Tag: Balkans
This is interesting
Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic is cited today as saying that Serbia has to find a solution for Kosovo before it can enter the EU, which might happen by 2015. This is not new, nor is it as promising as it sounds at first reading, because he adds:
Such compromise would guarantee economic and political autonomy of Kosovo, without jeopardizing Serbia’s territorial integrity….We cannot have a long-term peace if we support one nationalism against the other. It’s good to support the European kind of compromise which is not satisfactory but it is functional.
It is also said that he cited two precedents: Hong Kong and the two Germanies. Both of these are cases in which reintegration into a single sovereign state was the eventual result.
Anyone who follows Kosovo knows that autonomy within the context of even nominal Serbian sovereignty is no longer possible, if it ever was. Nor will reintegration happen, except in the context of EU membership for both Belgrade and Pristina. Belgrade cannot hope to govern Kosovo the way China today governs Hong Kong or Berlin governs East Germany. That’s a pipedream.
Djelic’s statements are nevertheless interesting, as they suggest that Belgrade is beginning to think seriously about what it has to do about Kosovo in order to get into the EU. This should be the vital question for Belgrade. It is also urgent, since the EU is unlikely to move quickly on an application for membership from a state that cannot define its own borders.
It should also be the vital question for Brussels, which so far has not spoken unequivocally about the need to resolve the Kosovo issue before Serbia can enter the EU. It is of course hard for Brussels to speak with one voice on this subject, as 22 of its member states have recognized Kosovo and 5 have not. Some of those 22 are sure to block Serbian membership so long as the Kosovo issue remains unresolved and have said as much publicly and privately. Getting an unequivocal statement out of the 27 would go a long way to clarifying the situation. You don’t need to have recognized Kosovo to know that EU membership for Serbia is impossible without resolving the Kosovo issue.
Washington will also have to be clear with Belgrade about the need to resolve Kosovo before Serbia can enter NATO. This is less urgent, as Serbia understandably shows few signs of really wanting NATO membership. But no one should be encouraging Belgrade to think that anything less than a full resolution of the Kosovo issue is vital to Serbia’s long-term relationship with the United States.
Pristina should take notice too. It would be perilous for Kosovo if Serbia were to enter the EU first, even if it has accepted Kosovo as a sovereign state. Belgrade would then have a veto on Pristina’s EU membership. The only reasonable solution to this problem is for Pristina to accelerate its own efforts at preparing for EU membership. It has done well to meet the EU technical requirements for the Schengen visa waiver, and I hope the EU will come to its senses and allow that to go forward. But there are many other areas in which Pristina is lagging. It needs to get its own house in order. Governing well is the best revenge.
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That was easy!
EU mediator Robert Cooper opened talks between Pristina and Belgrade Tuesday in Brussels, marking the launch of a dialogue process called for by the UN General Assembly last fall and likely to last many months if not years. Chief negotiators Borko Stefanovic and Edita Tahiri are eminently capable and qualified exponents of their respective sides and will be expected to try to keep the talks going despite shaky political situations in both capitals.
I’ve now heard several different versions of the agenda, with Stefanovic saying the first item was land registers, diplomatic sources saying it was supposed to be customs (an obviously sensitive issue for the Serbian side) and the Americans originally interested in establishing the authority of the Kosovo courts in northern Kosovo.
I’m not sure it matters much. Whatever works is okay for me. But I do think it will be difficult to keep the focus on practical issues without wandering off into status questions. If you don’t think land registers can be linked to status issues, guess again. Serbian government and Church land claims in Kosovo are extensive. The link of status to customs and courts is too obvious to mention.
This is one of those diplomatic dances that drives outsiders nuts. All the diplomats agree the talks are about practical issues, not status, but it is also perfectly clear that the eventual goal is to get to a situation in which Serbia can accept Kosovo as a sovereign state, one way or another. Membership in the UN might be sufficient, if formal diplomatic recognition proves too difficult.
Nothing less than that will get Serbia into the EU, and nothing less than that will satisfy Pristina and Washington either. We just don’t say it in polite company, because it will make life harder for those Belgrade who want to prioritize Serbia’s EU membership. But that symmetrical table, with the Pristina delegation on one side and the Belgrade delegation on the other, already presages the eventual outcome.
