Tag: Balkans
Why no partition of Kosovo?
Tanjug, Belgrade’s government press agency, asked me this morning to comment on the possibility of dividing Kosovo. The reason for this question was a statement of Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic to media in Kosovo yesterday. Tanjug quoted him as saying that would be the only realistic and quick solution for both Serbia and Kosovo.
This was my reply:
There are two practical problems with the idea of dividing Kosovo: 1) if Serbia gets the North, Kosovo will want the Albanian-majority Presevo area of southern Serbia, which Serbia will not give up; 2) Belgrade and Pristina would have to find a way of guaranteeing that partition of Kosovo would not lead to partition of Bosnia or Macedonia. I don’t see how they would be able to give those guarantees.
As a matter of reciprocity, you can expect Pristina to ask for Albanians anything Belgrade gets for Serbs—Belgrade should be moderating its requests with this in mind. It is also important to note that there are few important Serb religious sites in the North—most of the important churches and monasteries would in any event remain south of the Ibar, along with most of the Serb population.
The international community has demonstrated repeatedly that it does not want to move boundaries to accommodate ethnic differences, even though it has been willing to change the status of various boundaries (from internal boundaries to international borders). This is at least in part because all the Balkans countries are expected to end up eventually in the European Union, where borders will disappear. Belgrade has the real possibility of entering the European Union well before Kosovo, but only if it gives up any claims to its neighbor’s territory.
An added thought for readers of this blog: why did I not appeal to the principle of multiethnicity? The short answer is that I don’t really think there is much multiethnicity to be had in Kosovo today. The Serb population is now likely under 10 per cent, even counting those who live north of the Ibar, and many of those are old and living in enclaves. It is my hope that a Kosovo that remains whole will welcome Serbs back in the future, whether as visitors to the many Serb monuments and religious sites or as residents. But it would be disingenuous to suggest that today Kosovo is truly a multiethnic society that must be preserved at all costs. Let’s hope it becomes one, something far more likely to happen if it is not divided.
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A really bad idea
I imagine in Brussels they are congratulating themselves today for Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik agreeing to postpone the referendum he was threatening, in exchange for “structured talks” with the European Union on the future of judicial institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Why is this a bad idea? Let me count the ways:
- Postponement leaves the threat of the referendum hanging, providing continued leverage to Dodik from a proposition that clearly violates letter and spirit of the Dayton agreements.
- Agreeing to discuss Bosnia’s judicial system with the RS undermines the authority of the prosecutors and judges at what Bosnians call the “state” level (national to Americans, but that means something else in Bosnia).
- Using the enlargement commissioner of the EU to conduct these talks could open the door to de facto negotiations on implementation of the EU’s acquis communitaire with the RS.
To make matters worse, the EU’s top foreign policy official, Catherine Ashton, is reported to have said, “We consider that any legitimate issues require an adequate response.” And to seal the EU’s groveling, she added, “We welcome your leadership, Mister President.”
Why wasn’t Dodik told to go discuss the issues he is raising with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo? Why wasn’t any EU discussion of judicial reform undertaken a the state level? Of course, that would have required that Dodik also be told to get on with government formation (it has been 7 months since elections under a caretaker government). EU use of its leverage to that end would have been a very good idea. Allowing Brussels to become an instrument of Dodik’s campaign to enhance the autonomy of RS and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Sarajevo government is a really bad idea.
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Compare these
Here is an excerpt from Monday’s statement by Serbia at the UN Security Council debate on Bosnia:
We consider that the announced referendum of the citizens of Republika Srpska on the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina has nothing to do with the territorial integrity of the country and is not in contravention of Dayton Peace Accords. Without any intention to interfere into the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we consider that legislative initiative belongs only to competent assemblies formed by the legitimately elected representatives of citizens and that there are no powers on the basis of which it could be taken over by other governmental organs in Bosnia and Herzegovina or by the international presence.
