Last Wednesday I published a popular piece on Ugly Diplomacy in the Balkans. The “hook” of the piece was a recent agreement to create liaison positions for Serbian diplomats in the State Department. I was critical of that decision because I assumed that Kosovo diplomats had not yet been offered the same opportunity. I was wrong.
Mea culpa
I have been informed that a Kosovo diplomat has been working in the State Department since early 2022. A second started working there in January 2023. That information is available in tweets from Embassy Pristina that I had missed. I welcome this news and hasten to acknowledge my incorrect assumption.
One of the Kosovars is working in Educational and Cultural Affairs. I haven’t had an answer to my inquiry about the other or the Serbs.
The Secretary of State is tweeting nonsense
None of that changes my view of the the current diplomacy pursued at State vis-a-vis Serbia. The State Department is anteing up goodies for Belgrade well before it has done what we would like on Ukraine and many other issues. I know of no backing for this tweet from Secretary Blinken:
Had a productive conversation with Serbian President @AVucic today at the @MunSecConf. We discussed the importance of normalized relations with Kosovo and I conveyed our appreciation for Serbia’s continued support for Ukraine. We share Serbia’s desire for a future with the EU.
This is nonsense. President Vucic, who has aligned himself increasingly with Moscow and Beijing, so far as I am aware has done little or nothing in the West’s favor on Ukraine, other than vote for a couple of helpuful but toothless UN General Assembly resolutions. He hasn’t done a whole lot on normalization with Kosovo or EU accession either.
The Americans don’t care
But the Americans don’t care. Witness Washington’s full-throated support for Serbia’s Open Balkans initiative and its much-vaunted proposal for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo. Many in the region perceive both these propositions as threats to the territorial integrity of neighbors.
Washington support for Belgrade contrasts sharply with the pressure Washington is bringing to bear on our friends in Pristina, who aren’t getting nice photo ops with the Secretary or full-throated praise for their successful anti-corruption efforts or their acceptance of the French-German proposal on normalization as a basis for negotiations.
Ugly is still ugly
So yes, I was wrong in my assumption about Kosovo diplomats inside the State Department. They are already there. But it is still ugly diplomacy when you reward people who refuse to do what you want and pressure your friends. I know it is easier to twist the arm of your friend than your adversary, but it is still ugly.
Today’s Serbia National Day message from the State Department includes this tidbit:
I am pleased our two countries recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create liaison positions for Serbian diplomats within the U.S. Department of State. This unique program will not only foster a better understanding of our respective foreign policy goals and objectives but will forge new channels of communication and build lasting partnerships.
This comes after avowal of support for Serbia’s EU ambitions and the umpteenth plea for Serbia to support Ukraine.
Where this leads
Serbia is not an allied country. It is not a member of NATO or a major non-NATO ally and has a policy of military neutrality. It has not joined the Western sanctions against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. In fact, Belgrade is largely out of alignment with EU foreign policies it has promised to respect.
But the State Department has decided it can “win over” Belgrade. It is doing so by providing goodies up front. State is supporting Belgrade’s “Open Balkans” initiative, which aims at removing border barriers between Serbia and Serb populations in neighboring countries. State is also supporting Belgrade’s proposal to separate governance of the Serb-majority population of Kosovo from Pristina’s authority through creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
That will create another de facto “Republika Srpska.” Bosnia’s Republika Srpska is now preparing to refuse the authority of Sarajevo’s courts. We can expect the same in Kosovo, if the Association is formed with the executive powers Belgrade seeks.
Ugly diplomacy
There is, sadly, more to the illogic of what the Americans are doing. Washington says it is supporting the EU-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. That aims at “normalization” of their relations. Having Serbian foreign service officers in the State Department while the dialogue proceeds will arouse understandable suspicions in Kosovo.
Such liaison officers learn a great deal about the inner workings of US diplomacy. Even if assigned to roles far from the European Bureau, the signal Washington is sending is clear: we favor Serbia’s perspective in the dialogue. The only way to make this move palatable is to offer the same to Kosovo in two days time, when it is Kosovo national day.
