Tag: Balkans
Big fish caught in Serbia, lots of questions unanswered
Yes: the US Treasury has sanctioned Aleksandar Vulin, the head of Serbia’s Security Intelligence Agency, former Defense and Interior Minister, and bestie to President Vucic. His misdeeds, according to the US, include drug and arms trafficking as well as facilitating malign Russian influence. This is a big step. I heartily welcome it.
Questions
Then come the questions. Why wasn’t this done earlier? The world has known about Vulin’s misdeeds for years. The US did not just discover that Vulin has been trafficking in drugs and arms. Maybe he trafficked in the wrong directions recently? His subservience to Russian objectives is also well known. Did he send some weapons to Russia, to compensate for the much-ballyhooed Serbian munitions going to Ukraine?
Vulin is, among other things, the leading advocate for “the Serbian world.” That is a concept hard to distinguish from Greater Serbia, Milosevic’s aim in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. It is also an analogue to “the Russian world,” the banner under which Putin is trying to carve out parts of Ukraine. President Vucic has avoided associating himself too closely with the concept, though he has pursued it in practice in Kosovo, Bosnia, and Montenegro.
That raises the question of whether Vucic knew about the sanctions move before they happened. Did he object? Did he welcome them as a way of dissociating himself from someone who had become a liability in dealing with the Americans and the Europeans? And how will he react now that it is done? Will he fire Vulin or keep him on? Or will he shifted elsewhere to keep him out of the way until the time comes for resurrection?
No answers yet
I can’t answer any of these questions yet. The Americans aren’t likely to comment on the timing of this move. But an enterprising journalist might get them to link a bit more derogatory information. Vucic is unlikely to fire Vulin outright, unless he has reason to believe that Vulin, like Yevgeny Prigozhin, was planning to contest his hold on power. If Vulin is kept on, it will be a clear sign of where Vucic stands: not with the West. If he is shunted off someplace, the signal may remain ambiguous.
We’ll need to wait and see how things shake out.
What if Vucic turns westward?
This moment is an opportunity for Vucic. If he really wants to turn westward and embrace Serbia’s European prospect, he could use the occasion of US sanctions on Vulin to good effect. That would mean not only firing him but expelling the extensive Russian intelligence service presence in Serbia, aligning Serbia with EU sanctions on Russia, closing Moscow’s supposedly humaniarian base near Nis, ending support for Serbia’s agents inside Kosovo and Montenegro, and disowning Milorad Dodik’s efforts to separate Republika Srpska from the authority of Sarajevo’s institutions.
Vucic could also mend democracy in Serbia. That would entail freeing the media from government domination, respecting the independence of the judiciary, restraining the police, favoring gun control, and encouraging freedom of expression and association. Not to mention moving quickly to implement the acquis communautaire requirements for EU admission.
First to applaud
I’ll be the first to applaud if anything like that happens. But it won’t. Whatever happened with Vulin, Serbia’s broader turn westward still seems far off.
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Is bankrupting Republika Srpska a good idea?
Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik has for years sliced the salami thin piece by thin piece. He is getting his sub-national entity, the 49% of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territory that is majority Serb, closer to independence. With Russian backing, he is now taking bigger slices. The RS Assembly has passed a law that invalidates the authority of the Bosnian Constitutional Court on his entity’s territory. He has also declared his intention to hold a referendum on independence before the end of the year.
Ethnonationalism is the creed
I take these moves seriously. Elections in Republika Srpska are neither free nor fair. But there is no reason to doubt that Dodik has more than majority support there. He can’t go on promising independence forever. He needs to try to deliver at some point.
The popular appeal of independence to the people who live in the RS is mainly ethnonationalist. The RS conducted an ethnonationalist war against the Bosnian state in 1992-95, including the Srebrenica genocide and other instances of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Dayton peace agreements preserved the RS and gave it, despite its criminal history, international validity as a subnational entity and a great deal of autonomy. Many people who live in the RS view it as protecting them from retaliation.
