State Department Counselor Chollet and Deputy Assistant Secretary Escobar have published a strong appeal for Kosovo to create the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM) it committed to in 2013. The piece is intended to pressure Prime Minister Kurti to drop his opposition to the ASM, which he has been willing to consider only in the context of Belgrade’s recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Kosovo state.
Serbia has refused to do that. The Chollet-Escobar appeal is consequently one-sided. It offers nothing at all to Pristina in exchange for satisfying one of Belgrade’s primary negotiating objectives. It essentially says “America is your best friend, you owe us this because of all the support we’ve given you, your government in the past pomised it, we’ll make it come out all right.” This is diplomatic bullying. Similar moments in the past have led to disappointments for Kosovo.
The Americans are offering lemons. Is there a way for Kosovo to make lemonade?
What is Serbia after?
What President Vucic seeks is official blessing for its hegemonic control of the Serb population in Kosovo. That control already exists, especially in the four northern municipalities contiguous with Serbia. Belgrade has for two decades controled their governments, education and health systems, police and courts. Money flows directly from Belgrade into these institutions and their employees. Little happens in the northern Serb communities that Belgrade could not change if it wanted to do so. That includes the ample organized crime activities.
Serbia wants the international community to accept this ethnic control. Belgrade often tells Western diplomats that the objective is a better deal for the Serb community in Kosovo. It is pursuing similar objectives in Bosnia and Montenegro as well. But inside Serbia this extension of Belgrade’s control to ethnic Serbs beyond Serbia’s borders is called “the Serbian world.” Comparable to the Russian world President Putin is pursuing inside Ukraine, this is an irredentist effort to deny the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring countries that have significant Serb populations. Vucic is tying to construct de facto if not de jure the Greater Serbia that Milosevic failed to create in the 1990s.
What is Kosovo after?
Prime Minister Kurti wants a sovereign country with equal rights for all its citizens and no ethnic privileges on its entire territory. That would leave authority unequivocally in the hands of Albanians, as they constitute more than 90% of the population. Kosovo however starts constitutionally far from that objective, as there are reserved seats for minorities in parliament as well as requirements for minority participation in its government. There is also a Council of Communities that gives minorities direct access to the President. Some of the Serb-majority municipalities were created explicitly to give Serbs more local control. All have the extensive powers provided for in Kosovo legislation. None of that is going to change.
Albanians are no less attached to their ethnicity than Serbs. They are concerned about the welfare of Albanian communities in southern Serbia, which have been under significant pressure from the Serbian security forces for decades. Nor are those communities offered anything like the privileges Serbs have already and are seeking inside Kosovo. Reciprocity is rule one of diplomacy. Belgrade should not ask for anything it isn’t willing to give.
Squaring the circle
The question is whether there is any way to satisfy, at least partially, both Vucic and Kurti. The Americans view the ASM as a coordination mechanism. They are promising that it will have to be consistent with the Kosovo constitution, include non-Serbs living in Serb-majority municipalities, make financial transfers from Belgrade more transparent, and better integrate the Serb population into Kosovo. Those are worthy objectives. Can they be achieved?
I suspect so, but they will require something different from the Serb-dominated ASM assembly and executive that Belgrade envisages. That structure would lend itself to infringements on Kosovo’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which the Americans say they don’t want. Instead, the “Association” should be a bilateral enterprise, one that includes active participation by both Belgrade and Pristina as well as American and European guarantors. If Belgrade wants to pay for education or economic development in Serb-majority municipalities, the transfers should require the approval of Pristina as well as input from the communities involved, not just Serbia’s unilateral decisions.
Coordination among the Serb-majority municipalities should also take into account the needs of their neighbors in Kosovo’s Albanian-majority municipalities. So one requirement might be active Serb participation in the already existing Kosovo municipalities association.
