Tag: Balkans
A Balkans agenda for the lame duck
We are entering the final stretch before the US election. That means a lame duck period for lower priority parts of the world like the Balkans until January 20. Neither Kamala Harris nor Donald Trump is likely to say anything about the region before November 5. Even after Inauguration Day it will be some time before the new administration focuses on the Balkans.
We can guess their views
Harris’ views on the Balkans are unknown. But she has spent a career prosecuting criminals and defending equal rights. That likely tells you something about her attitude toward corruption and ethnonationalism. Trump is a corrupt white supremacist who tried to partition Kosovo while in the White House. If elected, he will no doubt empower Ric Grenell or his doppelganger to try again in Kosovo and Bosnia. Serbia has leverage on Trump. Jared Kushner has been looking for investment opportunities there.
What should the people at the State Department and in the White House do in this lame duck period? They should seek to correct the mistakes of the last three years, which have produced mainly diplomatic failure in the Balkans. The Biden Administration mistakenly focused on creating a statutory Association of Serb Majority Municipalities in Kosovo. In Bosnia, it rightly sought to disempower ethnonationalist politicians, but it succeeded mainly with Bosniaks. Those priorities condemned Biden’s Balkan policies to strategic defeat. They also alienated Kosovars and Bosniaks, America’s best friends in the region.
Here are a few ideas to correct course. Assuming that Harris will be elected, as I fondly hope, these thoughts aim to reduce the sway of ethnic nationalism. They would also increase the functionality of governance in still-fragile Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Some ideas
- Consult with Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti on a joint plan to establish beyond doubt his country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This should include an end to Belgrade intimidation of Serbs who join Kosovo security institutions and wider international recognition.
- Adopt as the official US stance conditional support for a nongovernmental Association of Serb Majority Municipalities. The municipalities themselves should form this Association consistent with the Kosovo constitution. The conditions should include Belgrade fulfillment of its obligations under the agreement in which Pristina agreed to the Association.
- Tell Belgrade publicly that it needs to produce accountability for the Serbian government malfeasance of last year. That includes the kidnapping of Kosovo police, rioting against KFOR, and the Banjska terrorist plot.
- Stop the bad-mouthing of Serbian environmentalists who oppose the Rio Tinto lithium plant. Start publicly criticizing corruption and growing autocracy in Belgrade.
- End the Bosnia High Representative’s intervention to reverse the European Court of Human Rights ruling in the Kovacevic case. The ECHR ruling promises a big step in reducing ethnic nationalist control of state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- Develop criminal charges in the US against the leading Serb and Croat advocates (Milorad Dodik and Dragan Covic) of ethnonational division in Bosnia.
There are some tall orders in this list. But the failure of three years of misguided US and EU diplomatic efforts suggests a dramatic turn is needed.
The resistance will be strong
Serbia’s President Vucic is committed to the “Serbian world” goal of governing Serbs in neighboring countries. He has succeeded in Montenegro. The government in Podgorica is under Serbia’s thumb. In Bosnia and Kosovo, only de facto partition can deliver success to Serbia. Belgrade will resist all the above moves, as will their proxies in the neighboring countries.
Belgrade is at risk of falling irreversibly under the influence of Russia and China. The US needs to counter that influence with sticks as well as carrots. The carrots only appeasement approach has failed. Here is the result:
The Americans will be far more effective at all of this if the EU and UK will act in tandem. The UK will likely follow a strong US lead. The EU may not follow right away, That makes another task for the lame duck interval: getting Brussels on board.
This is pandering, not diplomacy
The US and Europe have now teamed up to applaud the mining of lithium–needed mainly for electric vehicle batteries–in Serbia. The enthusiasm is over the top. German Chancellor Scholz was in Belgrade for the July signing of a Serbia/EU “strategic partnership” on sustainable raw materials, battery value chains, and electric vehicles. The US has likewise signed an agreement on US-Serbia strategic cooperation in the field of energy in Serbia.
