Tag: Balkans
Independence is over-rated
Yes, that’s what I said: over-rated. Despite the inspirational words, the declaration of July 4, 1776 didn’t change much. Seven years of war ensued. That didn’t settle it either: the British continued to interfere with American shipping, so we fought another war in 1812 (-15). Friendship with Britain did not begin until late in the 19th century, and the “special relationship” is a product of the 20th.
My Kosovar and Southern Sudanese friends are discovering that things haven’t changed much.
The NATO/Yugoslavia war over Kosovo ended in June 1999. Seventy-six countries have recognized Kosovo since its independence in February 2008, but Belgrade is using Russia to block Kosovo’s entry into the United Nations General Assembly, which is the modern world’s equivalent of universal recognition. Pristina is now engaged in discussions of practical issues with Belgrade, with modest results, but good neighborly relations are still far off. The promise of eventual EU membership–much sooner for Belgrade and much later for Pristina–may keep things on track, but there are no guarantees.
Sudan’s independence will be declared July 9. Despite extensive arrangements for this eventuality in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between Khartoum and Juba in 2005, things are not going smoothly. The Abyei region is still contested, despite two arbitration decisions. Ethiopian peacekeepers are now being deployed there, after Khartoum’s army displaced more than 100,000 people last month. There is instability in two northern states, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, where southern sympathies are strong (and some of the sympathizers armed). There are still no agreements on crucial issues: citizenship for northerners in the South and southerners in the North, division of assets and debt, as well as oil revenue and oil transport from the South through the North.
Independence can be declared, but it is sovereignty and statehood that really count. Neither is a function of saying, only of doing. They are acquired through practice, not expression. The three concepts are often confused, and in a well-established state they in fact are congruent. But they are three distinct concepts: statehood depends on the existence of an organized distribution of political power, sovereignty on the state having a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence, and independence–a relative term–on the sovereign state being able to make its own decisions without seeking the approval of others. Neither Southern Sudan nor Kosovo is yet a fully independent sovereign state, though I trust both will make it in due course.
There will be a lot of ups and downs along the way. There certainly were in the United States. The Washington, DC I visited as a child was a segregated city, not by law but by preference of the white majority. Many times while I served abroad in the U.S. Foreign Service I was asked whether a black president was possible. I always said “yes,” but I wasn’t at all sure it would happen in my lifetime. It did, and a lot of people had to change their conception of what it means to be American for it to happen (which is why I’m not surprised that some haven’t changed and are still worrying themselves about the President’s birth certificate).
This process of infusing new meaning into old concepts is important to acquiring statehood and sovereignty: an inclusive concept of what it means to be Southern Sudanese or “Kosovan” is vital to organizing political life and exercising a monopoly on the legitimate means of violence. If some people are excluded, or demoted to second class citizenship, the state will be less than worthy and sovereignty less than complete. So I conclude with Marvin Gaye’s effort to infuse new meaning into an old German drinking song, not so much because I like the results, but because I like the process:
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Small beans, big potatoes and one more thing
Usually I don’t comment on an agreement or the like until it is published, or at least reliably leaked. But while the few remaining Balkan-watchers are holding their collective breath for the results of the Belgrade-Pristina dialogues, word is circulating widely on what the results might be. So I’m tempted to comment, in a conditional and hypothetical way. I reserve the right to change my mind on any of these points once we’ve got a text. I readily admit that my judgments may change once I see the details, and that I am biased because I am not “status-neutral.” I accept Kosovo’s sovereignty.
Here is what I am hearing:
1. Telecomms: Serbian and Kosovar mobile providers will be allowed reciprocal roaming rights in both Kosovo and Serbia at low rates. Serbia will maintain and provide service over landlines in Kosovo’s Serbian enclaves.
Comment: Reciprocity is always nice, though I suspect it will be hard for Kosovar providers to offer service in any but nearby parts of Serbia. Who cares about landlines? Few people will be using them, but might Belgrade be interested because they can be made more secure than mobiles?