Pristina should consider its options
Chollet and Escobar invite the Kosovo government to put forward its own proposal for the ASM. Prime Minister Kurti should accept that challenge, designing an international structure that meets Kosovo’s constitutional and other requirements while rendering Serbia’s role in the Serb majority communities more transparent and accountable. Kosovo should ask that a comparable structure be created inside Serbia for th Albanian-majority communities.
Nothing designed in Pristina is likely to please Belgrade, but it would at least satisfy the Americans that in the context of recognition Kurti is prepared to move forward on the ASM. That would put the ball in Serbia’s court, which is where it belongs.
Here is the latest version I’ve seen of the German-French plan for normalization between Kosovo and Serbia. It is a step in the right direction, if fully implemented, but with some dubious additions and important missing elements.
What’s new
This latest text has a bit more detail on arrangements for the Serbian community in Kosovo than I have seen previously, especially in Article 7 (the glitch [sic] is in the original):
Both sides advocate for the achievement of concrete arrangements, in accordance with the relevant instruments of the Council of Europe and using existing European experiences, in order to ensure an appropriate level of self-government for the Serbian community in Kosovo and the possibility of providing services in Kosovo. Kosovo.[sic] some specific areas, including the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia and direct channels of communication between the Serbian community and the Government of Kosovo.
The parties will formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo and ensure a high level of protection of Serbian religious and cultural heritage, in accordance with existing European models.
The first of these paragraphs isn’t great. It fails to make reference to the Kosovo constitution as the basis for these “concrete arrangements.” It also fails to require reciprocity inside Serbia for the Albanian community there. What conditions would govern “the possibility of financial assistance from Serbia”? Nor is it clear what “direct channels of communication” with the Kosovo government means. There is already a Council of Communities that provides such communication with the Kosovo President, as well as Serb and other community representation in parliament and in the government ministries.
As for the Church, the text lacks reference to the longstanding issue of the Decan/i monastery’s property. It should reference implementation of the relevant Kosovo Constitutional Court decision.
What’s missing
Most important is what is missing. There is no apparent reference to recognition of Kosovo by the five EU members that do not recognize it.
The failure to get recognition by the five nonrecognizers is a deal breaker. It might not have to be in this text, but it would have to happen in order for Kosovo to be convinced that normalization was real. Even with those five recognitions, this agreement would not come close to the German/German Basic Treaty it is supposedly modeled after. That entailed the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic both becoming members of the United Nations. There is no such possibility here, as Russia would require an unacceptable price.
EU negotiator Lajcak is said to have met with the five nonrecognizers this week in Brussels. That’s good, but more is going to be needed. Each one will have to be convinced that the time has come to drop their opposition to Kosovo’s European prospects. Washington and EU capitals, not just Lajcak, will need to engage.
The rest of the iceberg
They will also need to engage on pressuring both Belgrade and Pristina to make the necessary compromises. Pressure on Kosovo has long been apparent. It is relatively easy to pressure a country that has no other option than bandwagoning with NATO and the EU. Pressure on Serbia is far less so. President Vucic has played a successful hedging game, balancing Russia and China against the EU and US.
That game may now be up. The Europeans have delivered a tough ultimatum to Serbia, one whose specific content is uncertain but easy to imagine. Branko Milanovic does:
threats must range from the suspension of EU negotiations, elimination of EU support funds (that Serbia gets as a candidate member), reintroduction of visas, discouragement of EU investors, to possibly additional financial sanctions (say, no access to short-term commercial loans), ban on long-term lending by the European banks, EBRD and possibly the World Bank and the IMF, and for the very end elements of a true embargo and perhaps seizure of assets.
@Demush Shasha thinks this has caused a notable change in President Vucic’s tone:
Have been following many of these conferences. This was the most realistic by far. Vucic spoke about need for Serbia to stop “lying to itself” and “open its eyes” and understand the consequences of rejecting French-German proposal.
He noted that Serbia can not stop Kosovo membership into NATO, CoE, etc. He underlined that if Serbia rejects French-Gerrman proposal: (1) EU accession process will be stoped, incl visa ban, (2) withdrawal of EU investments, (3) overall economic sanctions.