The heavy lean of the Americans toward Belgrade is ugly diplomacy. It favors the less friendly party while making the more friendly party uncomfortable. Washington expects its favors to Belgrade returned in some indefinite future, while demanding Pristina agree to Open Balkans and the Association right now. It won’t be hard for Belgrade to agree to “normalization” that includes validation of Serbia’s authority over the Kosovo Serb population. Once that is done, Serbia will expect the analog in Bosnia and Montenegro.
What Washington isn’t doing is delivering what Kosovo wants: Serbian recognition and membership in the United Nations. “Normalization” could come to mean international recognition for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities but not for Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is hard to imagine a worse outcome for Pristina.
Alma Baxhaku of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: PM Kurti presented six conditions for establishing the Association of Serbian Majority of Municipalities yesterday. How do you comment on this move? A: I think it is helpful for the Prime Minister to have stated clearly what his conditions are. That is far better than simply rejecting the Association.
Q: Do you think Kurti finally is responding positively to Western pressure or these conditions are a new obstacle to establishing ASMM and achieving an agreement based on the Franco-German plan? A: This is a positive response, but some of the conditions will clearly represent obstacles to an agreement. Negotiations should focus on those.
Q: One of the conditions set by PM Kurti is that the Association will enter into force after mutual recognition. Opposition parties suggest that he’s deceiving opinion and that by this he’s referring to the Franco-German plan which doesn’t contain mutual recognition. How do you see this? A: You have to ask the Prime Minister to clarify this point. Unfortunately, we don’t have an official version of the plan, so it is difficult to comment. But I agree with the Prime Minister that the Association will look different to Pristina in the context of recognition.
Q: Do you think Serbia will accept an Association that is in accordance with the Kosovo Constitution and has no executive and legislative powers? A: I don’t know. That is clearly not the kind of Association Belgrade has in mind. So you’ll have to ask President Vucic.
Q: And the final question, do you think that Kosovo should change its Constitution to accommodate Association and Franko- German if the parties reach an agreement? A: I don’t yet see any reason for changes in the Kosovo constitution, which can accommodate an Association that accords with the Constitutional Court decision. Certainly there should be no changes in the Kosovo constitution without changes in the Serbian constitution.
PS: I understand some media in Kosovo have portrayed me as opposed to the Association. I am certainly opposed to it becoming a Republika Srpska inside Kosovo and think there is a serious risk, as that is what Belgrade wants. The Americans have promised that it won’t be allowed to become a de facto Republika Srpska, so I expect them to act as guarantors of any agreement on the Association. It is clear that only with recognition will the Kosovars feel comfortable with an Association that meets all the requirements of their Constitutional Court. Anything less leaves the door open to shenanigans.
The US and EU are exterting a lot of pressure on Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti to agree to create an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in negotiations with Serbian President Vucic. Kurti has set six conditions:
1. The association must be by the Constitution and laws in force in the Republic of Kosovo.
2. The association cannot be monoethnic, must change its name, cannot have/carry any public (or executive) power, and must only serve the horizontal cooperation of municipalities according to the Constitution and the law on local self-government (Chapter 5).
3. The association is part of the final agreement and is implemented after mutual recognition. And, in connection with the latter, only after Serbia accepts the principles of the UN Charter in its interstate relations with the Republic of Kosovo.
4. Before the establishment of the Association, the illegal structures of Serbia in the north of Kosovo are extinguished and all illegal weapons are handed over.
5. The rights of national minorities and the relevant protective mechanisms should strengthen the principle of reciprocity between the two respective states, as well as take into account European standards and models.
6. The President of Serbia withdraws the letters sent to five (and other) EU member states for not accepting the application of the Republic of Kosovo for EU membership (which also represents a violation of the same Thaçi-Dacic agreement of 19 April 2013).