2. Trade: “Republic” of Kosova, which is what the Pristina authorities call themselves, will not be allowed on trade documents or products, but Serbia will accept imports from Kosovo without the “R” word.
Comment: I imagine the trade is worth more than the symbolism.
3. Documents: Serbia will accept Pristina-issued identification cards as valid for entry into Serbia (as Kosovo already does for Serbian ID cards).
Comment: sounds good to me.
4. License plates and car insurance: Serbia will not accept the usual Pristina-issued plates, which are marked “RKS” (as in Republic of Kosovo) but will require that cars entering Serbia use new “KS” plates, issued by Pristina (or cover the offending “R”). Verification of insurance for Kosovo-plated cars that have an accident in Serbia will be handled through EULEX, not directly between the two police forces.
Comment: This is bizarre, and stupid since it will continue to make Serbs readily identifiable by their license plates, putting them at risk inside Kosovo. And inserting EULEX into the insurance verification process is even sillier. But I imagine someone in Belgrade thinks the display of that offending “R” would suggest in Serbia that Belgrade had given something away, and you wouldn’t want any serious cooperation to develop with that Kosovo Police Service, would you?
5. Electricity: Serbia would continue to provide electricity in northern Kosovo, but the company would have to register in Pristina and make payments to the Kosovo electric company.
Comment: Sounds OK to me. I’m told there is a lot of money involved.
6. Official documents: Kosovo will only get copies of the cadastral (real estate property) records and civil registries that Belgrade took in 1999, at the end of the NATO/Serbia war. EULEX, the EU’s rule of law contingent, will verify the copies (but will have no way of being certain that the originals have not been altered).
Comment: I put this in the “yech” category: the original records should be returned to the Kosovo authorities. You don’t have to recognize Kosovo’s independence to appreciate that those authorities are the legitimate ones, democratically validated.
None of this is great, but it should not trouble anyone–Serb or Albanian–too much. These are, as promised, practical issues that are finding–according to my informants–more or less practical solutions, with the occasional impractical prohibition of an “R.” Serbia is still thoroughly hung up on the sovereignty question, to the point of embarassing itself through trivia.
But there are three other things happening at the same time.
1. There seems to be no movement on the EU giving Kosovo what everyone refers to as a “contractual” relationship, that is the possibility of signing agreements with the EU. This is important–without it Kosovo cannot even begin to proceed with a process that could end in EU membership. I know this is hard for an EU where five members have not recognized Kosovo, but they are going to have to get over it. Better sooner than later. How do they expect Serbia to deal with Kosovo in a practical way if they can’t?
2. Nor is Kosovo being given a “roadmap” to obtain a visa waiver program, allowing Kosovars to enter the Schengen area without a visa. Serbia, Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia already have the visa waiver. Shutting the door on Kosovo encourages pan-Albanian political sentiments (as in “I’d do better if I were an Albanian citizen”) that are not healthy.
3. To add insult to injury from the Kosovar perspective, Serbia is seeking a UN Security Council statement endorsing a EULEX task force to investigate allegations of organ trafficking, including against Kosovo’s sitting prime minister. I am all for the investigation, which I understand has already begun. But this Security Council statement is a dreadful idea, as Belgrade will use it worldwide to prevent countries from recognizing Kosovo until the investigation has been completed, a pitch they are already making. I hear the Americans are saying a loud “no” at the Security Council. I hope they stick with it.
Belgrade on the other hand is rumored to be getting out of this process exactly what it wanted: EU candidacy status and a date to begin membership negotiations. This will put it leagues ahead of Kosovo in the membership “regatta.” No real harm in that, but I do think Kosovo should get a contractual relationship with the EU and the visa waiver roadmap, which are small beans by comparison with Serbia’s big potatoes. And Serbia should be told it will have to settle its problems with Kosovo before entering the EU.
