Tag: Balkans
A good hearing, if the Administration were listening
The House Foreign Affairs Committee raised the alarm in a hearing yesterday about the situation in the Balkans. Member after member cited concerns. They worried about escalating ethnic tensions and instability, Russian malfeasance, Chinese inroads, failure of Serbia and Kosovo to implement agreements, failure to implement court decisions and secessionist moves in Bosnia and Herzegovina, endemic corruption, and flagging economies. They might also have cited substantial migrant outflows from the region.
There was a single witness: Gabe Escobar, Deputy Assistant Secretary. Despite the availability of many credible people who hold contrasting views, the Congress has unfortunately chosen in this and the previous recent Senate hearing on the Balkans to hear only from the Administration. Congressman Issa (R-CA) was at pains to lament this.
Say it fast and confidently
Gabe quickly cited EU accession as the US objective, without noting the diminished credibility of that prospect and unlikelihood that would happen any time in the foreseeable future. He averred that the “breakthrough” normalization (Ohrid) agreement reached in February and the annex added in March are critical. But he failed to note that Serbia refused to sign both and quickly violated them.
He insisted on the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASMM) to coordinate culture, education, and public services as the keystone. But he failed to explain why the US has not insisted on the quid pro quo also agreed in 2013. That was the extension of the Kosovo constitution to the Serb majority municipalities of the north. Belgrade has repeatedly blocked that in many different ways.
Gabe noted the supposed agreement of Kosovo and Serbia to recognize each other’s documents and national symbols. But he neglected to note that this is a problem principally in Serbia. He repeated the canard that Serbia would no longer lobby against Kosovo’s international integration. Serbian President Vucic has pledged not to fulfill that provision. Belgrade failed to observe it at the Council of Europe days after signing the agreement.
In Bosnia, Gabe cited Milorad Dodik’s anti-Dayton activities. But he was at a loss to explain how the US would get Europe to join in the sanctions against him. He cited excessive reliance in the region on Russian energy. However, he failed to note that Serbia is the prime culprit in that respect.
The questioning was good
Chair Kean (R-NJ) wanted to know whether the US will bring strong pressure to bear on President Vucic if Kosovo Prime Minister proceeds with the ASMM. Gabe said a quick and confident “absolutely” and went on to claim that the agreement requires Serbia to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This it clearly does not do. He added that Serbia has agreed to remove the protesters and participate in new elections for mayors in northern Kosovo.
I suppose that might be true in diplomatic channels, but where is the evidence in public? Would you believe it just a few months after elections held because Belgrade agreed the Serbs would participate but that they then boycotted? Gabe went on to say that those demonstrators who attacked journalists Kosovo police and NATO should be punished. Where is the public US demand that Belgrade, which ordered the rioting, turn them over to the Kosovo justice system?
Ranking Member Keating (D-MA) focused on China. Gabe rightly emphasized Beijing’s political conditions but placed his hope entirely in the EU to institute (some day) contracting procedures that would counter Beijing and keep projects open to US competitors.
Sanctions
Representative Wagner (R-MO) underlined her bipartisan “Upholding the Dayton Peace Agreements Through Sanctions” Act. Gabe pledged to support it and to prevent financing from reaching those who are trying to dismantle Bosnia (in addition to support for EUFOR and the HiRep). That sounded serious. Maybe State has finally realized that staying silent on Dodik is not a winning strategy. The Congressman made it clear she wanted Hungary bent into allowing EU sanctions on Dodik.
Congressman Titus (D-NV) focused on Russian disinformation and the free press. Gabe skipped the opportunity to focus criticism on Serbia, which has seen a long decline in press freedom and a dramatic rise of Russian disinformation.
Congressman Huizenga (R-MI) asked about Serbia buying Chinese and Russian arms. Gabe claimed Serbia had curtailed its purchases from Russia “significantly” in response to the threat of sanctions but has increased procurement from China (which is not covered by the “CAATSA” sanctions in question). Huizenga also asked about the five EU nonrecognizers. Gabe took the opportunity to claim vaguely that action on the ASMM would be helpful.
Congressman Self (R-TX) focused on President Vucic’s incitement of the election boycott and import of heavy weapons from Russia. Why don’t we have sanctions on Serbia now? Gabe squirmed out by claiming that he didn’t control CAATSA sanctions and that other sanctions had been used in the Balkans, neglecting to mention they have not been used against Serbia. Self made it clear he regards Serbia as a Russian proxy in the Balkans.
