Tag: Balkans
Now criminals use intelligence agencies
Vreme, a Belgrade weekly, has given permission for me to republish this recent interview with Saša Janković. The interviewer was Nedim Sejdimovic. Included at the end are two questions and answers not published in Vreme.
Saša Janković was the first Ombudsman of Serbia, a man who, along with his team, established and developed the institution of the Protector of Citizens from 2007 to 2017. Soon after its establishment, it became the most important state control mechanism, representing citizens’ interests and enjoying their unequivocal trust. Following a call from a part of the public (100 public figures) to run as a candidate in the 2017 presidential elections, Saša Janković resigned from his position as Ombudsman and went head-to-head against Aleksandar Vučić. In the elections, he garnered nearly 600,000 votes in a perfectly unfair battle. After the elections, he founded the Free Citizens’ Movement and became its first president. However, in December of the following year, he resigned and announced that he would no longer pursue a political career.
Janković is a lawyer by profession, with a post-graduate specialization in national and global security from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. He currently works as an international consultant for human rights and oversight in the security sector.
“VREME”: Aleksandar Vulin, head of BIA (the Serbian civilian Security-Intelligence Agency), has found himself on the U.S. government’s blacklist, among other things, due to “involvement in transnational organized crime, illegal operations related to narcotics, and abuse of public office.” How did this man end up at the helm of the secret service?
SAŠA JANKOVIĆ: Vulin was appointed to all positions, including the head of BIA, due to his loyalty to Aleksandar Vučić, without whom he would have remained a minor political figure. Not to be misunderstood, loyalty is an important trait in politics. Without it, at the first crisis, everything falls apart and everyone goes home “the smartest,” but as losers. I know how I fared in politics because I did not pay attention to the loyalty of my associates, taking it for granted. However, loyalty alone is not a sufficient qualification for leading a ministry or a secret service. It does not justify steering Serbia towards an increasingly dangerous foreign policy course, nor pursuing a violent domestic policy. Both are causing this country, its institutions, and its citizens to burst at the seams, although, Vučić and Vulin would disagree. Anyways, the responsibility for appointing Vulin to that position lies with Vučić, not with Vulin himself.
Q: Apart from loyalty, what else can be said about Vulin’s role in Vučić’s government?
A: Despite all the mockery directed towards Vučić from the opposition, his government is well-organized. Vulin’s role in it is to be a prominent pro-Russian and anti-Western figure, and he plays his part in a flamboyant but wholehearted manner. He won’t betray when things get tough. There are also members of the government whose task is to maintain good relations with the West. Vucic strategically presents either group to the audience that matters to him at the moment. Having these different groups allows him to politically maneuver, choose, and shift focus to conduct some sort of policy. What kind of policy that is, is another matter. In my opinion, it is wrong and harmful in so many ways.
Q: You said that the decision of the US government was not random and was not made hastily. Does that mean that the US has strong and unambiguous evidence against Vulin? And could our government request to see that evidence for potential actions? If not Vučić’s government, could the next government request to see that evidence? And should we expect that some other official from our country might end up on that blacklist?
A: If Vulin remains in his position, which I doubt will be for long, the list of individuals under US sanctions may continue to grow. I don’t believe the US has anything major about Vulin that is not already known in Serbian institutions. The explanation provided by the US did not surprise anyone, and I don’t think any formal proof will, or should be sent to Serbia. However, it is possible that some information may be leaked to the media, similar to the leak of the “Sky” phone conversations. The current government is more concerned about this type of pressure than with any formal evidence and how it would (not) be used by the domestic justice system. It is unfortunate that foreign powers hold the key to this pressure and can choose when and how to apply it in their own interest. What makes it worse is that there is material available for such pressure.
Q: What does the decision of the US government mean for Serbia in political and security terms? And how do you comment on Vučić’s reaction to the news about Vulin being sanctioned?
A: With this decision, the USA is sending a message to Serbia that Belgrade has not taken its previous warnings about the consequences of abandoning the European path and turning towards Russia seriously. I believe that Ambassador Christopher Hill wants Vučić to understand that the number of people in Washington with zero tolerance for Serbia on these issues is increasing. Politics, security, and economy are intertwined, especially given the situation in Ukraine, and the US administration’s decision has implications for Serbia in all three spheres. It portrays Serbia as a country plagued by crime, corruption, and Russian influence, and could lead to further deterioration of relations with Western countries on all levels and in all issues.
Vučić’s initial public reaction was expected – he responded sharply to America in front of his followers. However, it remains to be seen what will happen in the coming months – I believe that Vulin will be “promoted” to a next position. It is noteworthy that there are no reciprocal measures against American agencies and their leaders, only a sharp retort from Vučić. But this is not about how he handles this situation publicly, this is about the situation should never have happened in the first place: Vulin should never have been appointed to that position, and if he was, he should have been removed before public sanctions were imposed. Because, these sanctions have been unofficially in effect for some time.
Q: Why is security cooperation with America exactly important for Serbia?