Dodik was not personally involved in the atrocities of the Bosnian war, so far as I know. At the time, he was an opposition member of the RS Assembly seen in the West as a relative moderate. But that does not diminish his present willingness to exploit ethnonationalist passions for political purposes. Since his campaign for the Bosnian presidency in 2006, he has made himself the leading nationalist voice in the RS.
But Dodik is not only interested in satisfying the ethnonationalist craving for security from revenge by those the RS once displaced, imprisoned, tortured, and killed. He has two other interests to tend.
Dodik’s other interests: impunity
The first is to keep himself out of the hands of any legal system, domestic or foreign, that will hold him accountable for corrupt practices. When it imposed sanctions on Dodik in 2022, the US Treasury alleged:
“Dodik is also being designated pursuant to E.O. 14033 for being responsible for or complicit in, or having directly or indirectly engaged in, corruption related to the Western Balkans. Specifically, he has established a patronage network in BiH from which he and his associates benefit. As one example of his corrupt actions, Dodik has provided government contracts and monopolies in the RS directly to close business associates. With his corrupt proceeds, Dodik has engaged in bribery and additional corrupt activities to further his personal interests at the expense of citizens in the RS.”
The Treasury also alleged that, using a company (ATV) he personally controls,
“Dodik has awarded ATV-related contracts directly to members of his family, which he has used as yet another avenue for corruption. He has funneled money directly from public companies to ATV for corrupt purposes. Dodik has substantially increased funding for ATV in recent years and engaged in malign social media influence campaigns through ATV to publish content that advances his political and personal goals.”
I too would want impunity, had I been credibly accused of these things. Too bad the Europeans haven’t followed the US lead on sanctions.
Dodik’s other interests: state property
The second Dodik interest is to ensure that state property in the RS is at his disposal. The RS is heavily indebted, to the tune of over $2 billion. A big slice of this amount, perhaps more than one-quarter, needs to be repaid or refinanced this year. State property is now the main collateral Dodik can pledge to creditors. Everything else is already hocked to the max. While the Finance Minister claims the debt is only 38% relative to GDP, RS officials are scrounging in Beijing for financing.
The US Embassy in Sarajevo has made its position on state property eminently clear:
“State property belongs to the state, and a state-level law is required to regulate it. This is not a matter of opinion; it is a constitutional and legal fact.”
Only saying it, however, won’t make it so.
Separating the court system could solve both problems for Dodik
These two interests, impunity and debt, are why Dodik, while pressing for independence, is trying first to block the Bosnian court system from the RS, whose Assembly passed the “Law on the Non-Enforcement of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” The international community High Representative has annulled that law, but it is unclear how he will enforce the annulment. Dodik will seek instead to force the HiRep into a negotiation on the state property issue. Once that happens, Dodik can hope for half a loaf.
That makes me wonder. Is refusing to negotiate and forcing the RS into bankruptcy a good idea? Won’t the debtor and the creditors cry for the Sarajevo, the central (in local terms the “state”) government, to intervene? The Chinese presumably won’t be interested in RS secession and would likely want central government intervention. The Russians, who are also creditors, might be interested in secession, but in current circumstances they would be unlikely to pick up the tab associated with bankruptcy. So why not let the RS go bankrupt and start the negotiation there?
I’ll welcome submissions to peacefare.net that argue the contrary case.
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Montenegro: north by northeast
Miodrag Vlahović, former Montengrin Minister of Foreign Affairs and former ambassador to US, is now president of the Montengrin Helsinki Committee. He writes:
Newly-elected President of Montenegro, Jakov Milatović, has chosen Belgrade for his first bilateral visit after assuming the office. This comes as no surprise.
Confirming the obvious
Milatović considers President Vučić’s Serbia as Montenegro’s principal and privileged partner. For Milatović, Serbia is “more than a neighbor.”
He even dared to explain recently to the Viennese Standard the similarities between Austrians and Germans, on one side, and Montenegrins and Serbs, on the other. This remark provoked comments that a certain Austrian national-socialist politician with similar ideas in 1930s and 1940s ended his life in the “Fuhrerbunker.”
Milatovic’s trip to Serbia will come on July 10. This raises the question whether he will attend the anniversary commemoration of Srebrenica Genocide the next day. That remains an undeniable “litmus-test” for any Montenegrin official.
