Tag: Balkans
How to solve the Dayton puzzle
Bosnian Fulbrighter Cancar will present tomorrow 11-12:30 at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Please register and join us!
![](https://i0.wp.com/www.peacefare.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/37895b1e36bd231d98da32ddad1da3ffb0afee122f4e555972289e2ff25b.png?resize=550%2C550&quality=80&ssl=1)
Serbian civil society boycotts Government
Here’s a statement, published by European Western Balkans, from leading civil society organizations in Serbia, who want nothing to do with a government that is suppressing the student protest movement:
Since the beginning of the student protests in Serbia, we have publicly and unequivocally supported all their demands. The loss of innocent lives in the collapse of the train station canopy in Novi Sad on November 1st last year deeply shook us, as did the violence we are witnessing and the actions of institutions that, instead of fulfilling their duties, are using various maneuvers to suppress the student movement. The students have demonstrated that the movement cannot be suppressed and that the struggle will continue until institutions begin fulfilling their mandates. The rule of law and accountability of public officials must be the foundation of a functioning society. However, Serbia has long ceased to be a country governed by the rule of law.
For years, we have witnessed pressure, attacks, and intimidation campaigns against civil society organizations, human rights defenders, activists, journalists, and citizens who dare to stand up against corruption and abuse of institutions. We see the misuse of state security structures and other institutions for illegal surveillance of activists and the fabrication of criminal and other legal proceedings aimed at intimidating activists and journalists. The pressure on civil society has now taken on an institutional form for the first time through the proposed law on a special register of foreign influence agents, modeled after regulations in Russia and Belarus. In response to all this, the responsible institutions remain silent and fail to perform their fundamental duty – they do not protect citizens or the common good.
In recent days, we have witnessed harassment, arrests, deportations, and entry bans imposed on activists, students, and public figures from abroad. We are also seeing the targeting of citizens with dual citizenship, while convicted war criminals publicly share students’ personal data, thereby endangering their safety.
We are also witnessing authorities attempting to uphold a false facade of democracy and inclusivity in policy-making by formally involving civil society in decision-making processes. However, regardless of how well these initiatives may appear, they are not implemented in practice, and the standards for protecting human rights and freedoms have been in steady decline in recent years. Citizens and civil society have no real opportunity to influence decisions regarding projects and activities that already have or could have a negative impact on their rights, property, health, and safety. Public spaces and services, cultural heritage, and natural resources are being systematically taken from citizens, with the active complicity of public institutions, public servants, and the country’s highest-ranking officials.
Due to all the aforementioned reasons, and guided by the conviction that the rule of law must finally prevail, we have decided to suspend our cooperation with the legislative and executive authorities in Serbia. By cooperation, we refer to any form of membership – formal or informal – in working groups within government ministries, as well as in all other permanent and ad hoc working groups, councils, and similar instruments of state bodies that require our direct involvement.
We will not abandon the effort to restore institutions of the Republic of Serbia to their rightful functions and to the citizens. We remain committed to our work and will continue to monitor all decision-making processes, regularly inform the public about their effects, and, in the coming period, utilize all legal, administrative, and other mechanisms available within state institutions. In doing so, we will protect human rights, report criminal offenses and violations, highlight harmful decisions and actions, and make use of all available mechanisms to safeguard the public interest, human rights, freedoms, health, safety, and property of citizens, in accordance with the goals, vision, and mission of our organizations.
Signatories:
- A11 – Initiative for Economic and Social Rights
- Alternative Girls’ Center
- ASTRA – Anti-Trafficking Action
- Autonomous Women’s Center
- Belgrade Centre for Human Rights
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy
- Center for Contemporary Politics
- Civic Initiatives
- CRTA – Center for Research, Transparency, and Accountability
- European Movement in Serbia
- FemPlatz
- Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
- Humanitarian Law Center
- Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia
- Initiative for the Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities – MDRI-S
- International Aid Network – IAN
- Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights – YUCOM
- Media Association
- Ministry of Space Collective
- National Coalition for Decentralization
- Online Media Association
- Partners for Democratic Change Serbia
- PIN – Psychosocial Innovation Network
- Polekol – Organization for Political Ecology
- Regulatory Institute for Renewable Energy and Environment – RERI
- SHARE Foundation
- Slavko Ćuruvija Foundation
- Youth Initiative for Human Rights
Bosnian constitutional reform on one page
I hope my friends at Circle (Krug) 99 in Sarajevo won’t mind my republishing this statement. It is a clear and concise proposal for constitutional changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina presented at their January 19 session. It also puts the responsibility where it belongs: primarily on Bosnians.