A: The lack of security cooperation with America would not only affect relations with the US, but also with the majority of Western countries. This would hinder access to intelligence information, resources, and support in the fight against terrorism, organized crime, and other threats. Ironically, some members of our security community may welcome this, as cooperation with the West directly harms their interests. However, no country, including Serbia, is strong enough to navigate the world in isolation in terms of security, economy, and politics. We would have to turn completely towards the East, which in the world as it is today, means a conflict with the West. We have already experienced such a conflict in our recent history and know the outcome of that wartime adventure.
The truth is also that aligning with America and the West today still means conflict, but with the opposite side or sides. So which option is better for Serbia if we have to choose between the two? Where can we better pursue our interests, especially given that our neighboring countries have already made their decisions towards NATO and the EU? I would prefer if we were a militarily neutral country, as we were at some point in the past. However, then we should not have asked for, nor accepted financial and political support from the West for decades, nor, to that matter, deified Putin in the pro-governmental media.
Not to mention that we now don’t fulfil most of the international criteria for military neutrality. For that, we should have been leading a moderate foreign policy, in everything. But let me ask: from a historical and human perspective, what do we really want? Do we want to align ourselves with how Russia’s responded to NATO’s expansion – by occupying and destroying a sovereign country? Are we prepared that some overwhelming military power does the same to us if we decide to join an adversary (to them) military-political complex – be it Russian or some other towards the East? It is easy to die bravely; living with a wrong choice is what is difficult.
However, I am not a pessimist. I don’t believe that by imposing sanctions against Vulin, the USA and the West truly intend to sever security cooperation with Serbia. On the contrary, they want to draw certain red lines to enable our cooperation to continue and develop. Our security/intelligence agencies have reduced international cooperation to its lowest level in recent history, except with Russian and maybe Hungarian counterparts. But I don’t believe this is sustainable.
Q: How accurate are the claims we hear – that U.S. and Western agencies have numerous pieces of evidence about the ties between the Serbian government’s top officials and organized crime, and that they use it as a certain means of blackmail? Is there any truth to this, or are these just “gossip from the neighborhood”?
A: As previously mentioned, it is publicly known that the decrypted conversations from the “Sky” phones originate from abroad. This means that someone, possibly in Paris or another location, is choosing what to officially disclose and what to retain and use according to their needs and interests.
Q: So, Western agencies influence internal political processes through the media?
A: Let’s not be hypocritical; of course, foreign agencies will use their resources and material to further their national interests. There are numerous cases linking crime, such as corruption and arms smuggling, to people in power, and any of these could become the next big headline. Media and journalists cannot be blamed for doing their job; their role is to publish news, and they should continue to do so as long as it is truthful. The way to reduce external influence is not by concealing crime, but by rooting it out, especially among high-ranking state officials. Furthermore, the distinction between good and bad cannot be based on the principle of “if we do it, it’s good, and if they do it, it’s bad.”
Q: As the Protector of Citizens, you performed oversight of the work of security services. What were your experiences during that period? And what processes occurred after the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) came to power?
A: At the beginning, on behalf of the international community, I participated in the organizational reform of our intelligence agencies. Then, as the Protector of Citizens I oversaw their activities, ensuring they respected human rights and adhered to democratic standards. I worked with heads of the agencies, including Stojanović, Kovač, Cvetković, Anočić, Miličević and Živaljević, Vukadinović, Bulatović, Rodić, Aleksandar Đorđević, Milić, Nikolić, Tomčić, and others. I recall working also with some lesser-known but very important professionals, such as Jandrić, Dragičević, Teodorović, Banković, Delić, Panić, and Stojić.
During this time, journalists like the late Dejan Anastasijević were well-informed about intelligence and security matters. In 2006, he wrote an article titled “Is BIA going to outlive Serbia?” in which he predicted the Agency’s recruitment slogan, “countries change, the Service remains,” and the perverted philosophy behind it. I recall debating with director Rodić about his plan to open an Academy within the BIA for high-school graduates. I expressed my concern that molding such young individuals might be suitable for military or police profiles, but not for intelligence or counterintelligence officers, especially civilian ones.
At the time, my advice was not heeded, but I was at least not considered an enemy of the state because of it. In 2007, I insisted that the Service for Research and Documentation and the Security Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must be deprived of their legal status as national security/intelligence services. Many did not understand my reasoning, but when the change was made, none of those services called me a traitor.
Things gradually changed with the rise of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) to power. The first law that the SNS amended immediately after assuming the power in 2012 was the Law on the Fundamental Organization of Security Services. The amendment enabled Aleksandar Vučić to become the operational coordinator of secret services. That’s when he and I had our first conversation – I argued that this was the beginning of the systematic politicization of services that were required by the Constitution and laws to be politically neutral.
To be fair, even before SNS took power, the same provision on selection criteria for the secret services operational coordinator was tampered with politically. The working group that drafted this landmark law in 2007 required that the coordinator be a non-political person. However, this was changed before the adoption of the law in the cabinets of then-President Boris Tadić and then-Prime Minister Koštunica.
