Tag: Balkans
The Senate takes a bite at the Balkans
Here are the notes I took during today’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the Balkans. I’ll have more to say later today on what I think of what I heard:
Senator Menendez (D-NJ) knows what is going on. He said in his introduction to today’s Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing that a two-faced Belgrade is too close to Moscow. He added that the US is bringing too much pressure to bear on friends in Pristina and not enough on Belgrade. Senator Risch (R-ID) was not far behind, focusing (among other things) on regional energy and cybersecurity issues.
Europe whole and free
State Department Counselor Chollet treated the Balkans as a missing piece of the “Europe whole and free” puzzle the Administration seeks to solve. The February and March normalization “agreements” between Belgrade and Pristina he treated as a breakthrough. He acknowledged Kosovo as a good friend and Serbia as a problematic. He sought to reinforce support for Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, Montenegro’s progress on rule of law, and Macedonia and Albania’s movement towards EU membership.
State Deputy Assistant Secretary Gabriel Escobar claimed the recent normalization agreements are being implemented. He pledged to deter Milorad Dodik’s movement toward secession. He pushed on EU accession for Montenegro, Albania, and North Macedonia, including a constitutional change in Skopje recognizing the Bulgarian minority.
Ethnonationalism
Questioned about corruption in Serbia, Chollet claimed the US is dealing with it. Pressed on Vucic’s refusal to sign the normalization agreement or to implement it, he retreated to bothsidism. Escobar claimed the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities would have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution and would provide advantages to Kosovo in its relations with its Serb population.
Menendez urged that the US engage with the EU nonrecognizers, eliciting suggestions from Chollet and Escobar that progress on normalization would help. On minority rights in Serbia, Escobar made the usual noises about being concerned for all but made no commitment to seek conditions for them equivalent to what the Serbs are seeking in Kosovo.
Risch asked about US relations with the different ethnic groups in Bosnia. Chollet underlined US support for Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and expessed dismay at talk about secession. He promised to impose consequences on those who are corrupt or undermine the Dayton accords. Senator Ben Cardin (D-MD) asked about the HiRep’s imposition of changed rules after the election. Escobar claimed those changes had allowed formation of the Federation government with objections from “one ethnonationalist” party.
China and Russia
Senator Ricketts (R-NE) asked about growing Chinese influence, especially in Serbia. Escobar bemoaned the easy availability of Chinese financing. He suggested the Committee and its members might be helpful by visiting and talking with people in the Balkans. He also asked about Montenegro and got a strong endorsement of newly elected President Milatovic, whose inauguration Escobar will attend.
Senator Shaheen (D-NH) asked about the EUFOR mandate for peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Chollet averred that the UN Security Council will act to renew it without too much difficulty. Escobar and Chollet pledged vigorous use of sanctions against corrupt individuals. They also thought repeating to Vucic and Kurti that they need to move forward will help.
Narcotrafficking and back to ASMM
Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA) asked about Albanian narcotrafficking. Escobar said it is a difficult challenge. He agreed that Open Balkans has potential to help and said the US supports initiatives that are open to all of the Balkan states on an equal basis. Chollet referred to the problem of trucks spending “80% of their time” at borders.
Senator Chris Murphy (D-VA) shared Menendez’s worries about Serbia not fulfilling commitments but added that Kosovo has not been much better. The ASMM he thought is not entirely new. It could help Kosovo integrate its Serb population and be less reliant on Belgrade. Chollet said the US will not support anything like a Republika Srpska. Murphy noted we are asking North Macedonia to change its constitution but not Kosovo.
Ethnonationalism redux
Senator Van Hollen (D-MD) asked about Bosnia’s constitution. Escobar thinks the EU is pushing for a more civic Bosnia and some constitutional change will be needed. He thought the formation of the Federation and state governments would lead in that direction but the path would be a rocky one.
Menendez worried about reinforcement of ethnonationalism in Bosnia by the HiRep’s decisions. Escobar suggested that Venice Commission and EU recommendations are up for discussion. But he also thought corruption was part of the problem.