Congressman Moran (R-TX) asked about Montenegro. Sadly, Gabe was unaware of the newly contracted coastal road there that the Chinese will build and mistakenly thought it was the already built north/south highway. He also took the opportunity to emphasize that Montenegro’s new government will make Podgorica a fast-achieving candidate for EU membership and that its new president as “pro-American.” I don’t yet see any guarantee of those two propositions.
A well-briefed committee, but the Administration isn’t listening
Well-briefed, the members of Congress asked good questions. The Administration responses were less convincing. They consistently avoided any serious criticism of Serbia and continued to hold Kosovo principally, if not exclusively, responsible for the current train wreck. There was no sign that Gabe was listening to the repeated indications that a tougher approach with Serbia is needed.
Two notable omissions. Gabe did not mention Open Balkans, a Belgrade initiative that appears to have died a merited death. But bad ideas never die in the Balkans. They return like zombies to haunt the region. Just wait a few years, or maybe months. It will be back, along with partition.
Unless I missed it, Gabe also failed to mention the recently sanctioned Serbian Director of the Security Intelligence Agency. No one asked what we are going to do about Aleksandar Vulin. That was an unfortunate omission.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
The Americans are satisfied with less rather than more
The United States sanctioned Serbia’s intelligence chief last week for arms and drug dealing as well as facilitating malign Russian influence in the Balkans. I’ve applauded that move.
Vulin is a symptom
But stopping there will be less than half a loaf. Aleksandar Vulin is symptomatic of far deeper maladies. There is no way he could have engaged in drug trafficking without at least the tacit nulla osta of President Vucic. Any arms dealing he has done would have required something more than that, including the cooperation of his intel people. It would be hard to miss his loud advocacy of Russian interests in Ukraine and elsewhere.
Vulin is also Serbia’s prime exponent of “the Serbian world,” the idea that Serb populations in neighboring countries should at least all respect Belgrade’s direction. He would prefer to see them all incorporated into the Serbian state. This is indistinguishable from the Greater Serbia Slobodan Milosevic sought in the Balkan wars in the 1990s.
President Vucic is his top cover
Vulin has served in government with Vucic for the past 11 years. He started with the Kosovo portfolio in 2012 and moved on to Social Affairs, Defense, and Interior before becoming the intel director last year. Though they belong to different political parties that are coalition partners, Vulin and Serbian President Vucic are like peas in a pod: politically far more similar than different. Vulin made his way during the Milosevic regime affiliated with Mira Markovic, Milosevic’s wife. Vucic was tied more to Milosevic himself.
Now Vucic is Vulin’s protector. In reaction to the sanctions, Vucic has asserted the US is really concerned with the Russia connection, not with the arms and drug dealing. This is convenient for him, as it makes the issue not one of legality and morality but rather politics. In Serbia, both the government and public opinion regard wanting good relations with Moscow as a virtue, not a vice.
No action yet
There is no sign yet of what, if anything, Vucic is going to do about Vulin. He has announced an investigation, but it would be surprising if one were really needed. Vucic has tight control of his government and no doubt has known whatever business Vulin is involved in. Vucic has publicly backed Vulin’s advocacy of the “Serbian world,” though he is careful not to mention the idea often.
The American Ambassador has been mincing his words about the sanctions, emphasizing that they target Vulin, not on Serbia’s institutions:
That presumably means Washington intends to try to preserve its intelligence liaison relationship with Belgrade. The US may want to see Vulin fired, but it won’t be seeking any more far-reaching reform.
Now what?
That is too bad. “Serbian institutions” unquestionably have known what Vulin is up and have failed to act against him. They are still failing, though of course it is only days since the sanctions announcement. Washington should be pressing for Vucic to fire not only Vulin but all his cronies. The US should also be seeking a much wider reform that frees Serbian media from state dominance, ensures independence of the judiciary, makes space for a serious opposition, and detaches the country from its strong intelligence, political, and military connections to Moscow. How about starting with alignment to the EU Ukraine-related sanctions?