An additional curiosity – the composition of the National Security Council was also changed at that time, and Serbia got its first NSC in modern history without a Minister of Foreign Affairs as a member. Due to personal and party disputes, the architecture of the security sector has been distorted. Today, this distortion has reached extremes, with a disregard for all rules and an establishment of subservience and sycophancy as the only criteria.
Q: To what extent is Predrag Petrović from the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy right when he says that the secret services in Serbia have returned to the 1990s?
A: I see the situation differently, although there are some similarities to the 1990s. Back then, secret services used criminals for their operations, whereas today, I see criminals using the services for their dirty work. The boundary between them has been erased. In the 1990s, the services were not pursuing their own agendas, but those defined by the state. Many things were wrongly defined, but it was done within state institutions. During that time, the services engaged in “business” on state orders, circumventing international sanctions and securing essential goods. To fund such operations, they were also involved in smuggling high-profit goods like cigarettes. However, when sanctions ended, the channels remained, and some individuals from the services gradually transitioned into “private business.”
Today, I fail to see how activities facilitated by the services, like the “Jovanjica” affair, have any connection to the so-called “state reasons.” I see no justification for them or their link to national interests, even if misunderstood. They lack legal basis and decisions from state organs, even formally. There is no documentation, not even “on-the-white” notes (in the services’ jargon, these are documents without letterheads and signatures); things simply happen in silence. Some individuals enrich themselves by using the services as their private resource, sharing a portion of the spoils with the party, and that’s it.
In the 1990s, the hierarchy was clear: at the top was the state, followed by the services, then business, and finally, crime. Even when destructive and insane acts were committed, like the assassination of Stambolić or the attempted assassination of Drašković, it was clear who was in charge and where each entity stood.
Today, it is impossible to distinguish them. If someone is literally mincing humans in a house under surveillance by a service, is there any difference between the monster and the operative? Who is really in charge? The boundary between politics, services, business (money), media and crime has been eliminated, creating today’s vulgar and violent reality. To explain the difference compared to the 1990s more vividly: no, I do not believe that Jovica Stanišić and Aleksandar Vulin, just like Aleksandar Tijanić and Željko Mitrović, are the same, even though all of them are harmful to Serbia.
Q: Were you surprised by the “Jovanjica” affair and the fact that top intelligence agency officials were directly involved in it?
A: Honestly, I didn’t think they would be so audacious. Now, one of the members of the services, a colonel in the Military Intelligence Agency, fled through Slovenia to the US, where he was granted asylum, and it’s not difficult to figure out how. At that time, Vulin was the Minister of Defense and politically responsible for the work of both military intelligence agencies. I believe he knew everything about the hooligans, Jovanjica, the Belivuk clan, the transmission of raw intelligence to Russia, and many other things.
Q: In your opinion, are there professionals within the agencies who could resist or attempt to resist party abuse? How much have they been “tamed” in the meantime?
A: We have reached a point where we are delighted when someone does something normal. In the past decade, people with integrity were thoroughly purged from the services. Those who now make decisions have no doubt – they are there precisely to safeguard the party’s power and ensure that certain tasks are accomplished while others are not. There are, of course, some who would like to work differently, but they do not have the authority to decide. Some are passive because they don’t see a clear alternative or they don’t want to suffer for the sake of an internet “like”. However, let’s not deceive ourselves; the majority now do as they are told, waiting for privileged apartments and pay raises.
Q: Regarding the narrative of all-powerful secret services in Serbia, which supposedly have enormous, decisive influence on the political, social, and even cultural life – to what extent is it a myth, and how much truth is there in it?
A: Although some in the services believe they are more important and long-lasting than the state, even boasting about it on TV, I don’t believe they really make crucial political decisions. However, they are among the strongest tools for implementing these decisions, even when they are unlawful and unethical, especially in such cases. It is true that they manipulate this confused society by discrediting or favoring individuals, and anyone who thinks they can always avoid their machinations is mistaken.
But they are not all-powerful. It is a sad and deplorable job for a secret service agent to engage in discrediting, intimidating, and plotting within the country, especially when they shy away from strategic intelligence work and real security challenges. Just look at the topics that security agencies worldwide deal with, while ours attend the founding event of an infantile youth nationalist NGO!
Q: Let’s recall the time when you were Vučić’s opponent in the presidential elections. There was a fierce, unprecedented campaign against you. Pro-regime media, among other things, published that you were a collaborator with the BIA. To what extent and in what ways are secret services involved in the campaign against you and against Vučić’s opponents in general?
A: The practice of working against so-called “internal enemies,” though under different names, has been reintroduced on a large scale within all three major secret services. Any influential political dissenter of the current government qualifies for an “enemy.” The novelty is that the military services, which previously maintained some distance from civilians, are now competing shoulder to shoulder with their civilian colleagues to prove loyalty by “covering” political leaders and activists.
