Tag: Balkans
May 25 Yugo-nostalgia, not
A former Yugoslav friend writes:
May 25th was celebrated as Tito’s birthday, and was known as Youth Day. They used to take us out of school to wave flags at the runners carrying “best birthday wishes from students, peasants and workers of Yugoslavia” hidden in a baton. Students, peasants and workers started running a relay around the country around May Day, passing the baton hand to hand every couple of hundred meters — it was a huge honor to be a carrier. Factories would stop for a shift and schools would close while workers and students lined the streets to greet the passing baton. Every evening at 7:30, the daily news, which was mandatory viewing for all, would first show that day’s leg of the relay and all the happy workers and peasants celebrating.
Weeks of celebrations culminated on May 25th, at the Stadium of the Yugoslav People’s Army in Belgrade, where the baton would be handed to Tito, by a breathless Stakhanovite or his student equivalent. This one is Tito’s last birthday, in 1979. The lyrics of the song are: “Tito, Tito is our Sun. Tito, Tito is our heart. There is no end to our joy and one love binds us all. Tito-Party-Youth-Action.” Action refers to “work action” – unpaid physical labour that we performed for the motherland, digging ditches, picking corn, laying railroad tracks.
The determined young Albanian woman recites our collective wish: “that you continue to navigate the ship of our state for many more years with a steady hand and a clear eye.” The commentator gushes about the air being “charged with love, respect and gratitude.” The birthday boy manages to string a few semi-coherent short sentences.
I was in the audience. I was over the moon. Within a year, Tito dies. Life changes.
This helps explain how those same people lined up behind new leaders a decade later, and killed and died on command.
All the more glory to those who refused, and who still refuse today, to be led in the wrong directions.
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Own goal
Serbian President Boris Tadic is apparently prepared to skip a summit of Central and Southeastern European leaders in Warsaw Friday and Saturday because Kosovo’s president will be present and treated as an equal.
I of course understand Tadic’s domestic political problem. He doesn’t want to be seen acknowledging Kosovo’s sovereignty, which Belgrade continues to contest. He and Foreign Minister Jeremic seem almost in a competition to see who can move more aggressively in the nationalist direction. The Foreign Minister has come out strongly for withdrawal of the international community High Representative from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tadic was pleased the other day to tell Serb school children from Kosovo that Serbia is their country.
This despite the fact that Serbia’s delegation to the EU-hosted talks has met with the Kosovo delegation at a symmetrical table, where rumor has it they will soon be able to announce modest progress on issues like mutual recognition of documents and customs stamps. Tadic needs that, in order for Serbia to gain EU candidacy status for Serbia before calling elections. Kosovo in the meanwhile will try to gain entry into the visa waiver program, whose technical requirements it claims to have fulfilled.
So there appears to be at least some limited progress on practical issues, but Serbia is unwilling to take the next step. Atifete Jahjaga is the constitutionally elected president of Kosovo. Whatever Kosovo’s status, she is clearly its legitimate leader. Tadic needs to learn to make this distinction: between recognizing Kosovo as sovereign and independent, and accepting its leader as its legitimate representative. He should take the advice of Sonja Licht, president of the Foreign Policy Council at the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
I personally believe that the time has come that the policy of the Government is reconsidered in order that more creative solution is found. That solution has to respect the fact that the circumstances have changed in the meantime. We have started dialog with Kosovo and accepted it as a side in negotiations. More courageous and determined steps are necessary.
Tadic’s refusal to go to Warsaw is an own goal. The Americans will certainly want to think more than twice before inviting Tadic to Washington if he is unwilling to join President Obama for this group summit in Warsaw.
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More in sadness than anger
I suppose I should resist the temptation to respond to International Crisis Group’s latest wrong-headedness. I’ve got friends at ICG and a great deal of respect for the fine work they have done in the past, and continue to do in many parts of the world. But that would disappoint my Balkan readers. So here goes.
ICG’s account of what was agreed between Republika Srpska President Dodik and EU High Representative Ashton is not the same as what Dodik says was agreed. ICG says Dodik agreed to cancel the referendum. What he says he agreed is the following:
…we think that the referendum is not necessary for the time being. The conclusions present a political position of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska [RSNA], but they will be reconsidered in the light of this agreement on structural dialogue.