The current Constitutional arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on Annex 4 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, whose principal attribute Is the cessation of armed conflict in our country. However, its implementation over the past three decades has clearly shown that this consensual constitutional arrangement in fact represents an obstacle to the development of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a democratic state in harmony with contemporary standards. For this reason, constitutional reform is necessary and should unfold in three directions. First, we should incorporate into the constitution the actual achievements of constitutional development attained up to now. For example, the Constitution provides for legal regulation of state symbols, and this has been realized. The symbols have been adopted and have taken on a life of their own. Now it is necessary to raise their normalization to the constitutional level. In addition, reform of the armed forces, introduction of a Court and Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina, intelligence agencies and indirect taxation – these are all new institutions and authorities for our state that should be dealt with in a coherent text of the principal law of the land. Second, the Constitution is replete with provisions of a limited time nature. In other words, their validity and implementation are linked with precisely defined timelines. Some of these have either expired, or they present solutions that are no longer realistically implementable because of the afore-mentioned developments. For example, there is the convening of the Constitutional Court, the first naming of the Executive Council of the Central Bank with a foreigner as its governor, and the Permanent Committee for military issues. Constitutional reform would include eliminating references of this kind. The third direction of reform is perhaps the most demanding, since it calls for the harmonization of the Constitution with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, which has time after time referred to the discriminatory nature of current provisions that limit the active and passive voting rights for the House of Peoples and for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would be enough to recall the decision in the Kovacevic vs. Bosnia case, where the claimant demonstrated that the House of Peoples at the state level has no electoral legitimacy under today’s constitutional arrangements. There exists in this country the will, the professional expertise and expert communities necessary to conduct a thorough constitutional reform, whose work hopefully would be augmented with considerable assistance of international players. ** Presenters at the “Krug 99” session were: Professor Dr. Sukrija Baksic Law Faculty of the University of Sarajevo 19 January 2025 ** Adil Kulenović, president |
Why a PM resigning doesn’t matter
I’ve been preoccupied with events in DC and thus slow to comment on Serbian politics. Certainly the resignation of the prime minister is a credit to the demonstrators. They have maintained the pressure for months in the aftermath of the collapse of the Novi Sad train station canopy.
Waves of protests
In my way of counting this is a third wave of recent popular protests against President Aleksandar Vucic. The first wave was the anti-violence protests starting in late 2023. The second was environmental protests against lithium mining last summer and fall. Now we are seeing massive protests asking for accountability for the Novi Sad tragedy, which occurred last November 1. The common thread is that Serbs are asking for more transparency, accountability, and rule of law.
The protests show profound dissatisfaction with Vucic. He has introduced a semi-authoritarian system. The state vilifies and arrests dissenters, denies them outlets for free expression, and buys support with government jobs and contracts. Meanwhile, he and his allies are harvesting rents from any and all who want to do business in Serbia.
While united on the street, the opposition is fragmented among small political parties and their egotistical leaders. There is no opposition ready to govern. Some of the demonstrators are calling for a technical government to prepare for elections. Vucic won’t likely do that. He doesn’t hesitate to cheat when need be during electoral campaigns and at the polls. A technical government might put a crimp in his style.