Brussels and Washington intend these agreements to encourage commercial exploitation of Serbia’s lithium deposits, under a contract with the British-Australian firm, Rio Tinto. Institutional investors (that is mutual funds, banks, pension and hedge funds) control 58% of Rio Tinto. The single biggest shareholder (11% Google AI tells me) is the Aluminum Corporation of China.
Not quite right
That is the first hint that something is not right. Washington and Brussels do not usually support British or Australian firms, or firms whose single largest shareholder is Chinese. But both the EU and US appear to have decided that Serbia’s lithium deposits are a top priority for electric car batteries.
But are they? Here is one picture of known lithium resources around the world:
Serbia’s lithium deposits amount to 1.3% of the global total. The resources are distributed widely around the world, most in the Western Hemisphere. Lithium is a commodity traded in a worldwide market, like oil. Serbia’s production has no great significance in this global picture.
Nor is the future market for lithium a sure thing. Other technologies are in the research and development pipeline. Five or ten years from now lithium is unlikely to be the only economically viable technology.
Why then?
Why then are European and American officials tripping over themselves to encourage the development of the Serbian lithium deposits? Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kasanof has even suggested the lithium project could block the rise of ethnic nationalism in the Balkans. Meanwhile,
Here is a hint of what is really going on: US Ambassador Chris Hill told a debate in Belgrade on political options for the Western Balkans that many of the people protesting against plans to mine lithium in western Serbia support Russia.
Those protests are the most serious opposition movement still extant in Serbia today. Red-baiting (if we can still label Moscow as “red”) the demonstrators aims to undermine their impact. That is not the usual US position on environmental concerns. But the Rio Tinto project is a top priority for President Vucic. We can only imagine why. He has no doubt told the local diplomats that he will greatly appreciate their help in squelching the protests.
Let me be clear: I have no objection in principle to economic cooperation with Serbia, or to environmentally and financially sound production of lithium in Serbia or elsewhere. But I do object to European and American officials trying to squelch environmental and financial concerns to please an increasingly autocratic president.
Appeasement is the policy
The diplomatic pandering is part of a broader effort to appease Serbia, provide it with economic goodies, and convince it to turn westward. Let’s skip whether redbaiting legitimate environmental criticism reflects Western ideals. The bigger issue is whether this approach has any chance of working.
It is notable that in neither the European nor in the American agreements cited above does Serbia undertake to conduct its mining in an environmentally sound or financially transparent way. The State Department made it clear the US wants financial probity. The European agreement does likewise. But Belgrade didn’t commit to it in either agreement.
Serbia has aligned itself militarily and politically with Russia and China since Vucic became President, the recent purchase of French Rafale warplanes notwithstanding. Belgrade has also undertaken repeated efforts to destabilize northern Kosovo and to undermine the independence of Montenegro as well as the territorial integrity of Bosnia. The idea that Belgrade can be convinced to embrace the West is dumb. Vucic will take EU money and American political pressure on his environmental opponents, but neither will make him give up his affection for like-minded autocrats with irredentist ambitions.
Montenegro needs to right itself, now
Miodrag Vlahović, former Foreign Minister of Montenegro, writes:
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić should be gratified. Politicians close to him have finally become part of the 44th Government of Montenegro, Serbia’s neighbor to the southwest.
Others are not so pleased. The US Embassy in Montenegro has expressed concern that there are pro-Russian parties in the government. The EU Mission warns of hindrance to the European agenda. The new government uses European and NATO rhetoric, but their political practice and decisions follow the Belgrade-Moscow lead.
What happened
A Bosniak party enabled this governing coalition. It holds six ministerial mandates in the farcically cumbersome cabinet of Prime Minister Milojko Spajić. That is what it got to compensate for joining with parties that deny the Srebrenica genocide and treat war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić as heros.