I won’t be a hypocrite and deny that even in the most democratic countries, services responsible for national security keep an eye on politicians who make critical decisions for the state or might soon find themselves in such situations. However, the aim of such monitoring must be solely to uncover any illegal influence, dictated by foreign or criminal factors, on their decisions and activities. Or a risk for it. If this is not the case, even if their political views and actions are diametrically opposed to the state policy, whatever the operatives discover about politicians must not be circulated around, but destroyed.
To guarantee this, the services must be under strict institutional control by parliament (for political neutrality), the judiciary (to ensure respect for the law), the Ombudsman, and other independent state oversight bodies (to uphold human rights and democratic principles). In the past, I engaged in lengthy and serious discussions with the leadership of the services on the modalities of this system of checks and balances. And there was serious oversight of their work, making Serbia an example of progress in good practices in this regard.
The problem now is not that I am no longer involved; the problem is that nobody is – there is no longer any institutional control over the work of secret services! Public oversight by media or similar means can never replace institutional control in terms of depth of knowledge, scope, and effects.
Now, you didn’t want it, but you brought me back to those difficult times, and reintroduced something from their dirty kitchen into the legitimate public discourse. So, you just confirmed my words that it is impossible to altogether avoid the consequences of their intrigues. I know exactly who devised that discredit, we met and talked several times in my life.
Actually their “kompromat” speaks volumes about the state of secret services: firstly – to discredit someone, you have to connect the target with something very bad; however, for them the “bad” is neither drugs nor arms trafficking (those are apparently recommendations to become the service’s director!). No, for them, the “bad” is – the secret service itself! So, these people know how much their own service, which should be elite and respected, is in fact shameful, and they cast that shame to disgrace someone else with it!
Secondly – they know that nobody will think that the alleged work with the service was about uncovering the intentions of foreign states and services, identifying networks of foreign agents and the traitors they recruited, producing intelligence to facilitate national interests and protect national security, or intercepting terrorist activities, although all of these are tasks of the service. Instead, they expect the public to associate it exclusively with snitching on friends, political plotting, and other morally and legally prohibited actions. What does this actually say about this Service?
Thirdly – anyone with even a bit of brains, who has ever genuinely worked or considered secretly working for BIA, if they believed what was propagated about me, would believe that they too can be betrayed tomorrow. Such a recruitment strategy is scandalous, not to mention that disclosure of identities of covert operatives and assets would constitute a severe criminal offense, as their identities are highly classified. However, the person who devised this discrediting action knew that they would never go to court for it because they did not truly reveal a collaborator’s identity – as I was never one. But someday, that person could, and should, appear before the lustration commission.
Lastly, an ambassador of a Western country told me at that time: “In my country, we secretly honor people who do what they claimed you did. In your country, they seem to warn them not to try to help their nation under any circumstances. Strange.” Not just “strange,” but I must wonder if accidental!
In the end, all of this reminds me of another situation: when in 2016, I underwent and passed the security vetting for the second time to access the top-secret information, including details of ongoing operations, and, ironically, the names of secret assets, the then director of BIA, Đorđević, said something like, “My people say they can’t catch you, identify for which foreign service are you working for, but they’re sure you do because otherwise you wouldn’t know so much or have advanced so far.” I told him to dismiss them all, because they obviously view me from the perspective of their own ambitions. He signed that there were no obstacles to issuing my security certificate, but he didn’t dismiss them. Now, those people reign supreme in BIA.
Two questions and answers were not published in Vreme:
Q: Although I deliberately avoided conventional political questions, I cannot help but ask you in the end: do current events indicate that the ruling party SNS is really falling apart?
A: I am not concerned about the state of SNS, but about the state of my country. If something is falling apart, it’s the institutions of my state. If something is at risk, it’s its citizens whom the leaders of SNS treat as enemies of the state. If something is declining, it’s our self-respect. The greatest internal risk to the national security of Serbia is the conflict of the ruling party, that is the state leadership, with the citizens; it is the division of Serbia into members of SNS and others, and it is the fusion of security services, criminal elements, and politics.
Q: Is there a possibility of more serious internal turmoil, what is your assessment?
A: I wish for my country to be stable, for political life to proceed freely, for the government to change through free elections (if they are not free – then they are not really elections), and for citizens and their state not to be in conflict. It is up to those in power to ensure that, but they are not doing so. I am concerned that some new tragedy or incident might spark further protests, leading to even more protesters venting their legitimate revolt on the streets, throwing the government out, creating a power vacuum that could be filled by anyone, regardless of their legitimacy, as long as they have support from one side or the other.
PS: They wouldn’t be needing to do things like this if they were really turning West:
The West needs to rebalance Balkans policy towards tough love
The US Congress has now conducted hearings on the Balkans in both the Senate and House. Members from both sides of the aisle evinced discomfort with Biden Administration policy. It has leaned heavily towards appeasement of Belgrade and has failed to react strongly to secessionist moves in Bosnia. What is the alternative?