Milatović intends to continue the policies that have characterized two governments in Montenegro after its August 2020 elections, which brought the opposition to power. He will mouth EU rhetoric and claim Euro-Atlantic orientation. But this is mere lip-service. Co-operation and more with Serbia is his real interest and objective.
EU slowdown
In the meantime, Brussels officials continue to issue direct warnings that Montenegro’s EU-agenda goes nowhere. The slow down and stagnation is turning into regression.
Technical Prime Minister Abazović and his allies – formal and informal – pay no attention to messages from EU Commission. Even worse: they ridicule the entire process. They ignore efforts of the EU member states to remind the Montenegrins that the EU doors are still open but that the EU cannot remain interested in accession if there is not even minimal willingness of Montenegro’s political leadership to engage.
In the latest among numerous scandals, Brussels decided no Montenegrin request for EU funds was serious enough for acceptance. This provoked a tragi-comic confusion in the ranks of technical government, as responsible officials were not even sure whether they have applied for funds!
The sudden death of Open Balkans
The Vučić-Rama “Open Balkans” project that some in Montenegro favored has come to sudden death with a simple statement of Albanian Prime Minsister Rama. He nonchalantly declared that “Open Balkans” has “fulfilled its role” and that the Berlin Process – favored by most EU countries and Germany specifically – is now the needed and desirable framework for regional co-operation.
This death notice has ruined President Milatović’s ambitions for his Belgrade trip. Without Albania, the regional initiative has left only Serbia and North Macedonia on board. With Open Balkans kaputt, the Belgrade talks betweem Serbian host and Montenegrin guest have lost any significance beyond Serbian domination over political and social processes in Montenegro.
The Belgrade and Moscow connection
That is still significant. Vučić controls a large chunk of Montenegrin politics. Milatović is his new principal ally, or, better, executer. Signs of that liaison are already present. It is reported that the President has strongly advocated participation of pro-Serbian/pro-Russian parties in the new Montenegrin government, likely to be formed under the leadership of the president of his own party (Europe Now).
The EU and QUINT ambassadors have shown no support for inclusion of anti-NATO and pro-Russian/Serbian forces in the new Cabinet. But Montenegro is now moving North (towards Serbia) and Northeast (towards Russia), instead of West. This will lengthen its already long journey to European institutions and European Union.
This mistaken path will continue until Montenegrin voters understand the difference between populist rhetoric and serious policies. That lesson may be unpleasant to learn. And the moment seems distant.
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Something to chew on while I vacation
I am going to try to take the next few days off in rural Wisconsin, but here are a few remarks I made to the Balkans press today:
Bosnia
Q: Dzeilana Pecanin of VoA asked about Srpska Assembly’s announcement that they do not recognize Bosnian Constitutional Court any longer or any of its decisions/laws.
A: The Americans and Europeans are saying the right things, but they aren’t doing anything against Dodik’s unconstitutional usurpation of authority. He is moving slice by slice towards de facto RS independence. That can’t be countered with words. Only actions at this point count. There are none.
Kosovo
Besnik Velija of Gazeta Express asked several questions about the ongoing situation in relations with the US, especially in light of the letter to the White House from 8 US senators, that asks for measures if there will be no de-escalation.
Q: Do you think that now in the US there is a broad, bipartisan opinion that Kosovo’s position is wrong and that the situation should be de-escalated?
A: Yes, I do think there is a consensus on de-escalation. Continuation of the current situation risks worse.
I do not however think that Belgrade and Pristina are equally responsible for the current situation. It originated in the Serb boycott of municipal elections and continued with violent demonstrations against the presence of Kosovo police on Kosovo territory as well as the kidnapping of Kosovo police on Kosovo territory.
Q: Is this an indicator that Kurti should reflect?
A: I’m sure the Prime Minister is aware of American concerns. I’m sure President Vucic is as well, but Washington and Brussels are not sending Belgrade the same strong messages they are sending to Pristina. That is a serious mistake.
