Tag: Balkans
IREX short term research travel grants
2012-2013 FELLOWSHIP OPPORTUNITIES
Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program (IARO)
Short Term Travel Grants Program (STG)
IREX is pleased to announce that applications are now being accepted for the 2012-2013 Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program and Short Term Travel Grants Program.
These research support programs offer US scholars and professionals the opportunity to conduct policy-relevant research in Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Researchers are also able to increase their understanding of current regional issues, develop and sustain international networks, and directly contribute to the formation of US public policy by conducting research on topics vital to the academic and policy-making communities. The fellowships provide logistical support, international airfare, a living/housing stipend, visa support, emergency evacuation insurance, and, in many countries, field office support.
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The Individual Advanced Research Opportunities Program (IARO) provides students, scholars and professionals with support to conduct policy-relevant field research in the countries of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
**Eligibility: Master’s students, predoctoral students, postdoctoral scholars, and professionals with advanced degrees are eligible. Applicants must be US citizens.
** Information and application: http://www.irex.org/project/individual-advanced-research-opportunities-iaro
**Deadline: 5 p.m. EST on November 16, 2011
**Contact: By email at iaro@irex.org or by telephone at 202-628-8188
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The Short-Term Travel Grants Program (STG) is a short-term, flexible program for postdoctoral scholars and professionals to conduct targeted, policy-relevant research in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.
**Eligibility: Postdoctoral scholars and professionals with advanced degrees are eligible. Applicants must be US citizens.
** Information and application: http://www.irex.org/project/short-term-travel-grants-stg
**Deadline: 5 p.m. EST on February 1, 2012
**Contact: By email at stg@irex.org or by telephone at 202-628-8188
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Countries Eligible for Research:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan
IARO and STG are funded by the US Department of State Title VIII Program.
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Stop! in the name of what?
Serbs are continuing to block roads in northern Kosovo, while several Serbs have been killed in the Albanian-majority area south of the Ibar in the last few weeks. Continuing in these directions will push Kosovo in the direction of partition, which is what nationalist Serbs and Albanians intend. What can stop this drift?
Not, certainly, love, or even mutual understanding. One of the Serb mayors in northern Kosovo is quoted as saying
This can be easily solved if KFOR and EULEX say that they will not transport Kosovo police and customs officers and if they take back those people from the crossings, then a space for free movement of everybody and for normal talks will be opened.
This is what the Serbs of northern Kosovo claim is a “status-neutral” solution: a complete surrender by the international community and Pristina to Serb demands, in advance of negotiations.
Belgrade, concerned about the impact of the Serb resistance in northern Kosovo on its own hopes for approval of EU candidacy and a date for accession talks to begin, is trying to leave everything up to the Serbs in northern Kosovo. No one should be fooled. The northern Kosovo Serbs are heavily subsidized by Belgrade, which could bring them into line if it really wanted.
It is difficult to say the same about the Albanians south of the Ibar, especially as the murders seem to be unconnected. But Pristina needs to try harder. There has to be strict accountability for crimes against Serbs if Kosovo is to gain high ground in its international tug of war with Belgrade. The murders in recent weeks have to be made the object of serious investigations leading to arrests and prosecutions. And those who perpetrate these crimes, or who intimidate witnesses, should be viewed as what they are: enemies of a Kosovo state seeking to gain international recognition as a willing and capable defender of the rights of all its citizens.
It is always difficult to get individuals who stand to lose something in line in order to serve a broader, societal interest. But that is precisely what is needed both among the Serbs and the Albanians. They need to stop the violence against Serbs south of the Ibar and the barricades north of the Ibar in the name of the broader interests at stake for their respective groups. Both communities are cohesive enough to do this.
Albanians need to stop in the name of Kosovar interests. Serbs need to stop in the name of Serbian interests.
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Mr. Dodik came to Washington too
The President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik, is careful. Unlike Slobodan Petrovic, the Kosovo Serb deputy prime minister who spoke in public to a group at Johns Hopkins/SAIS that included people who do not agree with him, Dodik declined an invitation to do a public event and instead talked to a SAIS class taught by David Kanin, a retired CIA analyst for whom I have a lot of respect. But he is also a sympathizer with ethnic separation in the Balkans. The message is clear.
