My Balkanite friends are clamoring to know what is going to happen tomorrow when Serbian President Vucic and Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti meet once again. The Europeans and Americans are pressing hard for a “normalization” agreement. No one knows quite what that means.
But I have some ideas about how to evaluate whatever happens tomorrow. These come from my personal perspective, which supports the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Kosovo. Those who imagine Serbia ever again governing Kosovo, or annexing part of its territory, need read no further.
My assessment criteria include these:
Improved state-to-state relations
Normalization should mean making the relationship between Serbia and Kosovo more like a “normal” state-to-state relationship between respectful neighbors. This requires agreement, at least in principle, on the line of control between them. A commitment to agree and demarcate that line would be a clear positive signal. Normalization should also mean forswearing the threat or use of force to settle disputes. Serbia has recently mobilized its army and threatened the use of force in response to imagined abuses against Serbs in Kosovo.
Good neighbors need however to do more than respect a line and not use force or threats of it. They need also to respect their neighbor’s state institutions. This applies in particular to Belgrade. Serbian state security and other personnel remain in the Serb communities inside Kosovo. The situation is especially egregious in the four northern municipalities contiguous with Serbia. But Serbian security agents intimidate Serbs throughout Kosovo who seek to join the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and other Kosovo institutions.
Belgrade should welcome, not resist, the recruitment of Serbs into the KSF and other Kosovo institutions, especially the police and judiciary. Return of the Serbs to those institutions in northern Kosovo should be a touchstone in assessing whatever is agreed. So too, should be elections in the northern municipalities, held under the authority of Pristina.
Reciprocity
Reciprocity is a critical dimension of any state-to-state relations. It has been lacking in the loud international community insistence on the formation inside Kosovo of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). Pristina has asked for a reciprocal Association of Albanian-majority Municipalities inside Serbia with comparable powers, but Belgrade has not welcomed that idea. Pristina is also insisting that the ASM be formed consistent with the Kosovo constitution. That would mean without executive powers and without a sectarian name. It would be a purely consultative body not limited to Serb participation.
Serbia however wants the ASM as a means of permanent control over the Serbs in Kosovo and leverage over the Kosovo state. It has no intention of conceding anything comparable to the Albanian population in southern Serbia. If a unilateral ASM with executive powers is permitted, you can expect trouble not only in Kosovo but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There the main Serb leader has said bluntly it would be a prelude to independence for the 49% of the territory known as Republika Srpska.
If the ASM were to be formed before Belgrade recognition of Kosovo in an agreement generated by the US and the EU, that would give the ASM even more implicit EU approval than the Kosovo state itself. No government in Pristina should want that to happen. The ASM should be formed only after Serbian (and presumably then all-EU) recognition.
International engagement
If implementation is left up to Belgrade and Pristina, the results will be predictably minimal. They have already spent more than 10 years discussing the Brussels agreement that introduced the ASM and called for application of the Kosovo police and judicial systems in the northern municipalities. Unless the international community seriously engages, we can expect no better in the next 10 years.
That engagement can come in several forms. One would be formation of an implementation task force in which the EU and US act as guarantors, prepared to intervene actively and effectively in pointing out implementation failures of that sort. A body of this sort could deliver on promises American officials have already made ensuring the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Kosovo. The International Civilian Office that supervised Kosovo’s implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan after independence might be a model.
Another form of international engagement would be recognition by the five EU states that have not already done so. That could soften the blow of unilateral formation of the ASM, without a comparable association inside Serbia. All five might be more than one can hope for, but several would be good. Even one would be desirable. None will lead to serious disappointment in Kosovo.
NATO could make its position on future Kosovo membership, after its army is fully accredited in 2027, clear and unequivocal.
Financing is another possibility. Serbia has already received a major grant for railway reconstruction. Kosovo has received nothing comparable. It should.
Minimal outcome
Serbian President Vucic has for years fed Serbia’s tabloids a diet of anti-Albanian racism that has fired up his nationalist opposition. That includes expressing his personal regret that Serbia released Prime Minister Kurti from prison. Russian bots and agents pitch in frequently. Kurti indulges in less overt hate speech. He also has more support at home for an agreement, but only if it does not infringe on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. He is implacable on that subject.
One or the other leader, or both, may walk away from tomorrow’s meeting unwilling to sign. Either would likely increase in domestic popularity if he did so. Democracy, in this case, is the enemy of conflict resolution, because the leaders have not prepared their constiuents for compromise. Only international pressures and inducements can compensate for domestic unhappiness. The US and EU, if they get an agreement, will need to continue to engage.
PS: As I have left out mention of Ukraine, let this letter from Prime Minister Kurti to President Zelensky fill the gap:
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Last Wednesday I published a popular piece on Ugly Diplomacy in the Balkans. The “hook” of the piece was a recent agreement to create liaison positions for Serbian diplomats in the State Department. I was critical of that decision because I assumed that Kosovo diplomats had not yet been offered the same opportunity. I was wrong.
Mea culpa
I have been informed that a Kosovo diplomat has been working in the State Department since early 2022. A second started working there in January 2023. That information is available in tweets from Embassy Pristina that I had missed. I welcome this news and hasten to acknowledge my incorrect assumption.