That is not to say there isn’t a lot of work to be done on practical issues, or that it won’t be useful to start with them. The potential agenda is long: land registers, customs, authority of the Pristina institutions in northern Kosovo, mutual recogntion of documents, return of artefacts, state property, citizenship, pensions, salary arrears, transportation and telecommunication links, police and border patrol cooperation…. Resolving at least some of these issues will improve relations between Pristina and Belgrade–which have been virtually non-existent since the 1999 NATO/Yugoslavia war.
I trained both Serbian foreign service officers and Kosovan officials for these talks years ago. I’m delighted to see that they are happening, and I wish both sides well in pursuing their legitimate interests. Success in these talks will help a good deal to move the Balkans closer to the EU. Failure is not an option. Best wishes to Edita and Borko!
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Refighting the Bosnian war
The arrest in Vienna on a Serbian warrant of the Bosnian general who led Sarajevo’s defense at the beginning of the Bosnian war in 1992 is the latest Belgrade effort to rewrite history. Jovan Divjak, an ethnic Serb, is accused of war crimes for an incident in May 1992. During the UN-negotiated evacuation of a Yugoslav National Army (JNA) general an his aides from Sarajevo, the UN-protected convoy, which without authorization from the Bosnian side carried soldiers, weapons and files, was attacked and 18 people killed.
The merits of the war crimes accusations have already been considered in London last year, in the case of Ejup Ganic. The British court found that the Serbian authorities had abused the judicial process and released Ganic, after months house detention.
But if you want to see for yourself Divjak’s role, get the documentary The Death of Yugoslavia (it’s available from Google Videos on line) and watch the general call for those firing on the convoy to stop. It’s in part 4. Start with Divjak at about minute 28, and watch the part about the detention by the JNA of Bosnian President Izetbegovic, which is essential background to the convoy incident at minute 44.
Why would Belgrade pursue this legal case now? Serbia’s current leadership is mainly focused on getting the country into the EU, but it is also determined to satisfy nationalist sentiment by establishing that Serbs were victims during the wars in Yugoslavia. I have no problem myself in acknowledging that: Serbs suffered not only during the war, but also thereafter under the continued autocracy of Slobodan Milosevic.
But it is past time–almost 20 years have gone by–for Serbs to adopt a version of history that is recognizable by their antagonists. Arresting Divjak is as much an abuse of judicial process as the arrest of Ejup Ganic and dishonors Serbia’s democracy.
PS: The thesis that Belgrade is refighting the Bosnian war is elaborated in more detail and with ample support in an RFE piece by Nenad Pejic. He writes
Standing behind all these cases are figures in Serbia’s security organs, police, and military who are backed by far-right political forces….Despite having all these cases dismissed one after another — and the case against Divjak will surely be dismissed as well — the rightists have achieved their goal. Serbian media covered all the arrests with patriotic jingoism, and ethnic tensions across the Balkans were inflamed. Divisions were deepened. Tolerance suffered another setback. The soil was prepared for future conflicts or partitions. And pro-Western forces in Serbia have been sent a strong message about the power of the far right. They are still fighting a war that has been lost.
PPS: I guess if the Austrian Foreign Minister thinks the extradition of Divjak is “unthinkable” that means it won’t happen. But the request is still an embarrassment to Serbia.
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“Bosnia and Herzegovina does not exist beyond the entities”
With gratitude for the translation, I have posted Milorad Dodik’s letter to the Ambassadors of the member countries of the EU and Peace Implementation Council in BiH, in which among many other things he claims that “Bosnia and Herzegovina does not exist beyond the entities.”
The letter has been carefully prepared by Dodik’s lawyers and merits being read in its entirety. Not being a lawyer, I would not want to get into a tussle on the legal issues it raises.
But it is also a political document, one intended to appeal particularly to Americans, whose constitution is cited repeatedly as justification for Dodik’s views.