I think what we saw tonight is a first clear step in prepping the the ground for agreement with Kosovo.
Let me echo Demush. Something is beginning to move. Branko, a keen observer of the Balkans even if he mostly focuses on inequity worldwide, is opting for taking the agreement rather than suffering the consequences. It is not however yet clear whether the push will be sufficient. We’ll have to wait and see whether hopes are realized or dashed.
Derek Chollet, Counselor at the State Department, is the highest-ranking US government official dealing with the Balkans these days. He was in Pristina and Belgrade last week. What should we understand from his tweets about the trip?
The caveats
First: the caveats. We don’t know whether Chollet tweets for himself or has staffers do it. He surely supervises the tweeting, but that might be after the fact, not necessarily before. Nor should we expect tweets to reveal anything the US government regards as confidential. But tweets have become a main vehicle for getting into the public domain a diplomat’s narrative about trips and meetings. So it is worth some time and mental energy to interpret them.
Pristina
Derek began his trip on January 11 with this meeting and tweet:
Had a wide-ranging conversation with Kosovan journalists today. Once again commended for immediate and strong solidarity with Ukraine & discussed our perspective on ASM and next steps for the EU-facilitated, US-supported Dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.
That “Kosovan” may signal that there was at least one Serb journalist in the group. Albanians in Kosovo refer to themselves as Kosovars; Kosovan is accepted way of referring to “citizens of Kosovo,” regardless of ethnicity. I can’t imagine why he would commend journalists for solidarity with Ukraine. More pertinent was his mention of the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM), which the Americans are pressing hard. So no real surprises here, but a pretty clear indication of priorities: Ukraine, dialogue, ASM.
Next up was a meeting with Prime Minister Kurti:
Important conversation with @albinkurti on Dialogue. Appreciate engaging constructively and flexibly. Looking forward to continued partnership on advancing ongoing efforts towards normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia.
This is pretty friendly to Kurti, who has aggravated the Americans a great deal in the past. It appears not only to acknowledge some flexibility and constructiveness on his part, but also states that the objective of the dialogue is normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. That falls short of mutual recognition, which is what Kurti wants. But it corresponds to EU objectives and goes much further than Serbia has been willing to go so far. An “important” conversation in diplomatese means one that pointed in the right direction.
President Vjosa Osmani is less directly engaged in the dialogue but has played an important role in staking out the Kosovo state’s posture on many issues:
Good to meet with VjosaOsmaniPRKS. Our partnership is steadfast. We commend Kosovo for solidarity with Ukraine in enacting sanctions, supporting refugees and journalists, and condemning Putin’s war. Grateful for Kosovo’s generosity in hosting Afghan evacuees & refugees.
That acknowledges Kosovo’s solidarity with the West on two key issues. It’s a good look for Pristina.
From here things get a bit harder to interpret. Chollet met next with the Kosovan Serb political party sponsored by Belgrade whose members have withdrawn from Kosovo’s state institutions:
Informative meeting with Srpska List members. Valuable to hear the concerns of all communities in Kosovo. Need Kosovan Serbs in Kosovan institutions. We continue to emphasize the importance of an ASM consistent with Kosovo’s Constitution.
This underlines the importance of the Serbs’ return to their official jobs and offers an ASM consistent with the Kosovo constitution as incentive. That last point on the constitution has not always been clear in US statements, but of course it reduces the incentive, as Srpska Lista has no interest in an ASM that isn’t controlled by Belgrade.
Chollet went on to meet with political opposition and civil society leaders:
Appreciate hearing from Kosovo’s opposition leaders. Constructive dissent is essential to a strong democracy. Grateful for the opportunity to engage and hear their views.
Really enjoyed the discussion with representatives of Kosovan civil society. Appreciate the important role you play in advocating for all citizens & holding institutions accountable. Your efforts advance the EU-led Dialogue & support inclusion of all communities in Kosovo.
