Tag: Balkans
Fantasy diplomacy is failing to appease
Chris Hill, the American Ambassador to Serbia, tweeted Friday:
I’ve dedicated my life to diplomacy – to finding diplomatic solutions to seemingly intractable problems. In the course of my career, I’ve learned that sometimes diplomacy fails. When it does, the results can be tragic. (1/4)
I offer my personal condolences to the families of those who lost their lives during the wars of the 1990s, including as a result of the NATO air campaign. I know that the Serbian people will never forget that terrible time, nor should they. (2/4)
The Serbian people will never set aside their grief, but I believe they are strong enough to set aside their grievances. The United States’ dedication to our partnership with Serbia is unwavering, as is our commitment to diplomacy. (3/4)
Together, we can build the better future the Serbian people deserve and want for future generations. (4/4)
He had previously tweeted:
The most important outcome from the Ohrid talks: Serbia has embraced its European future and a clear plan for how to get there—a decision that took wisdom, integrity, and courage. Much work remains, and the United States will be with you every step of the way.
If this last were true, his tweets Friday would have been unnecessary.
Fantasy diplomacy
This is fantasy diplomacy. There is no evidence in the Ohrid talks or elsewhere that Serbia has embraced its European future. To the contrary, Belgrade continues to refuse to align with EU foreign policy and leans heavily in the direction of Moscow and Beijing. The former provides military help and the latter investments. Here is Vucic with his favorite “European” a week after the Ohrid meeting:
Serbia no longer meets the EU’s Copenhagen criteria, if it ever did. Its “partly free” polity is moving in an authoritarian direction. Media are not free. The judicial system is not independent. And the opposition comes mainly from ethnonationalists who care not a whit about Europe. Belgrade has done nothing to apologize, or make amends, for the Milosevic regime’s brutal crackdown on Kosovo in the late 1990s.
It isn’t working
It is hard then to imagine what justifies condolences now for the action NATO took in 1999 to stop the murder and ethnic cleansing of the better part of a million Albanians from Kosovo. NATO caused around 454 civilian deaths (including more Albanians than Serbs and Montenegrins), according to the Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center.
The condolences come from someone who was part of the team that initiated the bombing in response to the Serbian failure to sign the agreement negotiated at Rambouillet. American diplomats then argued that Milosevic would only respond to the use of force. If I stretch, I imagine Chris is thinking his tweets will assuage his own conscience, appease Serbia, and soften its attitude toward normalization of relations with Kosovo.
I see no sign yet that this is working. President Vucic has refused to sign the two agreements recently reached with Kosovo,. Though he has said his oral agreement is legally binding, it isn’t clear just what he verbally agreed to. He has said explicitly he will oppose UN membership for Kosovo, despite a provision in the normalization agreement that reads:
Serbia will not object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organisation.
He has denied that Serbia has implicitly recognized Kosovo, even though the first agreement includes recognition of its documents and symbols, and has made it clear he will pick and choose what provisions of the agreement he implements or not. The EU will be incorporating the requirements in the agreements into its accession process, but that could mean postponing Serbia’s compliance by years if not a decade or more.
Ukraine could make the difference
Vucic is still trying to walk with Washington and ride with Moscow. That’s a difficult game these days. Rumors have it that Serbian ammunition has reached Ukraine, but Belgrade denies it has sold a single bullet there. Nor has it aligned with EU sanctions against Russia, which it is obligated to do. Still, if your lobbyists can keep the American ambassador and Washington believing that you are sincere in seeking a Western future, the game can work for a while. Putin is blessedly distracted and the US committed to appeasement, which is easier than the alternative.
The question is when the State Department and White House will wake up to reality. Serbia is not choosing to come West. Only if Russia loses in Ukraine will Belgrade reassess. Until then, it would be best to forget the fantasy diplomacy. Realism dictates that the US back countries that back Ukraine. Belgrade doesn’t.