One of the Kosovars is working in Educational and Cultural Affairs. I haven’t had an answer to my inquiry about the other or the Serbs.
The Secretary of State is tweeting nonsense
None of that changes my view of the the current diplomacy pursued at State vis-a-vis Serbia. The State Department is anteing up goodies for Belgrade well before it has done what we would like on Ukraine and many other issues. I know of no backing for this tweet from Secretary Blinken:
Had a productive conversation with Serbian President @AVucic today at the @MunSecConf. We discussed the importance of normalized relations with Kosovo and I conveyed our appreciation for Serbia’s continued support for Ukraine. We share Serbia’s desire for a future with the EU.
This is nonsense. President Vucic, who has aligned himself increasingly with Moscow and Beijing, so far as I am aware has done little or nothing in the West’s favor on Ukraine, other than vote for a couple of helpuful but toothless UN General Assembly resolutions. He hasn’t done a whole lot on normalization with Kosovo or EU accession either.
The Americans don’t care
But the Americans don’t care. Witness Washington’s full-throated support for Serbia’s Open Balkans initiative and its much-vaunted proposal for an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities inside Kosovo. Many in the region perceive both these propositions as threats to the territorial integrity of neighbors.
Washington support for Belgrade contrasts sharply with the pressure Washington is bringing to bear on our friends in Pristina, who aren’t getting nice photo ops with the Secretary or full-throated praise for their successful anti-corruption efforts or their acceptance of the French-German proposal on normalization as a basis for negotiations.
Ugly is still ugly
So yes, I was wrong in my assumption about Kosovo diplomats inside the State Department. They are already there. But it is still ugly diplomacy when you reward people who refuse to do what you want and pressure your friends. I know it is easier to twist the arm of your friend than your adversary, but it is still ugly.
Today’s Serbia National Day message from the State Department includes this tidbit:
I am pleased our two countries recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding to create liaison positions for Serbian diplomats within the U.S. Department of State. This unique program will not only foster a better understanding of our respective foreign policy goals and objectives but will forge new channels of communication and build lasting partnerships.
This comes after avowal of support for Serbia’s EU ambitions and the umpteenth plea for Serbia to support Ukraine.
Where this leads
Serbia is not an allied country. It is not a member of NATO or a major non-NATO ally and has a policy of military neutrality. It has not joined the Western sanctions against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. In fact, Belgrade is largely out of alignment with EU foreign policies it has promised to respect.
But the State Department has decided it can “win over” Belgrade. It is doing so by providing goodies up front. State is supporting Belgrade’s “Open Balkans” initiative, which aims at removing border barriers between Serbia and Serb populations in neighboring countries. State is also supporting Belgrade’s proposal to separate governance of the Serb-majority population of Kosovo from Pristina’s authority through creation of an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
That will create another de facto “Republika Srpska.” Bosnia’s Republika Srpska is now preparing to refuse the authority of Sarajevo’s courts. We can expect the same in Kosovo, if the Association is formed with the executive powers Belgrade seeks.
Ugly diplomacy
There is, sadly, more to the illogic of what the Americans are doing. Washington says it is supporting the EU-sponsored dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. That aims at “normalization” of their relations. Having Serbian foreign service officers in the State Department while the dialogue proceeds will arouse understandable suspicions in Kosovo.
Such liaison officers learn a great deal about the inner workings of US diplomacy. Even if assigned to roles far from the European Bureau, the signal Washington is sending is clear: we favor Serbia’s perspective in the dialogue. The only way to make this move palatable is to offer the same to Kosovo in two days time, when it is Kosovo national day.
The heavy lean of the Americans toward Belgrade is ugly diplomacy. It favors the less friendly party while making the more friendly party uncomfortable. Washington expects its favors to Belgrade returned in some indefinite future, while demanding Pristina agree to Open Balkans and the Association right now. It won’t be hard for Belgrade to agree to “normalization” that includes validation of Serbia’s authority over the Kosovo Serb population. Once that is done, Serbia will expect the analog in Bosnia and Montenegro.
What Washington isn’t doing is delivering what Kosovo wants: Serbian recognition and membership in the United Nations. “Normalization” could come to mean international recognition for the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities but not for Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. It is hard to imagine a worse outcome for Pristina.
Alma Baxhaku of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: PM Kurti presented six conditions for establishing the Association of Serbian Majority of Municipalities yesterday. How do you comment on this move? A: I think it is helpful for the Prime Minister to have stated clearly what his conditions are. That is far better than simply rejecting the Association.
Q: Do you think Kurti finally is responding positively to Western pressure or these conditions are a new obstacle to establishing ASMM and achieving an agreement based on the Franco-German plan? A: This is a positive response, but some of the conditions will clearly represent obstacles to an agreement. Negotiations should focus on those.
