Tag: Balkans
Good facts, lousy policy
It wasn’t easy, but I managed to plow, or at least skim, my way through the 37 pages of ICG’s report on the 49% of Bosnia that constitutes Republika Srpska (RS), since I know you are all waiting for my verdict.
It’s mixed. The report seems to me clear and compelling in portraying the profound corruption and extreme nationalism that dominate the RS as well the difficulties in the relationship between the RS and the governments in Sarajevo (both Federation and “state,” as Bosnians call what Americans would term the Federal government). There are few better sources than this report, if any, for a comprehensive account of how RS has sought to weaken the state government and establish its own control over as many state functions as possible. And the section towards the end on “The War: Facts” is a useful compilation.
But when it comes to policy, the report treats the RS as if neither corruption nor extreme nationalism is really a serious problem. RS President Dodik’s efforts to block transfer of competences to the state are treated as mistakes from which it might be convinced to back off, not as a concerted effort to wreck any real prospect for a functional state government. Dodik’s push for referendums on issues that clearly are intended to weaken the state are viewed as quixotic and erratic, when they are all too clearly purposeful and consistent. Even the hope for independence is described as “vague”, when it in fact is clear and explicit.
Here’s a sample of ICG perceiving ambiguity:
The government in Banja Luka plays a strange game when it comes to independence – shifting from advocating a referendum on independence to reforms to return Bosnia to its
Dayton roots. While Dodik constantly publicly threatens secession,and the RS leadership continues to harden its positions, Dodik’s aides explain that his statements are meant for internal RS consumption and complain that Federation officials and internationals take them seriously. Yet,even far from the public and in bilateral meetings, Dodik and his closest advisers say they do not believe Bosnia has a future.
I am at a complete loss how anyone can think this “strange game” is anything but the usual one in which internationals are led around by aides who have placed a figurative ring in their nostrils. Dodik has publicly and repeatedly told his electorate that he intends to deliver them to freedom from Sarajevo. There is no ambiguity. The only thing that prevents him from doing this is the international community.
ICG can’t admit this because it has committed itself to dismantling the main international community barrier to Dodik’s secessionist ambition: the Office of the High Representative (OHR). Instead, ICG thinks the EU will solve all. Somehow this view creeps into the Executive Summary, though I looked in vain for any detailed discussion of the issues involved in the main text of the report:
The EU’s response, aided by the U.S. and others, to the political and legal challenge the RS posed in June offers a non-coercive alternative from which it will be difficult for any party to walk away.
This is almost comic: I can’t remember the last time I heard American diplomats angrier at their European colleagues than over Catherine Ashton’s ill-conceived and poorly executed maneuver to create this “non-coercive alternative,” a maneuver in which she managed not only to side-line the OHR but blind-side the Sarajevo government and provide a gigantic boost to Dodik’s claims of RS sovereignty. The only good thing about it was that it ended Dodik’s hope of an early dissolution of the OHR, because it stiffened American spines and gave even Europeans second thoughts.
I won’t grace the recommendations with a detailed critique, though it is notable that they lack any for Belgrade even though the report itself highlights its role in supporting Dodik’s last electoral campaign. The recommendations that do exist amount to asking everyone in the RS to do good things without providing any real reason why they should do so other than the goodness of their hearts. I think we all know how that will work out. But there is one recommendation that is downright pernicious:
Declare that neither partition nor greater centralisation is compatible with Bosnia’s early progress toward EU membership.
This is neither true nor wise. The Bosnian state is clearly incapable of EU membership without greater centralization, which is unquestionably compatible with early progress in that direction. Centralization of some functions is not the same as eliminating the RS, a canard that ICG should be savvy enough not to believe. I am a strong proponent of decentralization and subsidiarity for those issues that can be handled at an entity or municipal level, but EU membership will require more functionality in Sarajevo than currently exists there. ICG’s effort at balance, falsely equating centralization with partition as two polar evils, has led it to err more than its fine leadership should allow.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
A Belgrade voice that should be heard
Jelena Milic, Executive Director of Serbia’s Center for Euro-Atlantic Studies, takes a hard look at reform of the security/justice sector and finds it still lacking (in a speech in Dublin to the Institute of International and European Affairs):
Note her criticism of U.S. cooperation with the military starting around minute 23.
She also testified two days later at the Joint Committee on European Affairs:
if Serbia meets other E[uropean] C[ommission] expectations from last year’s progress report, which will be evaluated in Commission findings and its recommendations to be announced on 12 October, and if the situation in Kosovo does not deteriorate and dialogue with Prishtina resumes, and if the state demonstrates that it can provide for the protection of the constitutional rights of the participants in the Pride Parade, Serbia should be given candidacy status.