Here is an excerpt from the statement by Croatia on the same occasion:
In this respect, we echo previous speakers who have expressed serious concern regarding the unilateral decision by Republika Srpska to hold a referendum on challenging the authority of state judicial institutions and rejecting the authority and past decisions of the High Representative. We believe this decision should be reversed, as it undermines the constitutional structure of the country and could undo the positive developments achieved since the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement. If the referendum moves forward, it may foster new tensions in the country and the region. Croatia underscores that all Parties should respect the Dayton Peace Agreement and acts of the High Representative taken with the approval of the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
I was originally tempted to comment on this contrast, but I think I’ll leave it to readers to judge which one is sincere and which is disingenuous.
PS: A hint to non-Balkan watchers: the first statement would justify secession from the Union by South Carolina.
PPS: For the record, the referendum question in the RS reads as follows:
Do you support the laws imposed by the High Representative of the International Community in BiH, especially those pertaining to the Court of BiH and BiH Prosecutor’s Office, as well as their unconstitutional verification in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly?
Take a guess as to which way those who wrote the question want you to vote!
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How to save Bosnia and Herzegovina
John Menzies, post-war U.S. ambassador in Sarajevo in 1996 and war-time Charge’ d’affaires in 1995, writes:
Background
The U.S. has made an enormous investment in Bosnia; billions of dollars, thousands of man-years, and actual blood. The Dayton system is unraveling due to the depredations of hard-line nationalist elements. We cannot afford the success of these elements. It is time to act quickly and effectively to reverse the current trend toward fragmentation and dissolution of the Bosnian state.
Current systems seem unable to address the urgency of the moment. Here are a few simple suggestions for correcting the current course.
Moving Forward
1. Name a Special Envoy to Bosnia; provide high level political support.
2. Create a new “Friends of Bosnia” group to meet on the margins of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This group would include the U.S., the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and Turkey. Membership should be open to those who genuinely want to make the peace work. No other venue serves the purpose of the NAC. Turkey can participate as a NATO member, and the NAC can discuss much tougher approaches than can the EU or any other umbrella.
3. Reinvigorate (if at all possible) the OHR. As unlikely as it sounds, it is worth trying; it is an institution already in place. This does not substitute for a U.S. Special Envoy. The Special Envoy will add resolve and strength to the OHR, and can extend the Envoy’s own mandate by supporting the OHR.
4. Press for a new Dayton-like process to correct the flaws of the original. The new effort should have an open mandate, but only to make Bosnia work. It should be clear from the outset that there will be no multi-state solutions.
We have invested far too much to allow Bosnia to fail. Heightened resolve is the key to finding solutions.
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Red card
The High Representative for Dayton peace agreement implementation in Bosnia has submitted two reports to the Secretary General, one more a routine update and the other finding that one of the two entities constituting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srspska (RS), is in breach of the Dayton agreements. HiRep Valentin Inzko adds:
The recent decisions taken by the RS authorities represent the most serious violation of the GFAP [General Framework Agreement for Peace] since it was signed more than 15 years ago.
This is the more or less the equivalent of giving Republika Srpska a red card. The problem of course is that RS’s sin is refusing to recognize the authority of the referee, by calling a referendum that will reject his decisions and those of Bosnia’s state court.
This puts Inzko, and the international community, in a difficult spot. What would a soccer ref do if a player refused to leave the field? What if the player suspected the referee did not have sufficient force or sanctions to make it happen? And the player knew half the stadium was full of people ready to back him up, while the other half would not want to fight?
The issue was raised at my discussion this afternoon at the Woodrow Wilson Center with Jim O’Brien and Gerald Knaus, two experienced Bosnia hands for whom I have a great deal of respect. Nida Gelazis was in the chair.
Gerald argued that Inzko is playing into Dodik’s hands by making a big deal about the referendum. We should oppose it in a more low key way, saying that it violates Dayton and would only delay progress on the EU accession project. Inzko should not try to stop it, since he doesn’t have the power, but he should make it clear we will not respect its results.