There are lots of other opportunities in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro for Serbia to signal serious changes in Serbian policy that would bring Belgrade closer to the West. But the Americans seem satisfied these days with less rather than more.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Big fish caught in Serbia, lots of questions unanswered
Yes: the US Treasury has sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency, former Defense and Interior Minister, and bestie to President Vucic. His misdeeds, according to the US, include drug and arms trafficking as well as facilitating malign Russian influence. This is a big step. I heartily welcome it.
Questions
Then come the questions. Why wasn’t this done earlier? The world has known about Vulin’s misdeeds for years. The US did not just discover that Vulin has been trafficking in drugs and arms. Maybe he trafficked in the wrong directions recently? His subservience to Russian objectives is also well known. Did he send some weapons to Russia, to compensate for the much-ballyhooed Serbian munitions going to Ukraine?
Vulin is, among other things, the leading advocate for “the Serbian world.” That is a concept hard to distinguish from Greater Serbia, Milosevic’s aim in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. It is also an analogue to “the Russian world,” the banner under which Putin is trying to carve out parts of Ukraine. President Vucic has avoided associating himself too closely with the concept, though he has pursued it in practice in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
That raises the question of whether Vucic knew about the sanctions move before they happened. Did he object? Did he welcome them as a way of dissociating himself from someone who had become a liability in dealing with the Americans and the Europeans? And how will he react now that it is done? Will he fire Vulin or keep him on? Or will he shifted elsewhere to keep him out of the way until the time comes for resurrection?
No answers yet
I can’t answer any of these questions yet. The Americans aren’t likely to comment on the timing of this move. But an enterprising journalist might get them to link a bit more derogatory information. Vucic is unlikely to fire Vulin outright, unless he has reason to believe that Vulin, like Yevgeny Prigozhin, was planning to contest his hold on power. If Vulin is kept on, it will be a clear sign of where Vucic stands: not with the West. If he is shunted off someplace, the signal may remain ambiguous.
We’ll need to wait and see how things shake out.
What if Vucic turns westward?
This moment is an opportunity for Vucic. If he really wants to turn westward and embrace Serbia’s European prospect, he could use the occasion of US sanctions on Vulin to good effect. That would mean not only firing him but expelling the extensive Russian intelligence service presence in Serbia, aligning Serbia with EU sanctions on Russia, closing Moscow’s supposedly humaniarian base near Nis, ending support for Serbia’s agents inside Kosovo and Montenegro, and disowning Milorad Dodik’s efforts to separate Republika Srpska from the authority of Sarajevo’s institutions.
Vucic could also mend democracy in Serbia. That would entail freeing the media from government domination, respecting the independence of the judiciary, restraining the police, favoring gun control, and encouraging freedom of expression and association. Not to mention moving quickly to implement the acquis communautaire requirements for EU admission.
First to applaud
I’ll be the first to applaud if anything like that happens. But it won’t. Whatever happened with Vulin, Serbia’s broader turn westward still seems far off.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Is bankrupting Republika Srpska a good idea?
Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik has for years sliced the salami thin piece by thin piece. He is getting his sub-national entity, the 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory that is majority Serb, closer to independence. With Russian backing, he is now taking bigger slices. The RS Assembly has passed a law that invalidates the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court on his entity’s territory. He has also declared his intention to hold a referendum on independence before the end of the year.
Ethnonationalism is the creed
I take these moves seriously. Elections in Republika Srpska are neither free nor fair. But there is no reason to doubt that Dodik has more than majority support there. He can’t go on promising independence forever. He needs to try to deliver at some point.
The popular appeal of independence to the people who live in the RS is mainly ethnonationalist. The RS conducted an ethnonationalist war against the Bosnian state in 1992-95, including the Srebrenica genocide and other instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Dayton peace agreements preserved the RS and gave it, despite its criminal history, international validity as a subnational entity and a great deal of autonomy. Many people who live in the RS view it as protecting them from retaliation.
Dodik was not personally involved in the atrocities of the Bosnian war, so far as I know. At the time, he was an opposition member of the RS Assembly seen in the West as a relative moderate. But that does not diminish his present willingness to exploit ethnonationalist passions for political purposes. Since his campaign for the Bosnian presidency in 2006, he has made himself the leading nationalist voice in the RS.
But Dodik is not only interested in satisfying the ethnonationalist craving for security from revenge by those the RS once displaced, imprisoned, tortured, and killed. He has two other interests to tend.