This will provide some support for genuine pro-EU forces within Serbia and preempt a drop in public support for the EU integration process in advance of the 2012 general election in Serbia. The date of the EU negotiations should then be announced and organized as quickly as is feasible, but be firmly and clearly conditioned. Continued Serbian progress towards EU membership, if predicated on the strengthening of institutions and regulatory bodies within Serbia would weaken the principal opponents of the pro-EU agenda.
I’m less keen than Jelena on doing things based on their presumed impact on Serbian politics, but hers is a voice that should be heard.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
For the Balkanites among you
Matja Stojanovic of Danas asked a few questions again. I understand my replies were published today. Here is the interview in English:
1. What instruments will the EU and the USA apply in order to try and push Serbia to stop blockades and barricades?
DPS: I don’t really know, but I imagine they will tell Belgrade that it is embarrassing itself with support to efforts that are unlawful and counterproductive. Serbia needs to settle the Kosovo issues, not make them worse.
2. If Serbia remains firm at its current positions, what actions would the EU and the USA have at their disposal in order to avoid violence, or in other words, is the violence inevitable?
DPS: Violence is certainly not inevitable. If the day comes when NATO feels it has to use force, I imagine it will do so effectively, with a minimum of violence.
3. Do you think the Ahtisaari plan is the only acceptable solutions for the EU and the USA? Is there any maneuver space for Serbia, in terms of gaining another kind of special status for the north (like shared sovereignty or something similar)?
DPS: The first thing to be done is to sit down and discuss the Ahtisaari plan, which provides a large margin of autonomy to Serb communities in Kosovo, including those in the north. I don’t think Belgrade is likely to convince Pristina to agree to something other than that, but I imagine there may be some aspects of implementation that could be usefully discussed and specified in more detail. The best way to reintegrate the north with the rest of Kosovo—and maintain legitimate ties to Belgrade—would be as a cooperative project between Belgrade and Pristina.
4. What is the reason, in your opinion, that those who organize trafficking at the north, represent criminal structures, organize barricades and incite violence are still at large and not arrested (having in mind that, for example, even Borko Stefanovic confirmed his life was threatened by a local strongman)?
DPS: I think it is clear that there are elements of the government in Belgrade that support the people in the north who are causing difficulties. And they likely use threats to ensure that support continues.
5. Is Belgrade controlling the north, in your opinion, and to what extent?
DPS: The day Belgrade decides to settle issues in the north, they will be settled. I’m not sure it is correct to say that Belgrade “controls” everything that goes on there. Moreover, there are different components in Belgrade, some of which may not be fully under control of the government.
6. Could ambassador of Russia Alexander Konuzin’s appearance and his now well-known speech be seen as an intention to destabilize political circumstances in this important moment?
7. Do You think Russia has interest in having the nationalist and war prone parties back to power in Serbia, and if so, why?
DPS: I confess I really haven’t followed the Russian angle, but Konuzin has long been more Serb nationalist than the Serbs. He is just trying to carry out his assigned task of keeping Serbia as far from NATO and the EU as possible. Yes, he would like to see real Serb nationalists back in power in Belgrade—that would serve his purposes well. Anyone in Serbia who thinks that would be a better route is entitled to his view, but I don’t think most citizens will agree.
8. What could be the next EU move if Tadic says, at the meeting with Ashton, that Serbia does not want to remove the barricades?
DPS: I think the EU would be glad to have an excuse to delay Serbia’s candidacy and date for negotiations. There is no great need for the EU to move quickly on these things right now.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Tempest in a tea pot
B92 reports that Pristina and Belgrade have reached agreement on customs stamps and documentation: they will read only “customs of Kosovo,” which is what they have read since independence in February 2008 and contain no symbols.
None of that is very important, however much the press and commentators have gotten excited about it. The key issue is who will be present at the border posts between Serbia and Kosovo to collect customs. Edita Tahiri, the Pristina negotiator, is reported to say it will be Kosovo police and customs, but even that doesn’t quite tell us what we need to know, since that was also the case before the seizure in late July of gates 1 and 31 by Pristina’s special police.
The issue is whether the Kosovo police and customs will actually be people loyal to the authorities in Pristina and therefore willing to enforce its laws and collect the customs duties. I guess we’ll have to wait and see whether that will be the case. We shouldn’t have to wait long. The Serbian negotiator, Boris Stefanovic, expects goods to start flowing across what he would consider the boundary line in 7 to 10 days.