The US is oblivious to the obvious
Administration officials are fond of reiterating the laudable 1990s strategic objective: Europe “whole and free.” They are oblivious to the obvious. It is not happening anytime soon. President Putin has forced the drawing of a new line in Europe. The Russian-dominated parts Europe will remain for now on the Eastern side of the line. This includes Russia and Belarus as well as parts of Georgia (Abkhazia, South Ossetia) and Moldova (Transnistria). The remaining questions are about Ukraine and the Balkans. Will the line go through them, or will they join the West?
In Ukraine, conventional warfare will answer the question. In the Balkans, it is already decided. For the foreseeable future, there is no serious prospect that Serbia or Republika Srpska (the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia and Herzegovina) will join the West.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
For the RS, that is obvious. Its president, Milorad Dodik, is a wholly-owned Russian proxy. He is doing his best to end any accountability to the Sarajevo “state” government. The RS parliament has already passed legislation denying the validity of Constitution Court decisions. It is only a matter of time before it passes legislation claiming state property, which the RS needs as collateral for its international loans. The international community’s High Representative will presumably annul all secessionist legislation from now on, but how he will enforce his decisions is not clear.
Dodik may not proceed all the way to declaring independence, as even Serbia would be reluctant to recognize the RS. But whether he does or not, RS will remain attached to the East so long as he is in power. The only hope for getting rid of him is to bankrupt the entity and bail it out with Western financing, conditional on his resignation and an end to secessionist ambitions. It is not yet clear whether Washington and Brussels have the stomach for that.
Serbia
Serbia is different. President Vucic is hedging between East and West. He plays Washington and Brussels off against Moscow and Beijing, hoping to get all he can from all four. Belgrade has a policy of military neutrality, for example, and conducts exercises with both NATO and Russia. Serbia buys weapons from both East and West. It ships weaponry to both Russia and Ukraine. Belgrade has refused to align with EU sanctions against Russia, but it votes against Russia on some General Assembly resolutions denouncing Russian aggression.
This Yugoslav-style “non-aligned” foreign policy is linked with ethnic nationalist domestic politics and ambitions for regional hegemony. Judging from ongoing anti-Vucic demonstrations, there are a lot of Serbs who aren’t happy with the current regime, which they view as violent, corrupt, and repressive. But the only viable electoral opposition to Vucic stems from his Serbian nationalist right. He has all but obliterated the liberal democratic opposition, which was weak to begin with. He controls most of the popular media and judicial system in addition to the executive. The Serbian security services and their allies in the Serbian Orthodox Church are wedded to Moscow.
In the region, Vucic aims to create the “Serbian world,” analogous to Putin’s “Russian world,” an idea that supported the invasion of Ukraine. In its weakest form, the goal is Belgrade political control over the Serb populations in neighboring states. Belgrade has already achieved that in Montenegro and Kosovo. In Bosnia, only Dodik, whose interests are not congruent, stands in the way. In its stronger form, the Serbian world entails annexation of territory Serbs occupy in neighboring countries and creation of Greater Serbia.
Rebalance the policy
Belgrade has not moved one inch closer to the West in the six years of Vucic’s presidency, despite consuming a truckload of diplomatic carrots. Strengthening of his links to Beijing has more than compensated for any weakening of his links to Moscow. The RS has spent 17 years moving towards secession. It is not going to reverse course without vigorous pushback. This situation requires a more realistic Western policy in the Balkans.
We need to lower expectations and raise incentives. Dodik’s RS and Vucic’s Serbia are not going to voluntarily embrace the West. The US, UK, and EU will need to starve the RS of all Western funds in order to end Dodik’s secessionist ambitions. They will also need to end Serbia’s immunity from Washington and Brussels criticism. Washington recently sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, Director of Belgrade’s Security Intelligence Agency, for corruption, drug and arms trafficking, and supporting Russia’s malign influence. That was a step in the right direction. The EU should do likewise. A public demand for Vulin’s removal as well as for the arrest and extradition to Kosovo of the thugs who attacked NATO peacekeepers in May would be another.
Possible benefits
Rebalancing toward Serbia and the RS would have the great virtue of testing not only their intentions, but also Moscow’s and Beijing’s. Moscow under current conditions is not going to want to increase funding to the RS. China hopes to use Serbia as an entry point to Europe. Beijing might think twice about investing in a Serbia that is on the outs with the EU. We could well be happily surprised if China and Russia decide to cut their losses and leave Serbia and the RS on the Western side of the new division of Europe. If they don’t, we will at least have saddled them with significant burdens.
Rebalancing could also help to revive the moribund dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. Washington and Brussels have focused their pressure on Pristina, which has no hedging option and has traditionally bandwagoned with the West. There is a long history of Pristina responding better to carrots than sticks. Even longer is the history of Belgrade responding better to sticks than carrots. If Vucic saw Washington and Brussels coming after him with a stick rather than carrots, he would be inclined to hedge more in their direction. Tough love would bring better results than appeasement.
A good hearing, if the Administration were listening
The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised the alarm in a hearing yesterday about the situation in the Balkans. Member after member cited concerns. They worried about escalating ethnic tensions and instability, Russian malfeasance, Chinese inroads, failure of Serbia and Kosovo to implement agreements, failure to implement court decisions and secessionist moves in Bosnia and Herzegovina, endemic corruption, and flagging economies. They might also have cited substantial migrant outflows from the region.
