade is likewise is inflexible in dealing with Pristina. It demands creation of an Association of Serb Majority Municipalities inside Kosovo with no quid pro quo.
The broader context
Kosovo’s future depends today more on what happens beyond its borders than on this ambiguous election result. Ric Grenell, Trump’s former envoy, is telling everyone in the Balkans he will again be in charge of the region. He loathes Kurti. Last time around, he tried to partition Kosovo. Likely he’ll try again. Or at least insist on self-governance for the Serbs in the north that compromises the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. And he’ll wield control over NATO accession as a stick. He’ll also wield USAID assistance, which will need to be unfrozen.
Even without the American push for partition, any discussion of partition of Ukraine will open the question in the Balkans. Russia and Serbia will encourage Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina. They will also try to get the Serb-majority north to leave Kosovo. Moscow and Belgrade will figure the US and EU will be unprepared to defend either country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While the Trump Administration is bad news for Kosovo, so too are future elections in Europe. Further strengthening of the right in Germany this month will stymie EU expansion, already slowed to a crawl.
Kosovo is a good example of successful democratization in the Balkans. But it is also complicated, both internally and in the broader geopolitical context.
How to solve the Dayton puzzle
Bosnian Fulbrighter Cancar will present tomorrow 11-12:30 at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Please register and join us!

Serbian civil society boycotts Government
Here’s a statement, published by European Western Balkans, from leading civil society organizations in Serbia, who want nothing to do with a government that is suppressing the student protest movement:
Since the beginning of the student protests in Serbia, we have publicly and unequivocally supported all their demands. The loss of innocent lives in the collapse of the train station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1st last year deeply shook us, as did the violence we are witnessing and the actions of institutions that, instead of fulfilling their duties, are using various maneuvers to suppress the student movement. The students have demonstrated that the movement cannot be suppressed and that the struggle will continue until institutions begin fulfilling their mandates. The rule of law and accountability of public officials must be the foundation of a functioning society. However, Serbia has long ceased to be a country governed by the rule of law.
For years, we have witnessed pressure, attacks, and intimidation campaigns against civil society organizations, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and citizens who dare to stand up against corruption and abuse of institutions. We see the misuse of state security structures and other institutions for illegal surveillance of activists and the fabrication of criminal and other legal proceedings aimed at intimidating activists and journalists. The pressure on civil society has now taken on an institutional form for the first time through the proposed law on a special register of foreign influence agents, modeled after regulations in Russia and Belarus. In response to all this, the responsible institutions remain silent and fail to perform their fundamental duty – they do not protect citizens or the common good.
In recent days, we have witnessed harassment, arrests, deportations, and entry bans imposed on activists, students, and public figures from abroad. We are also seeing the targeting of citizens with dual citizenship, while convicted war criminals publicly share students’ personal data, thereby endangering their safety.
We are also witnessing authorities attempting to uphold a false facade of democracy and inclusivity in policy-making by formally involving civil society in decision-making processes. However, regardless of how well these initiatives may appear, they are not implemented in practice, and the standards for protecting human rights and freedoms have been in steady decline in recent years. Citizens and civil society have no real opportunity to influence decisions regarding projects and activities that already have or could have a negative impact on their rights, property, health, and safety. Public spaces and services, cultural heritage, and natural resources are being systematically taken from citizens, with the active complicity of public institutions, public servants, and the country’s highest-ranking officials.
Due to all the aforementioned reasons, and guided by the conviction that the rule of law must finally prevail, we have decided to suspend our cooperation with the legislative and executive authorities in Serbia. By cooperation, we refer to any form of membership – formal or informal – in working groups within government ministries, as well as in all other permanent and ad hoc working groups, councils, and similar instruments of state bodies that require our direct involvement.
We will not abandon the effort to restore institutions of the Republic of Serbia to their rightful functions and to the citizens. We remain committed to our work and will continue to monitor all decision-making processes, regularly inform the public about their effects, and, in the coming period, utilize all legal, administrative, and other mechanisms available within state institutions. In doing so, we will protect human rights, report criminal offenses and violations, highlight harmful decisions and actions, and make use of all available mechanisms to safeguard the public interest, human rights, freedoms, health, safety, and property of citizens, in accordance with the goals, vision, and mission of our organizations.
Signatories:
- A11 – Initiative for Economic and Social Rights
- Alternative Girls’ Center
- ASTRA – Anti-Trafficking Action
- Autonomous Women’s Center
- Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Center for Contemporary Politics
- Civic Initiatives
- CRTA – Center for Research, Transparency, and Accountability
- European Movement in Serbia
- FemPlatz
- Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
- Humanitarian Law Center
- Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia
- Initiative for the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities – MDRI-S
- International Aid Network – IAN
- Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights – YUCOM
- Media Association
- Ministry of Space Collective
- National Coalition for Decentralization
- Online Media Association
- Partners for Democratic Change Serbia
- PIN – Psychosocial Innovation Network
- Polekol – Organization for Political Ecology
- Regulatory Institute for Renewable Energy and Environment – RERI
- SHARE Foundation
- Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation
- Youth Initiative for Human Rights
Bosnian constitutional reform on one page
I hope my friends at Circle (Krug) 99 in Sarajevo won’t mind my republishing this statement. It is a clear and concise proposal for constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina presented at their January 19 session. It also puts the responsibility where it belongs: primarily on Bosnians.
The current Constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, whose principal attribute Is the cessation of armed conflict in our country. However, its implementation over the past three decades has clearly shown that this consensual constitutional arrangement in fact represents an obstacle to the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a democratic state in harmony with contemporary standards. For this reason, constitutional reform is necessary and should unfold in three directions.               First, we should incorporate into the constitution the actual achievements of constitutional development attained up to now. For example, the Constitution provides for legal regulation of state symbols, and this has been realized. The symbols have been adopted and have taken on a life of their own. Now it is necessary to raise their normalization to the constitutional level. In addition, reform of the armed forces, introduction of a Court and Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, intelligence agencies and indirect taxation – these are all new institutions and authorities for our state that should be dealt with in a coherent text of the principal law of the land.               Second, the Constitution is replete with provisions of a limited time nature. In other words, their validity and implementation are linked with precisely defined timelines. Some of these have either expired, or they present solutions that are no longer realistically implementable because of the afore-mentioned developments. For example, there is the convening of the Constitutional Court, the first naming of the Executive Council of the Central Bank with a foreigner as its governor, and the Permanent Committee for military issues. Constitutional reform would include eliminating references of this kind.               The third direction of reform is perhaps the most demanding, since it calls for the harmonization of the Constitution with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which has time after time referred to the discriminatory nature of current provisions that limit the active and passive voting rights for the House of Peoples and for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be enough to recall the decision in the Kovacevic vs. Bosnia case, where the claimant demonstrated that the House of Peoples at the state level has no electoral legitimacy under today’s constitutional arrangements.              There exists in this country the will, the professional expertise and expert communities necessary to conduct a thorough constitutional reform, whose work hopefully would be augmented with considerable assistance of international players.  ** Presenters at the “Krug 99” session were: Professor Dr. Sukrija Baksic Law Faculty of the University of Sarajevo 19 January 2025 ** Adil Kulenović, president  |