Dodik’s other interests: impunity
The first is to keep himself out of the hands of any legal system, domestic or foreign, that will hold him accountable for corrupt practices. When it imposed sanctions on Dodik in 2022, the US Treasury alleged:
“Dodik is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption related to the Western Balkans. Specifically, he has established a patronage network in BiH from which he and his associates benefit. As one example of his corrupt actions, Dodik has provided government contracts and monopolies in the RS directly to close business associates. With his corrupt proceeds, Dodik has engaged in bribery and additional corrupt activities to further his personal interests at the expense of citizens in the RS.”
The Treasury also alleged that, using a company (ATV) he personally controls,
“Dodik has awarded ATV-related contracts directly to members of his family, which he has used as yet another avenue for corruption. He has funneled money directly from public companies to ATV for corrupt purposes. Dodik has substantially increased funding for ATV in recent years and engaged in malign social media influence campaigns through ATV to publish content that advances his political and personal goals.”
I too would want impunity, had I been credibly accused of these things. Too bad the Europeans haven’t followed the US lead on sanctions.
Dodik’s other interests: state property
The second Dodik interest is to ensure that state property in the RS is at his disposal. The RS is heavily indebted, to the tune of over $2 billion. A big slice of this amount, perhaps more than one-quarter, needs to be repaid or refinanced this year. State property is now the main collateral Dodik can pledge to creditors. Everything else is already hocked to the max. While the Finance Minister claims the debt is only 38% relative to GDP, RS officials are scrounging in Beijing for financing.
The US Embassy in Sarajevo has made its position on state property eminently clear:
“State property belongs to the state, and a state-level law is required to regulate it. This is not a matter of opinion; it is a constitutional and legal fact.”
Only saying it, however, won’t make it so.
Separating the court system could solve both problems for Dodik
These two interests, impunity and debt, are why Dodik, while pressing for independence, is trying first to block the Bosnian court system from the RS, whose Assembly passed the “Law on the Non-Enforcement of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The international community High Representative has annulled that law, but it is unclear how he will enforce the annulment. Dodik will seek instead to force the HiRep into a negotiation on the state property issue. Once that happens, Dodik can hope for half a loaf.
That makes me wonder. Is refusing to negotiate and forcing the RS into bankruptcy a good idea? Won’t the debtor and the creditors cry for the Sarajevo, the central (in local terms the “state”) government, to intervene? The Chinese presumably won’t be interested in RS secession and would likely want central government intervention. The Russians, who are also creditors, might be interested in secession, but in current circumstances they would be unlikely to pick up the tab associated with bankruptcy. So why not let the RS go bankrupt and start the negotiation there?
I’ll welcome submissions to peacefare.net that argue the contrary case.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Montenegro: north by northeast
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montengrin Helsinki Committee. He writes:
Newly-elected President of Montenegro, Jakov Milatović, has chosen Belgrade for his first bilateral visit after assuming the office. This comes as no surprise.
Confirming the obvious
Milatović considers President Vučić’s Serbia as Montenegro’s principal and privileged partner. For Milatović, Serbia is “more than a neighbor.”
He even dared to explain recently to the Viennese Standard the similarities between Austrians and Germans, on one side, and Montenegrins and Serbs, on the other. This remark provoked comments that a certain Austrian national-socialist politician with similar ideas in 1930s and 1940s ended his life in the “Fuhrerbunker.”
Milatovic’s trip to Serbia will come on July 10. This raises the question whether he will attend the anniversary commemoration of Srebrenica Genocide the next day. That remains an undeniable “litmus-test” for any Montenegrin official.
Milatović intends to continue the policies that have characterized two governments in Montenegro after its August 2020 elections, which brought the opposition to power. He will mouth EU rhetoric and claim Euro-Atlantic orientation. But this is mere lip-service. Co-operation and more with Serbia is his real interest and objective.
EU slowdown
In the meantime, Brussels officials continue to issue direct warnings that Montenegro’s EU-agenda goes nowhere. The slow down and stagnation is turning into regression.
Technical Prime Minister Abazović and his allies – formal and informal – pay no attention to messages from EU Commission. Even worse: they ridicule the entire process. They ignore efforts of the EU member states to remind the Montenegrins that the EU doors are still open but that the EU cannot remain interested in accession if there is not even minimal willingness of Montenegro’s political leadership to engage.