Back to Russia, China, and Open Balkans
Menendez also worried about Serbia’s lack of interest in the EU and what the US can do to stop its drift towards Russia and China. Chollet claimed that is what the US has been doing, but energy, Kosovo, and corruption present obstacles. Serbia has not aligned on sanctions but has been helpful on humanitarian and other issues, including UN resolutions.
Menendez finally worried about Open Balkans and sanctions evasion in Serbia. Escobar claimed sanctions evasion is not a problem in the region and that Open Balkans is complementary to other pro-Europe initiatives. It must be open to all as full members or the US won’t support it.
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Bilateral isn’t working, so…
Yesterday Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti failed to reach any further agreement at their umpteenth meeting of the EU-sponsored Belgrade/Pristina dialogue in Brussels. The two leaders merely reiterated a longstanding pledge to deal with the outstanding issue of missing persons from the 1998/99 Serbian repression and Kosovo rebellion. The best that can be hoped is that they will now fulfill that pledge.
Prime Minister Kurti explicitly rejected a Serbian government proposal to create an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) inside Kosovo. Suzana Starikov (@Intetyst) reports that he called it:
fundamentally incompatible w/Constitution, w/democratic & European values, w/human & minority rights according to European standards
https://twitter.com/Intetyst/status/1653506908421070852/photo/1
That is a thoroughgoing repudiation. Petrit Selimi reports:
The statute of Association proposed by the Management Team led by a Serbian MP doesn’t pass, what one diplomat called a “laughability test”. Belgrade wants ASM to “execute laws”, “organize referendums”, “establish institutions & agencies”. It’s a non-starter in 90% of content.
https://twitter.com/Petrit/status/1653683292661579777/photo/1
Kosovo seems not to have put forward its own proposal, despite many urgings to do so.
The bilateral approach just isn’t working
The EU is warning about possible violence due to this stalemate. That is realistic. Belgrade has several times in the past year or so precipitated violence in Serb-majority northern Kosovo. Serbia is trying its best to demonstrate that Kosovo cannot govern there and to get the Americans and Europeans to convince Pristina to let Belgrade do it through the ASM. Kurti isn’t buying, not only because he wants to protect Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but also because Serbia, the US and the EU are offering him little in exchange.
The plain fact is that the “bilateral” Kosovo/Serbia dialogue isn’t working. It is tempting to say no one is to blame, but it would be more accurate to say they all are. The Europeans have failed to make accession attractive. The Americans have simply shifted to appeasing Belgrade and beating on Pristina. Belgrade isn’t really interested in anything but maintaining de facto authority over Serbs in Kosovo. Pristina is demanding apologies and recognition from Serbia that they know Belgrade won’t provide. It’s what the US military terms a goat rope, or more expressively FUBAR. Or the conflict management nerds would say there is no ZOPA (zone of possible agreement).
Try something else
There are other options. The multilateral approach–involving all six of the non-EU members of the Western Balkans–has been far more successful. The so-called Berlin process last year produced highly popular agreements on mutual recognition of identity cards, university diplomas and professional qualifications. Both Serbia and Kosovo have ratified these agreements, though of course it remains to be seen whether and how they implement them. These latest agreements come on top of the commitment to a Common Regional Market (CRM), which aims to free up movement of goods, services, people, and capital in preparation for EU accession. The CRM also envisages regional investment, digital, and industrial and innovation areas.
It would be reasonable to hope that success multilaterally would focus minds. It did. Serbia has proposed Open Balkans, a regional scheme without the EU mediation it intends to dominate, along with Albania. That isn’t going far. Serbia won’t invite Kosovo on an equal basis with the others participating, so Kosovo won’t even consider joining. Montenegro is thinking about it. And the Bosnians as usual can’t agree one way or the other. Without the Europeans in the mix, it is hard to get the Balkanites to do much, especially when they are rightly suspicious of the organizers’ intentions. In any event, much of what Open Balkans might do is already included in the Berlin process.