This sounds more like a postponement than a cancellation to me, and he confirmed that in public on May 17. The promised reconsideration of the RSNA conclusions falls far short of what Lady Ashton sought, which was their withdrawal. The RSNA is proceeding very slowly even on reconsideration.
ICG goes on to say that “The deal is hard to fit into Bosnia’s political narrative.” That is true only if you have not understood Bosnia’s political narrative, which is one in which RS is aiming to enhance its legitimacy and prestige while demonstrating the ineffectiveness and irrelevance of the state institutions in Sarajevo. This deal fits perfectly into that narrative, as it enabled Dodik as RS president to begin dealing directly with the EU on issues of importance to the state, including not only the referendum but also the future “structured dialogue” on the state’s judicial institutions. To add insult to injury from the perspective of the state institutions, that dialogue will be conducted by the EU’s enlargement commissioner beginning in Banja Luka. I don’t know whether state officials will be invited (nor am I sure it would be wise for them to attend if they are).
ICG then declares the EU and Bosnia the winners. I’ll defer to their better judgment on the EU, though to me it looks as if Ashton got a good deal less than half a loaf. I don’t see any win for Bosnia and Herzegovina here. No legally valid referendum was going to happen: the international community High Representative Valentin Inzko was going to invalidate the law under which it would have been called. Nor is the referendum question one that would stand up to judicial scrutiny anywhere but North Korea (and, of course, RS).
People are asking me how it is that ICG has gone so far off the tracks in Bosnia. I don’t know the answer to that question. But it seems to me the fundamental error of judgment they are making has to do with EU capability. ICG is happy with the Ashton/Dodik deal because it emarginated the High Representative, whom they view as an obstacle to Bosnia’s democratic development and progress toward EU membership. I am inclined to agree that it is time for the EU to take over in Bosnia, but I’d like to see better performance at handling the issues than what happened on this occasion.
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The Yugo-second is over
A friend in the Balkans, whose perspective is not far from mine, writes:
Richard Holbrooke often referred to the “Yugo-second,” the amount of time that passed between when a Balkan politician made a promise and broke it.
The EU’s High Representative for foreign policy Lady Katherine Ashton and her Balkan Director Miroslav Lajcak, traveled to Banja Luka last Friday in a poorly planned, poorly conceived and poorly executed trip, where they met with Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik. The official purpose of the trip was to dissuade Dodik from holding a referendum and to have him revoke the 24 problematic RS National Assembly (RSNA) conclusions. Lajcak’s hidden agenda was to demonstrate the EU’s ability to take over from the OHR and prove that Bonn Powers are not necessary.
The EU came away with a “triumph” that represents a contemporary “peace in our time.” Rather than have Dodik travel to Sarajevo and meet Lady Ashton at the EU House, Lady Ashton was forced to travel to Banja Luka and have a photo op in front of a large map of RS that shows Brcko belonging to RS. The meeting also took place with only RS flags present — no Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) state flags. Dodik was accompanied by a large entourage of more than ten people. And after the meeting Dodik emerged triumphant in the RS media, touting victory.
A longtime pro-Serb activist in Washington, Obrad Kesic, hit the nail on the head when he described the outcome of the Ashton/Lajcak visit. “The agreement reached in Banja Luka presents a great achievement for the RS. When I look at that agreement, I see three already recognizable results. Firstly, the High Representative has been completely excluded, not only from the process of negotiation, but from all future actions… Secondly, this is the first time the RS has been given legitimacy by the EU when it comes to one of the more important state issues… Thirdly, this presents affirmation of political and legal status of the RS, not only as a negotiator, but as a partner.”
The EU came away thinking that Dodik had committed to annulling the referendum conclusion by the end of this week. The EU also thought that Dodik would annul the RSNA conclusions shortly thereafter. In exchange the EU had committed to send enlargement commissioner Fuhle to Banja Luka to negotiate with RS over the state courts and prosecutors.
Within only hours of the Dodik/Ashton meeting, RSNA president Radojcic announced that he wouldn’t call a special RSNA session before the end of the month. Dodik hinted then that the RS would only delay the referendum and would wait until Fuhle arrived to see what those discussion produced. Only then would they consider annulling the referendum.
Today Dodik came out and made it official: no annulment of the referendum until they see what gifts Fuhle has to offer.