One more thing: Pristina should ask for an office in Belgrade. Serbia has one in northern Kosovo (it was previously in Pristina). It is occasionally necessary, but I would never want to negotiate with a country in whose capital my country was not represented. For both public information and reporting purposes, Kosovo should have a capable Serbian-speaking representative in Belgrade. No need for diplomatic status.
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Here’s another idea for Bosnia
One question plagues every discussion of Bosnia: do Bosnians want to live in the same country? Nationalist leaders of two of the main ethnic groups (Croat and Serb) seem to be saying “no,” while most Bosniaks (that’ s Muslim to most Americans, but without the religious connotation) say “yes.” They are the largest group (44% of the pre-war population).
What would happen if they voted on it?
Of course they did vote on it once, in 1992. The result was 98% for Bosnian independence, with many Serbs boycotting (turnout was 68%). The rules then–and now–are that 50% wins (55% if you are in Montenegro, ask the Europeans why). Boycotts don’t invalidate the results.
Republika Srpska (RS) President Milorad Dodik has lately pumped up the idea of a new referendum, which he wanted to conduct in the RS on an obviously biased and contentious proposition that would seek to delegitimize institutions of the Bosnian state as well as the international community representative in Sarajevo, thus laying the groundwork for an independence bid. But there is no reason why any referendum on a question concerning the country as a whole should be conducted only in the RS, from which many Bosniaks and Croats were ethnically cleansed and where they still find themselves unwelcome.
This leads me to wonder out loud what the results of a new referendum might be, but one conducted in the whole country on a serious proposition: “do you want to live in a Bosnia and Herzegovina that can become a member of the European Union?” That is the real choice Bosnians face: to split up the state and give up hopes of joining the EU, or stick together and get into the EU some time in the next decade or so.
Of course I wouldn’t wonder out loud if I didn’t think I knew the outcome. I believe well over 50% of Bosnians would vote “yes” in a free and fair referendum of this sort: easily 90% of the more or less 50% of the country that is today Bosniak, plus an overwhelming majority of those refusing to identify ethnically and significant percentages (I’d guess close to half on the proposition as I’ve formulated it) of the Croats and Serbs.
You’ll be able to tell right away if I am correct: nationalist Croats and Serbs will reject this whole-country referendum proposal, knowing well that they would lose. Some Bosniaks will also not like the idea, concerned that it will exacerbate interethnic relations. I may even get a cross-ethnic coalition to oppose me. That would be gratifying, in a perverse kind of way.
Lest there be any doubt about my own views: I know full well no referendum of this sort will be held, and I think breakup of Bosnia would be a disaster for the Balkans and for Europe. It would result in creation of Croat and Serb statelets that the “mother” countries would not want to absorb and an isolated Islamic republic in central Bosnia whose population would radicalize in an effort to survive (and attract Islamic support) in difficult circumstances. There is no prospect of an easy agreement on the borders of these statelets, so violence in the process of breakup would be likely. Nor would it be possible to contain the breakup to Bosnia. Muslim-majority areas of Sandžak in Serbia would grow restive, not to mention possible echoes in Kosovo, southern Serbia and Macedonia.
As I’ve said before in the Kosovo context, best to keep Pandora’s box closed. But that should not prevent us from being realistic about the horrors that lie inside.
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Here’s an idea for Bosnia
Balkans fans will know that Brčko, a northeast Bosnian town, became the knot that couldn’t be untied at Dayton and was therefore referred for arbitration thereafter. The result was an unusual decision in favor of a “condominium”–Brčko became legally part of both the Federation and Republika Srpska and de facto distinct from both, under international (American) supervision. Adam Moore of UCLA has written an interesting paper on the post-war evolution of Brčko, which has become a rare but fraying exemplar of reintegration in Bosnia: Why Brčko became one of the only success stories in Bosnia.