One by one
These conditions are a step forward, even if they fall short of the Pristina proposal for the association that I have suggested. Let’s examine the conditions one by one.
The requirement that any association conform to the Kosovo constitution is now well-establshed. As for Kosovo’s laws, I am not certain what conforming to them would entail. In any event, laws can be changed, if mutual interest requires it.
Here too there is some consensus that the association should not be monoethnic. There are non-Serbs who live in Serb-majority municipalities. Municipalities in Kosovo have subsantial powers that in theory might be pooled through horizontal cooperation. But the powers should remain with the individual munipalities. I understand why the Prime Minister might like for the association to have a different name, but a rose by any other name smells just as sweet (or sour).
This is a vital point. The association will pose a far lesser threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity if it is implemented after Serbia has accepted that sovereignty and territorial integrity. I have no reason to believe that Serbia has accepted this point.
Yes, creation of the association should be the occasion for disbanding all illegal structures and armed groups that Belgrade supports inside Kosovo. This should include all employees of the Serbian security services. All activities of Serbia inside Kosovo should become transparent and accountable.
Yes again. Whatever Serbs get inside Kosovo Belgrade should offer inside Serbia to Albanian-majority municipalities. Reciprocity is the rule between states. Serbia has not accepted this point, to my knowledge.
Serbia’s efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the EU, will have to cease once an agreement is reached. Without this, there is no normalization.
Overall
I have no reason to believe that Belgrade is seriously considering meeting several of these conditions. Whether it does so will depend on pressures from Washington and Brussels. So far, the pressure on Belgrade has been sporadic and inconsistent. The Americans and Europeans fear pushing Serbia further into the philo-Russian, pro-China camp. The pressure on Pristina is high and unrelenting. I call it diplomatic bullying, undertaken because Kosovo has no alternative but to look West. Now that Prime Minister Kurti has met the Americans partway, I hope they will forget some of their resentments of his past. Most of his six conditions are eminently reasonable, though I would add a seventh: the US and EU should act as guarantors of any agreement, ensuring its good-faith implementation.
The problem is that Brussels and Washington are unlikely to be able to convince President Vucic to accept even the most reasonable of Kurti’s conditions. Vucic has intentionally stoked his nationalist opposition with a daily media diet of accusations and vituperation against Kosovo Albanians. He faces no serious threat from Serbia’s relatively small liberal democratic opposition. Nor does he see much upside to resolving the conflict with Kosovo. Serbia would then need to institute serious reforms in order to prepare itself for EU accession. Some of those reforms would pose political and judicial risks to Vucic’s hold on power.
I continue to hope I am wrong. But a decent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia still seems far off.
State Department Counselor Chollet and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar have published a strong appeal for Kosovo to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) it committed to in 2013. The piece is intended to pressure Prime Minister Kurti to drop his opposition to the ASM, which he has been willing to consider only in the context of Belgrade’s recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kosovo state.
Serbia has refused to do that. The Chollet-Escobar appeal is consequently one-sided. It offers nothing at all to Pristina in exchange for satisfying one of Belgrade’s primary negotiating objectives. It essentially says “America is your best friend, you owe us this because of all the support we’ve given you, your government in the past pomised it, we’ll make it come out all right.” This is diplomatic bullying. Similar moments in the past have led to disappointments for Kosovo.
The Americans are offering lemons. Is there a way for Kosovo to make lemonade?
What is Serbia after?
What President Vucic seeks is official blessing for its hegemonic control of the Serb population in Kosovo. That control already exists, especially in the four northern municipalities contiguous with Serbia. Belgrade has for two decades controled their governments, education and health systems, police and courts. Money flows directly from Belgrade into these institutions and their employees. Little happens in the northern Serb communities that Belgrade could not change if it wanted to do so. That includes the ample organized crime activities.