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Getting the numbers right
The Humanitarian Law Center published on Friday this account of the casualties in the NATO/Yugoslavia war of 1999, in order to counter disinformation in Serbia and elsewhere:
On Friday, March 24, eight year in a row (not including 2020, when there was no commemoration due to the Covid-19 pandemic and state of emergency), the central state commemoration of the anniversary of commencement of the NATO bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was held. Humanitarian Law Center (HLC) draws attention to the established facts on the Kosovo war and bombing campaign of the FRY, warning against the threat of history revisionism undertaken by the state.
Let us recall that the President of Serbia, Aleksandar Vučić, used to make references to thousands of casualties of NATO’s air raids until 2022, most often mentioning 2,500 victims. At the 2018 commemoration, he stated that the Republic of Serbia had “more than 2,000 recorded, well remembered names”. However, as of 19 October 2021, when the Serbian Parliament rejected the proposal to set up the previously announced national commission which would be tasked with making a list of the bombing casualties, the President ceased to mention the number of victims. Speculating with the figures was resumed by the public broadcaster RTS, which this year highlighted that during the NATO bombing, “1,100 members of the Army and police were killed“ and “around 2,500 civilians, although the accurate list of victims has not been established yet ”.
Although the Republic of Serbia has never made a list of NATO bombing, Humanitarian Law Centre (HLC) and Humanitarian Law Center Kosovo (HLC Kosovo) published a list of all victims’ names in 2014, within the RECOM project. According to this register, during the NATO attacks, 756 persons were killed, amongst whom 452 civilians and 304 members of armed forces. Of the killed civilians, 206 were Serbs or Montenegrin by ethnic background, 218 were Albanians, 14 Roma, and 14 civilians of other ethnicity. In the bombing, 275 members of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) and Ministry of the Interior (MoI) were killed, whereas the number of the killed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was 29. A total of 261 persons were killed on the territory of Serbia, 10 in Montenegro, and 485 in Kosovo. This is the only and most complete list of victims of NATO’s bombing of FRY so far.
The Serbian President this year at the central commemoration also denied war crimes against Kosovar Albanians committed by Serbian forced before 24 March 1999, documented in the HLC reports as well as in those of international organisations. He stated that Serbia was found guilty for wanting to be “on its own” and proceeded with cynical discussion on the term “humanitarian disaster” which was used to describe the situation in Kosovo before the NATO bombing.
Just like in the previous years, the President did not address the events in Kosovo during the NATO bombing. According to the data collected by HLC and HLC Kosovo, Serbian forces killed 6,872 Albanian civilians during the bombing. In the same period, KLA members killed 328 Serb civilians and 136 Roma and members of other ethnic groups. In the conflicts between Serb forces and KLA, 1,204 members of KLA and 559 members of the VJ and Serbian MoI were killed.
Humanitarian Law Center reminds the public broadcaster and institutions of the Republic of Serbia that by augmenting the number of the NATO bombing casualties, they are suggesting that the actual victims are not sufficiently important and thus offend their dignity. We call upon them to pay tribute to all killed citizens by accepting the list with individual names. Also, HLC urges on all national institutions to abandon historical revisionism of the Kosovo war. Recognising the accountability of the Republic of Serbia for the crimes committed against Kosovo’s Albanians is the only possible way towards overcoming the war past and building the common future for Serbs and Albanians.
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Stevenson’s army, March 23
I am back from a week in Doha when I wasn’t posting, and Charlie is back from a few days away:
Back at my desktop and partway through the accumulated newspapers, here are some links.
– Stimson has a bunch of reports. I especially liked the “Chimera of Technological Superiority” paper.
– Lots of Iraq reflections [today is the 20th anniversary of the start of the US war]. Reporter John Walcott was right. As was Jim Fallows.
– A Marine calls for a more family friendly military personnel system
– SAIS prof Ed Joseph sees a Kosovo deal.
– US News said US intell helped India against China.
– Fred Kaplan assesses the Xi-Putin summit. WaPo notes the absence of a pipeline deal.
– Two views on US aid to Ukraine: surprising success or much too slow.
– NYT analyzes DeSantis foreign policy.
– Max Boot sees return to 1930s GOP foreign policy.
– RollCall notes Biden’s high success rate with Congress.