These are pretty pro forma statements. It is good, standard practice for US diplomats to meet with opposition and civil society leaders. It tells you something mainly when it doesn’t happen, as we’ll see in Belgrade.
Belgrade
There Chollet stuck with protocol order, which means President Vucic first:
We seek a strong relationship with Serbia based on respect and a shared commitment to democratic principles. Thanks to @predsednikrs Vucic for good conversation on US-Serbia partnership.
This is not enthusiastic. He states the American objective without any hint that it was shared by Vucic and he refers to a “good” conversation, which in diplomatese connotes disagreement.
No one should agree to be photographed with Vucic standing up:
The contrast is immediately apparent in Chollet’s meeting with Foreign Minister Dacic:
Great conversation with FM Dacic. We value Serbia’s commitment to peace and stability, and we are committed to helping Serbia realize its European future.
This is odd though, as Dacic is a prime Russophile who may have been smart enough to quot the State Department statement on Chollet’s trip, which cited peace and stability. But his political commitments are far closer to Moscow than Brussels.
Things get worse at the next meeting:
Pleased to meet PM @AnaBrnabic and DPM/Minister of Defense @VucevicM to talk key issues from energy security to economic integration, to U.S.-Serbia defense relations and ensuring peace and stability.
Brnabic was particularly antagonistic toward Europe and the US during last month’s Belgrade-instigated blockade of northern Kosovo while Vucevic mobilized Serbian forces on the boundary/border. I suppose that soft reference to ensuring peace and stability betrays a bit harder line in private, but these two are prime movers behind Belgrade’s opposition to sanctioning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine and many other anti-Western Serbian government positions. Why no hint of that?
Chollet met with the press in Serbia and tweeted this:
Free and independent press is key to a flourishing democracy. Happy to spend time tonight talking with #Serbia’s dynamic press corps about where we can take relations in 2023 and beyond.
Serbia’s press is far from free and independent. It’s “dynamism” is manifest in finding ways every day to pump up fake fear of Kosovo Albanians and do the bidding of the government in myriad other ways.
Civil society in Serbia is in far better shape, in part because it lacks political weight. Chollet tweeted this:
Civil society is crucial to ensuring the rights of all citizens in every democracy. Enjoyed hearing from a diverse group about their important work here in Serbia.
But there was no photograph. Maybe someone wasn’t comfortable with being seen at that meeting.
One big difference between Belgrade and Pristina: no meeting with the political opposition in Belgrade. It is weak, but exists. It includes some ultra-nationalists as well as more liberal democratic folks. But not meeting with opposition is a notable departure from normal US diplomatic practice. Why not?
It might of course have happened in private. But even that tells us what we need to know. Unlike Kosovo, Serbia is no longer a democracy but is well on the way to autocracy. That should inform American policy. It doesn’t yet.
With respect to Wigemark, I disagree about a “vacuum” in northern Kosovo. Belgrade controls it, not with rule of law but with ruleof security services and organized crime.
What you do about a problem depends on how you perceive the forces at work creating it and the possibilities for solution. Perceptions often diverge. Here are some issues in the Balkans today where that is the case, including my own views:
Did President Vucic control this month’s Serb rebellion in northern Kosovo?
He claimed not. He told Western diplomats that if they press him too hard about northern Kosovo without offering him something he might lose control there. That would presumably make things worse. Vucic is expert at playing this game. What he wants is the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities (ASM). That would be an institutional vehicle for maintaining Belgrade’s control over the Serb population in Kosovo permanently.
In my view, it’s nonsense to pretend Vucic doesn’t control what happens among the Serbs in northern Kosovo. It is true Vucic is not liked by many of them, because he has delivered nothing they want. But the barricades erected there in recent weeks came down the day, nay the hour, in which he said so. The Serbian security services and organized crime they control are the main instigators in the north. Anyone who bucks them will be arrested, beaten up, fired, or worse.
Is the problem Kurti?