What does this incident tell us about the prospects for Kosovo and Serbia to achieve “good neighborly relations,” which is the European Union’s requirement for all members? It bodes reasonably well, provided the EU keeps the pressure on, as it did in this case. German Foreign Minister Westerwelle and Chancellor Angela Merkel, in visits respectively to Pristina and Belgrade, made it clear that northern Kosovo needs to be reintegrated with the rest, without moving the northern border to accommodate ethnic differences.
While Belgrade still seems far from fulfilling the Westerwelle/Merkel expectation, it ducks the issue and relieves the pressure by resolving the customs issue expeditiously, even if on terms that seem manifestly favorable to Pristina. It is after all far more important for those in Belgrade who want to hold on to north Kosovo to maintain its extensive network of Serbian institutions in the north than to worry about how the customs stamps and documentation read.
If Pristina actually collects the customs duty, that from Belgrade’s perspective will also be a plus, as it will disincentivize the illegal, tax-free trade that has deprived not only Pristina but also Belgrade of revenue. So what we’ve got here is what most negotiators would consider a “win-win” solution, even if the tempest was in a tea pot.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Kosovo reprised
Margarita Kadriu of Kosova Sot, a Pristina daily, asked me a few questions last week, and I answered in an interview scheduled for publication today:
Q: Is the Kosovo’s government intervention in the south, in the custom checkpoints belated, having in mind that smuggling was a reality, not interfered from anybody?
DPS: I assume you mean the north. I don’t think the intervention was belated, but if the situation had gone on much longer it would have become a fait accompli. The Kosovo government acted to prevent that and to get the issue of north Kosovo back on the agenda. It has succeeded in that.
Q. KFOR has declared a military zone until the 15th September and the 2nd September negotiations will be held for the customs stamps. Does Pristina need to make a compromise again regarding this matter, recognition of the stamps?
DPS: I don’t know. I confess I find it hard to get excited about customs stamps and documentation. To me, the essential thing is that customs be collected for trade crossing the border.
Q: KFOR is in the checkpoints 1 and 31, but it is dealing in accordance with the Resolution 1244, which recognizes only an administrative and not a national border. Does this continue to represent a political problem?
DPS: Yes, it does, but that problem will continue until Belgrade accepts Kosovo as a sovereign and independent state. I don’t expect it to do that bilaterally—it will happen with Kosovo’s admission to the United Nations, which Serbia is still blocking.
Q: Working of Albanian policemen and custom officials in the north is not sustainable, because of lack of security. What do you think, how will official Pristina continue with the institutional control in the northern part of Kosovo?
DPS: This is part of what has to be worked out in the Belgrade/Pristina dialogue: how to ensure that Kosovo police and customs—they don’t necessarily have to be Albanians—can enforce the law effectively and safely.
Q: The international community once again made it clear that it will not allow border changes, but the north needs a solution, in order to calm the situation. There are voices that speak about a special status. Can Kosovars accept such a deal?
DPS: The Ahtisaari plan provides a special status. I still have not heard authoritatively from Belgrade or the Serbs in north Kosovo what they would want in addition. They are still focused on partitioning Kosovo, which isn’t going to happen.
Q: In the north there are still blockages of the roads, the parallel organs are effective, Serbia is present in every segment of life, in the judiciary system, in education, health, etc. How do you see the “Kosovarisation” of this part of Kosovo’s territory?
DPS: It has to be agreed with Belgrade that reintegration with the rest of Kosovo will occur, and a joint plan developed to make it happen.
Q: The actual situation has been exploited by organized crime and the smugglers. Tens of millions of euros are lost every year from the lack of law in the north, and the criminal activity showed also in the case of the killing of an Albanian policeman and in the burning of checkpoint 1. Can Kosovo’s authorities fight crime in the north without the help from EULEX and KFOR?
DPS: Not yet. EULEX in particular is still required. But that is a temporary solution. Eventually Kosovo institutions have to be established in the north, with the wide margin self-governance provided by the Ahtisaari plan.
Q: EULEX is being criticized for its passive role. Does this mean that this EU mission is failing?
DPS: EULEX has been slower and less definitive than many of us would like. But it is not failing. It is being careful and deliberate. I expect it to act against organized crime throughout Kosovo, sooner rather than later.
Q: The popularity of Prime Minister Thaci grew after the action in the north. But, his party is going through some internal conflicts. Some of the deputies are facing justice, accused of war crimes or corruption. Does Kosovo face another unstable phase?