Q: How do you see Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s frequent meetings with Brits? For two years he visited Great Britain 3 times and met two times with Foreign Secretary. Without depreciation of it as an alliance, but should Kurti focus more on the alliance with Washington and relations with Brussels, since Kosovo’s aspiration is EU membership?
A: I don’t mind his talking to the Brits. But he should also be thinking about repairing relations with the EU and US.
The Albanian gambit
Q: I want to get your comment also on the idea of Albanian PM Edi Rama for a High-Level conference, in which Kosovo and Serbia leaders will be closed in a meeting and they should not be allowed to get out without an agreement. Do you see it as possible and can it be helpful based on actual circumstances?
A: I might agree with Edi Rama that the problem lies at the top. But I don’t know anyone who could force them into a summit of that sort and keep them there. Besides, Vucic has made clear that it doesn’t matter what he agrees. He is prepared to denounce an agreement as soon as he leaves the meeting. Washington and Brussels don’t even complain when he does that.
I think it is clear there is no agreement right now on “normalization,” much less on mutual recognition. I’d like the top leaders to agree to go back to negotiating agreements on issues that make a difference to their peoples’ lives. Those negotiations before 2013 were far more successful (though some remain unimplemented) than the negotiations since 2013.
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Back to the future with the past in mind
This post will be “inside baseball,” so those who don’t care about the Balkans or are tired of talking about the region’s problems are hereby forewarned.
In addition to the current brouhaha over where the mayors of four northern Kosovo municipalities should sit, Washington and Brussels are pressing Pristina hard to start negotiation with Belgrade on proposed Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM). The Americans and Europeans point to the 2013 Brussels agreement that introduced this innovation. They insist it is a legal obligation and want Pristina to prioritize it.
No unilateral commitment
Memories are short in the US and EU. They should go back and read the 2013 agreement. It involved a quid pro quo, not a unilateral commitment. It obliges Kosovo to create an ASMM, in exchange for the extension of Kosovo’s constitutional order, in particular its judicial system and police, to northern Kosovo, where three Serb-majority municipalites lie.
The fourth and most substantial one, Mitrovica, is Serb-majority now, but only because the Serbs have prevented Albanians and others from returning to their homes north of the Ibar River since 1999. Any serious extension of the Kosovo constitutional order to the north would allow all the displaced people to return to their homes.
The Kosovo parliament approved the 2013 agreement and Serbia’s did not. That undermines the argument that it is morally binding on Pristina. I’m no lawyer, so let’s assume it is legally, even if not morally, binding. Where do we stand on extension of the Kosovo constitutional order to the north?
The quid pro quo isn’t working
Nowhere is the right answer. Serbia has maintained its control of the four northern municipalities. It uses a combination of clandestine security forces and cooperating criminal organizations. It refused to accept Kosovo’s decision to insist on Kosovo license plates in the north. That was after the expiration of an agreement that temporarily allowed Serbian license plates. Belgrade instructed the Serb police and judges to leave Kosovo’s institutions.
The Serbs of the north boycotted the recent municipal elections on orders from President Vucic, which his minions enforced with intimidation. The few citizens who turned out elected the non-Serb mayors. Rent-a-mob rioters have prevented three of them from entering the offices Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti insists they should occupy.
This reminds me of Kosovo during the period of Serbian rule in the 1990s. Then Albanians boycotted elections, but they also accepted the consequences, which were severe. Serbia appointed Serb mayors for Albanian-majority communities and ejected Albanians from their jobs in the supposedly autonomous province. The Albanians ran their own unofficial school and health systems for almost 10 years.
The chicken and egg
There is as usual a chicken and egg problem. You can ask who started the downward spiral, but you’ll never get an agreed answer. All that really counts is that things are bad and getting worse.
Serbia mobilized its army and deployed it closer to the boundary/border, a military threat that violates the February agreement on normalization of relations.
Serbian police have detained three Kosovo policemen, claiming they were on Serbian territory but providing no evidence. Belgrade has refused thus far to release them, despite a KFOR request. Even if they did wander into Serbia, which is possible but unlikely, why would Belgrade not repatriate them as speedily as possible? Or were they snatched from Kosovo territory, like the American Albanian Bytyqi brothers Serbian police murdered after the 1999 war?