I was not invited to the class, or to last night’s reception for Dodik. The reception was held at an institution run by retired Foreign Service officers, presumably in order to give it the air of an official diplomatic reception and avoid using the Bosnian Embassy, which belongs to an institution (the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina) that Dodik wants to weaken.
I’m particularly amused by the effort to restrict exposure to those who might disagree with Dodik because Obrad Kesic, one of his Washington handlers, is someone whom I invited to speak repeatedly during my years at the United States Institute of Peace though he espoused views I do not agree with. When he wanted, I published a dissent from a USIP paper on Bosnia he prepared with colleagues.
Dodik had trouble getting good meetings on the Hill but was supposed to see Senator Inhofe (R-Oklahoma). At the State Department, Phil Gordon was unable to see him due to a family matter, so he talked with Deputy Assistant Secretary Phil Reeker. Dodik forgot to push Republika Srspka independence there. It was all about Dayton and EU membership, without any mention of the now well-established incompatibility between the Dayton constitution and a state capable of meeting EU requirements. I am pleased to report that this charade fools no one at State.
Dodik doesn’t owe me anything. I’ve got more than enough lectures and diplomatic receptions to attend. He can appear or not in front of any audience he chooses in this open society, and invite or not invite to his liking. But someone who chooses to avoid rather than engage his critics and tries to give the impression of engaging in public discourse at a university when he really hasn’t is not my kind of guy. I trust he’ll impress his carefully chosen audiences in Chicago more.
PS, November 3: A Bosnian visitor called this video from Dodik’s Columbia event to my attention yesterday. He discusses Russia, Srebrenica and other interesting topics:
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Mr. Petrović comes to Washington
Slobodan Petrović, the leader of the largest Serb political bloc in the Kosovo parliament and a deputy prime minister in the Albanian-majority country, has visited us previously in DC, but this is the first time we’ve had him as a solo act at Johns Hopkins. He appeared previously with then Finance Minister Ahmet Shala. Petrović outperformed, as they say on Wall Street (when it isn’t occupied).
He starts from a simple premise: he can do more to protect his constituency, attract Serbs back to Kosovo (or keep them from leaving) and improve their economic and social conditions by political participation than by isolating the Serbs and refusing to vote or serve in parliament, which is what Belgrade prefers. This is a marvelously simple, even self-evident, but decidedly non-Balkan notion.
It has worked reasonably well for Serbs south of the Ibar river, where most of them live. Forty per cent of them voted in the last Kosovo election. They are less isolated than five years ago, when Petrovic launched his Serb Liberal Party, and their rights are more widely respected. The Pristina government has funded housing and infrastructure for Serb communities, and the international community has pitched in as well. Decentralization, in accordance with the Ahtisaari peace plan that Belgrade rejected, has provided Serb-majority municipalities with a wide degree of autonomy. Freedom of movement has improved. I won’t say all Albanians have learned to embrace the Serbs, but they are certainly far more accepting of them today than in the immediate aftermath of the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war, when something like half the Albanian population of Kosovo returned from having been expelled by Serbian forces.
There is lots more to be done for the Serbs south of the Ibar, but the big problem is northern Kosovo, where Belgrade has not permitted Pristina’s institutions to be established, even those that are guaranteed autonomy by the Ahtisaari plan. As Petrović recounted, Belgrade instead maintains barely functioning municipal governments with large payrolls. Nationalist Serbs from all over Kosovo have retreated to the north, including some Croatian Serbs relocated to Kosovo in 1995. The result is a lawless area where courts don’t function, services are poor and extremists are determined to resist not only Pristina’s authority but also the UN, EULEX, NATO and the EU.
Ultimately, this is a European Union problem. The EU Commission has recommended candidacy status for Serbia, provided it improves cooperation with Pristina. The question is how far Belgrade will go. The smart money is betting not far, since Serbia has elections early next year and the EU is believed to have set a low bar, apparently in the hope that will boost Serbian President Boris Tadić’s reelection prospects.