What are those views? In short, that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina never existed (“The only thing true is that the „Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina“ did never exist at all in accordance with the international law”), that Republika Srpska and the Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosna were the only legitimate institutions in Bosnia before Dayton (i.e. the Bosniaks who were loyal to the Republic don’t count), that the High Representative is an anti-democratic institution imposed on unwilling subjects, and that the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina that emerged from Dayton is nothing more than the two entities, supplemented later by Brcko district, and can have no functions other than those explicitly assigned to it in the Dayton constitution, or delegated to it by the entities. Not once are the requirements of NATO or EU membership mentioned.
I won’t quarrel with this letter point by point–I’ll leave that to others. I’ll just note that the history is dramatically incorrect and even offensive, as the letter is addressed to the representatives of states that had recognized the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite the genocidal efforts of Republika Srpska and its Belgrade master to wipe it off the map.
More importantly for the future, Dodik’s views are not compatible with a functioning Bosnia and Herzegovina that can meet the obligations of NATO and European Union membership. For anyone who still believes Dodik can be cajoled into supporting such a state, I recommend reading the whole thing. There is no way.
What Dodik is committed to here (and elsewhere) is the creation of a Republika Srpska that is sovereign in everything but recognition, which he no doubt believes will follow some day when the internationals tire further and finally accept his version of Bosnian history. He is also committed to grabbing enough state property to keep his ship afloat for a few more years, as it is in parlous financial condition.
The question is whether Washington and Brussels will read, understand and react in ways that make it clear that the only Bosnia and Herzegovina they are prepared to accept is one that can negotiate membership in NATO and the EU. That state will need to go beyond Dayton. The next test for Dodik is whether he is prepared to create a Sarajevo government that has all the powers it requires to take on the responsibilities of NATO and EU membership. I’m not holding my breath.
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Good news for Kosovo, but tough talks ahead
I count as good news both the formation of the second Hashim Thaci government in Kosovo as well as the conviction of Serbia’s former assistant Interior Minister of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Hague Tribunal.
Of course the story is more complicated than that. Thaci still faces accusations, but little evidence and no indictment, for serious crimes associated with organ trafficking that allegedly occurred in the aftermath of the NATO/Yugoslavia war more than a decade ago. His choice of Behgjet Pacolli as President of Kosovo, essential to gaining a majority in parliament, has also raised questions, as Pacolli’s construction business prospered doing work in Russia, which has opposed Kosovo’s independence. He was Both Pacolli and Thaci gained their positions with razor thin majorities.
Whatever the allegations and the size of their majority, their elections, and the appointment of a Serb as deputy prime minister, demonstrate that Kosovo’s institutions are functioning, if occasionally with difficulty. The need to repeat December’s elections in several municipalities showed both the challenges governance faces in Pristina and the capacity of its institutions to correct mistakes.
That said, Thaci and Pacolli have a difficult road ahead. Declaring yourself ready for talks with Belgrade and preparing for them seriously are two different things. Will they go to talks with Belgrade as a government with a razor-thin majority? Or will Pristina form a broader negotiating team, as it did for the Ahtisaari negotiations? The naming of the talented and tough-minded Edita Tahiri to lead the Kosovo team bodes well.
I hear the Europeans will focus in the first instance on customs on the Serbia/Kosovo border (boundary to the Serbs). This is an issue with virtues: there could be real benefits to the Kosovo, if Serbia agrees to accept its products. In addition, cooperation on customs implies some level of recognition that the authorities you are dealing with are properly constituted and have at least some sovereign attributes. There could also be some real benefits to Serbia, if smuggling comes under better control and if the European Union is willing to count the outcome of the dialogue as sufficient to allow Serbia to proceed to candidacy status.
But if the EU is going to go that far, Pristina will need to be certain that Serbia cannot become an EU member without accepting and recognizing Kosovo as a sovereign state. Several EU members have now said as much, but agreement on that position at 27 is difficult because of the five EU members that have not recognized Kosovo. Pristina is going to need some real statecraft to ensure that EU interest in accelerating Serbia’s membership does not come at Kosovo’s expense.
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Bosnia anyone?
Yes, there were quite a few of you out there interested in Macedonoia, and then the piece about Bill Montgomery piece about Bill Montgomery grabbed a lot of you interested in Serbia. What about Bosnia? My latest is here. It is a response to a piece by Ted Galen Carpenter advocating partition.
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