The new government has the two-thirds majority (54 out of 81 deputies) needed to enact significant legal and constitutional changes. They will want to enable dual citizenship and enact changes that would eliminate the civic concept of Montenegrin society. Already political leaders are presenting themselves as “the only authentic representatives” of their ethnic group. The dysfunctional Bosnian model of governance, based on ethnic group rights, is the daydream of ethnic nationalists in Montenegro.
But that is only one dimension of the new political constellation. The government includes no one who identifies as Montenegrin. The shrunken opposition includes parties of a civic, European and democratic orientation, but American and European diplomats have deemed them not “reformed enough.”
What it means
Spajić will allegedly try to implement the official European agenda and Euro-Atlantic policy. He will be doing this in cooperation with declared opponents of NATO, advocates of lifting EU-required sanctions against Russia, and parties that want to realize Greater Serbia. Mission impossible, but therefore desirable from the commanding heights of Belgrade and Moscow.
These same parties of the governing coalition, including Prime Minister Spajić himself, naturally look with enthusiasm at the possibility of Donald Trump returning to the White House. That shows precisely how little they are really oriented towards Europe, which Trump despises.
The Western policy of appeasement towards Serbia has now handed Montenegro to Moscow. The Biden Administration wasted four years pushing the anti-European project known as “Open Balkans.” That has enabled Vučić to meddle not only in Montenegro but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, with inevitable negative implications for North Macedonia as well.
Deliveries of Serbian arms and ammunition to Ukraine and mammoth contracts for lithium exploitation in Serbia have made this possible. They are both an explanation and a verdict. The EU’s continuing financial support for Serbia, regardless of Belgrade’s other behavior, reveals its true intentions, which condemn the rest of the Balkans to instability.
What needs to be done
Montenegro is on the brink. The Bosniak party is in power with nationalist populists and chauvinists from the Serbian-Russian milieu. A coalition of three nationalist parties presided over the beginning of the 1992 war in Bosnia. The Bosniak leaders who join this coalition will enable threats to Montenegrin sovereignty and independence.
The opposition parties need to answer the question whether this is a “point of no return” for Montenegro. There will be no help from the West. That makes the task of the opposition urgent and dramatic. Montenegro needs to right itself, now.
Time for tough love in the Balkans
Friends in the Balkans wonder what the candidacy of Kamala Harris will mean for them. There is precious little direct evidence to go on. But some things are obvious. Biden’s withdrawal was no surprise. Nor was his endorsement of Harris. But her attitude towards the Balkans is anyone’s guess. Here is mine.
Extrapolating
Harris is a strong supporter of Ukraine’s struggle against the Russian invasion. She will want to see Kyiv win and Moscow lose. She won’t settle easily for partition. That attitude will likely transfer to the Balkans. I wouldn’t want to be the one telling a female, Black, and Indian President that people of different ethnicities can’t live together.
Harris is also hawkish on China, like Biden as well as Trump. Kosovo may look like Taiwan (and Ukraine) to her. That would mean it needs to be nurtured and defended from territorial claims by a former sovereign. She is unlikely to be sympathetic to the Association of Serb-majority Municipalities or the autonomy of Republika Srpska. Someone needs to advise her early and often that both are bad ideas.
Still extrapolating
This fall’s campaign and election in the US will be in large part about preserving liberal democracy, that is democracy based on equal individual rights protected by the rule of law. Those who want support from her Administration should be aligning themselves with that objective. Partitionists and ethnic separatists should take heed.
The Biden Administration has adopted a policy of appeasement towards Serbia. There is however no reason why Harris should continue it. President Vucic has oriented Belgrade eastward, aligning himself with China, Russia, and other autocracies, including Azerbaijan and Hungary. Serbian munition supplies to Ukraine are worth something, but they will likely flow for economic reasons even if the political soft soaping is ended.
Appeasement has manifestly failed. It is time for tough love. That’s something Harris’ hard-edged temperament will find amenable.