DPS: No one is above the law. I see no reason for instability just because the law is being enforced. You should check how many members of the U.S. Congress have been investigated and have resigned in the past year.
Q: Next year we are supposed to hold presidential elections and Thaci can run for president. Do you think that he makes most suitable candidate, or do you see some other unifying figure?
DPS: Choosing the next president is entirely up to the citizens of Kosovo.
Q: Kosovo actually has a consensual president, but she is more a political puppet, than an active participant in the political scene of the country. Does this represent some barrier in the important processes toward EU?
DPS: I don’t agree with that at all. I think your current president is playing precisely the right role: she is a symbol and spokesperson for the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country and the aspirations of all its citizens. She is an advantage for Kosovo’s EU aspirations, not a hindrance.
Q: The only main strong oppositional party is “Vetevendosje”, which has more precise concepts regarding some political and economical issues. How do you see the future of Mr Albin Kurti’s party?
DPS: It will be whatever the voters of Kosovo decide. I disagree with Albin on issues like union with Albania, and I imagine it will be difficult for him to convince most of the population of Kosovo to give up the independence they have so recently achieved in order to be unified with a country that already has its own enormous challenges. But he is entitled to try.
Q: Kosovo waits to see the progress report in October, but expectations are not overly optimistic. Corruption is still there, the wealth that originates from criminal activities has not been confiscated, justice remains far away from the Western standards. Does this means that the road of Kosovo toward EU is going to be longer than supposed?
DPS: I don’t know how long it is supposed to be, but the road is unquestionably a long and difficult one that will require far higher standards for the justice system and many other governing structures than exist today. There are no shortcuts on the main issues. Kosovo citizens are entitled to institutions that meet European standards.
Q: All the countries in the region profit from visa liberalization. Is the European policy of leaving only Kosovo isolated, out of this process, wrong?
DPS: Yes, it is wrong and I hope to see it change. Kosovo should get a visa roadmap that leads sooner rather than later to visa liberalization, provided its institutions meet the requirements. Anything else will discourage pro-European sentiment in Kosovo and encourage pan-Albanianism, which I would prefer not to see.
Q: After all these events, in the fourth year of Kosovo’s statehood, can we say finally that Kosovo is a stable and sustainable country, or must we think twice before saying so?
DPS: I think twice most days before saying the United States is stable and sustainable. We’ve got big problems. Kosovo does too, though on a much smaller scale. Pristina needs to be clear-headed and persistent to reintegrate the north, but it is doable if there is strong political will.
Share this, I'll really appreciate it:
Costly delusion
Serbia’s state secretary for Kosovo Oliver Ivanović is quoted on B92:
“It should be clear to everyone, including Kosovo Albanians, that the issue of the Kosovo status has not been solved yet,” Ivanović told Tanjug and added that with all due respect to the U.S. and other influential and powerful countries that have recognized Kosovo’s independence, it was clear that until Serbia did so there would be a serious obstacle to Kosovo promoting itself as independent.
The state secretary noted that the negotiations on the status of Kosovo should not be rushed and that Albanians were slowly coming round to the fact that Serbia had all the keys, which was why they would need to negotiate with it about this matter sooner or later….
He expressed belief that the Cypriot model was the only right solution for the Kosovo issue.
Speaking about the status of northern Kosovo, the state secretary pointed out that this issue would certainly be opened, together with the status of entire Kosovo.
I agree that Serbia is an obstacle to full realization of Kosovo’s independence, both because it continues to control the north and because it stands in the way of General Assembly membership. But to suggest that Serbia has “all the keys” is clearly mistaken, unless Belgrade is willing to give up on European Union candidacy, as German Chancellor Angela Merkel made clear enough this week in Belgrade. And the notion that the EU would accept a Cyprus solution suggests outright delusion. That is precisely what virtually all EU members–especially Serbia’s putative ally Cyprus–will want to avoid.
This is instructive, because it illustrates so clearly how Belgrade paints itself into a corner. The analysis is basically correct, but Belgrade’s influence is exaggerated. Serbia does not have the power to reopen the question of Kosovo’s status, only the status of northern Kosovo, and it can get its way on that issue only if it is prepared to defy Brussels and Washington and sacrifice its own EU hopes.
I’ll be happy to let Serbs decide whether that is in their interest. They will want to take into account that Kosovo seems to cost Belgrade 500 million euros per year, according to Serb sources. It is hard to believe that is worthwhile, and it is certainly not sustainable.
RSS - Posts