Jim O’Brien wisely suggested that we make clear to Belgrade that its path to the EU will be encumbered if Dodik crosses whatever the international community decides is its red line. He also suggested we should focus on the consequences of Dodik’s move, which will hurt prospects for trade and investment. We should continue to build consensus on technical issues to recreate the positive dynamic evident in the case of visa liberalization policy.
I imagine that the internationals will find a way to muddle through this one, yielding a bit more ground to RS while trying to reassure the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims to the American press) that it really doesn’t make much difference. That is basically what we’ve been doing for years–accommodating Serb and Croat nationalists while soothing those among more Dayton-friendly forces who might want to stand up and object. In my view, this is taking us down a path to state dissolution, which is the RS’s stated objective.
The real problem will come the day the Bosniaks decide to engage rather than yield. I have no idea when that will be.
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Wrong, wrong, wrong, wrong
I am reluctant to turn www.peacefare.net into a boxing ring, with International Crisis Group (ICG) in one corner and an anonymous Bosnia-watcher in the other. But ICG is influential in the Balkans and has in the past published a great deal of fine analytical work on the conflicts there. Reasonable people should at least be able to agree on the facts. That seems not to be possible in Bosnia these days, so the best I can do is offer an alternative perspective on the facts that seems to me well-grounded (but I hasten to clarify that I did not write this material, much as I agree with it). So here goes, on four more points from page one of the most recent ICG report.
“State institutions are under attack by all sides”.
This is factually incorrect. State institutions are under attack from certain Croat and Serb political parties. The Bosniaks are not attacking them and not all Serb and Croat political parties are attacking them.
“The authorities of the larger of the entities, the Federation, were formed controversially – a main state institution said illegally – in March and are disputed by Croats, who have created a parallel Croat National Assembly”.
This consists of one factual error and several half-truths:
— The reference to a “parallel Croat National Assembly” is factually incorrect. There is only one Croat National Assembly, and it is not “parallel” in any sense of the word. Rather, it is completely legal.
— The HDZs had the opportunity to challenge both the “illegal” election of the Federation Presidency, and the nomination of the Federation government before the Federation Constitutional Court. They filed appeals, but then inexplicably withdrew them when it became clear the court would probably rule against the HDZs. Therefore, the HDZs have not mounted a court challenge to either the Federation Presidency or Government, even though such legal remedies are available.
— The same legal criteria were used in 2011 by the Federation House of Peoples’ to elect the Federation Presidency as were used to elect the Presidency of the old government in early 2007, i.e., the House of People’s was formed when sufficient members for a quorum had been chosen, but before they were certified by the Central Election Commission. Thus, if the election of the current Presidency was illegal, then so too was the election of the former Presidency. By extension, this would render illegal all laws and acts passed in the Federation since 2007.
“The two HDZs and the biggest winners of the October 2010 elections, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), all rejected reasonable internationally-brokered coalition proposals”.
This is factually incorrect. Only one side – the HDZs – turned down the offer. The OHR – with the full support of the Ambassadors of the PIC Steering Board and the EU, conducted mediation between the two camps. Both camps agreed on general principles for a government platform. The mediation broke down over maximalist demands from both sides regarding allocation of posts. The OHR then consulted with the Steering Board Ambassadors and the EU and split the two positions down the middle, giving each side half of what it wanted. It then presented this to the two sides in a take-it-or-leave-it package. After much grumbling, the SDP accepted the offer. The HDZs refused. Thus, only one side – the HDZs — rejected the proposal.
“The SDP then formed a Federation government in violation of the entity constitution and against the advice of the state-level Central Election Commission (CEC)”.
This is factually incorrect. At no point did the formation of the Federation government violate the Federation Constitution. So too, the Central Election Commission never reviewed the matter of government formation in the Federation, as this does not fall within its mandate. Had the Federation government formation been problematic, the HDZs would in all likelihood have challenged it before the Federation Constitutional Court. As noted earlier, the HDZs launched two appeals, but then withdrew them.
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