Who’s is charge?
While writing this post, I learned that Alexander Kasanof will be the deputy assistant secretary of state in the European bureau responsible for both the Balkans and public diplomacy. That combination is an innovation.
President Harris is unlikely to spend much quality time on the Balkans. People lower down in the bureaucracy count. Jim O’Brien will clearly remain engaged. I don’t know Kasanof, but his background in Ukraine may well be a plus for those who would like the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the current Balkan states reinforced. Besides, he is a Johns Hopkins/SAIS graduate. Let’s hope he knows about tough love. I wish him well!
Harris would be a solid candidate
I thought everything that could be said about President Biden’s poor debate performance last week had been said. Until I read my son Adam’s call for Biden to resign now. Caveat emptor: I’m his father. But he makes the case well. If Biden is too old to debate effectively, he is too old to govern. And his yielding the presidency to Vice President Harris would help her to gain traction after a late start. Her polling is already about as good as Biden’s, and incumbency would give her additional advantages.
A constitutional glitch
The glitch in this scheme is the 25th amendment to the US constitution. It requires a majority of both Houses of Congress to confirm nomination of a Vice President before s/he takes office. This looks doable in the Senate, where the Democrats have a slim majority.
But in the House of Representatives the Republicans have a slim majority. We can hope that at least a few Republicans would vote to confirm. But if they don’t Harris would presumably remain in the Presidency as “Acting” for a few months. Otherwise there is a real risk of discontinuity at the apex of the US government. That would not benefit no one.*
Harris’ record
As a California Senator, Harris voted the same way as Bernie Sanders 93% of the time. That puts her on the Democratic left. But prior to that she spent decades as a tough-on-crime prosecutor, albeit one who increasingly opposed charging minor crimes. As Vice President, she has been leading on reproductive rights, voting rights, and the southern border. None of those issues has provided triumphs, but her positions on them will solidify Democratic support. Republican criticism will be especially focused on southern border issues. The Republicans are trying to duck on abortion and voting rights, both of which they oppose.
Harris has also racked up more tie-breaking votes in the Senate than any other vice president in American history. That is more a reflection of the slim Democratic majority than any vice or virtue on her part. But it also means that her experience in Congress is longer than the four years she served as a Senator. And watching Joe Biden work the Hill since 2021 is excellent training.
Harris’ virtues
Harris has a lot of electoral virtues. She is clear-headed and would make mincemeat of Donald Trump in a debate. She is both Black (Jamaican) and Indian (Tamil Nadu) by parentage, married to a Jewish Second Gentleman. At 59 she looks considerably younger. She is a graduate of Howard University, a leading Black institution of higher learning in the US.
Shoring up Black support is an important Democratic objective for November. Harris will have an advantage in doing that. She is also a Californian, but that won’t help as its electoral votes a virtual certainty for the Democrats.
Foreign policy won’t weigh heavily in this election. But Harris was relatively early in calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. That could help her with Arab Americans. Their votes in Michigan and a few other states could be decisive. She has been stalwart and blunt in supporting Ukraine:
She stood in for Biden at Ukraine’s recent Peace Summit.
For my Balkan readers: there is no way Harris would support ethnic nationalist proposals for segregation by means of moving borders in the Balkans. I imagine the current Assistant Secretary of State for Europe, Jim O’Brien, would remain in place in a Harris administration.
Bottom line
There are still four months before the election. Harris would have immediate access to the resources of the Biden/Harris campaign. She could credibly take credit for the good things Biden has done, including on climate change, student loans, countering inflation, and job creation. Democrats could rally around her faster and easier than around one of the many other admittedly qualified aspirants. Harris is not a shoo-in, but she would be a solid candidate.
*This is wrong. I misread the 25th Amendment. The Vice President would become President on Biden’s resignation. It is a new Vice President who would have to be confirmed in Congress.