My SAIS colleague Charlie Stevenson distributes this almost daily news digest of foreign/defense/national security policy to “Stevenson’s army” via Googlegroups. I republish here, with occasional videos of my choice. To get Stevenson’s army by email, send a blank email (no subject or text in the body) to stevensons-army+subscribe@googlegroups.com. You’ll get an email confirming your join request. Click “Join This Group” and follow the instructions to join. Once you have joined, you can adjust your email delivery preferences (if you want every email or a digest of the emails).
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Smoke and mirrors make confusion, not peace
According to EU High Representative Borrell, Saturday’s meeting between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti was a success. It resulted in an “Implementation Annex” to the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation of Relations. There are two macro problems:
- It is focused on process, not substance.
- Serbia again refused to sign.
Process not substance
The major procedural innovation is incorporation of the obligations in the two agreements into both country’s EU accession obligations. The new agreement also foresees an EU-chaired monitoring group. These provisions have been implicit all along. They obligate the EU more than they obligate Serbia and Kosovo. Moreover, the obligation does not extend to recognition of Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, since the normalization agreement falls short of that benchmark.
The implementation annex also obligates Pristina to begin negotiations “immediately” on self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo. This reformulation of the 2013 agreement to create an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities has two notable features:
First: it avoids the specific institutional form of the original. That in Pristina’s eyes represented a potential threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Second: it references the “Serbian community.” This suggest it applies not to existing municipalities but rather only to those inside Kosovo who consider themselves Serbian citizens.
The first is clearly to Kosovo’s advantage. The second is to Serbia’s, since it eliminates obligations to most non-Serbs.
The new agreement adds other procedural niceties. The obligations of the original agreement are to be implemented independent of others and the order in which they are mentioned. None are to be blocked. All that is good.
No signatures
Once again, President Vucic refused to sign the agreement. Vucic’s motives are clear. He fears domestic reaction in Serbia, where ethnic nationalist passions and hatred of Albanians reign supreme. He wants to avoid any formal equality with someone who will insist on being identified as the Prime Minister of the (independent and sovereign) Republic of Kosovo (or maybe even Kosova, the Albanian preference).
EU and US officials would have you believe this does not matter. But it does. Under international law, signed agreements obligate a state. Unsigned ones do not. Serbia could walk away from all the agreements with Kosovo, as they are unsigned. In fact, it has not implemented many. Nor has Kosovo. Signatures would make a big difference. That is why Vucic resists.
The Americans and Europeans have pressed Kurti hard to obligate Kosovo. They have withheld goodies and criticized him publicly. It shows. He is willing to sign.
Brussels and Washington have taken a different approach with Vucic. It also shows. They have rewarded him in advance. Neither criticizes Serbia’s drift towards autocracy or its corruption. Both welcome Vucic and his minions for visits and provide ample assistance, including more than one billion recently for railroad reconstruction. This appeasement gives him the diplomatic space he needs for refusal to sign. Even the donor conference promised in the more recent agreement is of marginal interest, as Serbia has most of what it wants already.
What is missing
We always need to ask “what is missing?” That is often more significant in assessing a diplomatic maneuver than what is apparent. Here are a few missing elements:
- There is no reciprocity. Serbia gets its “self governance” for its citizens in Kosovo but the Albanians who live in southern Serbia do not get anything comparable.
- Serbia’s harassment of Serbs who participate in Kosovo institutions is not mentioned. This includes municipal governments as well as the Pristina institutions, including the Kosovo Security Force.
- There are no deadlines to accomplish the goals set out. An implementation agreement is only as good as its timetable.
- While a signature on this agreement might amount to virtual recognition, that possibility is not mentioned, even as a remote goal. Nor is there any sign of recognition by the five EU non-recogniers.
A process-focused agreement without signatures leaves a lot to future negotiations. This one is more smoke and mirrors than substance. It is more likely to generate further confusion than peace.
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The easy way out leads to failure
I spoke yesterday at a US-Europe Alliance panel on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in the Western Balkans. Here are my notes:
Let me start by making three point I regard as obvious:
- Russian military aggression in Ukraine has a counterpart in the Balkans There the aggression is via hybrid warfare directed from Serbia, mainly against Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia.