Those who worry about war in Bosnia worry about Brčko. It is vital to Republika Srpska (RS), since it sits in a narrow corridor that joins the eastern wing along the Drina with its western wing south of the Sava. If ever there is a war in Bosnia again, whoever gets Brčko wins: the RS needs it to survive intact, the Federation needs it to make RS independence impossible.
So protecting Brčko and preventing it from being “taken” by either the RS or the Federation should be a priority for the international community. The European force (EUFOR) in Bosnia has limited resources (1600 people “in theater,” whatever that means). Its mission is
…to provide a military presence in order to contribute to the safe and secure environment, deny conditions for a resumption of violence, manage any residual aspect of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in BiH (also known as Dayton/Paris Agreement).
It could pre-emptively begin to concentrate itself in Brčko (in addition to its near-Sarajevo headquarters), thereby providing a serious impediment to RS’s independence ambitions as well as to any pre-emptive move by the Bosniaks to prevent secession. Doing this would help to preserve the still integrated Brčko district and prevent it from fraying further.
A European move to strengthen its heretofore modest liaison and observation team in Brčko would demonstrate to all concerned–including the Americans–that EUFOR is serious and knows where Bosnia’s vulnerabilities lie.
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Serbia visits Sarajevo
Yesterday Danas, a Belgrade daily, published this interview with me by Matja Stojanovic and Snezana Congradin:
1. [Serbian] President Tadic will soon make his first official visit to the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) capital. How do you comment the fact that it took him so long, having in mind that in the course of that prolonged period, Serbia-Banja Luka relations flourished?
A: Belgrade, while insisting loudly that it supports One Bosnia, has in practice been focused on supporting Republika Srpska (RS) and [its President] Milorad Dodik in its quest for maximum autonomy. But Belgrade will not want Dodik to move in the direction of independence, since that would put Tadic in a difficult position: recognize the RS and give up hope for early entry into the EU, or not recognize and give up hope for reelection.
2. What has changed comparing to the past, in your opinion, that made such official visit possible?
A: Certainly the arrest of Ratko Mladic and his transfer to The Hague make a visit to Sarajevo much easier, both for Tadic and for Bakir Izetbegovic, the Bosniak member of the Bosnian presidency. Maybe RS has also realized that building power plants on the Drina and other pet projects aren’t going to happen without Sarajevo’s concurrence.
3. Is that visit a consequence of pressure coming from the international community, in connection with meeting the EU candidacy criteria, or that is a matter of something else?
A: I imagine both Europeans and Americans have urged Tadic to visit Sarajevo and to rebalance Serbian policy in the direction of supporting the Bosnian state, rather than just Republika Srpska.
Tadic won’t be disappointed by the way: I was in Sarajevo week before last and found it vastly improved from 10 years earlier. It is truly a beautiful city.
4. Support for the BiH EU integrations process is among the Sarajevo meeting announced topics. Would you agree that means that Tadic will be expected to influence Dodik, and if so, how should we see that in terms of BiH sovereignity, having in mind that doing so, one of the most important BiH questions – EU integrations – will be “controlled” (or at least directly influenced) by a president of another country?
A: It has long proved necessary to go to Belgrade to influence Banja Luka. It is also necessary to go to Zagreb to influence some Bosnian Croats. I might wish it weren’t that way, but that doesn’t change the facts of life.
5. Do you expect that the Dayton agreement will be amended, and if so – when?
A: Yes. It has to be amended to conform to the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on its discriminatory provisions. I hope it will also be amended to give the Sarajevo government all the authority needed to negotiate membership in the European Union. There will be other amendments needed as Bosnia proceeds through the EU accession process.
I have no idea when these amendments will be passed. Experience suggests that it will only be when external forces make it absolutely clear what is needed in order to gain some concrete benefit, as happened in the case of the visa waiver. But pressures for change are also growing within Bosnia—I hope to see them grow more. Citizens shouldn’t be happy to see Bosnia fall behind other countries in the EU “regatta.”