The Balkans are simmering
My ten days in the Balkans June 18-28 visiting Sarajevo, Skopje, Tetovo, and Pristina constituted my first trip there in more than five years. I’ll try to summarize my impressions/findings here. I won’t reveal sources and methods, but it is no secret that I have talked with prominent politicians in and out of power, government officials, diplomats, thinktankers, civil society people, and university professors and students. My focus is on the conflicts: are they over? getting worse? staying the same? metamorphizing?
Sarajevo is mostly looking good…
In Sarajevo I found the wars of the 1990s fading both in memory and in physical representation. The city shows few scars or even memorials from the siege of 1992-95. The young mayor is a woman better known for her work in academia than politics when the city council selected her. She and her family lived on the confrontation line during the war. The city is almost entirely restored, the confrontation line erased, and the metropolitan area significantly expanded, especially to Ilidza in the west. That is where the much-lauded Sarajevo School of Science and Technology resides (photo by DAVOR BILANDŽIĆ, a local guide, as I neglected to take one):
Serbs I talked with are living comfortably in the city. Many more are commuting from Republika Srpska to the east, where Bosniaks are also said to be buying apartments because they are cheaper. Bosniaks have even returned to Stolac in southern Bosnia, from which Croats ethnically cleansed them in 1993.
…but
But political life in Bosnia still revolves around ethnic identity. A big gap is opening between the society, where individuals speaking a more or less common language get along without much friction, and politics, which organizes and mobilizes around whether you are Serb, Croat, Bosniak (Muslim, whether religious or secular), or Other. The worst interethnic violence I heard cited was that someone had slashed tires on some Serbian-plated vehicles. Reprehensible, but not a war crime. It isn’t clear who did it, but it caused the Orthodox prelates to boycott the Inter-religious Council. The Catholic, Muslim, and Jewish members continue to meet.
Some pessimists suggest that the ethnic groups are just waiting for the next opportunity to slaughter each other. I hope that is not true, but we can’t be sure. The Dayton constitution under which the country is governed enshrines ethnic identity as a major factor in politics. Generations of living under that system has empowered ethnic nationalists, with consequences that could be catastrophic. Some think young people are even more nationalist than their parents. I find that hard to believe of the many 20- and 30-somethings noisily frequenting the bars in central Sarajevo until late at night, but that indicator may not reflect the rest of the country.
Skopje is restored too, but with a difference
In what is now officially North Macedonia, which never saw serious fighting in the capital, Skopje shows many signs of two conflicts that have plagued the country for decades. In 2014, the government launched a much-needed reconstruction of the center of the city. An ethnic nationalist government adorned it with grotesquely large statues of Greek heroes and a triumphal arch.
These monuments underlined the false claim that modern Macedonia, whose majority population is Slav rather than Greek, has roots in ancient history. That not only annoyed Greece but increased the sharp contrast between the mainly Macedonian part of the city and the more traditional other side of the river:
The construction of an Orthodox Church on the grounds of Skopje’s large, mainly Ottoman-era fortress remains stalled due to Albanian claims that the work is destroying an ancient Illyrian site. A colleague who has spent her career working on Macedonian/Albanian relations suggested to me that the “social distance” between citizens of different ethnicities is growing, due in part to separate schools, mutually incomprehensible languages, and little concern with inter-ethnic comity. But the politicians cooperate in coalitions that always include both Macedonians and Albanians. So the situation is the inverse of that in Sarajevo: the political class cooperates reasonably well, but ethnicity increasingly governs the society.
Pristina celebrates its own modern heroes
Pristina, which also suffered no widespread destruction, sports monuments to Kosovo’s conflict with Serbia. The monumental statues of Kosovo heroes, both nonviolent leader Ibrahim Rugova and Kosovo Liberation Army fighters, are prominent:
There are also now giant portraits of Kosovo’s former President Thaci and its former Parliament Speaker Veseli, both on trial in The Hague for war crimes. Statues of Bill Clinton and Madeleine Albright, who supported Kosovo in the 1990s, occupy prominent spots, and Bill Clinton Boulevard interests with (Senator) Bob Doll (sic) Street. The commercial bustle distracts attention from all these monuments and portraits, but they are not hard to find.