- If Russia succeeds in gaining territory in Ukraine, we should expect a far more aggressive effort in the Balkans.
- If Russia fails in Ukraine, it will fail as well in the Balkans.
Why?
Why then, you should ask, has the State Department been so soft on Serbia, Russia’s main agent in the Balkans? The US has allowed billions of dollars of development bank investments to go to Belgrade. The Pentagon is trying to revive military cooperation with the Serbian army. The State Department backed unproductive and unjustified decisions by the HiRep in Bosnia that favored Croat extremists and sanctioned Serbs. American officials befriended and encouraged a narrowly elected pro-Russian government in Montenegro. They have insisted on early formation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in Kosovo, a proposition that would weaken the still young Kosovo state.
Some regard these moves as recent. But they are better regarded as part of a long history of taking the easy way out in the Balkans. As difficult as they were, the Dayton accords seemed easier to Washington in 1995 than defeat of Republika Srpska. After Milosevic fell to the 2000 election in Serbia, the Americans quickly gave unequivocal support to his successors. They cut off funding to the Otpor Resistance movement that intended to keep a sharp eye on the democratization process. Senator Biden argued in a hearing several years later that it would be better to get Serbia into the EU accession process than to insist it earn candidacy on the merits.
Serbia’s response
The Serbian government took advantage of that support to reject the Ahtisaari plan for Kosovo’s independence. It instead established Serbia as a militarily “neutral” country. Belgrade rearmed as best it could, mainly with Russian help. When Serbia’s disappointing but relatively liberal “democrats” lost the 2012 election, Washington lined up behind their nationalist successors.
Many thought they could be convinced to resolve the Kosovo issue in a “Nixon to China” move. Presidents Nikolic and then Vucic declined to do so. President Vucic’s minions now talk openly about a “Serbian world.” That is analogous to Vladimir Putin’s “Russian world” and a synonym of Greater Serbia. It is only a matter of time before Serbia walks away from the French-German proposed agreement that Vucic refused to sign last month.
Washington however has been unresponsive and ineffective. Vucic’s unwillingness to sign, Republika Srpska’s “national day” display of force, Belgrade’s threats of military action in Kosovo, the Bosnia HiRep’s decision to change the way votes are counted the day after an election, the compromise of NATO secrets by Montenegro’s pro-Russian government, control of the press, harassment of liberal democrats, and corruption in Serbia—none of these developments have elicited an effective response from Washington.
Unedifying
The explanation is far less than edifying. Washington doesn’t give a hoot about the Balkans. The region is too complicated, too peripheral, too aggravating. So it delegates hegemony to a “pivotal state.” The State Department thinks that is Serbia, which is central geographically, larger than its neighbors, a bit better off economically, and a far more consolidated state than the other former Yugoslav republics.
If you delegate a pivotal state to control a region, you have to put up with most of its behavior, both in the region and at home. If the pivotal state in addition maintains good relations with your adversaries, you will fear a tilt in that direction. Hence the US government’s reluctance to call out Belgrade, even when it sides with Moscow and Beijing in foreign policy and slides inexorably toward autocracy at home.
This is a sad commentary, not only on American diplomacy. It sadly favors a Russian proxy over states truly aspiring to join the West. That’s ugly. But it is also sad for the region, which has good reason to fear instability. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro all face threats to their sovereignty and territorial integrity as a result of America’s treatment of Serbia as the pivotal state in the Balkans.
But it is sad also for Serbia, which no longer meets the Copenhagen democracy criteria for EU membership. Vucic can do what he pleases domestically, without concern about constraints on his power. And it is sad for Kyiv, which should worry that whatever the Americans agree in the Balkans they may copy in Ukraine. How about an Association of Russian-majority municipalities in Donbas?
To put it plainly: the easy way out leads to failure.
PS: Take a moment to look at Demush Shasha’s pertinent tweets from today:
Four important takeaways from today’s @freedomhouse “Freedom in the World 2023” report.