There was a single witness: Gabe Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary. Despite the availability of many credible people who hold contrasting views, the Congress has unfortunately chosen in this and the previous recent Senate hearing on the Balkans to hear only from the Administration. Congressman Issa (R-CA) was at pains to lament this.
Say it fast and confidently
Gabe quickly cited EU accession as the US objective, without noting the diminished credibility of that prospect and unlikelihood that would happen any time in the foreseeable future. He averred that the “breakthrough” normalization (Ohrid) agreement reached in February and the annex added in March are critical. But he failed to note that Serbia refused to sign both and quickly violated them.
He insisted on the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM) to coordinate culture, education, and public services as the keystone. But he failed to explain why the US has not insisted on the quid pro quo also agreed in 2013. That was the extension of the Kosovo constitution to the Serb majority municipalities of the north. Belgrade has repeatedly blocked that in many different ways.
Gabe noted the supposed agreement of Kosovo and Serbia to recognize each other’s documents and national symbols. But he neglected to note that this is a problem principally in Serbia. He repeated the canard that Serbia would no longer lobby against Kosovo’s international integration. Serbian President Vucic has pledged not to fulfill that provision. Belgrade failed to observe it at the Council of Europe days after signing the agreement.
In Bosnia, Gabe cited Milorad Dodik’s anti-Dayton activities. But he was at a loss to explain how the US would get Europe to join in the sanctions against him. He cited excessive reliance in the region on Russian energy. However, he failed to note that Serbia is the prime culprit in that respect.
The questioning was good
Chair Kean (R-NJ) wanted to know whether the US will bring strong pressure to bear on President Vucic if Kosovo Prime Minister proceeds with the ASMM. Gabe said a quick and confident “absolutely” and went on to claim that the agreement requires Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This it clearly does not do. He added that Serbia has agreed to remove the protesters and participate in new elections for mayors in northern Kosovo.
I suppose that might be true in diplomatic channels, but where is the evidence in public? Would you believe it just a few months after elections held because Belgrade agreed the Serbs would participate but that they then boycotted? Gabe went on to say that those demonstrators who attacked journalists Kosovo police and NATO should be punished. Where is the public US demand that Belgrade, which ordered the rioting, turn them over to the Kosovo justice system?
Ranking Member Keating (D-MA) focused on China. Gabe rightly emphasized Beijing’s political conditions but placed his hope entirely in the EU to institute (some day) contracting procedures that would counter Beijing and keep projects open to US competitors.
Sanctions
Representative Wagner (R-MO) underlined her bipartisan “Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreements Through Sanctions” Act. Gabe pledged to support it and to prevent financing from reaching those who are trying to dismantle Bosnia (in addition to support for EUFOR and the HiRep). That sounded serious. Maybe State has finally realized that staying silent on Dodik is not a winning strategy. The Congressman made it clear she wanted Hungary bent into allowing EU sanctions on Dodik.
Congressman Titus (D-NV) focused on Russian disinformation and the free press. Gabe skipped the opportunity to focus criticism on Serbia, which has seen a long decline in press freedom and a dramatic rise of Russian disinformation.
Congressman Huizenga (R-MI) asked about Serbia buying Chinese and Russian arms. Gabe claimed Serbia had curtailed its purchases from Russia “significantly” in response to the threat of sanctions but has increased procurement from China (which is not covered by the “CAATSA” sanctions in question). Huizenga also asked about the five EU nonrecognizers. Gabe took the opportunity to claim vaguely that action on the ASMM would be helpful.
Congressman Self (R-TX) focused on President Vucic’s incitement of the election boycott and import of heavy weapons from Russia. Why don’t we have sanctions on Serbia now? Gabe squirmed out by claiming that he didn’t control CAATSA sanctions and that other sanctions had been used in the Balkans, neglecting to mention they have not been used against Serbia. Self made it clear he regards Serbia as a Russian proxy in the Balkans.
Congressman Moran (R-TX) asked about Montenegro. Sadly, Gabe was unaware of the newly contracted coastal road there that the Chinese will build and mistakenly thought it was the already built north/south highway. He also took the opportunity to emphasize that Montenegro’s new government will make Podgorica a fast-achieving candidate for EU membership and that its new president as “pro-American.” I don’t yet see any guarantee of those two propositions.
A well-briefed committee, but the Administration isn’t listening
Well-briefed, the members of Congress asked good questions. The Administration responses were less convincing. They consistently avoided any serious criticism of Serbia and continued to hold Kosovo principally, if not exclusively, responsible for the current train wreck. There was no sign that Gabe was listening to the repeated indications that a tougher approach with Serbia is needed.
Two notable omissions. Gabe did not mention Open Balkans, a Belgrade initiative that appears to have died a merited death. But bad ideas never die in the Balkans. They return like zombies to haunt the region. Just wait a few years, or maybe months. It will be back, along with partition.