Nevertheless, Serbs now circulate safely and freely in Pristina, despite the still high interethnic tension in the northern four municipalities, which are majority Serb and contiguous with Serbia. Few young Albanians learn Serbian. Even fewer Serbs learn Albanian. Physical separation is the rule rather than the exception. Most Serbs live in Serb-majority municipalities. There is little political cooperation at any level.
Ambitions are similar…
In all three countries, I found similar government goals. Economic development is the top priority. Politicians in the capitals all agree that their citizens want jobs created and corruption reduced.
Kosovo’s prime minister is generally regarded as having clean hands. The country’s rule of law scores have been improving. But more than one person suggested that the administration lacks expertise and competence, both at the national and the municipal levels. The prime minister seems to his opponents to value loyalty more than capability.
The new prime minister in Macedonia is proud that the mayors from his political party who gained election two years ago have not garnered criticism for corruption. The party he inherited in 2017 was both broke and corrupt. He has rebuilt it and would be unlikely to welcome back his predecessor, who has fled to Hungary. The new government will include Albanians who have mostly been in opposition, displacing an Albanian party that had been in power for all but two of the past 12 years. That party had garnered a lot of criticism for arrogance and patronage.
…but Bosnia is different
In Bosnia, the situation is more complicated, as usual. The US has sanctioned the President of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb 49% of the country, for corruption, along with members of his family. The economy in much of the RS–which depends heavily on Russian financing–is moribund. Its eastern wing is depopulated. Corruption also plagues the main Croat nationalist political party, but evidence has proven hard to find. Its leader is careful not to leave his name on paper.
For reasons I find hard to fathom, the US and the international community High Representative preferred when they got a chance to torpedo the head of the main Bosniak party, not the Croat or Serb. The only explanation I heard was that its leader allegedly opposed meaningful state-building. A puzzling first choice for international ire, he is now in opposition but has maintained his command of a main Bosniak political party. The other two ethnic leaders are still on the target list.
Geopolitics heighten tensions
In all three countries, the US and EU are in competition with Russia and China. The Russian objective is to de-stabilize and thereby cause Washington grief. It does this using politicians in Belgrade, including the President, as proxies. Serbia seeks dominance of the Serb populations in neighboring countries. This “Serbian world” objective is a carbon copy of Putin’s “Russian world” that justified the invasion of Ukraine. The Chinese are looking to use the Balkans, especially Serbia, as a trade route into the EU, which is still the region’s (and Serbia’s) main trading partner.
The US declares that it wants to see all the countries of the Balkans in the Western camp. But Washington has turned a blind eye to Serbia’s definitive turn in the last couple of years towards the East. Belgrade happily takes weapons from Russia and investment from China. The EU claims to want all the states of the Western Balkans to become members, but that prospect is far off. In the meanwhile, Brussels fails to use sanctions and even verbal condemnation against those standing in the way of EU accession.
Macedonia in the middle
Moscow will be pleased with the new Macedonian government. It includes a deputy prime minister who is a vigorous Russophile, as well as two others close to Moscow. A Hungarian bank said to have Russian financing granted a 1 billion euro loan to the new government immediately after it was sworn in. The newly installed President has refused to use the country’s official name, North Macedonia. The 2018 agreement with Greece to use that name was a major EU achievement.
The new prime minister in Skopje is nevertheless at pains to emphasize his Western orientation, his ambition for EU membership, and North Macedonia’s fidelity to NATO membership. His Albanian coalition partners will insist on those points. A deputy prime minister can either be someone important or someone the prime minister wants to keep an eye on.