Some believe things are moving in the right direction and we just need to patiently keep them on track. Eventually, Serbia will have to accept Kosovo independence as a reality. Some even believe that Tadić, if reelected, will bring nationalist Tomislav Nikolić into the government as prime minster, reducing Kosovo’s salience as a competitive issue in Serbian politics and enabling both to accept reality sooner rather than later.
I’m not ready to sign up to optimism on Serbia’s acceptance of the Kosovo reality. I’ve been disappointed too many times. But I am optimistic about the prospects for the Serb communities south of the Ibar. Petrović is leading them in a good direction, one I hope the Albanians of Kosovo will appreciate and reward. Pristina’s fate still depends, as it has since 1999, on how fairly it is prepared to treat Kosovo’s Serb population. That is also the key to the north, where it is not going to be easy to gain the confidence of the population.
One note of appreciation: to the Kosovo embassy in Washington, which handled its deputy prime minister’s visit well. As those of us who deal with the Balkans in Washington know only too well, Washington embassies sometimes provide support that depends all too obviously on the ethnic background of the visitor. Thank you, Ambassador Spahiu, for showing that Kosovo knows better!
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Next week’s “peace picks”
Good stuff, especially early in the week. Heavy on Johns Hopkins events, but what do you expect?
1. Strengthening the Armenianj-Azerbaijani Track II Dialogue, Carnegie Endowment, October 17, 10-11:45 am
With Philip Gamaghelyan, Tabib Huseynov, and Thomas de Waal
With the main diplomatic track negotiating the conflict over Nagorny Karabakh apparently deadlocked, more attention is being focused on how tension can be reduced and bridges built through Track II initiatives and dialogue between ordinary Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
Mohamed Salah Tekaya, Tunisian ambassador to the United States; Tamara Wittes, deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs and deputy special coordinator for Middle East Transitions at the U.S. Department of State; Mohamed Ali Malouche, president of the Tunisian American Young Professionals; and Kurt Volker (moderator), managing director of CTR, will discuss this topic. For more information and to RSVP, visit http://www.eventbrite.com/event/2279443878/mcivte
4. Mexico and the War on Drugs: Time to Legalize, former Mexican President Vicente Fox, held at Mount Vernon Place, Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity, Cato Institute, to be held at the Undercroft Auditorium, 900 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. October 18, noon
Mexico is paying a high price for fighting a war on drugs that are consumed in the United States. More than 40,000 people have died in drug-related violence since the end of 2006 when Mexico began an aggressive campaign against narco-trafficking. The drug war has led to a rise in corruption and gruesome criminality that is weakening democratic institutions, the press, law enforcement, and other elements of a free society. Former Mexican president Vicente Fox will explain that prohibition is not working and that the legalization of the sale, use, and production of drugs in Mexico and beyond offers a superior way of dealing with the problem of drug abuse.
To register for this event, email events@cato.org, fax (202) 371-0841, or call (202) 789-5229 by noon, Monday, October 17, 2011.
Monday, October 17, 2011
7:30 PM – 9:00 PM
Lindner Family Commons, Room 602
1957 E Street, NW
5. Revolutionary vs. Reformist Islam: The Iran-Turkey Rivalry in the Middle East, Lindner Family Commons, room 602, 1957 E St NW, October 18, 7:30-9 pm
Ömer Tapinar, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution
Hadi Semati, Iranian Political Scientist
Mohammad Tabaar, Adjunct Lecturer, GW
The Arab Spring has brought Iran and Turkey into a regional rivalry to sell their different brands of Islam. While Tehran is hoping to inspire an “Islamic awakening”, Ankara is calling for a “secular state that respects all religions.” The panelists will discuss this trend and its influences on domestic politics in Iran and Turkey.
The Middle East Policy Forum is presented with the generous support of ExxonMobil.
This program will be off the record out of respect for its presenters.