In the latest among numerous scandals, Brussels decided no Montenegrin request for EU funds was serious enough for acceptance. This provoked a tragi-comic confusion in the ranks of technical government, as responsible officials were not even sure whether they have applied for funds!
The sudden death of Open Balkans
The Vučić-Rama “Open Balkans” project that some in Montenegro favored has come to sudden death with a simple statement of Albanian Prime Minsister Rama. He nonchalantly declared that “Open Balkans” has “fulfilled its role” and that the Berlin Process – favored by most EU countries and Germany specifically – is now the needed and desirable framework for regional co-operation.
This death notice has ruined President Milatović’s ambitions for his Belgrade trip. Without Albania, the regional initiative has left only Serbia and North Macedonia on board. With Open Balkans kaputt, the Belgrade talks betweem Serbian host and Montenegrin guest have lost any significance beyond Serbian domination over political and social processes in Montenegro.
The Belgrade and Moscow connection
That is still significant. Vučić controls a large chunk of Montenegrin politics. Milatović is his new principal ally, or, better, executer. Signs of that liaison are already present. It is reported that the President has strongly advocated participation of pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties in the new Montenegrin government, likely to be formed under the leadership of the president of his own party (Europe Now).
The EU and QUINT ambassadors have shown no support for inclusion of anti-NATO and pro-Russian/Serbian forces in the new Cabinet. But Montenegro is now moving North (towards Serbia) and Northeast (towards Russia), instead of West. This will lengthen its already long journey to European institutions and European Union.
This mistaken path will continue until Montenegrin voters understand the difference between populist rhetoric and serious policies. That lesson may be unpleasant to learn. And the moment seems distant.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Something to chew on while I vacation
I am going to try to take the next few days off in rural Wisconsin, but here are a few remarks I made to the Balkans press today:
Bosnia
Q: Dzeilana Pecanin of VoA asked about Srpska Assembly’s announcement that they do not recognize Bosnian Constitutional Court any longer or any of its decisions/laws.
A: The Americans and Europeans are saying the right things, but they aren’t doing anything against Dodik’s unconstitutional usurpation of authority. He is moving slice by slice towards de facto RS independence. That can’t be countered with words. Only actions at this point count. There are none.
Kosovo
Besnik Velija of Gazeta Express asked several questions about the ongoing situation in relations with the US, especially in light of the letter to the White House from 8 US senators, that asks for measures if there will be no de-escalation.
Q: Do you think that now in the US there is a broad, bipartisan opinion that Kosovo’s position is wrong and that the situation should be de-escalated?
A: Yes, I do think there is a consensus on de-escalation. Continuation of the current situation risks worse.
I do not however think that Belgrade and Pristina are equally responsible for the current situation. It originated in the Serb boycott of municipal elections and continued with violent demonstrations against the presence of Kosovo police on Kosovo territory as well as the kidnapping of Kosovo police on Kosovo territory.
Q: Is this an indicator that Kurti should reflect?
A: I’m sure the Prime Minister is aware of American concerns. I’m sure President Vucic is as well, but Washington and Brussels are not sending Belgrade the same strong messages they are sending to Pristina. That is a serious mistake.
Q: How do you see Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s frequent meetings with Brits? For two years he visited Great Britain 3 times and met two times with Foreign Secretary. Without depreciation of it as an alliance, but should Kurti focus more on the alliance with Washington and relations with Brussels, since Kosovo’s aspiration is EU membership?
A: I don’t mind his talking to the Brits. But he should also be thinking about repairing relations with the EU and US.
The Albanian gambit
Q: I want to get your comment also on the idea of Albanian PM Edi Rama for a High-Level conference, in which Kosovo and Serbia leaders will be closed in a meeting and they should not be allowed to get out without an agreement. Do you see it as possible and can it be helpful based on actual circumstances?
A: I might agree with Edi Rama that the problem lies at the top. But I don’t know anyone who could force them into a summit of that sort and keep them there. Besides, Vucic has made clear that it doesn’t matter what he agrees. He is prepared to denounce an agreement as soon as he leaves the meeting. Washington and Brussels don’t even complain when he does that.
I think it is clear there is no agreement right now on “normalization,” much less on mutual recognition. I’d like the top leaders to agree to go back to negotiating agreements on issues that make a difference to their peoples’ lives. Those negotiations before 2013 were far more successful (though some remain unimplemented) than the negotiations since 2013.
RSS - Posts