Q: One of the conditions set by PM Kurti is that the Association will enter into force after mutual recognition. Opposition parties suggest that he’s deceiving opinion and that by this he’s referring to the Franco-German plan which doesn’t contain mutual recognition. How do you see this? A: You have to ask the Prime Minister to clarify this point. Unfortunately, we don’t have an official version of the plan, so it is difficult to comment. But I agree with the Prime Minister that the Association will look different to Pristina in the context of recognition.
Q: Do you think Serbia will accept an Association that is in accordance with the Kosovo Constitution and has no executive and legislative powers? A: I don’t know. That is clearly not the kind of Association Belgrade has in mind. So you’ll have to ask President Vucic.
Q: And the final question, do you think that Kosovo should change its Constitution to accommodate Association and Franko- German if the parties reach an agreement? A: I don’t yet see any reason for changes in the Kosovo constitution, which can accommodate an Association that accords with the Constitutional Court decision. Certainly there should be no changes in the Kosovo constitution without changes in the Serbian constitution.
PS: I understand some media in Kosovo have portrayed me as opposed to the Association. I am certainly opposed to it becoming a Republika Srpska inside Kosovo and think there is a serious risk, as that is what Belgrade wants. The Americans have promised that it won’t be allowed to become a de facto Republika Srpska, so I expect them to act as guarantors of any agreement on the Association. It is clear that only with recognition will the Kosovars feel comfortable with an Association that meets all the requirements of their Constitutional Court. Anything less leaves the door open to shenanigans.
The US and EU are exterting a lot of pressure on Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti to agree to create an Association of Serb-majority Municipalities in negotiations with Serbian President Vucic. Kurti has set six conditions:
1. The association must be by the Constitution and laws in force in the Republic of Kosovo.
2. The association cannot be monoethnic, must change its name, cannot have/carry any public (or executive) power, and must only serve the horizontal cooperation of municipalities according to the Constitution and the law on local self-government (Chapter 5).
3. The association is part of the final agreement and is implemented after mutual recognition. And, in connection with the latter, only after Serbia accepts the principles of the UN Charter in its interstate relations with the Republic of Kosovo.
4. Before the establishment of the Association, the illegal structures of Serbia in the north of Kosovo are extinguished and all illegal weapons are handed over.
5. The rights of national minorities and the relevant protective mechanisms should strengthen the principle of reciprocity between the two respective states, as well as take into account European standards and models.
6. The President of Serbia withdraws the letters sent to five (and other) EU member states for not accepting the application of the Republic of Kosovo for EU membership (which also represents a violation of the same Thaçi-Dacic agreement of 19 April 2013).
One by one
These conditions are a step forward, even if they fall short of the Pristina proposal for the association that I have suggested. Let’s examine the conditions one by one.
The requirement that any association conform to the Kosovo constitution is now well-establshed. As for Kosovo’s laws, I am not certain what conforming to them would entail. In any event, laws can be changed, if mutual interest requires it.
Here too there is some consensus that the association should not be monoethnic. There are non-Serbs who live in Serb-majority municipalities. Municipalities in Kosovo have subsantial powers that in theory might be pooled through horizontal cooperation. But the powers should remain with the individual munipalities. I understand why the Prime Minister might like for the association to have a different name, but a rose by any other name smells just as sweet (or sour).
This is a vital point. The association will pose a far lesser threat to Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity if it is implemented after Serbia has accepted that sovereignty and territorial integrity. I have no reason to believe that Serbia has accepted this point.
Yes, creation of the association should be the occasion for disbanding all illegal structures and armed groups that Belgrade supports inside Kosovo. This should include all employees of the Serbian security services. All activities of Serbia inside Kosovo should become transparent and accountable.
Yes again. Whatever Serbs get inside Kosovo Belgrade should offer inside Serbia to Albanian-majority municipalities. Reciprocity is the rule between states. Serbia has not accepted this point, to my knowledge.
Serbia’s efforts to prevent Kosovo membership in international organizations, including the EU, will have to cease once an agreement is reached. Without this, there is no normalization.
Overall
I have no reason to believe that Belgrade is seriously considering meeting several of these conditions. Whether it does so will depend on pressures from Washington and Brussels. So far, the pressure on Belgrade has been sporadic and inconsistent. The Americans and Europeans fear pushing Serbia further into the philo-Russian, pro-China camp. The pressure on Pristina is high and unrelenting. I call it diplomatic bullying, undertaken because Kosovo has no alternative but to look West. Now that Prime Minister Kurti has met the Americans partway, I hope they will forget some of their resentments of his past. Most of his six conditions are eminently reasonable, though I would add a seventh: the US and EU should act as guarantors of any agreement, ensuring its good-faith implementation.
The problem is that Brussels and Washington are unlikely to be able to convince President Vucic to accept even the most reasonable of Kurti’s conditions. Vucic has intentionally stoked his nationalist opposition with a daily media diet of accusations and vituperation against Kosovo Albanians. He faces no serious threat from Serbia’s relatively small liberal democratic opposition. Nor does he see much upside to resolving the conflict with Kosovo. Serbia would then need to institute serious reforms in order to prepare itself for EU accession. Some of those reforms would pose political and judicial risks to Vucic’s hold on power.
I continue to hope I am wrong. But a decent agreement between Kosovo and Serbia still seems far off.
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