RSVP at: http://tinyurl.com/3ntfx9o
Sponsored by the Institute for Middle Eastern Stuides
PS: I really should not have missed this Middle East Institute event:
Troubled Triangle: The US, Turkey, and Israel in the New Middle East, Stimson Center, 1111 19th St NW, 11th floor, October 18, 4:30-6 pm
The trilateral relationship between Turkey, Israel and the United States has deteriorated in recent years as Israel’s and Turkey’s foreign policy goals in the Middle East continue to diverge. Despite repeated attempts, the United States has failed to reconcile these two important regional allies since the divisive Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010. Please join us for a discussion of this critical yet troubled trilateral relationship in a time of unprecedented change in the Middle East. The discussion will feature Prof. William B. Quandt, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Professor of Politics at University of Virginia, Lara Friedman, Director of Policy and Government Relations and Gönül Tol, Executive Director of MEI Center for Turkish Studies, and will be held on October 18 at the Henry L. Stimson Center.
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Not too much to ask
In today’s hierarchy of international challenges, Bosnia and Herzegovina ranks low. It is an out of the way place, off the main axes of current concerns: terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, oil, shifting sands in the Middle East, economic crisis. It had more than its 15 minutes of fame in the 1990s, when war in Bosnia attracted worldwide attention, NATO intervened and the international community at Dayton imposed and sustained a settlement that has more or less lasted until now. Isn’t that enough?
Vlado Azinović, Kurt Bassuener and Bodo Weber argue forcefully in a report published this week by the Atlantic Initiative and the Democracy Policy Council that it is not. They see real risks of renewed instability and spell them out in striking detail: dismantling the Office of the High Representative and the extraordinary powers he once wielded, inflammatory rhetoric, capacity of the Bosnian state institutions (including the police and judiciary), the impact of the global economic crisis on the country’s weak economy, the Bosnian armed forces and the extraordinary dispersal in the country of weapons, football hooligans, minority returnees and Islamic radicals. If war ever does break out again in Bosnia, no one is going to be able to claim there was no warning.
They also outline what they view as a necessary policy shift in the international community approach to Bosnia:
At the policy level, this shift would mean accepting, at least implicitly, that the path pursued since 2005 has failed and must be redesigned, starting from the identification of the strategic goal. That goal must be that BiH function well enough to meet the requirements to join the EU and NATO. Until that goal of durable functionality is reached by popular consent and demonstrated, it should be clear to all in BiH that the Dayton rules will continue to prevail and be enforced. That the country will not be allowed to fall apart, and that efforts in that direction will bring appropriately strong responses, needs to not only be articulated forcefully and clearly, but be believed.
What will that take?
– Additional troops from EU and non-EU members. EU/NATO member PIC SB countries not presently participating in EUFOR should make significant contributions.
– Sufficient helicopter lift for a quick reaction force based at Butmir of at least platoon, preferably company strength.
– Forward deployment in company strength to obvious potential flashpoints: Brčko and Mostar.
– Regular patrols between Tuzla airfield and Brčko, also to areas of minority return.
– De-emphasis of EUFOR activities not directly linked to the Chapter 7/Annex 1A SASE mandate.Restoration of credible deterrence would not only prevent a return to violent conflict, but would create the potential for forward movement on the political and social fronts by stripping the entrenched political elites of their current ability to leverage fear. This would create space for citizens and potential leaders who want to find a way to make the country function consensually. Restored, credible deterrence is the sine qua non of any political and social progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This all makes a good deal of sense. We are not talking giant resources here but a relatively modest increase in European commitments, including from non-members of the EU.
But the forces pushing against it are heavy. The United States is understandably frustrated with years of trying to convince the Bosnians to fix the Dayton constitution and anxious to confront more substantial risks to American national security. Distracted by the eurozone crisis, Brussels is happy to delegate Bosnia to its bureaucracy and entangle Sarajevo in the details of getting ready to make itself a candidate for EU membership. The longer that takes, the better from the perspective of those EU members hesitant about enlargement.
So we can’t expect much. I’m hoping that at least EUFOR will strengthen its forces in the northeastern Bosnian town of Brcko, which would be a primary objective of opposing Muslim and Serb forces if there is ever a return to conflict. The more important adjustment is less tangible but not less meaningful: making all concerned understand that Bosnia will remain a single country and enter both NATO and the EU as such, or not at all.
This should not be beyond Brussels’ capacity to communicate, even with its current distractions. And Washington will back it up. It is not too much to ask.
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