Many American and European officials dislike Albin Kurti, the prime minister of Kosovo. There are several reasons for this. In opposition, he was a firebrand and his political movement used violence both inside and outside the parliament. He has advocated a referendum on union with Albania, something Washington and Brussels won’t permit. He is often uncompromising, or as he says “principled.” He does not, as his predecessors did, bend easily to American and European preferences.
In my view, Kurti is a sovereigntist. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, but it is still not completely sovereign. A NATO-led force defends its territorial integrity. Foreigners still play roles in its judicial system. Kurti wants to establish Kosovo’s sovereignty, in part by reaching a “final” agreement with Serbia that includes strict reciprocity in all matters and mutual recognition. He doesn’t want to settle for the half measures Washington and Brussels encourage. That frustrates their diplomats.
Can KFOR solve the current crisis?
The NATO-led force in Kosovo, KFOR, now has about 3800 troops from 27 countries. In principle, that force concentrated in the north and properly equipped and trained could have readily taken down the barricades and calmed the situation. Its responsibilities also include Kosovo’s territorial defense. Serbia mobilized its forces along the border/boundary with Kosovo. Were the Serbian Army to enter Kosovo, KFOR (not the still nascent Kosovo Security Force) would be responsible for pushing them back.
In my view, KFOR is lacking what it needs for both its civil and territorial defense roles. Its troops are not all in the north, they are not all trained and equipped for civil unrest, and many of the troop-supplying countries would not want to see their forces in violent conflict. Belgrade understands this and exploits KFOR’s weaknesses. KFOR needs more capacity, not just to push back demonstrators (Albanian or Serb) and the Serbian Army but also to negotiate from a position of strength.
Is the solution two Germanies?
Paris and Berlin have been working for months on a proposal for a half measure that is usually referred to as the “two Germanies” model. The Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic in the early 1970s agreed to live and let live, without mutual recognition. The idea to use this as a model for Kosovo and Serbia has been around for a long time. A version of the French-German proposal leaked in November, but there is said to be a more recent version that includes the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities.
In my view, the leaked document isn’t too bad, but it is not two Germanies. Both Germanies became members of the United Nations in 1973. No one thinks Serbia will concede on UN membership for Kosovo. Even if Belgrade were to cave, Moscow won’t without exacting a high price from the West. The model discussed is “two Germanies minus.” It might have some virtues, but the ASM should be included only in a final agreement that provides for mutual recognition. In that context even a sovereigntist like Kurti should be open to considering the proposition.
In the last week of 2022, the Western Balkans again produces narratives about unfinished conflicts and about those that are expected to happen. I will not go delve into the explanation neither why nor since when nor who is responsible. The fact that this is happening 21 years after the last war (North Macedonia), 23 years after the NATO historic intervention in Europe (Kosovo and Serbia) and 28 years after the first genocide in Europe after World War II (Bosnia and Herzegovina) speaks for itself. It also speaks that there are many ways for perpetuation of conflict and war, but that the way of peace has not yet been found. And in the hyper-production of scenarios for one or the other solution (how to remove the barricades, how to solve the constitutional impasse in this or that country, how to unlock the ethnic veto…) here is a (perhaps) simple ten-point outline for peace for the entire region of the Western Balkans.
1. The six countries of the Western Balkans (WB6) will become (in 2028) part of the European Single Market, with equal access rights to the four European freedoms. They will be equal to the rights enjoyed today by non-EU countries, Norway, Switzerland and Iceland.
2. In order to gain the right of access to the single European Market, the Six Western Balkans must establish (in 2024) the space of the four European freedoms in their own region, i.e. establish the Common Regional Market. It is not about free trade, because that we more or less have. This is about inter-institutional agreements for a shared space.
3. Those WB6 countries that are prepared for EU membership on their own merits will be invited to sign the accession. The six partners are responsible for the preparation of the WB6 for entry into the four European freedoms (that is, group integration into the European Common Market) and at the same time for integration based on their own merits for membership in the EU (based on the regatta principle, where the first the one who is the most prepared) . The principle of regatta and that of “big bang” group action are mutually conditioned.