Unless I missed it, Gabe also failed to mention the recently sanctioned Serbian Director of the Security Intelligence Agency. No one asked what we are going to do about Aleksandar Vulin. That was an unfortunate omission.
The Americans are satisfied with less rather than more
The United States sanctioned Serbia’s intelligence chief last week for arms and drug dealing as well as facilitating malign Russian influence in the Balkans. I’ve applauded that move.
Vulin is a symptom
But stopping there will be less than half a loaf. Aleksandar Vulin is symptomatic of far deeper maladies. There is no way he could have engaged in drug trafficking without at least the tacit nulla osta of President Vucic. Any arms dealing he has done would have required something more than that, including the cooperation of his intel people. It would be hard to miss his loud advocacy of Russian interests in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Vulin is also Serbia’s prime exponent of “the Serbian world,” the idea that Serb populations in neighboring countries should at least all respect Belgrade’s direction. He would prefer to see them all incorporated into the Serbian state. This is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia Slobodan Milosevic sought in the Balkan wars in the 1990s.
President Vucic is his top cover
Vulin has served in government with Vucic for the past 11 years. He started with the Kosovo portfolio in 2012 and moved on to Social Affairs, Defense, and Interior before becoming the intel director last year. Though they belong to different political parties that are coalition partners, Vulin and Serbian President Vucic are like peas in a pod: politically far more similar than different. Vulin made his way during the Milosevic regime affiliated with Mira Markovic, Milosevic’s wife. Vucic was tied more to Milosevic himself.
Now Vucic is Vulin’s protector. In reaction to the sanctions, Vucic has asserted the US is really concerned with the Russia connection, not with the arms and drug dealing. This is convenient for him, as it makes the issue not one of legality and morality but rather politics. In Serbia, both the government and public opinion regard wanting good relations with Moscow as a virtue, not a vice.
No action yet
There is no sign yet of what, if anything, Vucic is going to do about Vulin. He has announced an investigation, but it would be surprising if one were really needed. Vucic has tight control of his government and no doubt has known whatever business Vulin is involved in. Vucic has publicly backed Vulin’s advocacy of the “Serbian world,” though he is careful not to mention the idea often.
The American Ambassador has been mincing his words about the sanctions, emphasizing that they target Vulin, not on Serbia’s institutions:
That presumably means Washington intends to try to preserve its intelligence liaison relationship with Belgrade. The US may want to see Vulin fired, but it won’t be seeking any more far-reaching reform.
Now what?
That is too bad. “Serbian institutions” unquestionably have known what Vulin is up and have failed to act against him. They are still failing, though of course it is only days since the sanctions announcement. Washington should be pressing for Vucic to fire not only Vulin but all his cronies. The US should also be seeking a much wider reform that frees Serbian media from state dominance, ensures independence of the judiciary, makes space for a serious opposition, and detaches the country from its strong intelligence, political, and military connections to Moscow. How about starting with alignment to the EU Ukraine-related sanctions?
There are lots of other opportunities in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro for Serbia to signal serious changes in Serbian policy that would bring Belgrade closer to the West. But the Americans seem satisfied these days with less rather than more.
Big fish caught in Serbia, lots of questions unanswered
Yes: the US Treasury has sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency, former Defense and Interior Minister, and bestie to President Vucic. His misdeeds, according to the US, include drug and arms trafficking as well as facilitating malign Russian influence. This is a big step. I heartily welcome it.
Questions
Then come the questions. Why wasn’t this done earlier? The world has known about Vulin’s misdeeds for years. The US did not just discover that Vulin has been trafficking in drugs and arms. Maybe he trafficked in the wrong directions recently? His subservience to Russian objectives is also well known. Did he send some weapons to Russia, to compensate for the much-ballyhooed Serbian munitions going to Ukraine?
Vulin is, among other things, the leading advocate for “the Serbian world.” That is a concept hard to distinguish from Greater Serbia, Milosevic’s aim in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. It is also an analogue to “the Russian world,” the banner under which Putin is trying to carve out parts of Ukraine. President Vucic has avoided associating himself too closely with the concept, though he has pursued it in practice in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
That raises the question of whether Vucic knew about the sanctions move before they happened. Did he object? Did he welcome them as a way of dissociating himself from someone who had become a liability in dealing with the Americans and the Europeans? And how will he react now that it is done? Will he fire Vulin or keep him on? Or will he shifted elsewhere to keep him out of the way until the time comes for resurrection?
No answers yet
I can’t answer any of these questions yet. The Americans aren’t likely to comment on the timing of this move. But an enterprising journalist might get them to link a bit more derogatory information. Vucic is unlikely to fire Vulin outright, unless he has reason to believe that Vulin, like Yevgeny Prigozhin, was planning to contest his hold on power. If Vulin is kept on, it will be a clear sign of where Vucic stands: not with the West. If he is shunted off someplace, the signal may remain ambiguous.
We’ll need to wait and see how things shake out.
What if Vucic turns westward?
This moment is an opportunity for Vucic. If he really wants to turn westward and embrace Serbia’s European prospect, he could use the occasion of US sanctions on Vulin to good effect. That would mean not only firing him but expelling the extensive Russian intelligence service presence in Serbia, aligning Serbia with EU sanctions on Russia, closing Moscow’s supposedly humaniarian base near Nis, ending support for Serbia’s agents inside Kosovo and Montenegro, and disowning Milorad Dodik’s efforts to separate Republika Srpska from the authority of Sarajevo’s institutions.
Vucic could also mend democracy in Serbia. That would entail freeing the media from government domination, respecting the independence of the judiciary, restraining the police, favoring gun control, and encouraging freedom of expression and association. Not to mention moving quickly to implement the acquis communautaire requirements for EU admission.
First to applaud
I’ll be the first to applaud if anything like that happens. But it won’t. Whatever happened with Vulin, Serbia’s broader turn westward still seems far off.
Is bankrupting Republika Srpska a good idea?
Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik has for years sliced the salami thin piece by thin piece. He is getting his sub-national entity, the 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory that is majority Serb, closer to independence. With Russian backing, he is now taking bigger slices. The RS Assembly has passed a law that invalidates the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court on his entity’s territory. He has also declared his intention to hold a referendum on independence before the end of the year.
Ethnonationalism is the creed
I take these moves seriously. Elections in Republika Srpska are neither free nor fair. But there is no reason to doubt that Dodik has more than majority support there. He can’t go on promising independence forever. He needs to try to deliver at some point.
The popular appeal of independence to the people who live in the RS is mainly ethnonationalist. The RS conducted an ethnonationalist war against the Bosnian state in 1992-95, including the Srebrenica genocide and other instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Dayton peace agreements preserved the RS and gave it, despite its criminal history, international validity as a subnational entity and a great deal of autonomy. Many people who live in the RS view it as protecting them from retaliation.
Dodik was not personally involved in the atrocities of the Bosnian war, so far as I know. At the time, he was an opposition member of the RS Assembly seen in the West as a relative moderate. But that does not diminish his present willingness to exploit ethnonationalist passions for political purposes. Since his campaign for the Bosnian presidency in 2006, he has made himself the leading nationalist voice in the RS.
But Dodik is not only interested in satisfying the ethnonationalist craving for security from revenge by those the RS once displaced, imprisoned, tortured, and killed. He has two other interests to tend.
Dodik’s other interests: impunity
The first is to keep himself out of the hands of any legal system, domestic or foreign, that will hold him accountable for corrupt practices. When it imposed sanctions on Dodik in 2022, the US Treasury alleged:
“Dodik is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption related to the Western Balkans. Specifically, he has established a patronage network in BiH from which he and his associates benefit. As one example of his corrupt actions, Dodik has provided government contracts and monopolies in the RS directly to close business associates. With his corrupt proceeds, Dodik has engaged in bribery and additional corrupt activities to further his personal interests at the expense of citizens in the RS.”
The Treasury also alleged that, using a company (ATV) he personally controls,
“Dodik has awarded ATV-related contracts directly to members of his family, which he has used as yet another avenue for corruption. He has funneled money directly from public companies to ATV for corrupt purposes. Dodik has substantially increased funding for ATV in recent years and engaged in malign social media influence campaigns through ATV to publish content that advances his political and personal goals.”
I too would want impunity, had I been credibly accused of these things. Too bad the Europeans haven’t followed the US lead on sanctions.
Dodik’s other interests: state property
The second Dodik interest is to ensure that state property in the RS is at his disposal. The RS is heavily indebted, to the tune of over $2 billion. A big slice of this amount, perhaps more than one-quarter, needs to be repaid or refinanced this year. State property is now the main collateral Dodik can pledge to creditors. Everything else is already hocked to the max. While the Finance Minister claims the debt is only 38% relative to GDP, RS officials are scrounging in Beijing for financing.
The US Embassy in Sarajevo has made its position on state property eminently clear:
“State property belongs to the state, and a state-level law is required to regulate it. This is not a matter of opinion; it is a constitutional and legal fact.”
Only saying it, however, won’t make it so.
Separating the court system could solve both problems for Dodik
These two interests, impunity and debt, are why Dodik, while pressing for independence, is trying first to block the Bosnian court system from the RS, whose Assembly passed the “Law on the Non-Enforcement of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The international community High Representative has annulled that law, but it is unclear how he will enforce the annulment. Dodik will seek instead to force the HiRep into a negotiation on the state property issue. Once that happens, Dodik can hope for half a loaf.
That makes me wonder. Is refusing to negotiate and forcing the RS into bankruptcy a good idea? Won’t the debtor and the creditors cry for the Sarajevo, the central (in local terms the “state”) government, to intervene? The Chinese presumably won’t be interested in RS secession and would likely want central government intervention. The Russians, who are also creditors, might be interested in secession, but in current circumstances they would be unlikely to pick up the tab associated with bankruptcy. So why not let the RS go bankrupt and start the negotiation there?
I’ll welcome submissions to peacefare.net that argue the contrary case.