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More in sadness than anger

I suppose I should resist the temptation to respond to International Crisis Group’s latest wrong-headedness. I’ve got friends at ICG and a great deal of respect for the fine work they have done in the past, and continue to do in many parts of the world. But that would disappoint my Balkan readers.  So here goes.

ICG’s account of what was agreed between Republika Srpska President Dodik and EU High Representative Ashton is not the same as what Dodik says was agreed.  ICG says Dodik agreed to cancel the referendum.  What he says he agreed is the following:

…we think that the referendum is not necessary for the time being. The conclusions present a political position of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska [RSNA], but they will be reconsidered in the light of this agreement on structural dialogue.

This sounds more like a postponement than a cancellation to me, and he confirmed that in public on May 17. The promised reconsideration of the RSNA conclusions falls far short of what Lady Ashton sought, which was their withdrawal. The RSNA is proceeding very slowly even on reconsideration.

ICG goes on to say that “The deal is hard to fit into Bosnia’s political narrative.” That is true only if you have not understood Bosnia’s political narrative, which is one in which RS is aiming to enhance its legitimacy and prestige while demonstrating the ineffectiveness and irrelevance of the state institutions in Sarajevo. This deal fits perfectly into that narrative, as it enabled Dodik as RS president to begin dealing directly with the EU on issues of importance to the state, including not only the referendum but also the future “structured dialogue” on the state’s judicial institutions. To add insult to injury from the perspective of the state institutions, that dialogue will be conducted by the EU’s enlargement commissioner beginning in Banja Luka. I don’t know whether state officials will be invited (nor am I sure it would be wise for them to attend if they are).

ICG then declares the EU and Bosnia the winners. I’ll defer to their better judgment on the EU, though to me it looks as if Ashton got a good deal less than half a loaf. I don’t see any win for Bosnia and Herzegovina here. No legally valid referendum was going to happen: the international community High Representative Valentin Inzko was going to invalidate the law under which it would have been called. Nor is the referendum question one that would stand up to judicial scrutiny anywhere but North Korea (and, of course, RS).

People are asking me how it is that ICG has gone so far off the tracks in Bosnia. I don’t know the answer to that question. But it seems to me the fundamental error of judgment they are making has to do with EU capability. ICG is happy with the Ashton/Dodik deal because it emarginated the High Representative, whom they view as an obstacle to Bosnia’s democratic development and progress toward EU membership. I am inclined to agree that it is time for the EU to take over in Bosnia, but I’d like to see better performance at handling the issues than what happened on this occasion.

Why no partition of Kosovo?

Tanjug, Belgrade’s government press agency, asked me this morning to comment on the possibility of dividing Kosovo.  The reason for this question was a statement of Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Ivica Dacic to media in Kosovo yesterday. Tanjug quoted him as saying that would be the only realistic and quick solution for both Serbia and Kosovo.

This was my reply:

There are two practical problems with the idea of dividing Kosovo:  1)  if Serbia gets the North, Kosovo will want the Albanian-majority Presevo area of southern Serbia, which Serbia will not give up; 2) Belgrade and Pristina would have to find a way of guaranteeing that partition of Kosovo would not lead to partition of Bosnia or Macedonia.  I don’t see how they would be able to give those guarantees.

As a matter of reciprocity, you can expect Pristina to ask for Albanians anything Belgrade gets for Serbs—Belgrade should be moderating its requests with this in mind.  It is also important to note that there are few important Serb religious sites in the North—most of the important churches and monasteries would in any event remain south of the Ibar, along with most of the Serb population.

The international community has demonstrated repeatedly that it does not want to move boundaries to accommodate ethnic differences, even though it has been willing to change the status of various boundaries (from internal boundaries to international borders).  This is at least in part because all the Balkans countries are expected to end up eventually in the European Union, where borders will disappear.  Belgrade has the real possibility of entering the European Union well before Kosovo, but only if it gives up any claims to its neighbor’s territory.

An added thought for readers of this blog:  why did I not appeal to the principle of multiethnicity?  The short answer is that I don’t really think there is much multiethnicity to be had in Kosovo today.  The Serb population is now likely under 10 per cent, even counting those who live north of the Ibar, and many of those are old and living in enclaves.  It is my hope that a Kosovo that remains whole will welcome Serbs back in the future, whether as visitors to the many Serb monuments and religious sites or as residents.  But it would be disingenuous to suggest that today Kosovo is truly a multiethnic society that must be preserved at all costs.  Let’s hope it becomes one, something far more likely to happen if it is not divided.

A really bad idea

I imagine in Brussels they are congratulating themselves today for Republika Srpska (RS) President Dodik agreeing to postpone the referendum he was threatening, in exchange for “structured talks” with the European Union on the future of judicial institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Why is this a bad idea?  Let me count the ways:

• Postponement leaves the threat of the referendum hanging, providing continued leverage to Dodik from a proposition that clearly violates letter and spirit of the Dayton agreements.
• Agreeing to discuss Bosnia’s judicial system with the RS undermines the authority of the prosecutors and judges at what Bosnians call the “state” level (national to Americans, but that means something else in Bosnia).
• Using the enlargement commissioner of the EU to conduct these talks could open the door to de facto negotiations on implementation of the EU’s acquis communitaire with the RS.

To make matters worse, the EU’s top foreign policy official, Catherine Ashton, is reported to have said, “We consider that any legitimate issues require an adequate response.”  And to seal the EU’s groveling, she added, “We welcome your leadership, Mister President.”

Why wasn’t Dodik told to go discuss the issues he is raising with the Bosnian government in Sarajevo?  Why wasn’t any EU discussion of judicial reform undertaken a the state level?  Of course, that would have required that Dodik also be told to get on with government formation (it has been 7 months since elections under a caretaker government).  EU use of its leverage to that end would have been a very good idea.  Allowing Brussels to become an instrument of Dodik’s campaign to enhance the autonomy of RS and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the Sarajevo government is a really bad idea.

Compare these

Here is an excerpt from Monday’s statement by Serbia at the UN Security Council debate on Bosnia:

We consider that the announced referendum of the citizens of Republika Srpska on the Court and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina has nothing to do with the territorial integrity of the country and is not in contravention of Dayton Peace Accords. Without any intention to interfere into the internal affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we consider that legislative initiative belongs only to competent assemblies formed by the legitimately elected representatives of citizens and that there are no powers on the basis of which it could be taken over by other governmental organs in Bosnia and Herzegovina or by the international presence.

Here is an excerpt from the statement by Croatia on the same occasion:

In this respect, we echo previous speakers who have expressed serious concern regarding the unilateral decision by Republika Srpska to hold a referendum on challenging the authority of state judicial institutions and rejecting the authority and past decisions of the High Representative. We believe this decision should be reversed, as it undermines the constitutional structure of the country and could undo the positive developments achieved since the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement. If the referendum moves forward, it may foster new tensions in the country and the region. Croatia underscores that all Parties should respect the Dayton Peace Agreement and acts of the High Representative taken with the approval of the Security Council acting under the authority of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

I was originally tempted to comment on this contrast, but I think I’ll leave it to readers to judge which one is sincere and which is disingenuous.

PS: A hint to non-Balkan watchers: the first statement would justify secession from the Union by South Carolina.

PPS:  For the record, the referendum question in the RS reads as follows:

Do you support the laws imposed by the High Representative of the International Community in BiH, especially those pertaining to the Court of BiH and BiH Prosecutor’s Office, as well as their unconstitutional verification in the BiH Parliamentary Assembly?

Take a guess as to which way those who wrote the question want you to vote!