My own guess is that the RS objective is to begin a conversation with Fuhle that will enable RS to claim that it is applying the acquis communitaire on its own and doesn’t need the dysfunctional Sarajevo government to qualify for EU membership.
What should Brussels do? It should agree to schedule the Fuhle meeting only in Sarajevo with the BiH authorities present and only after annulment of the 24 conclusions and the referendum decision. Odds of that are very long.
PS: Lady Ashton and Hillary Clinton discussed Bosnia today in Washington. According to the State Department,
Mrs. Clinton “…raised concerns regarding the political deadlock in Bosnia and Herzegovina and any efforts that could undermine the Dayton Peace Accords and the stability of the country. We fully support the authority of the Office of the High Representative Inzko in Bosnia and Herzegovina and want to see the people there realize their hopes for necessary reforms, effective government, and a European future.”
Note the emphasis the Americans put on the the High Representative.
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Why no partition of Kosovo?
Tanjug, Belgrade’s government press agency, asked me this morning to comment on the possibility of dividing Kosovo. The reason for this question was a statement of Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic to media in Kosovo yesterday. Tanjug quoted him as saying that would be the only realistic and quick solution for both Serbia and Kosovo.
This was my reply:
There are two practical problems with the idea of dividing Kosovo: 1) if Serbia gets the North, Kosovo will want the Albanian-majority Presevo area of southern Serbia, which Serbia will not give up; 2) Belgrade and Pristina would have to find a way of guaranteeing that partition of Kosovo would not lead to partition of Bosnia or Macedonia. I don’t see how they would be able to give those guarantees.
As a matter of reciprocity, you can expect Pristina to ask for Albanians anything Belgrade gets for Serbs—Belgrade should be moderating its requests with this in mind. It is also important to note that there are few important Serb religious sites in the North—most of the important churches and monasteries would in any event remain south of the Ibar, along with most of the Serb population.
The international community has demonstrated repeatedly that it does not want to move boundaries to accommodate ethnic differences, even though it has been willing to change the status of various boundaries (from internal boundaries to international borders). This is at least in part because all the Balkans countries are expected to end up eventually in the European Union, where borders will disappear. Belgrade has the real possibility of entering the European Union well before Kosovo, but only if it gives up any claims to its neighbor’s territory.
An added thought for readers of this blog: why did I not appeal to the principle of multiethnicity? The short answer is that I don’t really think there is much multiethnicity to be had in Kosovo today. The Serb population is now likely under 10 per cent, even counting those who live north of the Ibar, and many of those are old and living in enclaves. It is my hope that a Kosovo that remains whole will welcome Serbs back in the future, whether as visitors to the many Serb monuments and religious sites or as residents. But it would be disingenuous to suggest that today Kosovo is truly a multiethnic society that must be preserved at all costs. Let’s hope it becomes one, something far more likely to happen if it is not divided.
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A really bad idea
I imagine in Brussels they are congratulating themselves today for Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik agreeing to postpone the referendum he was threatening, in exchange for “structured talks” with the European Union on the future of judicial institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Why is this a bad idea? Let me count the ways:
- Postponement leaves the threat of the referendum hanging, providing continued leverage to Dodik from a proposition that clearly violates letter and spirit of the Dayton agreements.
- Agreeing to discuss Bosnia’s judicial system with the RS undermines the authority of the prosecutors and judges at what Bosnians call the “state” level (national to Americans, but that means something else in Bosnia).
- Using the enlargement commissioner of the EU to conduct these talks could open the door to de facto negotiations on implementation of the EU’s acquis communitaire with the RS.
To make matters worse, the EU’s top foreign policy official, Catherine Ashton, is reported to have said, “We consider that any legitimate issues require an adequate response.” And to seal the EU’s groveling, she added, “We welcome your leadership, Mister President.”
Why wasn’t Dodik told to go discuss the issues he is raising with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo? Why wasn’t any EU discussion of judicial reform undertaken a the state level? Of course, that would have required that Dodik also be told to get on with government formation (it has been 7 months since elections under a caretaker government). EU use of its leverage to that end would have been a very good idea. Allowing Brussels to become an instrument of Dodik’s campaign to enhance the autonomy of RS and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Sarajevo government is a really bad idea.
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