Macedonia’s biggest current international issue is with EU member state Bulgaria. Sofia is insisting that Skopje recognize in its constitution the fewer than 1000 citizens who identify as Bulgarians. The new prime minister campaigned against that. But he may be willing to do it in the final stage of EU accession, when the Bulgarians can’t afterwards raise additional issues. In the meanwhile, some optimists hope the Bulgarians will be willing to absent themselves from decisions on Macedonia’s accession process. That is what Hungarian Prime Minister Orban did on EU aid to Ukraine.
Bosnia is split, as always
The Russians will also be pleased with the current situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs and Croats there combine often to do things Moscow enjoys, including the defanging of the judicial system. The Europeans have been reluctant to use their considerable leverage in Bosnia, thinking that the accession process will fix everything. Brussels has not sanctioned the Serb leader, despite Washington pressure. Moscow seems ready to continue giving him money, with little prospect of ever getting it back.
The Bosniak and other participants in the current government of the 51% of the country they control in condominium with the Croats owe their position to the Americans. But they are a weak reed to lean on. While the Federation’s economy is doing better than that of the RS, its politics are still far from functioning at what we like to think of as a Western level.
Pristina is bandwagoning without benefits
Unlike Belgrade and the RS, the authorities in Pristina have no option to hedge their bets. Kosovo necessarily “bandwagons” (that’s the technical term) with NATO and the EU.
But the current prime minister is unhappy with Washington and Brussels for appeasing Belgrade. The results are felt keenly in the EU-sponsored and US-supported “dialogue” between Pristina and Belgrade. Kosovo wants Belgrade to withdraw a letter disowning an agreement on political normalization reached last year. Pristina asks that Serbia sign the agreement and transfer for trial the self-confessed organizer of a September 2023 terrorist plot. The prime minister has made these legitimate desires a condition for re-engaging in a dialogue that has produced precious little. That angers the EU and US, which see the dialogue as an end in itself, not just a means.
The result is anomalous. Kosovo is in the dialogue mainly to improve relations with the US and EU. But its conditions for participating are doing the opposite. This is not the first time Pristina has displeased its closest friends. Somehow it needs to find a way to make demands of Belgrade without alienating Brussels and Washington.
American leadership is decisive, but so too is European vigor
Most everyone I talked with recognized that America’s November election will be decisive for the Balkans. President Trump favored partition of Kosovo and will no doubt continue in that direction if re-elected. His willingness to surrender part of Ukraine to Russia will re-open the partition question in the Balkans.
Trump’s reliance on Serbophile Richard Grenell for advice on the Balkans and his son-in-law’s investment in Belgrade will guarantee support for Serbia’s ambitions. That would precipitate challenges to Serbia’s borders as well as Bosnia’s and perhaps Montenegro’s and Macedonia’s. Such challenges will spark violence, ethnic cleansing, and ultimately war. The simmering Balkans will boil over into instability, and even regional war if Trump gets another chance to pursue ethnic partition.
President Biden, while in my view too soft on Serbia, has maintained nominal support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the Western Balkan states. In a second term, he should correct course. He should give up on political normalization between Kosovo and Serbia, which is a bridge too far, and stiffen policy towards Serbia. He should also try to get past the Dayton constitution in Bosnia and pressure Bulgaria to postpone its hope for constitutional change in Macedonia.
The EU is appointing Estonia’s anti-Russian* prime minister as the new High Representative for foreign affairs. That will give Washington a stronger reed to lean on than the incumbent. He and his chief negotiator came from two countries, Spain and Slovakia, that do not recognize Kosovo. They both leaned towards appeasing Serbia. Kaja Kallas will be far more vigorous in countering Moscow’s influence. Biden will get along well with her. Trump won’t.
*A careful reader writes:
One small quibble – Kallas is not “anti-Russian,” she is anti-Kremlin or anti-Putin, or anti-Russian imperialism.
I accept that amendment.