Time to move the show
Kosovo and Serbia are simply not ready to do for each other what each needs to improve relations. Serbia has turned eastward internationally and less democratic domestically. Its state-influenced press whips up anti-Albanian fervor on a daily basis. There is zero likelihood of an apology for the 1990s repression. Kosovo is pretty much united in rejecting any new infringements on its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Its constitution already provides guaranteed seats in parliament for Serbs as well as a large measure of self-governance for municipalities.
No “final” agreement is anywhere on the horizon. That is what the bilateral dialogue was supposed to produce. So it is time to move the Serbia/Kosovo show to where it might be more productive. The Berlin process is the right place. Embedded in a multilateral context in which Berlin plays an important role, Kurti and Vucic might both play nicer.
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The Balkans are coming apart
I’ve been too committed to book-writing to comment much lately, but the deteriorating situation in the Balkans prompts this post.
Bosnia faces the risk of secession
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Serb member of the state presidency, Milorad Dodik, is reiterating his intention to declare independence. He nominally seeks incorporation into Serbia. His current issue is that the state judiciary won’t allow him to expropriate public land in Republika Srpska (RS), which he needs as collateral for the loans he will be refinancing from Russia and other dubious sources this summer.
But that contingency should not distract from the main objective. Dodik has long aimed to be free of the scrutiny that comes from both the state and the international community. His theft of RS resources and abuse of the funds Russia supplies make him vulnerable to prosecution. Dodik needs to free himself from Bosnia and find a home where he won’t risk arrest. It is unlikely Serbia will open its doors, as that would offend Brussels and Washington too much. But Dodik will be content with an independent RS.
Kosovo does too
In Kosovo, the situation has gone from bad to worse. Serbian President Vucic has demonstrated in two ways that he controls the Serbs who live north of the Ibar River. First, Sunday’s elections were peaceful. That could not have happened without his orders. Take it as confirmation that Belgrade ordered all the rioting there in the past. Second, the overwhelming majority of Serbs did not vote. Vucic ordered that too. Those citizens who did vote elected four Albanians as mayors in Serb-majority municipalities. Vucic and his prime minister reacted with the fury of ethnic nationalists offended that the minority decided the outcome, because of the boycott they ordered.
I wouldn’t want to be one of those mayors. They will get little or no cooperation from either local Serb officials or the majority populations. Vucic’s fury is intended to hide the fact that he will continue to de facto govern the four northern Serb-majority municipalities from Belgrade, using its network of security agents and organized criminals. Pristina will have a hard time getting anything done there.
Montenegro has already fallen
Vucic has already captured Montenegro. He has used savvy hybrid means with Russian support to elect a new president. Jakov Milatovic claims to be pro-EU but is more than affectionate towards Serbia. The Serbian Church, pro-Serbian political parties, and populist mobilization against corruption combined to chase from office Milo Djukanovic. He had held power for most of the last three decades, governing with ethnic minority group support. Upcoming June 11 parliamentary elections will give Milatovic a deeply pro-Serb, anti-minority majority in parliament.
Montenegro is a NATO member. Serbia claims militarily “neutral” status. This should be enough to prevent any annexation, but it also weakens the Alliance, inserting in its midst another spoiler like Hungary.
No accident
It is no accident that parallel efforts at removing Serbs from non-Serb governing authority are occurring in three countries. President Vucic is pursuing the “Serbian world,” that is a state for all Serbs that incorporates territory that lies in neighboring countries. This is “Greater Serbia,” Milosevic’s goal, by another name. In Bosnia, he needs only allow Dodik to do his thing. In Kosovo, he is taking advantage of Prime Minister Kurti’s reluctance to begin negotiations on a “self-management” mechanism for the Serbs in Kosovo. In Montenegro, elections have delivered what Vucic wanted.