6. Do You expect Dodik to oppose or cooperate in the process of the BiH EU integration, and the necesary centralisation of power in the country?
A: Dodik will make every effort to get the EU to deal directly with Republika Srpska in the process of EU integration, as he did successfully with the “structured dialogue” on the justice sector. Brussels needs to get smarter about this and make it absolutely clear that it is the Sarajevo government that joins the EU, not the Federation or Republika Srpska. If Brussels were to fail to do this, it could well cause the breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is unlikely to be a peaceful process. Moreover, the outcome would not be one Zagreb or Belgrade would want.
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Zbogom Balkan
My discussion last night with stalwarts of the Foreign Policy Initiative in Sarajevo suggested one important elaboration on yesterday’s post–an implicit assumption that I should have made explicit. In addition, I’d like to discuss one or two additional options.
The assumption is this: my implicit goal is preservation of a single Bosnia governed democratically and consistent with the rule of law, with authority devolved to appropriate levels. Regular readers will understand that I have no interest in partitioning Bosnia or in making it a “unitary” state, i.e. one governed exclusively by a strong central government in Sarajevo. The options I outlined yesterday were aimed at that goal.
The additional option, perhaps more realistic than any I discussed yesterday, is a new deal, that is a bargain between President Milorad Dodik of Republika Srpska (RS) and Zlatko Lagumdžija, who heads the Social Democratic Party that gained the largest number of votes in the last election. This is an odd couple, as Dodik has taken on a strong Serb nationalist tinge while Lagumdžija lays claim to being the secular champion of multiethnic Bosnia. They are the leading political forces in their respective strongholds. Why can’t they reach a deal?
Maybe they can, but only time and concerted pressure will make it happen. The RS is running out of money and concocting bizarre Chinese and Russian loans to fill the gap. The Federation (the Croat/Muslim entity that occupies 51% of Bosnia and Herzegovina) is also in fiscal trouble, but a newly formed government there claims to be cutting back. Lagumdžija insists on a government for Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole that aims seriously for NATO and EU membership, which means a government with the authority to carry out the relevant responsibilities. Dodik resists. Some think an American as the High Representative in Bosnia (a position so far always held by a European) could help resolve this and other problems, which adds an option to the ones I outlined yesterday.
Dodik in particular will resist NATO membership, which I should also have mentioned as an option yesterday. It is generally believed in Bosnia, with good reason I think, that entrance into NATO will end any discussion of partition or other changes to Bosnia’s borders. Dodik of course understands this perfectly well and has pressed a maximalist position on RS’s claims to the defense property of the Bosnian state, thinking other political forces in the country will give in because resolution of the claims is a condition for Bosnia to begin the NATO membership process. The maximalist defense property claims would also help to stoke, though not fill, RS’s treasury.
The political stalemate in Bosnia, which has already lasted eight months, can go on a while longer. It is leaving my Foreign Policy Initiative audience, which was multiethnic but secularist, extremely frustrated, some even verbally ready to go for the war option (and others declaring that they’ll get out quickly if war returns). I’ve found the Islamist Bosniaks (Muslims) far less irritated. They believe time is on their side and that in due course Serbia and RS will give up on their partitionist intentions. While some rail against Dodik, they don’t really think a solution is near.
I hope they are wrong. My own impatience is born of the feeling that this is a dangerous neighborhood in which to allow issues to fester. Not to mention that there are a lot of other things to do in the world besides worry about Bosnia’s decades-old post-Communist conflicts.
I’ll be traveling tomorrow and likely not posting. Sunday I’ll try to turn my attention to the Arab spring, which is lingering far too long, and to Afghanistan, which threatens never to go away. Then later next week I’ll have a multi-part (and multi-day) post on the prospects for democracy in Iraq, where at least something has changed over the past eight years.
The Balkans notoriously produces more history than it can consume, and less future than it needs. This two-week interlude has been great, but it is time to bid Zbogom Balkan and turn to America’s higher priority issues.
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