One sided diplomacy won’t work
The EU and US are making things worse. The American ambassador in Belgrade declared Kurti not a partner, while praising President Vucic just a few days after his agents had attacked NATO troops in the north. Even the State Department thought this strange. Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabe Escobar corrected the bizarre statement. NATO maintained its commitment to a military exercise with Serbia while canceling one with Kosovo.
The Europeans are fond of citing the 16 member states that have arrangements like the ASMM for numerical minorities. But in each and every one of those cases the neighboring country recognizes the hosting state. If Serbia were to recognize Kosovo, the ASMM would surely be less threatening to Pristina.
The EU has been sending detailed unilateral demands telling Prime Minister Kurti he has to withdraw his police from a territory they are entitled to be present in. Even if you think he made a mistake to try to install the mayors in the municipal buildings, you might want to show some understanding for his view that the Kosovo state has an obligation to enforce the rule of law as provided for in the 2013 agreement you are citing, or appreciation for his willingness to hold new elections in the north provided the Serbs will participate.
Back to the future
The 2013 Pristina/Belgrade agreement has real virtues in 2023. But they are not limited to the ASMM. The US and EU need to remember all its provisions, not just the ones that suit Belgrade.
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You aim too high and tilt too far.
I sometimes daydream. Here is my daydream for what I would say to the US and EU negotiators with Kosovo and Serbia:
Gentlemen: The current crisis in Kosovo creates daunting challenges. I wish you well in managing those.
But you also face challenges in the broader normalization process you have embarked on.
Failure is an option
There I think you are failing.
I don’t mean with Prime Minister Kurti. You are obviously failing with him.
But you are also failing with President Vucic.
I don’t see any evidence that he has moved one centimeter closer to the West in recent years, either domestically or internationally.
He is governing Serbia in increasingly autocratic ways and seeks to control Serb populations in neighboring countries.
He has continued to build a web of military and security relations with Moscow as well security and economic relations with Beijing.
He sits now on three stools.
Leverage wasted
Yes, Serbia is still vastly more dependent on the EU than on Russia or China for trade and investment, but the EU has done little to exploit its leverage.
It is hamstrung by its consensual structure and the five member states that don’t recognize Kosovo.
The U.S. has fed Vucic mainly carrots. We praise him as a partner, rarely mention his media manipulation or corruption close to him, refrain from asserting what we know about his control of thugs who dominate northern Kosovo and attacked KFOR, fail to criticize him for mobilizing military forces, and revivify National Guard cooperation.
We also pay him the honor of a visit from the USAID Administrator, a devotee of democracy and expert on war crimes and crimes against humanity, but he subsequently dines with a convicted war criminal.
Washington understandably appreciates Vucic’s allowing arms to go to Ukraine. That is hardly a sacrifice on his part.
The EU and US are pursuing Vucic’s main priority, the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASMM) inside Kosovo, with missionary fervor. But they offer little in return but a promise of renewing already failed efforts at gaining international recognition for Pristina.
The EU claims there are 16 arrangements like the ASMM in Europe. Each and every one of them, however, is in a country recognized by its neighbors.
With recognition by Serbia, Kosovo should be glad to arrange an ASMM like those others.
Re-assessement needed
Your current approach to normalization will not work: it aims too high and tilts too far.
Vucic is not ready to accept Kosovo’s territorial integrity, much less its sovereignty. You need to lower your sights and adjust your strategy.
What will work with Serbia is fewer carrots and more sticks.
What will work with Kosovo is fewer sticks and more carrots.
Continuing with your current approach risks undermining normalization and causing serious regional instability. Bosnia is inching towards de facto partition. Montenegro is drifting towards subordination to Serbia.
So my question is this: are you prepared, before the failure is complete, to do a thorough re-evaluation of your current strategy? Will you consult broadly about how to press forward before you are pressed backwards? Are you willing to rethink before you cause more problems in the Balkans than you solve?
PS: I did this interview for N1/BiH earlier last Wednesday.
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