4. The European Union, in addition to ambitious transformative funds (such as that of the Green Agenda), will establish the Fund for Peaceful Cohesion in the Western Balkans, directed towards the infrastructural, economic, cultural and other cohesion of the Western Balkans. The money of the Fund will also be used to achieve the two concentric circles of the four European freedoms, the Common Regional Market and the Common European Market.
5. Kosovo and Serbia will establish inter-institutional relations derived from the needs of establishing the common regional market and the single European market. The legal format of inter-institutional relations will be equal for all WB6 Six.
6. Kosovo and Serbia will negotiate and agree on the powers of the “protecting state”. This will regulate, according to the best European standards, the necessary role of Serbia for the protection and development of the Serbian people and Serbian culture in Kosovo. At the same time, the role of Kosovo will be regulated for the protection and development of the Albanian people and their culture in the Preshevo Valley and other parts of Serbia.
7. The WB6 will actively participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Countries that are ready for NATO membership and want to do so in 2028 will receive an invitation for membership. The six countries of the Western Balkans, regardless of their status as NATO members or not, will sign the Western Balkan 6 Cooperation and Security Agreement 2028.
8. The six countries of the Western Balkans will establish Common Memory Centers in their capitals under the direct sponsorship of their governments. In all these centers, the memory will be built for the civilian victims of the war, those “on the other side”. The Culture Centers will also serve as points of knowledge of the cultures of the “other side”.
9. The six countries of the Western Balkans will build the compact of the rights of the non-majority peoples, relying on the best practices of the region (such as the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001). The basis of the compact will be the non-territorial rights of the non-majority peoples, that is, the rights that are equivalent wherever the non-majority citizens live.
10. The Roma language will be the language in official use in the municipalities where x percent of the Roma population lives. The sixth of the Western Balkans will create the joint institutional body for the unification and standardization of the Romani language in the region.
Albioneta Ademi of Kosovo’s Gazeta Express asked questions. I replied:
Q: NATO-KFOR still did not respond to Serbia’ s request on deploying military in Kosovo. Why do you think it took so long to “analyze” such request?
A: I doubt they will ever answer. It’s a question that was asked as a provocation, not to get an answer.
Q: In November, Prime Minister Kurti said that Serbia aims to destabilize the north of Kosovo to cover the EU proposal rejection. Do you agree with Kurti? What’s hidden after the Serbia’s actions?
A: Albin knows better than I do. I think the evidence is in favor of what he says. Nothing is hidden. Serbia is trying to make it impossible for serious normalization talks to occur.
Q: Kosovo is waiting for KFOR to act saying Kosovo Police is ready and capable to take off the barricades but still Kurti is giving time to KFOR. Why so?
A: Because he is wise. It would be far better not to risk his police in a direct confrontation with people whose sole purpose is to destabilize.
Q: N1 (a CNN affiliated media in Serbia) reported on Monday that Serbia deployed its military close to Jarinje cross border. This can remind one what Russia did before Ukraine’s invasion. Is this a ‘benign’ threat, a show of force for internal use in Serbia or Kosovans should be really concerned?
A: Whenever military forces are deployed in an offensive mode, it is wise to take it seriously. There are no benign threats.
Q: Do you think the US and EU are doing enough in de-escalation? DAS Escobar and other EU’s representatives visited Kosovo and Serbia in mid-December. What is your comment on their way of addressing to tensions?
A: The US and EU have tried to appease Serbia by talking up the Association of Serb-majority municipalities. That appeasement has failed to produce moderation. Instead it has whetted Belgrade’s appetite. Brussels and Washington need a course correction.
Q: With all these developments, are you optimistic that spring will come with an Agreement or all of this will lead elsewhere?
A: I always hope to be wrong, but I see no prospect of an Agreement by spring. Serbia is playing the Milosevic/Putin game of threatening a neighbor. We know where that led in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Georgia, and Ukraine. How many lessons before we learn? Aggression needs a firm and effective response.
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