Serbia wants the international community to accept this ethnic control. Belgrade often tells Western diplomats that the objective is a better deal for the Serb community in Kosovo. It is pursuing similar objectives in Bosnia and Montenegro as well. But inside Serbia this extension of Belgrade’s control to ethnic Serbs beyond Serbia’s borders is called “the Serbian world.” Comparable to the Russian world President Putin is pursuing inside Ukraine, this is an irredentist effort to deny the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries that have significant Serb populations. Vucic is tying to construct de facto if not de jure the Greater Serbia that Milosevic failed to create in the 1990s.
What is Kosovo after?
Prime Minister Kurti wants a sovereign country with equal rights for all its citizens and no ethnic privileges on its entire territory. That would leave authority unequivocally in the hands of Albanians, as they constitute more than 90% of the population. Kosovo however starts constitutionally far from that objective, as there are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as requirements for minority participation in its government. There is also a Council of Communities that gives minorities direct access to the President. Some of the Serb-majority municipalities were created explicitly to give Serbs more local control. All have the extensive powers provided for in Kosovo legislation. None of that is going to change.
Albanians are no less attached to their ethnicity than Serbs. They are concerned about the welfare of Albanian communities in southern Serbia, which have been under significant pressure from the Serbian security forces for decades. Nor are those communities offered anything like the privileges Serbs have already and are seeking inside Kosovo. Reciprocity is rule one of diplomacy. Belgrade should not ask for anything it isn’t willing to give.
Squaring the circle
The question is whether there is any way to satisfy, at least partially, both Vucic and Kurti. The Americans view the ASM as a coordination mechanism. They are promising that it will have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution, include non-Serbs living in Serb-majority municipalities, make financial transfers from Belgrade more transparent, and better integrate the Serb population into Kosovo. Those are worthy objectives. Can they be achieved?
I suspect so, but they will require something different from the Serb-dominated ASM assembly and executive that Belgrade envisages. That structure would lend itself to infringements on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which the Americans say they don’t want. Instead, the “Association” should be a bilateral enterprise, one that includes active participation by both Belgrade and Pristina as well as American and European guarantors. If Belgrade wants to pay for education or economic development in Serb-majority municipalities, the transfers should require the approval of Pristina as well as input from the communities involved, not just Serbia’s unilateral decisions.
Coordination among the Serb-majority municipalities should also take into account the needs of their neighbors in Kosovo’s Albanian-majority municipalities. So one requirement might be active Serb participation in the already existing Kosovo municipalities association.
Pristina should consider its options
Chollet and Escobar invite the Kosovo government to put forward its own proposal for the ASM. Prime Minister Kurti should accept that challenge, designing an international structure that meets Kosovo’s constitutional and other requirements while rendering Serbia’s role in the Serb majority communities more transparent and accountable. Kosovo should ask that a comparable structure be created inside Serbia for th Albanian-majority communities.
Nothing designed in Pristina is likely to please Belgrade, but it would at least satisfy the Americans that in the context of recognition Kurti is prepared to move forward on the ASM. That would put the ball in Serbia’s court, which is where it belongs.
Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”? Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects. Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is uncertain but easy to imagine. Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF, and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable change in President Vucic’s tone:
Have been following many of these conferences. This was the most realistic by far. Vucic spoke about need for Serbia to stop “lying to itself” and “open its eyes” and understand the consequences of rejecting French-German proposal.
He noted that Serbia can not stop Kosovo membership into NATO, CoE, etc. He underlined that if Serbia rejects French-Gerrman proposal: (1) EU accession process will be stoped, incl visa ban, (2) withdrawal of EU investments, (3) overall economic sanctions.
I think what we saw tonight is a first clear step in prepping the the ground for agreement with Kosovo.
Let me echo Demush. Something is beginning to move. Branko, a keen observer of the Balkans even if he mostly focuses on inequity worldwide, is opting for taking the agreement rather than suffering the consequences. It is not however yet clear whether the push will be sufficient. We’ll have to wait and see whether hopes are realized or dashed.
RSS - Posts