Democratic backsliding has worked well for Vucic
But he is also genuinely popular in much of the country. He is a devoted Serbian nationalist who has attracted a lot of foreign investment from China, Europe, and the US. Despite his democratic backsliding, he has also gained political support from Washington and Brussels. They have regarded him as better than any of the conceivable alternatives, which are mostly on the nationalist right. And they like Vucic’s supply of ammunition to Ukraine and his willingness to mine lithium. Fawning over Vucic by the US government and by Germany has been particularly noteworthy.
Beijing has been investing mainly in steel, other metals, mining, and the automotive industry. In addition to its potential future in the European Union, Serbia is attractive partly because of lax regulation and enforcement. The Novi Sad collapse is symptomatic. China also supplies internal security technology that Vucic no doubt appreciates.
Moscow is not a big investor anywhere these days but gets lots of electronic components and political support from Serbia. Most notable is Serbia’s refusal to align with EU Ukraine sanctions.
One lapdog is as good as another
In this context, the resignation of a prime minister with little power doesn’t make a lot of difference. Vucic is the man, not Vucevic. If he thinks he’ll win, or can ensure that he’ll win, the President will call new elections. That has worked for him in the past to quiet protests. Or he will choose another lapdog prime minister who will do what the President wants without objection.
The prospects for real democracy in Serbia are dim, but of course that is true elsewhere as well. But that’s not a good reason not to try. My sentiments are with the demonstrators.
Things in the Balkans can get worse
My post yesterday on Biden’s less than sterling foreign policy legacy disappointed my Balkan fans. They thought his weak performance in their region merited attention. So here is a moment of attention. Let’s start with Trump’s first term, 2017-21.
Trump disappointed
In 2020, then President Trump signed with Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vucic separate agreements on “economic normalization.” The US Administration advertised these agreements as great achievements. They provided for highway and rail connections, financing for small and medium enterprises, entry of Kosovo into what was then labeled a “mini-Schengen” zone that included Serbia, Albania and Macedonia, mutual recognition of diplomas, prohibition of “untrusted” (read: Chinese) 5G vendors, as well as a number of other provisions that have little or nothing to do with economic normalization between Belgrade and Pristina. The other economic provisions were even more minimal, except for a promise to Belgrade of more US investment.
These agreements mostly went unimplemented. Israel recognized Kosovo and Pristina located its new embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Serbia got lots of new US investment. The most important provision, Serbia’s suspension of its anti-recognition campaign, never happened so far as I can tell.
Everyone had high expectations for Biden
People in the region, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, had high expectations for the Biden Administration in 2020. Senator Biden had been a vigorous advocate of US interventions in the Balkans. Secretary of State Blinken knew the region well. Ambassador in Belgrade Chris Hill had been deeply involved at Dayton and thereafter at Rambouillet and as ambassador in Macedonia. Derek Chollet, Counselor at State, was likewise knowledgeable.
To my surprise, they decided to turn American policy in a decidedly pro-Belgrade direction. They also decided to back Albanian Prime Minister Rama to the hilt. I knew that Biden had favored Belgrade getting candidacy for the European Union, without having met the requirements. I had opposed him on this issue while testifying in the 2000s. But I did not understand this reflected a generalized lean towards Serbia. For much of the Biden Administration, Gab Escobar, former DCM in Belgrade, led on the Balkans at State. He made creation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities his exclusive priority. That meant giving Belgrade what it wanted most while giving Pristina nothing. That was never going to work, and it didn’t.
But Biden’s people kept on leaning towards Belgrade. When Serbia kidnapped two Kosovo police from Kosovo territory, they said nothing meaningful. When Vucic sent rioters to Kosovo to attack NATO peacekeepers, Washington said little. When Serbia organized and equipped a terrorist attack in Kosovo, they did nothing. In Bosnia, the Biden people prioritized getting rid of a Bosniak nationalist politician. They left the much-sanctioned Serb and the equally odious Croat for another time.
What to expect now
I don’t expect better of the second Trump Administration. Jared Kushner, Trump’s Saudi-funded son-in-law, has been prospecting for investment projects in both Serbia and Albania. So far as I am aware, he hasn’t even visited Bosnia or Kosovo. You can expect Trump to do nothing that will endanger Kushner’s projects or his Saudi money. That means a continued tilt towards Belgrade and away from Pristina, though not away from Tirana. Albania and Serbia agree on many things, including the need for their presidents to stay in power without serious opposition. The Americans have been supportive under Biden. That will continue under Trump.