1. Kosovo is democratic trailblazer of the region. Kosovo made record annual democratic improvement and ranked as third most improved democracy in the world in 2022.
2. Kosovo and Serbia democracies are heading to totally opposite directions.
3. Looking at a longer time scale, only Kosovo and North Macedonia have today a better democracy then a decade ago. Albania has made no progress, while Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia have worst democracies today then a decade ago.
4. Serbia’s democratic collapse is in particular staggering. A decade long democratic nosedive has put it now in a category with Afghanistan and Myanmar.
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Put away the carrots and take out the sticks
Yesterday’s EU-hosted meeting between Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti ended without signature of a “normalization” agreement. That ranks as a failure, especially after months of built-up expectations. But let’s take a closer look, based on the criteria I outlined yesterday: improved state-to-state relations, reciprocity, and international engagement.
Assessing the unsigned agreement
- Improved state-to-state relations: Articles 1-2 score high in this category, as they would require recognition of each others’ sovereignty, equality, independence, territorial integrity, symbols, and documents. Article 3 would also apply the UN Charter provisions on the use and threat of force, which apply to sovereign states. Together they amount to mutual recognition as sovereign and independent states, in all but name. This is virtual recognition.
- Reciprocity: Article 4 provides that neither party can act on behalf of the other or represent the other internationally. This rates high in the reciprocity category. It also provides that Serbia will not block Kosovo’s membership “any” international organization, which presumably includes the United Nations. That is not reciprocal, but it need not be, since Kosovo has not tried to block Serbian membership. Article 5 applies mutual “non-blocking” specifically to the EU. Article 6 requires both parties to continue the dialogue with the goal of a “legally binding agreement on comprehensive normalization of their relations.” That doesn’t say mutual recognition. But it is close, especially when read in conjuntioin with Article 8 for exchange of permanent diplomatic missions.
- International engagement: Article 9 promises international financing and investment. Article 10 provides for an EU-chaired implementation committee. Article 11 provides for an implementation roadmap to be negotiated in future dialogue sessions. There is no mention of recogntion by any of the five EU nonrecognizers. Nor are there any specific financial commitments.
Not bad I’d say: maybe an 8 out of 10, if the parties had signed it. It is a shame Vucic was unwilling.
The rub
Article 7 is the rub. I quote it in full:
Both Parties commit to establish specific arrangements and guarantees, in accordance with relevant Council of Europe instruments and by drawing on existing European experiences, to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo and ability for service provision in specific areas, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia and a direct communication channel for the Serbian community to the Government of Kosovo.
The Parties shall formalise the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and afford strong level of protection to the Serbian religious and cultural heritage sites, in line with existing European models.
These are non-reciprocal provisions intended to satisfy the Serb population of Kosovo, without any comparable arrangements inside Serbia. The first paragraph replaces provisions in the 2015 Brussels agreement for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). Instead of presuming that institutional form, it instead outlines the functions Belgrade wants from such an Association: “self-management” for the Serb community, “service provision” partly financed by Serbia, and a “direct communication channel” with the Kosovo government.
This is a major step in the right direction. There are many ways, other than an Association that could pose a threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to meet these functional objectives.
The second paragraph requires a law on the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which will be controversial because of property issues but in the end doable.
Kurti yes, Vucic no, EU moves ahead, US should reevaluate
Prime Minister Kurti said he was ready to sign this agreement. It moves the dialogue in a good direction: toward recognition, toward reciprocity, away from the ASM, and toward more even-handed international engagement. President Vucic refused to sign. That puts the monkey on his own back. It also demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the many inducements he has been granted up front to get him to sign.
The EU decided to move ahead in the dialogue anyway on the basis of the unsigned agreement. This is the best they could do. Next step will be the implementation plan.
It won’t be easy to get Vucic to drop the ASM or proceed with any of the other provisions that move in Kurti’s direction. But Kosovo’s officials have an opportunity to shift the momentum of these talks on the basis of this unsigned agreement. In the meanwhile, the Americans and Europeans need to admit their appeasement strategy vis-a-vis Vucic has failed. Put away the carrots and take out the sticks.
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