While the Americans and Europeans continue to avow that Serbia is embracing the West, in fact Vucic has turned his country definitively to the East. For the “Serbian world” to become a reality, Belgrade needs to hope Russia will win in Ukraine. That would provide the precedent Vucic needs for annexing parts of Kosovo and Bosnia. He will also need China to provide the financing Greater Serbia will require. Montenegro he needn’t annex–just remarry to recreate the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, which existed 2003-06. Or cohabitate with lots of bilateral agreements an inch short of amalgamation.
The weak-kneed Americans and Europeans
Vucic knows the Americans and Europeans won’t want to accept de jure a Greater Serbia. But he hopes they will learn to live with a de facto one. They in turn are proving soft. Washington has been trying to ignore Dodik and mollify Vucic. American diplomats vigorously advocate for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities he sees as the vehicle for Serb “self-management.” The Americans have also revivified military cooperation and provided lots of financing through multilateral European development banks. Complaints about corruption in Serbia are few and far between. This appeasement has gotten no positive results.
Splits handicap the Europeans. Hungarian Prime Minister Orban acts as a protector for both Vucic and Dodik, preventing sanctions against both. France and the Netherlands have slowed enlargement prospects for Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia. That diminishes the EU’s appeal also in Serbia and Montenegro. The five EU member states that have not recognized Kosovo prevent a real consensus in its favor, even in the relatively non-controversial vote this week at the Council of Europe to Pristina’s membership process.
A change of direction is needed
The US and EU are failing in the Balkans. They need to change direction. Their basic analysis is flawed. They have been relying on Serbia as the pivotal state in the region to bring stability, in cooperation with Croatia and Albania. But Serbia is a revisionist power. It wants to govern all Serbs in the region. Croatia and Albania have lesser ambitions, but in the same direction: to control their compatriots in neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo.
Washington and Brussels need a far more vigorous, united, and principled approach. That would support the rights of individual citizens, whatever their ethnicity. It would counter ethnic nationalism wherever it abuses minorities. It would reinforce the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the region’s states. And it would welcome to the West only those who demonstrate real solidarity with the West.
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The Hague goes astray
I did this interview yesterday for for Sokol Berisha of Periskopi:
The rial against the former leaders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)- Hashim Thaçi, Kadri Veseli, Jakup Krasniqi and Rexhep Selimi – who the Office of Specia Prosecutor claims to have committed war crimes, has begun this Monday in the Special Court of Hague.
Q: If the KLA leaders are found guilty and sentenced to prison, do you think that this will damage the image of Kosovo internationally? How do you see this process?
A: It would certainly damage the image of the KLA, but it seems to me the Kosovo state has some things to its credit: creation of the Tribunal, the resignation of the Head of State, and his appearance with his colleagues in The Hague.
Q: Many have said that this process is not against KLA itself, but its leaders. In your opinion, can KLA and its leaders be distinguished?
A: Yes, they can be distinguished, but the Court’s indictment doesn’t do that.
Q: The US president, Joe Biden, has called the former president of Kosovo, Hashim Thaçi, “The George Washington of Kosovo,” and on the other hand, NATO’s intervention in the conflict on the side of the KLA and against the forces of Slobodan Milosevic seemed as a strong proof that KLA and its leaders were in their right to protect the people of Kosovo. Is this discourse now in danger?
A: Yes, it is in danger because the accusations are so wide-ranging.
Q: The report of Dick Marty was crucial in establishing The Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutor’s Office in Hague. Now that this report is no longer discussed, do you think that the whole process has changed its aim?
A: I do. The mandate of the Chambers is limited to issues in that report. But very little of what is in the report is in the accusations against the KLA leaders.
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Trump isn’t the only accused president
While the United States is understandably obsessed with judicial proceedings against Donald Trump, another president and his one-time comrades in arms is on trial in The Hague: Kosovo President Hashim Thaci. There is one common thread: Jack Smith was the prosecutor in The Hague before taking up his position in Washington to conduct investigations and possibly prosecute Trump. An expansive view of his mandate seems to be his trademark.