People in the Balkans will be watching Marco Rubio’s confirmation hearing today for any questions involving the Balkans. That could be a hint of where things are going. But I wouldn’t bet on any Balkan issues getting raised, unless someone prompts one of the Senators to do it.
Mico Vlahovic quotes outgoing Assistant Secretary James O’Brien as saying:
We do not want to it to seem that one [US political] party or the other is taking responsibility, because in America both parties believe that a strong relationship is important – both for our country and for Serbia.
That implies continuity in the appeasement of Belgrade.
It could be worse than that, if Washington returns to wanting to partition Kosovo on ethnic lines. But neither appeasement nor partition will bring peace and stability. The route to that is strengthened sovereignty for all the region’s countries. In these waning days, the Biden Administration is pushing “strategic dialogues” with both Belgrade and Pristina. That’s not the worst idea I’ve heard, but it all depends on the agendas.
Grenell’s special missions
President Trump has announced that Ric Grenell will be Presidential Envoy for Special Missions.
Ric, he says, “will work in some of the hottest spots around the World, including Venezuela and North Korea.” To my knowledge, this is a new job definition. In the past, presidents have often named special envoys for specific issues, not for “special missions” in general.
What he did in the past
Grenell was notorious in the first Trump Administration for mucking up several tasks. As Ambassador in Berlin he had a terrible relationship with the Germans. Without discussing the issues in private, he slammed German companies publicly for doing business with Iran and Russia. As a special envoy, Grenell tried to negotiate partition of Kosovo, transferring its Serb-majority northern municipalities to Serbia. That effort failed. He then spent several months as a highly partisan but interim Director of National Intelligence. In that job, he declassified documents he thought would embarrass Democrats.
Openly gay well before that was widely acceptable in the US, Grenell has been politically labile. He has worked for Mitt Romney, criticized Donald Trump, and lobbied for Hungarian autocrat Viktor Orban. He did not register with the Justice Department after signing a contract with Orban.
Venezuela and North Korea
President Trump in his first term notably failed in diplomacy with Caracas and Pyongyang. He recognized opposition candidate Juan Guaido as the rightful President of Venezuela. He even introduced him as such during a State of the Union address. But he failed to make it stick. President Biden is in a similar situation now. The US recognizes opposition candidate Edmundo Gonzalez as the winner of the July presidential election. But Nicolas Maduro remains in power.
The first Trump Administration likewise failed in its effort to reach an agreement with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. Trump tried both threats and flattery to get Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons, to no avail. North Korea is a de facto nuclear power with about 50 nuclear weapons. It also now has the fissile material needed to build at least another 50. The Biden Administration has not made any progress on the nuclear issue. It has also been unable to prevent Pyongyang from helping Russia with missiles and other conventional weapons.
So Grenell is taking on at least two difficult portfolios. Venezuela might be the easier, as Maduro appears weak and vulnerable. He allowed an election in which he was soundly defeated but claimed victory and refused to leave office. Kim Jong Un has not made that mistake. But even apparently strong regimes can be brittle and fall, as we have seen these last two weeks in Syria.
Good luck!
Good luck and timing are important factors in diplomacy. It’s possible Grenell will not fail this time around. I wish him good luck. America would be better off if Maduro concedes the presidency in Venezuela and Kim Jong Un surrenders nuclear capabilities.
The Balkans will be fortunate if Grenell stays busy with Venezuela and North Korea. He came close to precipitating disaster there in the first Trump Administration. Since 2021, Grenell has been involved with Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner in hospitality investments in Serbia and Albania. It would be a gross abuse for him to get involved now in the Balkans. But in an Administration that doesn’t know what “conflict of interest” means, it could happen. Kosovo and Bosnia would be the victims.
Ukraine should also count itself lucky that it was not named as a “special mission”: