Tag: Balkans
Montenegro: north by northeast
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montengrin Helsinki Committee. He writes:
Newly-elected President of Montenegro, Jakov Milatović, has chosen Belgrade for his first bilateral visit after assuming the office. This comes as no surprise.
Confirming the obvious
Milatović considers President Vučić’s Serbia as Montenegro’s principal and privileged partner. For Milatović, Serbia is “more than a neighbor.”
He even dared to explain recently to the Viennese Standard the similarities between Austrians and Germans, on one side, and Montenegrins and Serbs, on the other. This remark provoked comments that a certain Austrian national-socialist politician with similar ideas in 1930s and 1940s ended his life in the “Fuhrerbunker.”
Milatovic’s trip to Serbia will come on July 10. This raises the question whether he will attend the anniversary commemoration of Srebrenica Genocide the next day. That remains an undeniable “litmus-test” for any Montenegrin official.
Milatović intends to continue the policies that have characterized two governments in Montenegro after its August 2020 elections, which brought the opposition to power. He will mouth EU rhetoric and claim Euro-Atlantic orientation. But this is mere lip-service. Co-operation and more with Serbia is his real interest and objective.
EU slowdown
In the meantime, Brussels officials continue to issue direct warnings that Montenegro’s EU-agenda goes nowhere. The slow down and stagnation is turning into regression.
Technical Prime Minister Abazović and his allies – formal and informal – pay no attention to messages from EU Commission. Even worse: they ridicule the entire process. They ignore efforts of the EU member states to remind the Montenegrins that the EU doors are still open but that the EU cannot remain interested in accession if there is not even minimal willingness of Montenegro’s political leadership to engage.
In the latest among numerous scandals, Brussels decided no Montenegrin request for EU funds was serious enough for acceptance. This provoked a tragi-comic confusion in the ranks of technical government, as responsible officials were not even sure whether they have applied for funds!
The sudden death of Open Balkans
The Vučić-Rama “Open Balkans” project that some in Montenegro favored has come to sudden death with a simple statement of Albanian Prime Minsister Rama. He nonchalantly declared that “Open Balkans” has “fulfilled its role” and that the Berlin Process – favored by most EU countries and Germany specifically – is now the needed and desirable framework for regional co-operation.
This death notice has ruined President Milatović’s ambitions for his Belgrade trip. Without Albania, the regional initiative has left only Serbia and North Macedonia on board. With Open Balkans kaputt, the Belgrade talks betweem Serbian host and Montenegrin guest have lost any significance beyond Serbian domination over political and social processes in Montenegro.
The Belgrade and Moscow connection
That is still significant. Vučić controls a large chunk of Montenegrin politics. Milatović is his new principal ally, or, better, executer. Signs of that liaison are already present. It is reported that the President has strongly advocated participation of pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties in the new Montenegrin government, likely to be formed under the leadership of the president of his own party (Europe Now).
The EU and QUINT ambassadors have shown no support for inclusion of anti-NATO and pro-Russian/Serbian forces in the new Cabinet. But Montenegro is now moving North (towards Serbia) and Northeast (towards Russia), instead of West. This will lengthen its already long journey to European institutions and European Union.
This mistaken path will continue until Montenegrin voters understand the difference between populist rhetoric and serious policies. That lesson may be unpleasant to learn. And the moment seems distant.
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Something to chew on while I vacation
I am going to try to take the next few days off in rural Wisconsin, but here are a few remarks I made to the Balkans press today:
Bosnia
Q: Dzeilana Pecanin of VoA asked about Srpska Assembly’s announcement that they do not recognize Bosnian Constitutional Court any longer or any of its decisions/laws.
A: The Americans and Europeans are saying the right things, but they aren’t doing anything against Dodik’s unconstitutional usurpation of authority. He is moving slice by slice towards de facto RS independence. That can’t be countered with words. Only actions at this point count. There are none.
Kosovo
Besnik Velija of Gazeta Express asked several questions about the ongoing situation in relations with the US, especially in light of the letter to the White House from 8 US senators, that asks for measures if there will be no de-escalation.
Q: Do you think that now in the US there is a broad, bipartisan opinion that Kosovo’s position is wrong and that the situation should be de-escalated?
A: Yes, I do think there is a consensus on de-escalation. Continuation of the current situation risks worse.
I do not however think that Belgrade and Pristina are equally responsible for the current situation. It originated in the Serb boycott of municipal elections and continued with violent demonstrations against the presence of Kosovo police on Kosovo territory as well as the kidnapping of Kosovo police on Kosovo territory.
Q: Is this an indicator that Kurti should reflect?
A: I’m sure the Prime Minister is aware of American concerns. I’m sure President Vucic is as well, but Washington and Brussels are not sending Belgrade the same strong messages they are sending to Pristina. That is a serious mistake.
Q: How do you see Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s frequent meetings with Brits? For two years he visited Great Britain 3 times and met two times with Foreign Secretary. Without depreciation of it as an alliance, but should Kurti focus more on the alliance with Washington and relations with Brussels, since Kosovo’s aspiration is EU membership?
A: I don’t mind his talking to the Brits. But he should also be thinking about repairing relations with the EU and US.
The Albanian gambit
Q: I want to get your comment also on the idea of Albanian PM Edi Rama for a High-Level conference, in which Kosovo and Serbia leaders will be closed in a meeting and they should not be allowed to get out without an agreement. Do you see it as possible and can it be helpful based on actual circumstances?
A: I might agree with Edi Rama that the problem lies at the top. But I don’t know anyone who could force them into a summit of that sort and keep them there. Besides, Vucic has made clear that it doesn’t matter what he agrees. He is prepared to denounce an agreement as soon as he leaves the meeting. Washington and Brussels don’t even complain when he does that.
I think it is clear there is no agreement right now on “normalization,” much less on mutual recognition. I’d like the top leaders to agree to go back to negotiating agreements on issues that make a difference to their peoples’ lives. Those negotiations before 2013 were far more successful (though some remain unimplemented) than the negotiations since 2013.
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Back to the future with the past in mind
This post will be “inside baseball,” so those who don’t care about the Balkans or are tired of talking about the region’s problems are hereby forewarned.
In addition to the current brouhaha over where the mayors of four northern Kosovo municipalities should sit, Washington and Brussels are pressing Pristina hard to start negotiation with Belgrade on proposed Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM). The Americans and Europeans point to the 2013 Brussels agreement that introduced this innovation. They insist it is a legal obligation and want Pristina to prioritize it.
No unilateral commitment
Memories are short in the US and EU. They should go back and read the 2013 agreement. It involved a quid pro quo, not a unilateral commitment. It obliges Kosovo to create an ASMM, in exchange for the extension of Kosovo’s constitutional order, in particular its judicial system and police, to northern Kosovo, where three Serb-majority municipalites lie.
The fourth and most substantial one, Mitrovica, is Serb-majority now, but only because the Serbs have prevented Albanians and others from returning to their homes north of the Ibar River since 1999. Any serious extension of the Kosovo constitutional order to the north would allow all the displaced people to return to their homes.
The Kosovo parliament approved the 2013 agreement and Serbia’s did not. That undermines the argument that it is morally binding on Pristina. I’m no lawyer, so let’s assume it is legally, even if not morally, binding. Where do we stand on extension of the Kosovo constitutional order to the north?
The quid pro quo isn’t working
Nowhere is the right answer. Serbia has maintained its control of the four northern municipalities. It uses a combination of clandestine security forces and cooperating criminal organizations. It refused to accept Kosovo’s decision to insist on Kosovo license plates in the north. That was after the expiration of an agreement that temporarily allowed Serbian license plates. Belgrade instructed the Serb police and judges to leave Kosovo’s institutions.
The Serbs of the north boycotted the recent municipal elections on orders from President Vucic, which his minions enforced with intimidation. The few citizens who turned out elected the non-Serb mayors. Rent-a-mob rioters have prevented three of them from entering the offices Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti insists they should occupy.
This reminds me of Kosovo during the period of Serbian rule in the 1990s. Then Albanians boycotted elections, but they also accepted the consequences, which were severe. Serbia appointed Serb mayors for Albanian-majority communities and ejected Albanians from their jobs in the supposedly autonomous province. The Albanians ran their own unofficial school and health systems for almost 10 years.
The chicken and egg
There is as usual a chicken and egg problem. You can ask who started the downward spiral, but you’ll never get an agreed answer. All that really counts is that things are bad and getting worse.
Serbia mobilized its army and deployed it closer to the boundary/border, a military threat that violates the February agreement on normalization of relations.
Serbian police have detained three Kosovo policemen, claiming they were on Serbian territory but providing no evidence. Belgrade has refused thus far to release them, despite a KFOR request. Even if they did wander into Serbia, which is possible but unlikely, why would Belgrade not repatriate them as speedily as possible? Or were they snatched from Kosovo territory, like the American Albanian Bytyqi brothers Serbian police murdered after the 1999 war?
One sided diplomacy won’t work
The EU and US are making things worse. The American ambassador in Belgrade declared Kurti not a partner, while praising President Vucic just a few days after his agents had attacked NATO troops in the north. Even the State Department thought this strange. Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabe Escobar corrected the bizarre statement. NATO maintained its commitment to a military exercise with Serbia while canceling one with Kosovo.
The Europeans are fond of citing the 16 member states that have arrangements like the ASMM for numerical minorities. But in each and every one of those cases the neighboring country recognizes the hosting state. If Serbia were to recognize Kosovo, the ASMM would surely be less threatening to Pristina.
The EU has been sending detailed unilateral demands telling Prime Minister Kurti he has to withdraw his police from a territory they are entitled to be present in. Even if you think he made a mistake to try to install the mayors in the municipal buildings, you might want to show some understanding for his view that the Kosovo state has an obligation to enforce the rule of law as provided for in the 2013 agreement you are citing, or appreciation for his willingness to hold new elections in the north provided the Serbs will participate.
Back to the future
The 2013 Pristina/Belgrade agreement has real virtues in 2023. But they are not limited to the ASMM. The US and EU need to remember all its provisions, not just the ones that suit Belgrade.
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You aim too high and tilt too far.
I sometimes daydream. Here is my daydream for what I would say to the US and EU negotiators with Kosovo and Serbia:
Gentlemen: The current crisis in Kosovo creates daunting challenges. I wish you well in managing those.
But you also face challenges in the broader normalization process you have embarked on.
Failure is an option
There I think you are failing.
I don’t mean with Prime Minister Kurti. You are obviously failing with him.
But you are also failing with President Vucic.
I don’t see any evidence that he has moved one centimeter closer to the West in recent years, either domestically or internationally.
He is governing Serbia in increasingly autocratic ways and seeks to control Serb populations in neighboring countries.
He has continued to build a web of military and security relations with Moscow as well security and economic relations with Beijing.
He sits now on three stools.
Leverage wasted
Yes, Serbia is still vastly more dependent on the EU than on Russia or China for trade and investment, but the EU has done little to exploit its leverage.
It is hamstrung by its consensual structure and the five member states that don’t recognize Kosovo.
The U.S. has fed Vucic mainly carrots. We praise him as a partner, rarely mention his media manipulation or corruption close to him, refrain from asserting what we know about his control of thugs who dominate northern Kosovo and attacked KFOR, fail to criticize him for mobilizing military forces, and revivify National Guard cooperation.
We also pay him the honor of a visit from the USAID Administrator, a devotee of democracy and expert on war crimes and crimes against humanity, but he subsequently dines with a convicted war criminal.
Washington understandably appreciates Vucic’s allowing arms to go to Ukraine. That is hardly a sacrifice on his part.
The EU and US are pursuing Vucic’s main priority, the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM) inside Kosovo, with missionary fervor. But they offer little in return but a promise of renewing already failed efforts at gaining international recognition for Pristina.
The EU claims there are 16 arrangements like the ASMM in Europe. Each and every one of them, however, is in a country recognized by its neighbors.
With recognition by Serbia, Kosovo should be glad to arrange an ASMM like those others.
Re-assessement needed
Your current approach to normalization will not work: it aims too high and tilts too far.
Vucic is not ready to accept Kosovo’s territorial integrity, much less its sovereignty. You need to lower your sights and adjust your strategy.
What will work with Serbia is fewer carrots and more sticks.
What will work with Kosovo is fewer sticks and more carrots.
Continuing with your current approach risks undermining normalization and causing serious regional instability. Bosnia is inching towards de facto partition. Montenegro is drifting towards subordination to Serbia.
So my question is this: are you prepared, before the failure is complete, to do a thorough re-evaluation of your current strategy? Will you consult broadly about how to press forward before you are pressed backwards? Are you willing to rethink before you cause more problems in the Balkans than you solve?
PS: I did this interview for N1/BiH earlier last Wednesday.
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Road to nowhere in Montenegro
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montengrin Helsinki Committee. He writes:
Early parliamentary elections in Montenegro attracted the lowest turnout ever (56%). They have not brought major surprises. The populist movement “Europe Now!” gained seats in parliament, as expected. It won only a thin majority (24 MPs to 21) over the “Together” coalition led by former President Djukanović’s DPS. That creates additional uncertainities and confusion in an already compromised and disrupted political situation.
Government formation faces challenges
One thing seems clear: no coalition is possible between the two largest parliamentary groups. Milojko Spajić will almost certainly be given the mandate to form the the next government. He excludes any possibility of forming a cabinet with DPS.
Spajić also rejects a coalition with incumbent “technical” Prime Minister Abazović’s URA Movement, which won 12.5% and 11 seats (together with “Democratic Montenegro”). The bitter feud between the two is based on still unproven accusations of illegal election funding by a South Korean crypto-currency trader, now under investigation. The outcome of that proceeding may be harmful both for Spajić and Abazović. It has already become an important – if not the most important – feature of post-election Montenegro.
The pro-Serbian, pro-Russian For the Future of Montenegro coalition won 14.7% and 13, which puts them in a vital position despite a big decline from the previous election.
The country is not in good shape
Parliamentary elections in August 2020 expelled DPS from the majority. Despite much pro-EU rhetoric, the results since have been poor. Two annual EU Commission reports on Montenegrin progress have shown regression, despite EU Commissioner for Enlargement Varhelyi’s effort to support the populists who took power. In the meantime, the two anti-DPS governments have caused dissaray in all segments of social, economic, and political life, with clear signs of influence coming from Belgrade and Moscow.
The last barrier against collapse remains Montenegro’s NATO membership. Even that was significantly compromised by intentional disruption of important activities of Agency for National Security against the Serbian/Russian spy network in the country. Abazović has overseen constant, debilitating purges there.
Spajić promotes a wishful thinking economic program, “Europe Now 2.0.” But even he acknowledges the country is on the brink of financial implosion. “No salaries for public servants after September,” he has stated bluntly. But that has not prevented him from promising increases in salaries and pensions while announcing elimination of the state Pension Fund! Those voters who supported Spajić as well as two other coalitions close to Serbian President Vučić ignore the risk of economic crisis. They count on promises of miraculous progress by a new government empowered soon.
They may find themselves utterly surprised. Neither Spajić nor Jakov Milatović, the vice-president of “Europe Now!” and newly elected President, can guarantee political harmony even within their own political ranks. Milatović remains close not only to Serbian President Vučić, but also to Abazović. That complicates Spajić’sposition.
The internationals
The Western diplomatic community in Podgorica prefers stability underwritten by a stable qualified majority in the Parliament. They ignore the perils of participation by pro-Serbian and pro-Russian parties, despite their anti-NATO and de facto anti-EU standings. The problem will be how to include the ethnic minority parties (Bosniak, Albanian, and Croatian) in the new government. Western diplomats may intend to politely order them to join.
Both Abazović and Milatović, together with other leaders of the projected majority, support the Serbian proposal for “Open Balkans,” which the US backs. Spajić is unlike to oppose it if he wants to become prime minister.
So, the proverb has been confirmed: “once you enter the wrong train – all the stations are the wrong ones.” Montenegro entered the wrong train in August 2020. Insisting on continuing the journey does not ensure but rather endangers Montenegrin political stability and economic viability. It is a destructive and detrimental project. The next station may have the name “Grave Consequences.” The names of other “stations” would not be good even to mention here…
The return from the road to nowhere will be long and painful. The later it comes, the worse it will be.
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Stevenson’s army, June 15
– NYT says US is still paying Russia billions for nuclear fuel.
– NYT also has more on US-Iran talks.
– Canadian quits China bank, claiming CCP interference.
– FT says Putin backs Defense over Wagner.
– SAIS prof Ed Joseph has a Kosovo plan.
– Europeans discuss guarantees for Ukraine.
– Politico’s China Watcher explains problems facing Blinken’s trip.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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