As the trial at the Specialist Chambers in The Hague started on Monday, Deutsche Welle‘s Elona Elezi asked some questions and I responded:
Q: Mr.Serwer, how do you consider the trial against Thaçi and other three former commanders of KLA?
A: The Specialist Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor’s Office “have jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under Kosovo law in relation to allegations reported in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Report of 7 January 2011.” I am not a lawyer, but in my layman’s way of thinking the trial has departed markedly from this mandate. It seems to have forgotten the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly report.
Q: Does it diminish the role of Kosovo Liberation Army?
A: I’d say it exaggerates the role of the KLA in the abuses committed in Kosovo. The main allegations in the Council of Europe report appear to be unfounded and have been left out of the charges against the accused. The prosecutor is pursuing other, less specific, allegations against the KLA leadership quite unrelated to the CoE report.
Q: Will there be any implications if the court finds them guilty?
A: Certainly there will implications for the accused. They will be punished. But it will be a long time before there is a verdict. Their pre-trial detention seems to me unjust.
Q: In a macro perspective, does this trial affect the relationships between Kosovo and Serbia?
A: The trial is already exacerbating resentments in Kosovo, soothing consciences in Serbia, and making it harder for Pristina to normalize relations with Belgrade. That will get worse.
It was a mistake for Kosovo to agree to establish this court without a reciprocal arrangement with Serbia, that is a court with jurisdiction over “crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes” inside Serbia, where three American brothers were killed shortly after the 1999 war. Serbia was the main miscreant in the 1990s. The one-sided nature of the Specialist Chambers and Prosecutor’s Office prevents it from doing justice to the crimes Belgrade committed.
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Montenegro begins a test that won’t be easy
Last time I talked with Montenegrin President Djukanovic, maybe 7 or 8 years ago, I told him he lacked only one thing: a pro-European opposition that could alternate with his own coalition in power. Yesterday’s election will determine whether Montenegro has in the interim acquired it. A recently elected candidate for mayor of Podgorica, Jakov Milatovic, won with 60% of the vote, defeating Djukanovic after he had dominated politics in Montenegro for more than a generation.
There are serious doubts
Milatovic leads a party with the right name, “Europe Now!,” and the right professional career. He has been Economy Minister, after a stint in various private banks as well as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He holds an Oxford MPhil in economics and has spent time in the US and Austria as well.
But there is good reason for doubt. Milatovic’s supporters include the pro-Russian and pro-Serbian segment of Montenegrin politics. Many opposed independence and NATO membership. Some celebrated with Serbian flags, not Montenegrin ones. Those are Serb ethnic nationalists and resent Montenegro’s minorities, who have long supported Djukanovic. Even if Milatovic is seriously pro-Europe, it is not clear whether that will be the direction he can lead the country in.
Parliamentary elections are scheduled for June 11. The outcome will likely determine whether Europe Now can deliver. Dritan Abazovic, the current caretaker prime minister, is hoping to lead a centrist coalition thereafter. But Abazovic himself has been beholden to the pro-Serbian political parties in the past. He signed an agreement that privileged the Serbian Orthodox Church and has cozied up to Belgrade, while offering himself to Washington and Brussels as a sincere, Western-oriented reformist.
Keep the pressure on
Montenegro was until recently the Balkans front-runner for EU accession. Now Western pressure and incentives will be vital to ensuring a pro-European outcome. The Serb nationalist minority in Montenegrin politics is large and well-funded. The Russians will try to use it to destabilize NATO and poison the relationship with the EU. The all too necessary corruption investigations will cast doubt on many in the former governing coalition and damage its prospects.
Alternation in power is the ultimate test of any democracy. Montenegro has so far passed, ironically due to Djukanovic. He managed the transitional governments of the past two years skillfully. Now that Djukanovic will be out of the picture, Milatovic should aim to do as well, while keeping the country moving in the European direction. It won’t be easy.
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