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The second law of holes

As I’ve dared give advice to Belgrade, I might as well go on and compound the felony by giving advice to Pristina.

The problem is this:  Pristina does not control the relatively small part of its territory north and west of the Ibar river, including two border/boundary (Pristina regards it as a border, Belgrade as a boundary) posts with Serbia.  Much of the population there–majority Serb even before the war in the three northernmost municipalities–wants to remain in Serbia.

In the short term, it seems to me the best Pristina can hope for is collection of its taxes and enforcement of its laws at the border/boundary.  Exactly who will do this and under what supervision are the issues that need to be decided.  It might also hope for a clear statement from Belgrade that it regards Kosovo as a single entity, which is consistent with UN Security Council resolution 1244.

Achievement of these shorter-term goals will not however solve the problem of north Kosovo, where there is a population that does not accept Kosovo institutions.  Pristina needs to compete for the hearts and minds of the Serb population north of the Ibar, who are nearly as resentful of Belgrade as they are apprehensive about Pristina.

This is going to be difficult.  More radical Serbs from all over Kosovo have retreated to the north, where they have built up a lucrative trade in untaxed goods shipped not only into the north but also back into Serbia and to Kosovo south of the Ibar.  Pristina has successfully competed for the hearts and minds of at least some Serbs and other minorities living south of the Ibar, many of whom now participate in Kosovo’s institutions and derive benefits from them even if they reject Kosovo’s independence.  There is no reason to settle for less in north Kosovo, but lots of reasons why it will be a greater challenge.

The right approach is to use implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, which provides the Serb municipalities with ample self-government, adjusting as need be to meet legitimate concerns and changed circumstances.  This should be done in cooperation with Serbia, which will need to dissolve or withdraw some of its institutions in the north even as it commits to maintaining and even expanding others.  Educational, health, religious and cultural institutions and personnel that serve the Serb community in Kosovo should in principle be welcomed, because they will encourage members of that community to stay.   The last thing Kosovo needs is a big exodus of Serbs from the north.

Pristina will need to back its efforts with substantial resources and high-level attention.  It should appoint a minister to coordinate the government’s efforts on the north and provide generous funding.   It should also have a representative in Belgrade to improve cooperation and ensure coordination.

It would be reasonable to aim for the next municipal elections, in autumn 2013, to be held in the communities of north Kosovo, in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan.  By then, Belgrade and Pristina should have developed a joint plan for reintegration that will among other things decide the disposition of the Serbian institutions in the north, including the status of their personnel and programs.

I would expect the Kosovo Government to be prepared to discuss these issues, but it cannot be expected to allow Serb institutions that undermine Pristina’s authority in order to lay the groundwork for partition.  Belgrade has to be clear about the goal:  reintegration of the north with the rest of Kosovo.

One wag has proposed a second law of holes:  fill it in and keep it from becoming a hazard.

The first law of holes

Belgrade daily Pravda asked for my views on Kosovo and Serbia’s EU candidacy.  Here is how I responded:

Belgrade has dug a hole for itself.  It has told the world it will not recognize Kosovo as sovereign and independent.  It has exhausted its diplomatic credits trying to block recognition by other countries.  It has bought a Russian veto in the UN Security Council.  It has held on using its security forces to the northern corner of its former province.  It spends hundreds of millions of euros each year to keep its institutions functioning there.

It can expect none of this effort and expenditure to produce worthwhile results.  Whatever Kosovo’s status, it is clear that the democratically validated institutions in Pristina are the legitimate government of the whole territory of Kosovo, which is treated as undivided territory in UN Security Council resolution 1244, to which Belgrade has sworn fealty.

The European Union and the United States have made it clear that Kosovo will not be divided and that Belgrade needs to conform its efforts to the Ahtisaari plan, which offers a wide degree of self-governance to the north and other Serb-majority areas of Kosovo.  Pristina will no doubt be prepared to talk with Belgrade about how the Ahtisaari plan is implemented, but not about “Ahtisaari plus” or other efforts to reopen what has already been agreed by the Kosovo authorities.

I imagine that the European Council will want in December to approve Serbia’s candidacy for membership in the Union, as recommended by the Commission.  While there is some possibility one or more EU members will still block Serbia’s candidacy because of Belgrade’s failure to cooperate with UNMIK and NATO efforts to resolve border/boundary issues, I would much prefer to see those issues settled and Serbia’s candidacy ensured.  If Serbia fails to get candidacy in December, it may have to wait a long time for another opportunity.  I doubt it will get a date to start the negotiations—it does not even appear to want one.

In any event, I am certain that the Union will not accept Belgrade as a member until it settles all its outstanding issues with Pristina.  Little progress on these can be made before the Serbian elections, but I hope to see a government after the elections that can move expeditiously in a new direction.

The first law of holes is stop digging.  Belgrade would benefit from ending its diplomatic efforts against Kosovo’s recognition and sitting down with Pristina to develop a cooperative approach to implementing the Ahtisaari plan in north Kosovo.  It may be too much to ask Belgrade to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty, but it is not too much to ask Belgrade to accept the legitimacy and authority of the Pristina institutions.  It can best do this by unblocking the Security Council and allowing Kosovo to enter the General Assembly.